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December 22, 2016
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August 9, 2011
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September 29, 1974
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 RADIO TV REPORTS. INC. FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM Firing Line STATION WETA TV PBS Network DATE September 29, 1974 10:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C. STAT WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY: The argument rages over the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in" Chile during the Allende years. Critics focus on two situations. The first is the apparent contradiction. On the one hand, CIA Director William Colby apparently testified in secret to a congressional committee that the..CIA had been authorized to spend up to $8 million to prevent Allende from being inaugurated, and in the event he was inaugurated, to destabilize his regime. But meanwhile, two government officials had testified before another committeeof Congress that the CIA had done nothing to interfere in Chilean affairs. Now there is talk of bringing action against these two officials, charging them at least with contempt of Congress. The other situation inflamed by the CIA-Chilean development is the continuing question of the covert responsibilities of the CIA. There are those who desire to punish the American State Department officials, but mostly to deny to the CIA any further license to engage in covert activity. One of the Americans under fire is Edward Korry. He was our ambassador to Chile during the critical years, from 1967 through the election of Allende in 1970 to the end of the first year of Allende's term in 1971. Mr. Korry had been ambassador to Ethiopia, appointed there by President Kennedy. He is, however, in real life a journalist. A graduate of Washinqton & Lee with advanced training in Harvard, he was a foreign correspondent with NBC, then with United Press. Before being discovered by Kennedy, he was European editor for Cowles Magazine. Since leaving Chile, he has served as President of the Association of American Publishers and as President of the United Nations Association. He is now engaged in writing a book about Chile. O,j I should like to begin by asking Mr. Korry whether OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON. 0. C. ? LOS ANGELES ? NEW YORK ? DETROIT ? NEW ENGLAND ? CHICAGO Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 he acknowledges the truth of CIA Director William Colby's revelations. EDWARD KORRY: I should, I think, Mr. Buckley, first cla4fy the point about the time period to which Mr. Colby is referring. His testimony concerned 1970 to '73, and in a letter to The New York Times he has also denied that he ever used the term destabilization in his testimony. I left Chile in October '71, more-than two years before the end of this period. Therefore, I'm in no position to. comment about that time over which the furor is going on right now. BUCKLEY: Excuse me, but there's some furor going on about something that allegedly happened while you were there. KORRY: Right. Now as far as to what I testified -- and the Senate subcommittee has now, told the-full Foreign Relations Committee that I testified truthfully and that the only thing they accused me --:that is, the staff accuses hie of having done -- is refusing to testify as to the specific actions that the CIA took in Chile, or as to the instructions that I got from the Executive Branch of the government while ambassador. I did not deny in my testimony that there was an anti-Communist CIA program in Chile in 1970. They cited a specific amount. I said simply that I was under oath not to speak about the specifics of any CIA program, that that was the unique obligation of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. And then they called the then-Director, Mr. Helms, to testify. Those are the objective facts. BUCKLEY: Well, there is nothing, so far as I know, that is grounds for believing that William Colby reported falsely to this congressional committee. It seems to me for him to have reported falsely, something of this nature would be an admission against -- very much against [unintelli- gible] interests, and therefore one simply proceeds on the assumption that while you were ambassador, the CIA was spending money trying to bribe members of the Senate in Chile to get them to cast their votes against Allende. ?.KORRY: No. Excuse me. I testified under oath, and I repeat it now, and I call your attention to the fact that the subcommittee has now concluded that I told the truth, that there was no attempt at any time to bribe any member of the Chilean Congress. Now the reason that I could testify to that effect 00621 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 and the reason that I do not challenge anything that Mr. Colby may have said -- and I have no idea what he actually said, because Mr. Harrington, the member of the Congress from Massachusetts, has only referred to what he read from the transcript but was not allowed to take notes about, so his errors may be unavoidable due to the complexity of the testimony by Mr. Colby. But in any event, whatever may have been authorized by the so-called 40 Committee for the CIA to do, it was not done insofar as it applied to any bribery attempt of the Chilean Congress. Now the reason for this distinction is that the Chilean Congress was going to meet in the last week of October of 1971 to decide whether to confirm Mr. Allende... BUCKLEY: '70. KORRY: Of '70, I beg your pardon, of 1970 -- to decide whether to confirm Dr. Allende's election as President or to indulge in the constitutional alternative that they have to select the runner-up. In late September of that year, a month before that vote, I reported to Washington that there was no possibility of any kind that Dr. Allende would not be confirmed as President, that I wanted to return to Washington to discuss what policy we should carry out with Dr. Allende as President of Chile, and I further warned gratuitously that if anyone in Washington were to be thinking for any reason of a United States intervention, direct or indirect, to bar Allende from the presidency, they should be fully aware that the consequences would be worse than the Bay of Pigs, both