THE CIA: TIME TO COME IN FROM THE COLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020021-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 30, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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3 0 SEP 1974
( The aA: Time to Come In from the Cold
Question: "Under what international
law do we have a right to attempt to de-
stabilize the constitutionally elected gov-
ernment of another country?"
Answer: "! am not going to pass judg-
ment on whether it is permitted or au-
thorized under international law. It is a
recognized fact that historically as well
as presently, such actions are taken in
the best interest of the countries involved."
That blunt response.by President
Gerald Ford at his press conference last
week was either remarkably careless or
remarkably candid. It left the troubling
impression, which the Administration
afterward did nothing to dispel, that the
U.S. feels free to subvert another gov-
ernment whenever it suits American
policy. In an era of detente with the So-
viet Union and improving relations with
China, Ford's words seemed to repre-
sent an anachronistic, cold-war view of
national security reminiscent of the
1950s. Complained Democratic Senator
Frank Church of Idaho with consider-
able hyperbole: "Ut is] tantamount to
saying that we respect no law save the
law of the jungle."
The question on "destabilizing" for-
eign governments followed Ford's con-
firmation that the Nixon Administra-
tion had authorized the Central
intelli once Agency to wage an $8 mil-
lion campaign in 1970-73 to aid oppo-
nents of Chilean President Salvador
Allende's Marxist government (see box
page 21). Until last week, members of
both the Nixon and Ford Administra-
tions had flatly denied that the U.S. had
been involved in undermining Allende's
regime. They continue to insist that the
CIA was not responsible for the 1973
coup that left Allende dead and a re-
pressive right-wing junta in his place.
Congressmen were outraged by the
news that they had once again been mis-
led by the Executive Branch. More im-
portant, disclosure of the Chile opera-
tion helped focus and intensify the
debate in Congress and the nation over
the CIA: Has the agency gone too far in
recent years? Should it be barred from
interfering in other countries' domestic
affairs'? Where it has erred, was the CIA
out of control or was the White House
at fault for misdirecting and misusing
the agency? Should it be more tightly su-
pervised. and if so. by whom? In ad-
dition, the controversy spotlighted the
fundamental dilemma posed by an open,
democratic society using covert activity
-the "dirty tricks" or "black" side of in-
telligence organizations-as an-instru-
ment of foreign policy.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR WILLIAM E. COLEY
"There's nothing wrong with accountability."
At the center of the storm was Wil-
liam Egan Colby, 54, the CIA's director
for the past year. Shrewd and capable,
Colby has sought from the day he took
office as director to channel more of the
CIA's efforts into the gathering, evalu-
ation and analysis of information and
less into covert actions-the "operation-
al" side of the intelligence business. Says
he: "The CIA's cloak-and-dagger days
have ended."
Certain Actions. But obviously, not
quite. It was Colby who oversaw the last
months of the CIA activity in Chile as
the agency's deputy director for oper-
ations in 1973, though this operation ap-
parently ended shortly after he became
director. But it was also Colby who dis-
closed details of the covert action to a
closed hearing of the House Armed Ser-
vices Subcommittee on Intelligence last
April 22. A summary of his testimony
was leaked to the press two weeks ago.
By the time Ford met with the press.
Colby's revelations were more than a
week old; the President had been briefed
by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and doubtless was ready to field report-
ers' questions. Said Ford: "Our Govern-
ment, like other governments, does take
certain actions in the intelligence field
to help implement foreign policy, and
protect national security. I am informed
reliably that Communist nations spend
vastly more money than we do for the
same kind of purposes."
