WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 4, 1975
• Content Type: NIE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO
4 September 1975
Copy N2 155
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
N I E 11-14-75
WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Energy Research
and Development Administration
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy. Research and
Development Administration
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the
Treasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
`25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
CONTENTS
Page
NOTE ............................................................... 1
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS ........................................... 2
DISCUSSION ........................................................ 8
I. SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROLES OF THEATER FORCES
OPPOSITE NATO ............................................. 8
A. European Security Role ......................................... 8
B. Protection of Soviet Interests Within the Warsaw Pact ............. 9
C. Political Roles of Warsaw Pact Forces ............................ 9
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF FUTURE
WAR IN EUROPE ............................................. 9
A. The Khrushchev Era ........................................... 9
B. Since Khrushchev .............................................. 10
III. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND WAR-FIGHTING
STRATEGIES 11
A. Possible Theaters of War With NATO .......................... 15
B. Soviet Strategies and Objectives in a War in Central Europe ....... 18
C. The Strategic Backdrop of a War in Europe ...................... 19
IV. WARSAW PACT PLANNING FOR INITIAL OPERATIONS IN
CENTRAL EUROPE .......................................... 19
A. Forces ........................................................ 19
Ground Forces ................................................ 20
Air Forces .................................................... 22
Theater Nuclear Forces ........................................ 23
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare Capabilities ....... 23
Naval Forces .................................................. 24
Strengths and Weaknesses ...................................... 24
Sanitized Copy Approved for Rele
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Page
B. Pact Concepts for Launching an Offensive in Central Europe ....... 26
C. Wartime Organization ......................................... 27
V. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF WARSAW PACT
STRATEGY ................................................... 28
A. Capability of Pact Ground Forces to Break-Through NATO's
Defenses .................................................... 28
B. Warsaw Pact Air Operations .................................... 29
C. Control of Multinational Forces in a Warsaw Pact Offensive ....... 29
D. Warsaw Pact Logistical Capability .............................. 31
Ground Forces ................................................ 31
Air Forces .................................................... 32
E. The Reliability of East European Forces ......................... 32
VI. CURRENT TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES ...... 33
A. Background ................................................... 34
B. Growth and Improvement of Soviet Theater Forces Since the
Mid-1960s ..................................................
34
Expansion of Existing Force Elements ...........................
34
Equipment Modernization ......................................
35
New Aircraft ...................................................
36
Ground-Based Air Defense Systems .............................
38
The T-72 Medium Tanks .......................................
38
APCs and Combat Vehicles .....................................
38
Self-Propelled Artillery ........................ ................
38
Strategic Attack Forces ........................................
38
C. The East Europeans ........................................... 41
East Germany ................................................ 41
Czechoslovakia ................................................ 41
Poland ....................................................... 41
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria .............................. 42
D. Recent Trends ................................................ 42
E. Outlook for Further Growth in the Late 1970s .................... 43
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
NOTE
This Estimate is concerned with the Warsaw Pact forces-primarily
ground and tactical air forces-located in the European USSR and
Eastern Europe opposite NATO. Soviet naval, bomber, and missile
forces are treated only insofar as they bear directly on potential Euro-
pean land campaigns. Soviet theater forces opposite China are discussed
in NIE 11-13-73, The Sino-Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects.
Details on Soviet general purpose naval forces are contained in NIE
11-15-74, Soviet Naval Policy and Programs. Comprehensive estimates
on Soviet strategic attack and defense forces are contained in NIE 11-3/
8-74, Soviet Forces For Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985. Details
of order-of-battle and equipment characteristics which are outside the
scope of this Estimate may be found in joint CIA/DIA memorandums
and in Defense Intelligence Agency reports and estimates.
1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
The USSR considers its military strength in Europe to be funda-
mental to the protection of its national interests, to the maintenance
of its strategic posture vis-a-vis the West, and to its management of for-
eign policy. The Soviets appear committed to maintaining a demon-
strable numerical edge over NATO in some key elements of theater
forces such as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. They can-
not, however, separate Europe from the larger context of the overall
theater and strategic resources available to the USSR and the West. We
believe that the Soviets, given this larger view of the existing balance,
consider both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be deterred from ini-
tiating war.
Soviet thinking on the nuclear aspects of a war in Europe has
changed in the past decade and may still be changing. The Soviets evi-
dently no longer expect that any NATO use of nuclear weapons would
necessarily be answered with massive Pact nuclear strikes throughout
NATO Europe. We estimate that the following considerations charac-
terize current Soviet concepts of the initial stages of a war in Europe:
- The Soviets believe that a war in Europe probably would begin
with both sicles using only non-nuclear weapons.
- They also Jbelieve that the Pact would quickly- contain a non-
nuclear NATO attack, go on the offensive, and achieve early suc-
cesses in penetrating NATO's defenses.