in Chile and in the United States. BUCKLEY: Okay. Now what that tells us is that you were opposed to any attempt to prevent the installation of Allende. .ghat it doesn't quite tell us is whether your advice was followed. KORRY: No. I would say that if that is the impression I give, I wish to correct it. I was dead set against Dr. Allende as a candidate and everything that he stood for. And I must say that the professionals in the embassy, the foreign service officers, and I were in total unanimous agreement as to what Allende would do as President of Chile and what its effects would be on United States interests, particularly outside of Chile and outside of Latin America. Our reports of that period looked more like a description written after the fact, after the death of Allende than as a forecast, if read today. And Dr. Allende knew my position. I discussed 00622 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 it with him after he became President, as a matter of fact. I was against an attempt by the United States to get itself involved in an intervention against Allende to keep him out of office. I would have welcomed -- and I testified to this before the Senate subcommittee and I told any American newspaperman who was there at the time -- I would have gladly welcomed the Chilean Congress voting to keep him out of office or the Chilean people doing whatever they wished. I was against the United States doing it. BUCKLEY: Mr. Korry, you speak with your renowned lucidity on all matters, but you haven't yet told me whether you had personal knowledge that the CIA didn't attempt to accomplish that which you would not have attempted to accomplish but which you would have welcomed the happening of. KORRY: In my time? BUCKLEY: Yeah. KORRY: No. BUCKLEY: Okay. Your answer is no what? KORRY: Well, I my time I have knowledge that they did not try. BUCKLEY: You have knowledge that they did not try. KORRY: To the best of my reportorial capacity... BUCKLEY: Okay. That's very important. KORRY: ..to find out, I have knowledge that in my time they did not try. BUCKLEY: Okay. That leaves three alternative possibilities: Colby said something which in fact was not true, not intending it, but because his memory slipped. Or what he said was misreported by Michael Harrington when Michael Harrington read the transcript and then relied on his memory. Or they actually sent down a CIA agent and said, "For God's sake, don't tell Ambassador Korry what you're up to, but try slipping a few hundred grand to the senators." KORRY: We did not try that. It wasn't tried... BUCKLEY: You said to the best of your reportorial 00623 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 ability... KORRY: No, no, but the Senate subcommittee has now, in its wisdom, decided that there is a distinct difference between authorizing funds and deciding to spend them or not to spend them. What I am saying is that... BUCKLEY: That we did authorize them, but didn't spend them. KORRY: Did not spend them. BUCKLEY: Ah. Okay. KORRY: Never did. BUCKLEY: Okay. KORRY: That's the point -- for that purpose. BUCKLEY: The 40 Committee, as you know, is not the most widely known outfit in America, but it is an organization, I take it, that has the authority to do things like that. It has the authority to say, "Slip this hot American money into the hands of foreign legislators and see if we can't get them to do what we want to do." Right? KORRY: Uh-huh. BUCKLEY: Now who set up the 40 Committee? KORRY: Well, the 40 Committee was in existence, under a different name, when I came into government under President Kennedy. BUCKLEY: What was it called then? KORRY: I am not certain of this, but the last label that it had before it became the 40 Committee, I think, was the 303 Committee. BUCKLEY: Yeah. Now before the 303 Committee it was called what? KORRY: I'm not certain. BUCKLEY: Aha. Now the purpose of the 40 Committee, I take it, is to remove from the exclusive authority of the CIA decisions as sensitive as those we're now discussing, right? KORRY: That is correct. BUCKLEY: So who belongs in the 40 Committee? 00624 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 KORRY: Well, at the time that I was in Chile, Dr. Kissinger, as the effective head of the National... BUCKLEY: Ex officio, or because he was Kissinger? KORRY: Because he was the National Security Council BUCKLEY: Ex officio, uh-huh. So Bundy would have been his predecessor. KORRY: Bundy would have been his predecessor. But let me say that prior to my time in Chile and throughout my 4 1/2-plus, 4 1/2 years in Ethiopia, I didn't know of the existence of it. So I would not really be in a position to tell you who was on it or not at that time. Secondly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, through his undersecretary, the Secretary of State, through his undersecretary, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. And Mr. Kennedy had his brother Robert, as Attorney.. General, attend it. And Mister... BUCKLEY: Is it up to the President to decide who sits in the 40 Committee? KORRY: I believe he has that...' BUCKLEY: It's not a statutory committee, then. KORRY: I do not think so. BUCKLEY: Aha. Are there any representatives of the Congress in it? KORRY: None. BUCKLEY: Aha. Now do I understand, then, that -- suppose you, surveying the Allende situation, had gone back to Washington, as in fact you did, and suppose you had said, "The installation of Allende is so close that there's really just one or two guys who can make the difference. And since we all desire that Allende should be frustrated, let's have a whack at these two guys." We all know, for instance, that Willy Brandt most probably bribed the critical member of the legislature in West Germany, resulting in his becoming Prime Minister. This seems to be now an accepted story. So that it isn't all that unusual. I'm asking you to reflect on the general question 00625 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 of-'the ethics of using American money thus to interfere in the development of the politics of another country. KORRY: The principle had been well established and practiced for so many years that it was taken as a matter of course. One of the difficulties in trying to arrive at an objective view of the issue today is to try to apply the values of the period to the event