THE SOVIET BLOC ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Director of 1_,"ecret
Central
Intelligence
25X1-
The Soviet Bloc Role
in International Terrorism
and Revolutionary Violence
National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
. ?
LOGGED
To cret
NIE 1112-86CL
March 1987
Copy
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the
Departments of State, the Treasury, and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
__IerS'eCT-et 25X1
25X1
NIE 11/2-86CL
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NIE 11/2-86
THE SOVIET BLOC ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE
Information available as of 2 February 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 25 February 1987.
To ecret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
3
DISCUSSION
7
Outlook
iii
Top Secret
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Top Secret
SCOPE NOTE
Since NIE 11/2-86, Soviet Bloc Role in International Terrorism
and Revolutionary Violence, was published in August 1986, two
significant bodies of data relevant to the topic have become available.
In addition, the Soviets in a number of official
statements have indicated a willingness to cooperate in combating
international terrorism. This Memorandum to Holders reassesses the
Key judgments of NIE 11/2-86 in light of the new information to
determine if there is a change in our understanding of Soviet Bloc
support for international terrorism.
The new information considerably expands our horizons, especially
as it relates to Bloc states, and points out the serious gaps in our
knowledge about the region's ties to terrorist groups, in particular those
in the Middle East. It opens up the distinct possibility that, as collection
efforts go forward, additional facets of the relationships will come to
light.
1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
T94cret
KEY JUDGMENTS
The judgments of the recent Estimate regarding Soviet attitudes
and behavior toward terrorism and terrorist groups have been rein-
forced by recent information
New information on the nature of ties between some
Soviet Bloc states and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), however,
reveals a much closer relationship than was previously known.
states that Moscow supports a variety of
groups that use terrorist tactics on several grounds:
? Its Marxist belief in revolutionary use of violence.
? A perceived duty to help liberation movements.
? A desire to promote the weakening of the West.
stated that the Soviets tend to avoid direct contacts with West
European terrorist groups because they believe European groups are
uncontrollable and can undermine broader Soviet foreign policy objec-
tives. We believe, however, the Soviets appreciate that acts by these
groups create disruption that damages Western interests, although there
is no evidence that the Soviets support or direct them.
In the Middle East, the Soviet Union continues to provide support
for the PLO. Although Moscow appears to avoid direct relations with
more radical transnational terrorist groups, suggests that
the Soviets have a continuing -liaison relationship- with the Abu Nidal
Organization. The nature of this relationship is unclear
Under Gorbachev, Soviet officials?for political reasons and public
consumption?are speaking out more openly, both publicly and in
bilateral discussions, against international terrorism. Thus far, Moscow's
more open public posture against terrorism has provided propaganda
benefits without the Soviets actually having to alter their support to
national liberation groups that utilize violence against noncombatants,
or to states that support terrorism. The Soviets probably will be
somewhat more cooperative with some international measures to
control terrorism, but the political benefits to the Soviet Union of
supporting groups that advance their interests will continue to outweigh
the costs for the foreseeable future.
reveals a
more active web of relationships between Poland and East Germany
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
3 25X1
cret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Top Secret
and the Abu Nidal Organization than was known when the Estimate
was published. We believe the Bloc has multiple reasons for maintain-
ing contact with terrorist organizations:
? A principal motive is political?Marxism-Leninism calls for the
revolutionary use of violence as a tool for destabilizing capitalist
countries. Through passive assistance or a more active, support-
ive relationship with groups whose actions strike at Western
interests, the Bloc regimes are cooperating with Soviet efforts to
weaken the West without direct involvement.
? The prospect of earning hard currency also appears to have
been an important factor behind the willingness of Warsaw and
East Berlin to tolerate and exploit front companies. The ability
of terrorist front companies to act as conduits for hard currency
appears to be one motive behind Bloc countries' tolerance of
these groups.
? The available evidence continues to indicate that in some
instances intelligence and security reasons are still a motivating
force. The Bloc countries do not want terrorist acts committed
on their home turf. Some contacts provide intelligence about the
groups' activities in the Bloc or about Middle Eastern events
that could be useful locally as well as to Moscow
East Germany reportedly agreed to provide military training to the
ANO in 1985 and provided medical treatment to Abu Nidal himself in
late 1986. ANO commercial front organizations are based in East
Germany and Poland and have extensive contacts with officials of these
countries, some of whom expedite their commercial operations and
travel. Polish and East German leaders at the highest levels clearly are
aware of the ANO affiliation of the front organizations. We do not
believe that these commercial activities indicate that the host country
has control over ANO's operational terrorist activities outside its home
turf.
