SOVIET FORCES CAPABILITES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT THROUGH THE LATE 1990S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000200280001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: NIE

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Central 25X1
ICI Intelligence
Soviet Forces and Capabilities for
Strategic Nuclear Conflict
Through the Late 1990s
NIE 11-3/8-87
July 1987
Copy 5 ?~
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimates
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense- Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Departments of State and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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NIE 11-3/8-87
SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT
THROUGH THE LATE 19905
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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JCI.KCI
KEY JUDGMENTS
Strategic Offensive Forces. Evidence and analysis over the past
year have reaffirmed our judgment that all elements of Soviet strategic
offensive forces will be extensively modernized between now and the
late 1990s, and will be more capable, diverse, and generally more
survivable. An increasing proportion of Soviet intercontinental attack
warheads will be deployed on submarines and mobile intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and a smaller but still substantial proportion
in fixed silos. The major changes in the force will include:
- ICBMs. Preparations are underway to deploy in 1988 or 1989 a
new, silo-based heavy ICBM with an improved capability to
destroy hardened targets. ICBMs of the SS-X-24-class (a 10-
warhead system) will be deployed in SS-19 silos by 1988. The
new silo-based deployments will be more vulnerable as US
countersilo capabilities improve, but will enhance the Soviets'
already formidable capabilities for prompt attack on hard and
soft targets. SS-X-24-class ICBMs will also be deployed in a rail-
mobile mode this year. These rail-mobile deployments, contin-
ued deployments of the road-mobile SS-25 (a single-warhead
ICBM), and expected improvements and follow-ons to both
missiles, will significantly improve Soviet force survivability.
- SLBMs. The proportion of survivable Soviet weapons also will
grow through the deployment of much better nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and new submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The new submarines are
quieter and are capable of operating from deep under the ice-
pack, and carry long-range missiles. We expect the Soviets to
build a total of eight Typhoons and up to 12 to 14 Delta-IVs,
and judge they will introduce a new SSBN, carrying a new
SLBM, in the middle-to-late 1990s. Soviet SLBMs are likely to
have sufficient yield and accuracy by the late 1990s to attack
current US ICBM silos with greater confidence, but SLBMs
during the next 10 years will not be nearly as effective for this
role as Soviet silo-based ICBMs.
- Bombers and Cruise Missiles. Ongoing modernization will give
the heavy bomber force a somewhat greater role in interconti-
nental attack, with more weapons and greater force diversity.
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While production of the Bear H, which carries the AS-15 long-
range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), seems to be winding
down, the new swingwing Blackjack, which will carry ALCMs
and short-range attack missiles, will be operational in 1988. The
Soviets appear to have a program for development of a Stealth
fighter and a. Stealth bomber;
The earliest we would expect the fighter would be the
mid-1990s; the Stealth bomber could be operational by the late
1990s, but more likely not until about 2000. The SS-NX-21 long-
range, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is in the
process of being deployed, including on a dedicated submarine
carrying up to 40 SLCMs. The SSC-X-4 long-range, ground-
launched cruise missile could begin deployment in late 1987 or
1988, and SLCM and ALCM versions of a large, long-range
supersonic cruise missile are likely to become operational in 1988
and 1989.
Strategic Defensive Forces. The Soviets continue to invest about
as heavily in active and passive strategic defenses as they do in offensive
forces, and their capabilities will improve in all areas:
- Air Defense. Soviet capabilities against low-flying bombers and
cruise missiles are increasing because of continuing deployments
of the SA-10 all-altitude surface-to-air missile and three differ-
ent types of new lookdown/shootdown aircraft. These will be
supported by the Mainstay airborne warning and control system
(AWACS) aircraft, which should be deployed in 1987 or 1988.