rather than the hindsight values to that event. When I was being briefed to go to Chile in 1967 in October, September or October 1967, I was told, not asked, by well-known reporters of our leading media outlets, by congressmen, senators and their staffs of the very large United States role in the elections of 1964 in Chile, that is, the large effort mounted covertly... BUCKLEY: In behalf of Frei against Allende. KORRY: ...against Allende. All of these people presumably have known all about this, and indeed the staff of the Senate subcommittee that is making all these allegations spoke to me gratuitously about their knowledge of this in private. So they knew, and presumably Senator Church, who is the chairman of that subcommittee, is not being kept in the dark. by his own staff. BUCKLEY: Although that may be. KORRY: It is possible; it is possible. In any event, it was an open secret in Washington, but for 10 years, to this date, nobody has written about that. It was known, for example, when I testified in front of the Senate subcommittee in '73 and when I was interrogated by them privately in '72 that the 40 Committee was in being. And indeed in public testimony they cited it, asked me about it, and they knew, for example, that the Attorney General of the United States, both in the Kennedy period and in the Nixon period, were participating in those meetings, and that hasn't been talked about, although privately I've asked members of the press why it hasn't been talked about. Those were the policies that Presidents had been carrying out, to my knowledge, since the end of the war and had in their deliberative wisdom decided that this was in the interest of the United States. And no one has suggested that I carried out any policy that was not approved by this Executive Branch committee or that we were deviating in any way from known policy, that is, a policy that was directed against the Communist Party of Chile, which.happens to be QO6i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 the largest -- happened to be. It's been eliminated now, with the conditions in Chile, as a legal party. But it was the largest, best led, most influential single Communist Party in this hemisphere. And it was American policy to keep it out of power. BUCKLEY: Well now, how do you account for the fact that Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan in India, when he picked up the dispatches and saw the revelations of the last week or two, should have cabled the State Department expressing his huge dismay at learning that the CIA was involved in Chile, because he had just finished assuring India, or Gandhi, that we weren't involved? And now, says he, he's lost his credibility and they're going to make atom bombs and all that kind of stuff. Now if all these things were an open secret, why was it a closed secret to an ambassador who, as a matter of fact, presides over the largest embassy in the world in New Delhi? KORRY: It was an open secret in 1967, when Pat Moynihan was engaged in domestic affairs, and it is possible, perhaps even likely, that he was not part of this open secret circle. Secondly, I assume that rather than ask the Indians or talk to the United States about the Indian role in, say, Bangladesh, in the events that preceded Bangladesh or in the takeover of Sikkim right now and its incorporation into India, that it's better to go on record with your own dismay so that you retain some credibility. BUCKLEY: I see. In other words, this simply may have been a gesture calculated to pacify his critics in New Delhi. KORRY: And to keep his credibility as a human -- as an individual representative with the Indian Government and intellectuals. BUCKLEY: Uh-huh, uh-huh. Although it's kind of hard on you, isn't it? KORRY: Not really. 11 BUCKLEY: No really, uh-huh. Well now, so there you are;'you've gone back to Chile and we haven't tried to bribe them and Allende does become President. KORRY: That's right. ?062 7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 BUCKLEY: It is now charged that money was authorized, and perhaps you will tell us whether it was spent, to oppose Allende. They used the general term destabilize. You reject it. KORRY: I didn't reject it. Mr. Colby has in BUCKLEY: Mr. Colby has in a letter, yeah. But we all know that Allende came up to the United Nations and he went all over Europe shortly before he died and said that the reason Chilean Marxism was running into such special difficulties was not Marx, but the United States, that we were always there to prevent Chile from getting that fair shake it would have gotten, except for the omnipresence of the American economic gnomes. What is your comment to that? KORRY: If I may back up, the United States had three policy choices that it laid out at the time that we considered this seriously, just before Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress in October 1970. These three choices were: To seek to have a modus vivendi with him, get along with him as best we could and to try to accommodate him. Two, to have what was called a correct but minimal relationship with him. And third was to seek to isolate. and to hamper him. Now the President of the United States and the entire foreign policymaking process in the United States came down on number two -- correct but minimal. But in point of fact we carried out all three, and to the surprise of Mr. Nixon and others, we began with number one, that is, to seek an accommodation. BUCKLEY: Under your supervision. KORRY: I did this on my own, and, in a sense, I was doing what the President did not wish me to do. I had spoken to him about it in October of 1970. It came about almost accidentally, and it began to pick up momentum, and then the Government of the United States began to support it. Now people tend to, particularly Americans, to want these things in nice neat compartments or in nice sharp colors, black or white. The fact of the matter is that in foreign policy, as in politics or in love, mechanistic constancy and consistency do not guide actions. It's a series of interactions of all kinds. At one time, in Washington they may be making 00628 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 10 a policy based on a scenario that they believe in, but they recognize that there are intervening unexpected happenings. BUCKLEY: And improvisations. KORRY: Improvisations. And that is why you have an ambassador in the field and not a computer, because if you went on the mechanistic constancy line -- that is, set up as a standard hindsight -- then you would certainly need no one there. You would only need a machine. In fact, all you would need is a postman. And many of our embassies are run, for all practical purposes, as a mailbox. Now immediately after the inauguration in early November of Mr. Allende, I decided that even if our analysis was airtight, even if everything we said that Allende was going to do would in fact be carried out, that we had an obligation to the American public and to history to demonstrate that we did not operate to fulfill our own prophecies, that we had to test our assumptions. BUCKLEY: So therefore you tilted in the direction of helping him. KORRY: I didn't tilt. I walked in to their foreign minister, who described himself in that period as an al.1.