Since so much had already leaked
out, Ford perhaps had no choice but to
make an admission. But his statement
seemed to set no or few limits on clan-
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destine intervention in another country.; mittee launched a review of the testi Chilean coup. Now, he said, she won-
A somewhat sharper but still highly flex- mony and a probe into the Chilean' dered whether India might not be next.
ible limit was set afterward by Kissin affair. ' Many"Latin Americans shrugged; the
ger. He told TIME: "A democracy can; Anxious to heal the rift with Con- episode seemed to confirm their suspi-
engage in clandestine operations only gress, Ford and Kissinger briefed nine cions that the CIA invariably is behind
with restraint, and onlyin circumstanc-I senior Congressmen at breakfast the the continent's frequent upheavals-po-
es in which it can say to itself in good next day on Chile and covert affairs in litical and otherwise.
conscience that this is the only way to general. Later, at a previously scheduled Some cynical foreign reaction was
achieve vital objectives." hearing on detente, Kissinger reiterated not so much concerned with the CIA ac-
Moreover, there was an unsettlingly before the Senate Foreign Relations tivities themselves as with their becom-
disingenuous quality to Ford's words. Committee that the intent of the CIA op- mg known. Said a former President of
Was the intent of the Chilean opera
lion really to preserve freedom of the , eration in Chile was merely to keep the Argentina: "If you ask me as an Ar-
tion opposition alive and "not to de- gentine, the CIA intervention in Chile
press and opposition political parties, as i stabilize or subvert" his gaveinment. was wholly illegal interference in the
he insisted, or simply to undermine Kissinger also conducted two separate sovereignty of another state. If you ask
Allende? In this context, it is worth not- briefings at the Senate. Still, Congress me to see it from the point of view of an
ing that after the-coup, the U.S. did not was neither convinced nor mollified. As American, the fact that Senators and
object when the new military regime the week progressed, growing numbers Congressmen can interfere with the na-
banned all political parties and shut of Representatives and Senators called, tional security interests of the country l
down all opposition publications. for an all-out review of the CIA. for political motives indicates a grave
There were other disquieting notes.. the sFord described the op- The affair served to confirm all the decadence in the system."
in
eration as statement.
in the suspicions about the CIA and its The uproar recalled two earlier CIA
being "in the best interest pf, exaggerated image as a vast conspiracy. fiascos: the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961,
the people of Chile"-a throwback to Reaction abroad ranged from incredu- and the revelation in 1967 that the agen-
an America-knows-what's-best-for-you
lity to dismay. The London Times called cy for years had partly funded and ma-
offensive to many countries. In addition,
Ford did not make the small but cru-
cial distinction between intelligence
gathering and covert operations, which
led some critics to suspect that he was
not wholly familiar with the subject.
Misled Congress. There was a de-
gree of ingenuousness, perhaps even hy-
pocrisy, in much of the indignation,
since the CIA is widely known to have
carried out Chile-style operations else-
where before. What galled Congress and
many other U.S. and foreign leaders was
the fact that members of the Nixon Ad-
ministration had repeatedly misled Con-
gress about the Chile operation. At his
State, Kissinger assured the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee that since
197Q, the U.S. had done nothing in Chile
except try to "strengthen the democratic
political parties"-although critics ar-
gue that fostering strikes and demon-
strations amounted to a lot more than
that. During another hearing, then CIA
the revelations "a bitter draught" for nipulated the National Student Associ-
those who regard the U.S. as "sometimes ation and dozens of business, labor,'
clumsy, often misunderstood, but fun- religious and cultural groups. Both flaps
damentally honorable in its conduct of overshadowed the positive services that
international affairs." West Germany's the CIA had rendered before; there were,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung predict- demands for greater restraint by the CIA,
ed that "the disconcerting naivete with and closer control by the Executive
which President Ford enunciated his se- Branch, but no real changes came.
cret service philosophy" would have a The Chilean affair, however, poten
a"provocative"effect. tially has more lasting impact, for the
Grave Decadence. That was the agency has already been badly bruised
case in the capitals of the so-called Third by the Watergate scandals. Says Mich-
World. From New Delhi, U.S. Ambas- igan Representative Lucien Nedzi,;
sador Daniel Patrick Moynihan angrily
cabled the State Department that he had
assured Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
that the CIA had not been involved in the
Director Richard Helms was asked if
the CIA had passed money to Allende's
political opponents. Helms' response:
"No, sir." Former Assistant Secretary
of State for Latin American Affairs
Charles A. Meyer, former Ambassador
.to Chile Edward Korry and other Ad-
ministration officials gave similar testi-
mony, though they may not have known
about the operation.