- Ballistic Missile Defense. The new Moscow antiballistic missile
(ABM) defenses, with 100 interceptors, should be fully opera-
tional in 1988 or 1989 and will provide an improved intercept
capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around
Moscow. The Soviets have developed all the required compo-
nents for an ABM system that could. be used for widespread
deployments that would exceed Treaty limits. There are
differing views about the likelihood that the Soviets would
make such deployments, and we have major uncertainties
about the degree of protectinn suo ployments would afford
the USSR. ome new ABM compo-
nents may e un der eve opment and might begin testing in
the next year or two; if so, a new ABM system could be ready
for deployment as soon as the mid-1990s. Also, improving
technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and
ABM systems.
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Hardened Protection for the Leadership. We have identified
hardened Soviet command posts for military and
political leaders, deep-underground com-
plexes-bunkers, tunnels, secret su way lines, and other facili-
ties. Costing the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars, the
Soviets' 40-year program to provide deep-underground shelters
for the leaders is designed to enable them to survive a nuclear
war, and to direct the war effort, reconstitution, and postwar
recovery.
Antisubmarine Warfare. The Soviets still lack effective means
to locate US SSBNs at sea. While we expect the Soviets to
continue to pursue vigorously all ASW technologies, we judge
they will not be able to deploy in the 1990s, and probably not
until well beyond, a nonacoustic ASW detection system that
could reliably monitor US SSBNs patrolling in the open ocean.
However, the Soviets may be able to deploy
ASW remote detection systems by about 2005 that, under
certain conditions, would have some effectiveness against US
attack submarines approaching Soviet SSBN bastions.
Laser Weapons. There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to
develop high-energy lasers for air defense, antisatellite (ASAT),
and ballistic missile defense (BMD) applications.
about how far the Sovie s have
a
vanced, and the status and goals of any weapon development
programs. We expect the Soviets to deploy mobile, tactical air
defense lasers by the early 1990s, followed by more powerful
strategic and naval systems. The Soviets are developing ground-
based, airborne, and space-based high energy laser weapons for
ASAT. While there are differing views on dates of operation,
limited capability prototypes in some cases could be available
by the mid-1990s. If ground-based BMD lasers prove feasible
and practical, we expect a prototype would be tested in the
middle-to-late 1990s, although an operational system probably
would not be deployed until after the year 2000. The Soviets
also appear to be considering space-based lasers for BMD. We
think they may be able to test a feasibility demonstrator as early
as the mid-1990s, but we do not expect them to deploy an
operational system until after the year 2000.
- Other Advanced Technologies. The Soviets are also engaged in
extensive research on other technologies that can be applied to
ASAT and BMD weapons.
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there is
potential for a surprise development in one or more of these
areas. However, the Soviets probably are at least 10 to 15 years
away from testing any prototype particle-beam weapon for
ASAT or BMD. The Soviets might test a ground-based radio-
frequency ASAT weapon by the early 1990s. We believe it is
possible that a space-based, long-range, kinetic-energy BMD
weapon could be deployed, but probably no earlier than the late
1990s.
Space Program. The Soviets have a vigorous military space
program, and we expect their large investments to allow expanded
access to space for a variety of missions in the early 1990s. For example,
the new SL-X-17 heavy-lift launch vehicle, now being flight-tested, is
comparable in lift capacity to the former US Saturn V lunar launch ve-
hicle. It will provide key support for the establishment of larger space
stations and options for orbiting large components for possible futur
Projected Forces. This year, we have projected four alternative
Soviet strategic forces to illustrate possible force postures under various
assumptions of the strategic environment the Soviets will perceive over
the next 10 years. The number of deployed intercontinental nuclear
warheads, currently about 10,000, will increase by about 1,000 by 1990,
as new systems are deployed that carry more warheads than the systems
they replace. Two of the projected forces are premised on a Soviet
belief that relations with the United States are generally satisfactory and
arms control prospects look good. If the Soviets decide not to exceed the
quantitative sublimits of SALT II, by 1995 deployed warheads would
probably number between 13,000 and 14,000, perhaps as low as 11,500
if modernization and growth were more limited. In the absence of an
arms control process the Soviets would not necessarily expand their
intercontinental attack forces beyond these figures, but they clearly
have the capability for significant further expansion. In an environment
where the Soviets see relations with the United States as generally poor
and arms control prospects bleak, the number of deployed warheads on
Soviet intercontinental attack forces could grow to some 16,500 by 1995
and 18,500 by 1997. In all of these cases, the introduction of modern-
ized systems will result in a decline in the number of launchers.