- out Maoist, and this was in the period of the Red Guard, Claudimira Almeida (?), and not only had described himself to me that way, but to interviewers, later and before. :And I said, "You know my view of what I think Dr. Allende and you represent in the way of political forces in this country, in this hemisphere and in this world. You know that I was opposed to you. But you are now the representative of a sovereign power and I am the representative of a sovereign power, and we are both mature individuals. Our job, therefore, is to seek to avoid problems if we possibly can, and that I would suggest that I brief you on where our relationship was as of the day that Dr. Allende was inaugurated and that what I view as the unavoidable problems that will arise between our two countries and a process by which we may seek to avoid conflict and confrontation." And I explained the rationale as to why I thought this would be in their interest and in our interest. I said that Marx had never said that you had to go to socialism by tying your legs and your hands and crawl on your belly to it, that it could be done in a comfortable way, that the United States was not opposed to socialism. We were opposed to somebody exercising irrationality or hostility to everything we stood for. Now this process began very tentatively, but it suddenly began to jell in January-February of 1971, and 00629 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 it-really started to take off in April and early May. And suddenly it was stopped. Now we learned, and it was confirmed to us by Dr. Allende's closest advisers, that the reason he stopped was that a veto was interposed by the then-head of the Socialist Party, Senator Altamirano (?). The Socialist Party, incidentally, it should be emphasized, is to, in Chile, to the left, far to the left of the Communists, and there was an unending war between these. two.parties before and during and I'm sure after Dr. Allende's election, with the Communists accusing Altamirano of reckless leftism. That was the term they used. And Altamirano wanted to have a violent class war. He wanted no agreements with the United States. He wanted to have these dramatic encounters. BUCKLEY: So what you're saying is that Altamirano simply rejected the notion of minimal cooperation. KORRY: That's right. BUCKLEY: And so you slid from point one to point KORRY: Well, we were in point two all the time. BUCKLEY: Well, theoretically. KORRY: The correct relationship in public. BUCKLEY: But you were having a flyer with one. KORRY: That's right. BUCKLEY: Okay. Now having slipped to point two, were you still there when it slid over into point three? KORRY: No. When point two -- when point one collapsed, that was -- well, I should say that there was an intervening episode. We had spent five months to get certain agreements with the Allende government. He had signed off personally on them. People think that this enormous effort was made on behalf of the multinational corporations involved because they had to do with companies. But my interest,was of a different order. Firstly, the United States Congress, which presumably knows what it was doing, had committed to Chile, the Frei Administration, almost $2 billion to one of the smallest countries in the world. At the time it started it had barely 00630 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 12 T million people, and by the time I left it was 9 million. Now, these $2 billion was an investment by the United States taxpayer, the Congress, their representatives, in the most stable, tested, freest democracy in South America, a democracy which was a totally different profile than any other country in all of Latin America. 90% of all Chileans are literate, were literate; 85% of those eligible voted in elections, which is better than in this country; 70% of them were urban, very few landholders; there were practically no great fortunes in the sense that you had them in Peru or Colombia. In Chile one person might have qualified for being in the $5 million class of assets. In neighboring Peru you had what? -- 20, 40, 50 of them. You had a huge middle class in Chile. You had social democracy. It was already a statist society, overwhelmingly. By the time Allende was elected, the Frei government had effectively nationalized the copper industry. It had nationalized just about every other industry, because at the time -- in the last budget of Frei's, for the year '69-70, 63% of all invest- ment was in the public sector. Allende only raised that amount to 80%, so it was not much-o'f a change in policy, but the changes had to do with the democracy. Now democracy in Chile meant exactly what it meant in the United States, even more. It meant an unfettered press. It meant a multi-party Congress. It meant an independent judiciary. It meant an apolitical army, an army that never participated in politics. BUCKLEY: And what happened? KORRY: Allende changed all these things. But before that, I want to say what it is that -- why I felt that dealing with those corporations had to do with this investment. Part of our investment was to give guarantees to American investors against expropriation, and that mean any fresh investment that they would put into Chile, and the biggest part of this was to double the copper production of Chile -- if there were expropriation without adequate and effective compensation, then