The revelations, and Ford's confir-
mation of them, stunned many in Con-
gress. "Unbelievable," declared Demo-
cratic Senator Walter F. Mondale of
Minnesota. "Unsavory and unprinci
pled," said Church. Democratic Senator
Stuart Symington said that the disclo-
sure "certainly does not coincide with
the testimony that this committee [For-
eign Relations] has. received." The com-
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chairmar. of a House committee that
oversees the agency: "I don't believe that
"
the CIA will ever be what it was before
.
Agency officials have admitted that bolically into the CIA's seal: an eagle sig- lion-lots of it-knowing that he will
t l a inet domestic CIA ac- ten th and alertness and a eventually take some for himself. When
aws
a
f
g
espte
ytng s g
nt
tivity, they supplied one of the White compass rose representing the collection he gets dependent on it, you move in."?
House "plumbers," former CIA Employ of intelligence data from all over the; Once hooked, the recruit is given a lie
ee E. Howard Hunt, with bogus iden-, world. But as the cold war grew, so did detector test to discover his weaknesses.
tification papers, a wig, a speech-alter-.-the scope of the CIA's duties. The law,Continues Agee: "Then it all hangs out.,
ation device, and a camera in a tobacco provided that in addition to collecting He can go on serving you as a spy for
pouch. In addition, the agency provid-, information, the CIA was "to perform the rest of his life."
ed the White House with a psychological, such other functions and duties related) Americans usually learn of the agen-
profile of Daniel Ellsberg. to intelligence affecting the national se- c 's'covert actions only when they fail
criticism has come may from time to time direct." Under
cy's discomfiture
,
from disillusioned former CIA employ- that directive, the CIA actively began try-
.Tees. For two years, the agency struggled, ing to penetrate and even roll back the
and the Cult of Intelligence, whose prin- ter Communist influence in other coun-din 1961; the Chilean operation. Over the
cipal author is ex-CIA Officer Victor; tries. Its methods included support of years, there were successes for the CIA
Marchetti. The book accused the agen- pro-American political parties and in- as well: the 1953 coup that deposed Pre-
cy of using outmoded cold war methods dividuals, covert propaganda, economic mien Mohammed Mossadegh (who had'
and urged that it be prohibited from in- sabotage and paramilitary operations. nationalized a British-owned oil compa-
tervening in other nations' affairs under Under Cover. In theory, at least, ny and was believed to be in league with:
any circumstances (TIME, April 22). the station chiefs who head CIA offices Iran's Communist Party) and kept pro- I
Another critical book, Inside the overseas operate under the cover of some American Shah Mohammed Reza Pah-
Company: A C.I.A. Diary, will be pub- innocuous-sounding embassy job such asi lavi on the throne of Iran; the 1954 rev-
lished in London this January. In it Au- attache or special assistant. In practice, olution that overthrew the Communist-,
thor Philip Agee, who, after twelve years some chiefs are well known and some re- dominated government of President
of undercover exploits for the CIA in Lat- main under deep cover, depending on Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. The CIA
in America, switched to the side of the the nature of the country. In London, has been suspected of participating in
leftist revolutionaries he had been hired for example, practically anyone who is the 1967 military coup in Greece, the
to defeat, calls the CIA "the secret po- interested can learn the identity of the capture and killing in 1967 of Cuban
litical police of American capitalism.". CIA station chief; his arrival was even, Revolutionary Che Guevara in Bolivia,
On the contrary, CIA directors have - disclosed in the Manchester Guardian. and the 1970 overthrow of Prince No-
secret. Examples: the U-2 incident in
1960, when the Soviets shot down the
spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Pow-
maintained since the agency's founding
27 years ago last week that clandestine
actions constitute only a small part of
CIA activities. Indeed, over the years, the
agency has provided a huge volume of
reliable analysis and intelligence data
that has served in part as the basis for
U.S. defense and foreign policies. But
Marchetti reports that the CIA devotes
two-thirds of its annual budget (which
totals around $750 million) and some
6017c to 70% of its estimated 5,000
overseas employees to clandestine
operations.