We also include a projection for an SDI "response" force that
features a larger offensive force expansion (up to 21,000 warheads by
1997). The projection is based on a near-term Soviet judgment that the
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United States will deploy land-based ABM interceptors and space-based
SDI assets beginning in the middle-to-late 1990s. The projection depicts
Soviet measures aimed primarily at overwhelming US defenses through
sheer numbers of warheads, and does not reflect such possible responses
as increased ASAT efforts, Soviet BMD deployments, or advanced
penetration aids. While increasing the sheer size of their offensive forces
would be the most viable near-term Soviet response, advanced technical
countermeasures would be critical to dealing with SDI in the long term.
The size of the force could be several thousand warheads lower than the
projected 21,000, depending on the timing of the introduction of
technological countermeasures. Given the uncertain nature of the US
program and the potential disruption of their efforts, we judge that the
Soviets have not yet committed to deploy offensive force modifications
specifically to respond to SDI. Thus, in the absence of a crash effort,
such modifications would be unlikely to be deployed in significant
numbers until about 2000 or beyond.
Implications of Gorbachev's Declaratory Policy. We have
considered the potential impact of Gorbachev's declaratory policy that
takes an apparently more benign approach to issues of nuclear war than
we have typically characterized in previous years in this Estimate.
Analysts differ about the impact this policy may have, if any, on Soviet
weapons procurement and operational planning. On the basis of all the
available evidence which we present in this Estimate, we do not expect
any significant reduction in the priority the Soviets have given to
nuclear forces or any serious revision of their operational priorities and
practices.
At the same time, the Gorbachev leadership has placed a special
emphasis on revitalizing the Soviet economy and has made arms control
proposals calling for deep cuts in strategic forces. Economic factors
might affect somewhat the rate and levels at which some strategic
systems are deployed. However, the large sunk costs in production for
new strategic weapons and the fact that such production facilities
cannot readily be converted to civilian uses mean that Gorbachev's
industrial modernization goals almost certainly will not have major
effects on strategic weapons deployments through the mid-1990s. We
judge that strategic forces will continue to command the highest
resource priorities, and therefore would be affected less by economic
problems than other elements of the military.
Arms Control. We believe the Soviets are willing to reach arms
control agreements calling for deep cuts in intercontinental offensive
forces, contingent upon the curtailment of the US SDI. Greater
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flexibility with respect to arms control, however, would not prevent
continued vigorous modernization of all aspects of Soviet strategic
forces. Moreover, we judge that in negotiating agreements, the Soviets
would aim, at a minimum, to preserve the net strategic capabilities of
these forces to serve the gamut of Soviet security objectives.
Soviet Force Goals and Capabilities. Although Agencies have
long differed on the interpretation of Soviet military doctrinal issues,
there is reasonably close agreement on the trends in Soviet strategic
forces and on their employment in war. Soviet strategic capabilities
serve many vital functions for the political leadership. Powerful
strategic forces provide the most effective means to deal with the
contingency that global nuclear war could actually occur, and give the
USSR the superpower status that is critical to the maintenance and
expansion of its foreign policy influence. Moreover, the Soviets have
maintained the more traditional military view that forces prepared to
fight a war are also better able to deter war; they have never subscribed
to Western concepts, such as Mutual Assured Destruction, that draw
sharp distinctions between the strategic force requirements for deter-
ring a nuclear war and those for fighting one.
