KISSINGER'S EXCESSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020073-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: September 19, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020073-3
ilASIiINT~x STAR'
i 4 SEP 1974
Kissinger's Excesses
Something of a fuss is being raised
over the revelation of secret CIA efforts
to overthrow the Allende government in
Chile-raising a question in the minds of
some whether any clandestine opera-
tions at all are "legitimate."
My' own instinct, like that of most
Americans, is to be offended by our
meddling in other countries' affairs. But
I don't see a need to challenge CIA
functions in Soviet-bloc countries, which
are the counterpart of KGB operations in
the West. -
THE REASON, I think, is that the
United States has a proclaimed policy of
rivalry toward the Soviet bloc, and vice
versa. Each country knows that the'
other is engaged in clandestine under-
takings against it, and tacitly accepts
them. Equally important, the American
people know it, and over time have
ratified it.
That, I think-, is quite different from
the CIA's work in Chile. The Allende
government may have been displeasing
to Washington, but it posed no threat..
Allende himself, despite his Marxist
ideology, offered us his friendship. We,
in turn, were publicly aloof but promised
solemnly that we would stay out of
Chile's affairs.
The fact that we did not stay out, I
believe, is deception of a high order of
magnitude.
An administration, and even a bureau-
crat, has the prerogative to make
decisions on the execution of policy. In
the CIA's world, I can understand if
some of these decisions are secret. But
an administration, much less a bureau-
crat, does not have the prerogative of
making policy in secret, unless we are to
subvert. the essential meaning of
democracy.
WE HAVE ample evidence of the
disastrous consequences of secret policy-
making in foreign affairs. The very
expression "Bay of Pigs" sums it up. We
had another example in Cambodia in
1970. Now it's apparent that Chile, too,
was an enormous blunder-creating
fascism for the Chileans and, without
compensating benefit, tremendous ill
will for us.
To blame the CIA for this is to turn
away- from where the real responsibility
lies. We know this decision was made at_
the highest level, by a president'who has
since been discredited by other decep-
tions and driven from office..
The evidence, however, also impli-
cates the man who was then Nixon's
national security adviser, and has since
been promoted to secretary of state. We
Americans have tended to deify Henry
Kissinger and to find all sorts of excuses
to separate him from the excesses of the
administration he served.
But how heavy a price must we pay for
Kissinger's sweetly reasonable manner,
and occasional diplomatic successes?
ONE OF THE grounds for the impeach-
ment of Nixon was abuse of power.
Kissinger has consistently abused power
by secret policy-making-and no more
flagrantly than in the Chilean affair. It's
not a question of diplomatic morality;
it's a question of democratic process.
Right now, the scapegoats for the
secretary's excesses appear likely to
become two middle-level State Depart-
ment officials who lied to Congress to
protect the cover of the Chilean opera-
tion. Whatever penalty they may face,
they can scarcely be made to accept
responsibility for the deception.
This is a matter of Watergate magni-
tude. It's time for us to acknowledge that
Kissinger's rules of the game are not
terribly different from Nixon's. Most
Americans now agree that Nixon's rules
were a threat to our democratic system.
I think we should conclude from the
Chilean episode that Kissinger's are, too.
00`42
Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020073-3