That evidently was not the intent of
Congress in creating the CIA and giving
it almost complete autonomy to safe-
guard its secrecy. Originally the agen-
cy's principal task was to gather Intel-
ligence and keep the Government
informed about other countries, partic- was money. He describes the CIA meth-i
ularly the Communist nations. od of snaring an agent: "You start out,
,11 Oa,5Uia, ?.~ ~,.~~..,...,.u,.. ? ....,...... 7 - . .,... --- ... .
well known but, by tacit agreement, nev- The CIA was deeply involved in the!
er publicized by reporters. In politically war in Southeast Asia. Starting in 1962,
turbulent countries, the identity of the) it organized and equipped an army in
station chief is a closely guarded secret. Laos to fight the Communist Pathet Lao.
Warns one U.S. ambassador in South The army, which grew to 30,000 men,
America: "If he is named, he will have costs the U.S. at least $300 million a
to be recalled or his life won't be worth year, but Colby credits it with having
a nickel." prevented a Communist takeover.
The extent of their duties also var-, Prison Camps. The chief justifica-
ies widely. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, J for CIA operations is that the other
the CIA operatives are all ears but not side is doing the same-and more. Com-
hands, their activities confined to mon- munist powers have an advantage over
itoring radio broadcasts from the main Western democracies. Communist gar-
land, interviewing refugees and other in-i ties can be directed from Moscow or
formation gathering. other Communist centers (although in
By his own less than impartial ac-' recent years many have become more
count, Agee's main function for the CIA1 independent) but take the guise of local
was to recruit agents in Latin America. political movements. Moreover, Com-
In nearly every case, he says, the lure munist dictatorships without inquisitive
legislatures or press can organize and
C O6t ES SCHLESINGER
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finance secret operations in other coun-
tries in a way that no open society can.
Unlike American leaders, Communist
leaders never acknowledge such activ-
ities. The Soviet Union's KGB, headed
by Yuri Andropov, regularly runs what
the Russian bureaucrats call aktivniye
meropriyatiye (literal translation: active
measures). The KGB's budget is un-
known, but it has about 300,000 employ-
ees, many of.them assigned to domestic
duties like operating the vast network
of prison camps. Overseas, a majority
of the Soviet embassy personnel are KGB
officers.
p
e,
agreed to
e o
Teren
peak at a
c
?????
n tale CIA and co-
are better known than its successes. The of the CIA's Far East division in Wash- vert actions, which was sponsored in
organization apparently no longer com- ington. He returned to Saigon in 1968IWashington, D.C., by the Center for Na-
mits political assassinations abroad, but to take charge of the pacification effort,,;tional Security Studies. When associates
it does try to subvert or overthrow un- which included the notorious Phoenixwarned that he would be up against a
friendly governments-as in the Congo program. By 1971, Phoenix had caused'stacked deck, Colby shrugged: "There's;
1966
(now 7aire) in 196'2 and Ghana i
n
In Mexico, authorities uncovered a KGB-
sponsored guerrilla group in 1971. Just
last week officials in Belgrade disclosed
an unsuccessful Soviet attempt to set up
a pro-Moscow underground party in Yu-
goslavia. Moreover, the KGB's Disinfor-
mation Department tries to sow suspi-
cion abroad by circulating false ru-
mors and forged. documents. A case in
point: the KGB campaign now going on
to convince Indians that American ex-
change scholars and Peace Corps vol-
unteers are actually CIA agents.
Communist China's equivalent of
the CIA and KGB is so secret that the Chi-
nese are believed not to even have a
name for it. Among Western Sinologists,
it is known as the Chinese Intelligence
Service and is believed to be part of the
foreign ministry's information depart-
ment. The services primary job is to sift
intelligence data from members of Chi-
nese embassies and overseas news cor-
irdnsuk'tw or dirty tricks. "I'd call hint
an enlightened cold warrior," says a CIA
officer. "But remember that this busi-
ness is cold." In 1971, Colby went back
to the CIA labyrinth in Langley, Va.