The Soviets apparently believe that, in the present US-Soviet
strategic relationship, each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities
that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Thus, the
Soviets have strong incentives to avoid risking global nuclear war.
While the Soviets apparently do not foresee that this strategic
reality will soon change, they continue to procure weapons and plan
force operations intended to secure important combat advantages and
goals in the event of nuclear war, including, to the extent possible,
limiting damage to Soviet forces and society. Ideally, a favorable
outcome for them in such a war would comprise neutralizing the
capability of US intercontinental and theater forces to interfere with
Soviet capabilities to defeat enemy forces in Eurasia, dominating
Eurasia, and preserving the ability of the Soviet state to survive and re-
cover.
Because of the Soviets' demanding requirements for force effec-
tiveness, they are likely to rate their capabilities as lower in some areas
than we would assess them to be. They are probably apprehensive about
the implications of US strategic force modernization programs-includ-
ing significant improvements in US command, control, and communi-
cations-and are especially concerned about the US SDI program and
its potential to undercut Soviet military strategy. Although we do not
have specific evidence on how the Soviets assess their prospects in a
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global nuclear war, we judge that they would not have high confidence
in the capability of their strategic offensive and defensive forces to
accomplish all of their wartime missions-particularly limiting the
extent of damage to the Soviet homeland.
Nuclear War Initiation and Escalation. The Soviets' strategic
outlook would affect their decision as to whether or not to risk initiating
global nuclear war in various circumstances. In peacetime, their lack of
high confidence in accomplishing all of their wartime missions, and
their appreciation of the destructiveness of nuclear war, would strongly
dissuade them from launching a "bolt-from-the-blue" strategic attack.
The Soviets also would probably be inhibited from provoking a direct
clash with the United States and its allies that could potentially escalate
to global nuclear war.
The Soviets believe that a major nuclear war would be likely to
arise out of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict that itself was
preceded by a political crisis. The Soviets see little likelihood that the
United States would initiate a surprise nuclear attack from a normal
peacetime posture.
In a conventional war in which the Soviets were prevailing, they
would have obvious and strong incentives to keep the war from
escalating. Yet, they continue to believe it likely that NATO, to avoid
conventional defeat, would at some point resort to nuclear weapons-
potentially including US strategic strikes. The Soviets themselves are
prepared to use nuclear weapons, potentially including strategic strikes
on the US homeland, if they suffer serious setbacks in a conventional
war with NATO.
If NATO used only a small number of battlefield nuclear weapons
to try to halt a Warsaw Pact conventional offensive, there is a
substantial possibility that the Soviets would respond in kind or, if their
offensive was not stymied, even refrain briefly from resorting to nuclear
weapons at all. However, they would see the chances of global nuclear
war increasing significantly once any nuclear weapons were used in a
theater war with NATO.
If they had convincing evidence of US intentions to launch its
strategic forces (in, for example, an ongoing theater war in Europe) the
Soviets would attempt to preempt. It is more difficult to judge whether
they would decide to preempt in situations where they see inherently
high risks of global nuclear war but have only ambiguous evidence of
US intentions to launch its strategic forces. Because preempting on the
basis of such evidence could initiate global nuclear war unnecessarily,
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the Soviets would have to consider the probable nuclear devastation of
their homeland that would result, the reliability of their other nuclear
employment options (launching their forces quickly upon warning that
a US ICBM attack is under way and retaliating after absorbing enemy
strikes), and their prospects for success on the conventional battlefield.
We cannot ultimately judge how the Soviets would actually weigh
these difficult tradeoffs. Their nuclear warfighting strategy, however,
does not predispose them to exercise restraint if they saw inherently
high risks that global nuclear war could occur and believed restraint on
their part could jeopardize their chances for effectively waging such a
war. The Soviets have strong incentives to preempt in order to
maximize the damage to US forces and limit damage to Soviet forces
and society. Moreover, their strategic programs indicate that for the
period of this Estimate the Soviets' nuclear warfighting strategy will
endure
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