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December 22, 2016
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August 9, 2011
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September 23, 1974
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Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020043-6 11v"rl Jri i.l..1 23 SEP 1474 Thuo% ' _..._-_ e Bay of d d e The * United States Government ad- ! this failed, the 40 Committee deci tiered to a policy of nonintervention in to try' to induce the Chilean Congress- Chile's internal affairs during the Allen- sitting as an electoral college-to pass de period. over Allende. After this scheme crum- -Deputy Assistant Secretary of State bled, the CIA was given $5 million to Harry Schlaudeman spend over the next three years to "de- stabilize" the Allende government. In August 1973, with the Marxist regime al- We , n cotes, we funded no read in deep trouble, the 40 Committee , ice promoted no coups. candidates -Former Assistant Secretary of State li decided to throw in $1 million more. Charles Mever "Technically, Kissinger was accurate ' The CIA had nothing to do with the -COUP ... -Secretary of State Henry Kissinger oath after month, Nixon Administra- tion officials had come before Con- gress and testified that the United States was free of any involvement in the events leading up to last September's Chilean coup. Then last week those same lawmakers learned that the White House had, in fact, authorized CIA expendi- tures of $8 million in Chile from 1970 to 1973 in a clandestine effort to undermine the Marxist government of Salvador Allende. "I couldn't believe my eyes," said Massachusetts Congressman Mi- chael Harrington after reading a top- secret briefing to a House subcommittee by CIA director William Colby. "Here everyone from top to bottom in the Ad- ministration had been insisting we had nothing to do with it-and there it was, 40 pages in black and white ... telling in clinical detail how we were engaged up to our eyebrows." The revelations about the CIA's activi- ties in Chile broke in the press just as the fire storm over the Nixon pardon put an abrupt end to Congress's honeymoon with Gerald Ford. And in the revived mood of anguish and acrimony, Washing- ton reacted to the CIA story with deep dismay. Although there was no proof that the CIA had any direct role in the actual coup that toppled Allende, it was clear that Congress was deliberately mis- led about the scope and degree of U.S. meddling in internal Chilean affairs. Sev- eral lawmakers started an investigation to determine whether. State Department officials who testified before them on Chile could be prosecuted for perjury. And the controversy loomed as a serious political challenge to-Henry Kissinger, who apparently was the motive force be- hind the anti-Allende campaign in his role as head of the supersecret CIA board of overseers known as the "40 Committee" (page 52). Bribe: At the very least, last week's revelations embarrassed the CIA more than anything since details of the Bay of Pigs fiasco became public. As the lat- est story was pieced together, the CIA first distributed Si million among Allen- de's opponents in hope of defeating him in the 19; 0 Presidential election. When t pull when he said that the CIA didn the coup," remarked one expert. "But how can you work for three years to up- set Allende and then claim you didn't have anything to do with the coup?" The fact that the Nixon Administra- tion managed to keep its war against -Allende secret indicated anew how lit- t1d leverage Congress has over the CIA. The agency, an arm of the executive branch, reports in theory to four Con gressional subcommittees. But there is a reluctance among veteran members of these panels to ask too many questions. "The clandestine services give them a peek under the rug and their eyes pop," one CIA source said. "It doesn't take long before the Congressional overseers acquire that old-school feeling." While there seemed little inclination to go after the CIA, which was only carrying out White House orders, feel- ings were running stronger about the testimony of Administration officials. And a number of lawmakers felt any effort to get to the bottom of the Chilean story should start with the testimony of Henry Kissinger. NEwswEEK's Bruce van Voorst reported that it appeared that Kissinger pushed the covert operations against Al- lende even though the State Depart- ment and the CIA were not too enthusi- astic about the idea. "Henry had a tick about Chile," one 40 Committee staffer, told van Voorst. At a meeting of the panel that took place in June 1970, an- other source said, Kissinger declared: "`I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due f to the irresponsibility of its own people." Disclosure of the U.S. campaign against 1 Allende caused scarcely a ripple last week in Santiago, where most politicians have correctly believed for years that the CIA was deeply involved in Chilean politics. But the news created a sensa- tion in many foreign capitals, and revived all the old doubts and suspicions about CIA activities in far corners of the world. The U.S. ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, cabled Kissinger that the reports had confirmed Prime Min- ister Indira Gandhi's "worst suspicions and genuine fears" about American pal- ucks icy. "She is not sure," . loynihan told Kissinger, "but that we would be content to see others-like her-overthrown." Political considerations aside, there was also the question of morality. Kissin- ger himself is known to believe that there is a valid philosophical question whether democracies such as the U.S. should engage in such clandestine activi- ties-and if so, how Congress should be kept informed. Many congressmen-even some of those who were most critical of the Chilean revelations-would probably agree with CIA director Colby that in the harsh world of big-power politics the U.S. is left with little choice but to engage in sane covert activities. As Colby said last week during a two-day Washington conference on the CIA's ac- tivities: 'I think it would be mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert-action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the marines." At the same time, however, the Administration officials who send secret agents into action cannot ex- pect much public support in a demo- cracy if they lie to the people's repre- sentatives in Congress. Despite official denials, Washing- ton learned last week that the CIA had secretly campaigned to undermine, Chile's Marxist government. With files from Bruce van Voorst, 'Milton Ben- jamin assesses the controversy. Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020043-6 OQ691 itinued Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020043-6 O SUPERVISING THE SPOOKS. t 's one of Washington's most exclu- sive clubs and its name might lead some outsiders to think that it organ- izes snooty charity balls. But when the members of the 40 Committee gather once or twice a month behind the thick wooden door of the Situa- tion Room in the White House base- ment, they come prepared to endorse ? sub rosa action against real and im- agined enemies of the United States. The 40 Committee is the board of di-. rectors for America's master spies. Over the years, the projects it has ap- proved have included the 1953 coup against Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran, the spy flights of the U-2, the Bay of Pigs invasion and the secret war in Laos. Last week, it was identi- fied as the sponsor of the U.S. effort to sabotage the Marxist regime in Chile of the late Salvador Allende. Only the scantiest details about the fense department officials and its mis- sion was to make sure. the year-old CIA's projects were worth the political risk. Though it has been renamed from time to time-"the 54/ 12 group," "the 303 Committee" and now "the 40 Committee" after the title of its latest reorganizing memorandum-its mem- bership is still restricted to five key men. Currently they are Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, CIA chief Wil- liam E. Colby, Deputy Defense Sec- retary William Clements, Under Sec- retary of State Joseph Sisco and Air Force Gen. George Brown, chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff. Most of its work focuses on capsule summaries. of. CIA proposals, which-spell out objec- tives, list available agents, give costs, assess prospects and-most important -present a plausible way the Admin- istration can deny U.S. involvement if something- goes wrong. Old hands in the intelligence trade say that for many years the committee held a fairly tight rein on the "roman- . and 40 Committee boss Kissinger tics" the CIA inherited from the World War II OSS. Meeting' weekly. in the 1950s and 1960s, it thumbed down many operations-such as covert support for rightist politicians in Rome and Saigon-on the ground that they were. too risky or wouldn't work. The rise of Henry Kissinger, 'how- ever, has sharply reduced the com- mittee's impact. It meets less often now, and when it does Kissinger's unchallenged right. to say flatly, "The President told me .. has made him dominant. Some of the Secretary of State's critics feel that Henry Kis- singer is overly fascinated by the spy game at a time when. technology has become far more important to intelligence collection than espionage. He was recently dubbed "Henry Su- perspy" by one sarcastic 'critic. And when Kissinger takes a personal. in- terest in a project-in Chile, for ex- ample-it is almost certain to win ap- proval despite others' doubts. As with so many other aspects of U.S. policy abroad, says one former member, "the 40 Committee has come in practice to mean Henry Kissinger." 40 Committee are known. It was formed in 1948 as a "special group" of senior White House and State and De- Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020043-6