His private life-style matches his
professional modesty. Father of four (a
fifth child died last year), he lives in-
conspicuously in an unpretentious house'
in suburban Maryland. He does not
smoke, drinks only an occasional gin.
and-tonic or glass of wine, and is a de-
vout Catholic. His favorite recreations
are sailing and bicycling.
Since taking over as director, Colby
has tried to reform the CIA's operations
and rehabilitate its reputation. To woo
support, he has made a point of being
most of his adult years in the world of more open and candid than his prede-
spies. Son of a career Army colonel, he censors. He has in effect undertaken a
is a Princeton graduate who worked for task that to many seems self-contradic-
the Office of Strategic Services during tory: to be open about operations that
World War II. In 1943 he-parachuted by definition must be secret. Who ever
into France to join a Resistance outfit. !heard of an espionage chief being pub-
Later, he headed a unit that was dropped licly accountable? So far this year, Colby,
into Norway to sabotage a railway line, and other CIA officials have testified be-'
Mustered out as a major, Colby fore 18 congressional committees on 30
earned a law degree from Columbia. He occasions. Colby estimates that he has
practiced law in New York until the Ko- I talked with 132 reporters in the last year,
organization to the oss, the CIA. After He has also made more public
serving in Stockholm and Rome, he was.speeches than any previous CIA direc-
named CIA station chief in Saigon in tor. Recently, for exam
he
l
the deaths of 20,587 Viet Cong mein-nothing wrong with accountability."I
bers and sympathizers, according to Col The conference was dominated by crit-
by's own count. He explains, however, ics like Ellsberg, who harangued Colby
that when he took over, a year after the for 20 minutes, and Fred Branfinar of
program began, he "laid stress on cap-. the Indochina Resource Center, who ac-
turing rather than killing." In discussing cused the director of telling "outrageous
the victims, he claims that "87% were lies." Colby kept his temper.
killed by regular military in skirmishes." With Colby's encouragement, elev-'
To all outward appearances, Colby
respondents, who act as secret agents.
The Chinese Communist Party, howev-
er, does funnel funds to revolutionary
groups abroad, particularly in Asia and
Africa. From time to time, Chinese co-
vert operations also have failed spectac-
ularly. In 1965, Indonesia reacted to
China's attempt to sponsor a revolution,
in the archipelago by butchering tens
of thousands of Communists.
Phoenix Program. Few men un-
derstand better these clashes of,anon-
ymous armies on darkling plains or are
more practiced in the covert arts than
the CIA's William Colby, who has spent'
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AGENCY HEADQUARTERS (INSET: CIA SEAL)
An end to cloak-and-dagger days?
en agency analysts, wearing lapel tags ligence work less of a semiautonomous
labeled CIA, attended the recent Chica-ithmk tank and more of an appendage
go convention of the American Polit- of the NSC and the White House.
ical Science Association. Explains Gary Many skeptics view Colby's green-
Foster, the agency's coordinator for ac- mg of the CIA, his assurances of reform
ademic relations: "We wanted to dem- and restraint (see interview page 18) as
onstrate that we are a functioning, bona deceptive. They think these steps are de-
fide research organization." In addition, signed merely to enable "the firm" (as
Colby has permitted the agency's an- it is sometimes known) to carry on busi-
alysts to.publish articles in scholarly and ness as usual. But Colby clearly realizes
popular journals under their own names that he faces a serious questioning of the'
and CIA titles. At the same time, how- agency's purposes and function, which
ever, Colby has lobbied in Congress for is closely related to America's view of
a bill that would make unauthorized dis- its own role in the world.
closures of CIA activities by past and pre-, In the postwar era, covert action
sent employees a criminal offense. The seemed eminently justifiable on the
bill is now bottled up in committee. If it grounds that the U.S. was in a mortal
is enacted, ex-CIA employees like Mar- struggle with the Communist world.
chetti and Agee would risk jail for ex-, Now that the cold war has abated and
posing the agency's secrets. Communism is no longer a monolith,
An Appendage. Above all, Colby many scholars, diplomats and congres
has taken steps to reduce covert actions sional leaders favor ending the CIA's co
and direct more of the CIA's energies vert operations altogether, leaving it an
back to its original mission of intelli- intelligence-gathering agency.