We believe the Bloc countries?including Poland and East Germa-
ny?routinely exert great effort to know about activities of foreign
nationals in their countries. No foreign organization can operate
clandestinely on their soil on a continuing basis without the support of
host regimes. Because of recent allegations in the West linking them to
terrorist organizations, these governments have stepped up surveillance
and imposed even tighter controls over terrorists locally. They have
occasionally refused or delayed entry into their territory of senior
officials of terrorist organizations and, in at least one case, thwarted an
4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Top Secret 25X1
impending attack. These actions are intended primarily to prevent
attacks from happening in their territory and to improve relations with
Western nations.
There is no new information concerning Moscow's attitudes toward
Bloc countries' relations with such groups, but we continue to believe
Moscow is aware of and approves of these arrangements.
Moscow may be taking steps to ensure a unified position on terrorist is-
sues.
In accordance with the Estimate, we see no reason to believe that
the Soviet Union's policy toward terrorism is likely to change signifi-
cantly in the foreseeable future. Moscow is likely to continue to support
"national liberation- movements while periodically condemning "ter-
rorist- groups. In taking this approach, the Soviet Union can maintain
its influence with client countries and not constrain the operations of
terrorist groups that are useful to the USSR
The Bloc countries' relations with terrorist groups are more
susceptible to Western influence than those of the Soviet Union. As long
as the Bloc states seek better ties to the West, they are likely to modify
working relations with terrorists such as Abu Nidal if relations become
demonstrably counterproductive. The Bloc countries may urge terrorists
to be more cautious, but are unlikely to take measures that would
endanger their relations with terrorist and revolutionary organizations
that advance their interests. However, on the basis of recent experience,
the United States should expect that terrorist-related information passed
to Soviet Bloc governments about terrorist groups they support will be
passed to those groups
5
Top Secret
0. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
R
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Top Secret
Outlook
21. In accordance with the Estimate, we see no
reason to believe that the Soviet Union's policy toward
terrorism is likely to change significantly in the fore-
seeable future. Moscow is likely to continue to support
"national liberation" movements while periodically
condemning "terrorist" groups. In taking this ap-
proach, the Soviet Union can maintain its influence
with client countries and not constrain the operations
of terrorist groups that are useful to the USSR.
22. There are, however, several factors that could
contribute to a shift in policy. In order to deflect
international criticism of its behavior, the Soviets may
adopt a somewhat more differentiated tactical
10
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
(
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Top Secret
approach. Moscow has, for example, discussed agree-
ments aimed at preventing airline hijackings and
maritime terrorism. The Soviets will also continue to
periodically request certain national liberation move-
ments to curtail attacks against a country with which
the Soviet Union is trying to improve relations or
negotiate an agreement. Such requests would be
weighed against the possibility of alienating a client
country.
23. The Soviet Union has more latitude in its policy
toward groups it labels as terrorist. In this case, the
possibility of a change?measures to curtail the activi-
ties of the groups?would depend upon such factors as
the threat posed to Soviet facilities and personnel, the
potential for exposure of Soviet support, the level of
Soviet control, or the degree to which the group's
activities support Soviet interests.
24. The exposure of contact with terrorist groups is
of more immediate and serious concern to the Bloc
states and is likely to lead to efforts to hide the
contacts more carefully or to curtail them, at least
temporarily. The Bloc states will attempt to follow a
dual-track policy, but as long as they seek better ties to
the West, they probably will modify working relations
with terrorists such as Abu Nidal if these relations
become demonstrably counterproductive.
25. In addition, the Soviets and Bloc countries will
most probably expel known terrorists, possibly to other
Bloc countries, rather than endanger relations with
terrorist and other groups by taking harsher measures
against them. However, on the basis of recent experi-
ence, the United States should expect that information
passed to the Soviet Bloc about terrorist threats or
terrorists that the Bloc supports will be passed to the
terrorists.
11
Top Secret
im Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
L?J/V I
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the
sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this)-copy is for the exclusive
information and use of the recipient only.
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP09T00367R000200310001-2
25X1
25X1