the U.S. Government, through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a government agency, would have to pay those guarantees. Our exposure at that time was almost half a billion dollars. I felt, as the representative of the American taxpayer, public, that it was incumbent upon me to try to prevent their paying that -- that is, their... BUCKLEY: Raving to pay. 00631 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 KORRY: ...having to pay a half a billion dollars. So the first thing I had to do was to try either to eliminate the immediate call on those resources or postpone them. And that is why I went in that direction. But there was a second reason. If we could reach agreement on these things, and we were also reaching agreement on much lesser and simpler problems concerning the number of Peace Corps in the country, the military advisers in the country, the military aid program, all of these things, but if we could reach agreement on these others, you would develop a momentum that proved that the United States, as a mature power, could get along with any kind of government in this world, as long as it did not act irrationally. I mean after all, we were doing that -- or we were about to change our policy with the Soviet Union. We had perfectly normal relations with them in the diplomatic and government-to-government sense. Why couldn't we have it with Allende in Chile? BUCKLEY: And so? And so'? KORRY: And so we tried. BUCKLEY: And he proceeded to act irrationally in what way? KORRY: Well, he broke his word to me, not simply on the Cerro copper agreement, which had taken five months to negotiate and really had been an incredible taxing procedure for me. Let me say one word about Cerro. Unlike the Anaconda or Kennecott copper companies, which were larger, Cerro had not been in Chile before Allende. That is, they were in the process of developing their mine and it came on stream after Allende's election. They had -- they were a partner of the Chilean Government and they were a partner of the Japanese. It was a three-way deal. They had acted impeccably, and this mine had been put in high in the Andes underground, in an earthquake-prone zone. Everybody thought they were mad to put in that money, so it was an enormous gamble on their part. And the overrun had been more than 100;'. They had $14 million in U.S. guarantees, and their own money ,was well over 30 by the time they go through with it. Well, the Allende government began by Nand-it- over-or-else ultimatum in writing, "and then we may give you something, but very little." The company came to me and said, "What should 00632 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 I do about it?" And my reaction was very much like the Bobby Kennedy reaction to the Khrushchev ultimatum in the eyeball-to-eyeball. I said, "Ignore the bad part and stick to the good part." And I asked if they would like me to try to work out some sort of dialog, and I did. And the dialog developed. Allende named five negotiators, two Communists, two leftwing socialists, and his Minister of Mines. It took five months to negotiate this thing and I was the middleman, and the agreement was reached. Allende personally expressed his happiness that we had done this, to me. The five Chilean negotiators -- four of them, in point of fact. The Minister didn't go -- gave a party for Mr. Gordon Murphy, the chairman of the board of Cerro, the night before this was to be signed on nationwide television. They invited me to the party and invited me to the nationwide TV signing. I refused to go, thinking it was better to keep the U.S. Government out of this thing. Well, 30 minutes before it was due to be signed, Mr. Allende said he was terribly sorry, there'd have to be a postponement. He explained to me he had, quote, a little trouble in my chicken coop, unquote. To which I replied -- and he asked me for two weeks to sort it out and told me to assure Washington that he would do this.. I said, "Mr. President, it is your country. I can't give you two minutes, two weeks, two years. It is entirely your decision. I know the rooster who is loose in your chicken coop" -- Senator Altamirano. I didn't name in so as to spare any embarrassment. And I said I would have to inform Washington in all honesty. narrative. BUCKLEY: We're going to have to accelerate this KORRY: I'm sorry. There's a last sentence. I would have to inform Washington, in all honesty, that if Allende could not sign the agreements that he negotiated, that there was no point in my negotiating with him any further. And that is when I said we're getting to the end of the line. BUCKLEY: Aha. It is then that you started to slide from point two to point three. KORRY: No. We then made a further effort. We came back with a brand-new proposal. I came home, got Dr. Kissinger's okay separately, and Secretary William Rogers of the`State Department, to go back and make a whole new set of proposals concerning the big copper companies, which was the most unusual the United States has ever put forward and in brief... 00633 BUCKLEY: Okay. And they didn't work. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 15 KORRY: No, they didn't work. BUCKLEY: All right. So then we did move to point three, right? KORRY: And then I left. BUCKLEY: You left. But you presumably... KORRY: I was not kept informed after that. BUCKLEY: You were not kept informed. KORRY: No. BUCKLEY: But you presumably have made some deductions. KORRY: Only what I read. BUCKLEY: Only what you read. And what you read persuades you yes or persuades you no. KORRY: I have no reason to doubt what Mr. Colby is saying or is alleged to have said. The only thing that he denied in his letter to The Times is the use of the word destabilization. BUCKLEY: So therefore he is denying that part of the charge, that he went around the world getting in the way of Chile's requests for economic credit. KORRY: No, no. I don't think he had anything to do -- the CIA would not be doing that in any case. I think what he is denying is that the CIA set out to overthrow Allende. I think he is making a distinction -- if I understand what we're both reading in the newspapers, it is that they did not set out to overthrow Allende; they set out to try to keep in existence those democratic forces until the 1976 presidential elections. You have to remember