gence gathering. Spies still have a role No Secret. The reasons are both
in the modem CIA, but the U.S. now de- moral and practical. Says Richard N.
pends less on men and more on satel- Gardner, an international-law specialist
lites, high-altitude reconnaissance air- at Columbia University: "Dirty tricks
craft like the SR-71, and equipment that have always been immoral and illegal.
intercepts rival nations' secret commu- Now they also have outlived their use-
nications. Such technical advances' fulness." Former Ambassador to the So-
make the CIA highly successful in cot- viet Union George Kennan disapproves
lecting military and other strategic of covert operations as "improper and
information. undesirable." But he also disapproves for
Even so, Kissinger complained pragmatic reasons: "The fact that we
throughout Nixon's first term that CIA can't keep them secret is reason enough
assessments of the state of the world, to desist." U.C.L.A. Soviet Specialist Ro-
which were prepared by the agency's man Kolkowicz argues: "The track rec-
Board of National Estimates, were un- ord is deplorable. By and large, these
focused and useless for policymaking. operations have been a series of disas-
Last year Colby abolished the twelve ters." Adds Eugene Skolnikoff, director
member board and replaced it with ex- of M.I.T.'s Center for International
perts assigned to a country or region. Studies: "The resulting scandals provide
Now they periodically make concrete grist for attacks on the U.S., retroactive-
recommendations through Colby to the ly validate charges-true or false-that
National Security Council. The result the U.S. makes a habit of overthrowing
has been to make the CIA in its intel- governments, and even exacerbate do-
mestic distrust of public officials."
CIA would unwisely limit the President's
freedom of action.
Last week Democratic Senator!
James M. Abourezk of South Dakota,
sponsored legislation that would prohib-
it the CIA from "assassination, sabotage,
political disruption or other meddling in
a nation's internal affairs, without the
approval of Congress or the knowledge
of the American people." That propos-
al is unlikely to be enacted because most
Congressmen believe that restricting the
Further, says William Bundy, for-
mer CIA officer and now editor of For-
eign Affairs: "The last thing in the world
that is ever going to disappear is Soviet
covert activities of a political nature. To
say detente stops them is grossly naive."
Thus Bundy argues that the U.S. should
not be precluded from covert actions,
but should not use such actions as ex-
tensively as in the 1950s. Bowdoin Col
lege Provost Olin Robinson, an author-
ity on intelligence organizations in
democratic societies, agrees: "Unless
you've got a cast of world characters who
are willing to play by a certain set of
rules, you're going to have covert op-
erations." In other words, the CIA should
be left the capacity for covert action but
forbidden to use it except in tightly re-
stricted circumstances.
Colby himself believes that more
stress on intelligence gathering will
make it less likely that various situations
will develop into crises; the occasions
where covert action might be considered
would thus be reduced. But he main-
tains that to prohibit the CIA from con-
ducting any covert actions would "leave
us with nothing between a diplomatic
protest and sending in the Marines."
Ideas vary about what limits should
be set. Harry Howe Ransom, professor
of political science and an intelligence
KGB BOSS YURI ANDROPOV
Rumors and forgeries.
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COLBY & HIS WIFE BARBARA IN THEIR SUBURBAN MARYLAND HOME isIlation, and both times the bills were!
An unusuoWegree of openness and candor. I - soundly defeated Last week Republican'
_ his warning reflects widespread concern Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tea-;
specialist at Vanderbilt University, be- that the CIA may be too independent. Senators
lieves that "covert operations represent The CIA takes its orders from the nessee and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. of Con-,
an act just short of war. If we use them,: 40 Committee, which has existed under necticut made another attempt. Their,
it should be where acts of war would oth-; ' bill would create a committee of House,
various names since 1948. It screens ev-
supervise and,
the members
erwise be necessary." Ransom would ery proposal for clandestine activity. and Senate
cm,-and all other membersl
permit covert actions only when U.S. se-'Chaired by Kissinger, the committee is regulate the
the U.S. intelligence committee.