that the head of the Communist Party before the elections had said that if -- that once they were in, there would be an irreversible -- I beg your pardon. He said this after the elections in an interview with the Rome Communist newspaper Unita. He said that the political structure would be irreversible. And nobody that I knew in Chile took that to mean anything other than what it literally signified, that there would be no way you could reverse it for many years to come. There might be pro forma elections, but no way to change the system. BUCKLEY: Well now, are you saying, then, that 00634 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 16 in your diplomatic experience, it is simply -- it is a commonplace for the United States to help to maintain democratic practices in countries in which there are democratic practices? I don't imagine there was much for the CIA to do in Ethiopia, was there, when you were there? KORRY: Nothing. BUCKLEY: Nothing. But that this is simply consistent with America's... KORRY: No. BUCKLEY: ...implicit obligations to the world. KORRY: No. I think that there is a confusion, and I can understand it, and I will not attempt to talk for the President of the United States -- Mr. Ford has said what U.S. policy is -- or for Henry Kissinger. I will tell you, though, what I said to my government, to Dr. Kissinger at the time, and you may draw your-own conclusions. I said that the basic -- there were three American interests that were overriding in Chile. One is that a time that we were about to leave, whether it was admitted or not, about to begin the scaledown and the withdrawal from Vietnam and about to launch new initiatives with Moscow and Peking, that for the United States to act indifferent to the disappearance of a democracy, of a unique democracy in what was viewed throughout the world as its backyard, could have a significant effect on those who made policy in the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. That's number one. And I will just say parenthetically that those two governments, in Moscow and Peking, described the Allende triumph as an enormous defeat for the United States and for imperialism throughout the world, and a tremendous victory. Now that's number one. Number two. At that time there were elections coming up in both France and Italy, popular front tactics, which had to do with the whole fundamental structure of Western defense, Western ideals. So the Chilean model could have a certain effect. Number three. The American public was unaware, because it often tends to give others the benefit of the doubt and to look at it from a superficial point of view, that is,-,to look at the mask rather than the reality behind it, the American public did not realize that we were privy, chapter and verse, because we had penetrated the Soviet -- the Chilean Communist Party at the highest levels. I was 00635 privy to. everything they did long before Allende's election. i knew.exactly what they were planning and how. I knew the Socialists as well -- that how they were going to gradually Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 17 wipe out democracy, as we understood it, and in which the American public had demonstrated, through an awfully large per capita investment, its faith in it, wipe out or convert a democracy into a peoples democracy. Now I said when I first got to Chile in 1967 that if the United States was indifferent to the fate of that kind of extraordinary democracy... BUCKLEY: It would have international repercussions. KORRY: Not only that, that Americans -- it would affect how Americans practiced their own democracy. I'm not claiming any prescience about Watergate, but I am saying that if you become indifferent to that caliber of democracy -- and it only exists in four or five places in the world -- that you will then become very coarse in your appreciation of... BUCKLEY: Of your own. KORRY: ...your own democracy. BUCKLEY: Professor Cliff Thompson is with the Law School at Southern Methodist University. Professor Thompson. PROFESSOR CLIFF THOMPSON: Thank you. I think it's probably useful to have on record some of what the ambassador said, but I think we probably strayed from the Firing Line as you originally established it, Mr. Buckley. In particular, I wish more time had been spent on some of the issues that I think concern representatives of our country and our country in terms of how we think about this kind of problem. For example, people in this room may have the opportunity to become an ambassador, and what is the moral issue that has to be faced up to in this? If there are going to be covert acts, on what kind of standard should they be based, if we should have them at all? I want to ask you a question. I also want to raise the question of whether or not perhaps the standards that Mr.. Buckley has suggested in his column of this week are frightening in terms of U.S. domestic policy, in the Watergate sense that you suggested, Ambassador. But let me ask the question. I mean they're become an ambassador. Can they do their job competently if they don't know about the secret operations that are going on? I would have thought 6O6?6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 18 not. Therefore, if asked about them, as an ambassador, what would that person say? Would he have to lie? Would you advise the person to lie? KORRY: No. Let me very clear. I told the Senate subcommittee that I knew and took full responsibility for what the CIA was doing in my country because President Kennedy spelled out the obligations that an ambassador had both to know and to follow. So I would have been dishonest if I had answered any other way. The question that I refused to answer was the specifics of what they did. All right? That's number one. Number two. I have tried unsuccessfully to get on the record, and I am delighted to have this opportunity, that I think it is high time that the Congress stopped brushing under the rug and acting as if it didn't know what it should know and the obligations that it has to the American public. That is, it should determine what the proper function of the CIA Is, what the oversight responsibilities of the CIA -- of the Congress with regard to the,;-.