curity is clearly in jeopardy. William made up of Colby, Deputy Secretary of
T.R. Fox, professor of international re- State Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Sec- Possible Leaks. Its chances of pas-
lations at Columbia University, would, retary of Defense William P. Clements sage are rated better than even, because
additionally permit them "to undo the, Jr., and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the storm over the CIA and because
spread of Hitler and other like govern- . General George S. Brown. In his book, the bill was referred to reform-minded
ments." Dean Harvey Picker of Colum- Marchetti describes the committee as a Sam Ervin's Government Operations;
bia's School of International Affairs rubber stamp that is predisposed to give Committee. But the bill may yet be de-
would allow clandestine operations to the CIA what it wants. But others say , feated. Even many members of Congress
prevent nuclear war. As Senator Church believe that they should not be entrust-
that the committee frequently rejects or ed with CIA secrets because of points out, however, the "national se-1 orders revision of CIA proposals. More- possible,
curity considerations must be compel- over, recommendations for major covert leaks. The alternative is to keep Con-
ling for covert action to be justified. For gress uninformed, which seems equally
his part, Colby declines to say under actions like the Chile operation require unacceptable.
what precise circumstances he would fa presidential approval. Whatever the degree to which Con-
vor Congress's supervision of the CIA is
covert action. gress can be informed-and even crit-
inadequate; in some respects, it is a
Many critics who concede the need ics of the CIA concede that it is tricky
for covert action in some cases never- myth. A Senate subcommittee headed for legislators Mississippi irregularly to be in on the decision-
theless propose two other reforms: by conservative Democrat hnd Stennis has making of an espionage agency-there
,
separating intelligence gathering from is a clear necessity for Congress to hold
covert operations and 2) tighter control.almost no staff. Member Symington the Executive more accountable for
Most experts doubt that "dirt, that, from the U-2 incident what the CIA does.
tricks" can be separated from intellito the Chile affair, the subcommittee has To some extent, the dilemma over
gence gathering. Explains Richard Bis- known less about CIA activities than the the CIA has to do with an American need
sell, onetime head of CIA covert oper- press. A House subcommittee chaired to have it both ways: the U.S. wants to,
ations: "The gathering of information by liberal Democrat Nedzi meets more be (and to see itself as) a morally re-
inevitably edges over into more active often, but he looks on his responsibility sponsible country and yet function as a functions, simply because the process of, "as making a determination as to wheth- great power in an immoral world. As
making covert contacts with high-rank- er or not the cu has acted legally, after Bowdoin's Robinson puts it, "There is;
ing officials of other nations gives the or during the fact." Thus no one in Con- an inevitable tension between an orga
U.S. influence in them." To eliminate, gress knows in advance about potential- nization like the CIA and a democratic
that problem, the U.S. could run two ly controversial CIA operations. Coro- society. From time to time there will be
separate agencies. Bissell claims that I plains Democratic Representative Mi- pulling back when the organization may
this idea was found to be impractical i chael J. Harrington of Massachusetts: have gone too far." The U.S. has reached,
by both Britain and Germany in World' "There is a studied inclination in Con- such a point with the revelations about,
War II because agents kept "running gress toward noninvolvement, superim- its actions in Chile. which, on balance,'
into each other." i posed on a pattern of deference toward are hard to justify. While it cannot rule1
The case for closer surveillance is I the Executive Branch. If the Executive out covert operations in all circumstanc-
. much stronger. Says Kolkowicz: "En- is in the dock, you have got to put the es, the nation must remember that it has
trusting covert operations to a secretive Congress in there too-and firmly." better and stronger weapons to rely on:
agency lacking effective supervision More than 200 times in the past two its economic and technological weight,
amounts to leaving policy to faceless bu- decades, Congressmen have sponsored its diplomacy, its cultural impact and
reaucrats whose judgment is question- bills and resolutions calling for more ef- -though tarnished-its freedom.
able." Although somewhat exaggerated, fective supervision of the CIA. At least
twice, Congress has voted on such leg
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Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020021-0