-CIA are, what an official secrets act is. I think it's outrageous that men in the Congress have eulogized people who have stolen information from the State Department and profited by it, that is, to sell the information. I think it is disgraceful. PROFESSOR THOMPSON: Well, if -- in fact, that's a phenomenon that's interesting. If things are stolen at the rate that they are stolen, can you have a secret operation at all? KORRY: Well, I think that these are proper matters to discuss right now, because the United States has gone through a kind of counterrevolution. Now I'm not in favor of a porno type approach to -- a porno-flick type of approach to foreign policy, that is, that you convert everything into dung, including yourself. I think that's horrible. I think there is a balance between everything being the soap opera and everything being pornographic. I think there is a mature approach. But I reject in its entirety that civil servants -- not myself, because I was a political appointee. Let me say I was appointed by three Presidents. I never gave a vote, a word or a dollar to Mr. Nixon, and he fulfilled his obligations to me, although he knew that I would never vote for him. Now, I think it's outrageous that. civil servants are being hauled up now for doing what was a superb professional ?0637 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 jo'b. You can't have it both ways, to ask people to be professional in carrying out the laws of the United States and at the same time ruin their careers by this public trial without benefit of a hearing. I think that's outrageous. BUCKLEY: Professor Beverly Karl is also of the Law School at SMU. PROFESSOR BEVERLY KARL: Thank you. I'd like to direct a question to Ambassador Korry. I certainly agree with you, Ambassador, that Chile was one of the exceptional democracies that one sees on the world scene, and [I] was formerly a student in Chile and returned to Chile in 1973. I am a little disturbed by some of the comments that you made about the Allende government and his party out to wipe out democracy. I would concede that Allende and his government were certainly admittedly out to change the economic system and probably would have ultimately wiped out the capitalist model as we know it and had gone to a command model. On the other hand, when I was in Chile in 1973, under the Allende government, from what I perceived personally, there was still free expression, freedom of the press, freedom of the radio, etcetera. Now, whatever the role of the U.S. Government may or may not have been in bringing about the coup and the change -- I will keep an open mind on that. But if we had any role in this, then clearly what we have achieved -- according to the OAS statistics there's something between 7,000 and 10,000 political prisoners. The head of the junta said the other day that their government may be in power 10, 20 or 30 years. Democracy certainly appears to be dead in Chile at the moment. And certainly what I saw under Allende seemed to indicate a rather ample preservation of what we would call freedom of expression. KORRY: All right. I think the point is well taken as to what succeeded Allende. But what succeeded Allende was a consequence of what he did. The army was apolitical. It was Allende that brought the army into the government repeatedly to assume responsibility for the actions that he was taking and to give him- legitimacy. He politicized an apolitical army, and that army, when I was there, was overwhelmingly, including the present dictator in Chile, General Pinochet, overwhelmingly in favor of Allende. Now that's got to be kept clearly in mind, that he accomplished that task, nobody else. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 We had just about cut off all relations more than pro forma with the Chilean armed forces in my time. The military mission in Chile had gone, in my four years, from 68 down to 13. So, that was his doing. Secondly, you cannot have it both ways. If, as President Ford has said, the United States were to support Chilean media so that they could stay alive, you cannot then say that it was Mr. Allende that gave them freedom of expression. Let me just, if I have the time, just enumerate the kinds of things he was doing in my time, '71, not '72- 73. A. He had just about eliminated all sources of advertising for the newspapers. He controlled all their credits and -- that is, through the banks -- and he was not going to give credits unless they gave him political support. We knew this for a fact::.:. 3. He, through the Minister of Labor -- and Chile became the only place, except the Soviet Union, where the head of the trade union movement was the same person a$.. the Minister of Labor. It's just not done.if you want a free labor movement. The pressures on the unions to strike... PROFESSOR KARL: I concede on the economic. I'm talking about... KORRY: This is not economic; that's political. There is no such thing as diversity in society where you have highly centralized control. Allende said to me and to others that he did not believe in, say, the Yugoslav workers' management role. He did not believe in the co- management model of West Germany or France. He believed in highly centralized control of the trade union movement. In my day, and that's when I first had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Buckley, as a union organizer for the CIO- AFL, in organizing newspapermen at the United Press, we fought against a Communist control of the union at that time, and I am familiar with how their operation works. And it was no different in Chile in my time than it was in the '.40s in New York. Now, he was using the trade unions to try to provoke strikes artifically, because under the law in Chile, once there was a strike, the government could intervene and take over. 00639 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 complex. BUCKLEY: He also closed down an entire publishing KORRY: He tried to get -- he tried to -- he did get effective -- well, he tried to get effective control over the one source of newsprint in Chile. He denied spare parts to radio. He threw out the elections by the students of the Catholic University to remove the directors of their television newsroom and their television programming. And when they tried to set up an alternative station, to bring about their decision, to bring it into being, he sent the police in to break it up. PROFESSOR THOMPSON: I don't see where your answer goes, though. I mean if you're saying it's not as good as it was under Frei, I think most people here agree. But if you're saying it's better than it was under the military, I wish you'd say that. KORRY: No. Oh, Good Lord no. PROFESSOR THOMPSON: Well., then are you saying it was a justification for the worst kind of covert activity? KORRY: No. What I am saying is -- I'm just answering the specifics. He was seeking, to our knowledge, to eliminate a free press. That's one. Two. He politicized the military. The created 7000/,'-a-year inflation. If you were to have 700`-a-year inflation in this country, you would have a government like they have in Chile. BUCKLEY: Mr. David Lambell (?) is a reporter with the Newsroom of KERA. Mr. Lambel l . DAVID LAMBELL: One of the few articles in an American magazine that I could find on Chile that dealt with the issues to a great degree was written by Gabriel Garcia Marquez. It was published in [larch of 1974. It's called "The Death of Salvador Allende." One of the paragraphs I think is pertinent to what you have said about the Chilean military having a history of being nonpolitical or apolitical. "The Chilean armed forces," he says, "contrary to what we've been led to believe, have intervened in politics every time their class interests have seemed threatened and have'done so with an inordinately repressive ferocity. The two Constitutions which the country has had in the past 100 years were imposed by the force of arms, and the recent military coup has been the sixth uprising in a period of 50 years." And he goes on to talk about specific instances where the military intervened in the country, including OOG-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 one under President Frei, where a military patrol opened fire on a demonstration to break it up and killed six people, among them children and a pregnant woman. And then he goes on to say, "The myth of legalism and the gentleness of that brutal army was invented by the Chilean bourgeoisie in their own interest. Popular Unity, Allende's party, kept it alive with the hope of changing the class makeup of the higher cadres." He goes on also to say that just before the coup, that officers sympathetic to Allende were systematically purged and killed and that the military had to go through a number of changes to bring about the people that they wanted in power. How does this set with what you said before about the army being essentially nonpolitical? KORRY: I think it's all nonsense, from beginning to end. He's a Marxist. He's spreading the Marxist mythology. Almost every word in that article.i.:s untrue. Now, one. The only Chilean military man that I know of in the last decade who was killed was General Schneider (?), who was a Christian Democrat, one of President Frei's closest friends, a member of this upper bourgeoisie he's talking about. Number two. The Chilean Army was lower-middle- class in most of its origins and with rare exception from the upper bourgeoisie, rare exception. Number three. The Chilean military was very unfriendly to the Frei government and to the United States at the time of Allende's election for a variety of very good reasons. We had practically cut off all aid to them, under the legislation passed by the U.S. Congress which put a ceiling on sales and grants for all of Latin America, and that meant a few million dollars for Chile in training and resupplies of minimal character. The Frei government refused their demands on the grounds that it would contribute to inflation. The Chilean military repeatedly appealed to me to intervene with Frei to get them this kind of hardware or that kind. We just didn't do it, and instead we deliberately wound down our presence. BUCKLEY: And you just finished alleging that the leaders of the military were demonstrably pro-Allende until they saw finally the direction in which he was taking the country. KORRY: Yes, and that's a very good point. It 00641 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 is-the point. And moreover, we had said that the Chilean military would never lead Chile; it would always follow the people, that therefore, in my view, it was not worth paying a lot of attention to them because they would always be in the vanguard... BUCKLEY: By the way, it's not all that unusual. You just go one country north and see on whose side the military is. Hardly on the side of the capitalist class, which they've just finished expropriating. PROFESSOR THOMPSON: Where? LAMBELL: Well, he also makes the point that he feels what essentially happened in Chile in the coup that overthrew Allende was an attempt to duplicate the situation in Brazil, where the military took over in a very repressive fashion. And this seems to be exactly what happened. KORRY: That is a different judgment. That is something quite different. But between Nay of '71 and late '73, when Allende was thrown out, Altamirano had carried out his entire policy. That is, he had radicalized that situation. He had imposed his veto over the Communist Party on a number of things. One, the business with the United States. But more important, I think that the Communist Party of Chile and Allende were predisposed to bring in at least part of the Christian Democratic Party several times, and that he -- in order to divide and split the -- fragment the largest party of Chile and eliminate it as a force and to push President Frei into the camp of the Right. I think that Altamirano vetoed that on a number occasions. And he was beginning to pass out arms to a great number of people in Chile. He was trying to subvert the navy of Chile. There was never any question as to his guilt in that. He had... BUCKLEY: We have only a few seconds. Let me just ask you to reply briefly and kindly to Professor Thompson's query. Do you think that diplomats of the future must continue to understand that their role will include supervision of or acquiescence in covert activity? You have 10 seconds. KORRY: Yes, if the Congress so reaffirms. BUCKLEY: And it is your judgment the Congress 60642 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020024-7 will reaffirm. KORRY: Finally, yes. BUCKLEY: Thank you very much, Ambassador Korry. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen of the panel. Than you all. 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