- The Soviets would continue to use only _non-nuclear weapons as
long as possible.
- NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons- to compel Pact
forces to halt their offensive.
- If NATO's initial use of theater nuclear weapons were selective
and limited, we could not confidently predict the Soviets' response.
But they have been broadening the range of options available to
them for responding. They might continue purely non-nuclear op-
erations. Or they might launch a massive theater nuclear strike-
But
we cannot exclude the possibility that they would respond-with
limited nuclear strikes of their own-they have considered this
alternative.
2
Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
- The Soviets reckon, however, that once nuclear weapons are intro-
duced by either side, the risk of escalation is very great because
the side that struck first massively would have the advantage.
The likelihood of an attempted preemption by one side or the
other with theater-wide strikes would increase greatly.
- Available classified Soviet writings are vague with regard to the
issue of nuclear escalation from the European theater to a US-
USSR intercontinental exchange. Unclassified writings charac-
terize such escalation as likely.
- Recent evidence does not reveal Soviet intentions toward carry-
ing a Pact offensive into France. The Soviets might prefer not
to involve the French in the conflict because the independent
French nuclear capability would increase the risk of nuclear
escalation.
Because of the uncertainties in our appreciation of current Soviet
nuclear doctrine and our lack of information by which to judge how
Soviet political authorities would respond to a proposal by the Soviet
military to use nuclear weapons, we cannot confidently predict how
the Warsaw Pact would react to a NATO initiation of nuclear war. But
we judge that the odds still favor rapid escalation once nuclear war
began in Europe.
The Warsaw Pact has some 150 divisions in varying states of strength
and combat readiness and some 4,200 tactical aircraft, in Eastern Eu-
rope and the portion of the USSR opposite NATO. Another 22 divisions
and 250 tactical aircraft in the central USSR probably constitute a gen-
eral reserve for use against either NATO or China. Elements of the
Pact's navies and strategic attack and defense forces would a so e used
in a European war. The Soviets evidently plan for military operations
against NXT'Oin t~iree separate theaters:
- In the northwestern USSR and Scandinavia, to defend Murmansk
and Northern Fleet installations, to neutralize or seize NATO in-
stallations in northern Norway, and to attack NATO naval forces
and merchant shipping in the Norwegian Sea.
- In central and western Europe, to destroy NATO forces in West
Germany and the Benelux countries, and, using airborne and am-
phibious forces against key Danish islands in conjunction with
ground attacks through Jutland, to assist the Pact navies in gaining
control of the Baltic Sea and assuring passage from the Baltic to
the open ocean.
- In southern Europe, against Greece and Turkey to secure the
Turkish Straits and support naval operations in the eastern Medi-
terranean. Also, operations against northern Italy, intended to
3
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
secure the southern flank of Pact forces attacking West Germany,
might be launched from Hungary through Yugoslavia or Austria.
The Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the decisive theater
of a large-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Whether they would
launch offensives all along NATO's flanks concurrently with any cam-
paign in Central Europe is uncertain. We believe that the Warsaw Pact
has the means to conduct limited, but not general, offensive operations
in Scandinavia and southern Europe while simultaneously carrying out
an offensive against the NATO center. We judge that early Pact offen-
sives toward the Turkish Straits and northern Norway are more likely
than in the other flank areas such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia.
The Soviets consider it likely that, in the case of a NATO-Pact war,
Pact operations-including major offensives-would begin prior to
their carrying out a large-scale reinforcement with ground forces from
the USSR. Until about the mid-1960s, the Soviets expected to conduct
such a reinforcement in advance of war. This Chan e, which has become
apparent since the late 1960s,
may have occurred because the Soviets no longer count on having the
time for prior reinforcement, and also because of the danger that such
action could be counterproductive. For example, it might cause NATO
to begin a buildup of its own that would work against the Pact's initial
numerical superiority of forces in Central Europe. The Soviets may also
believe that the reinforcement process is not as severely threatened by
NATO nuclear attack as it was in earlier years. This change in doctrine
does not necessarily represent a change in Soviet preferences but re-
flects what is, from their point of view, a prudent planning assumption.
This appreciation of Pact offensive concepts has important warning
implications for NATO. In particular, we no longer can be confident
that the movement of a 25-30 division force from the USSR into Central
Europe would take place before an attack.'
The Soviet military evidently believes that Pact ground forces are
superior to NATO's. They also believe that Pact theater forces now in
Central Europe are not only capable of containing a NATO attack in
the early days of a conflict, but are also capable of conducting a non-
nuclear offensive into West. Germany. This rapidly advancing offensive
would depend on the tank-Pact forces in Central Europe have some
16,000. The Soviet ground forces are more dependent upon the tank
than any army in history. If the Soviets were ever forced to conclude
1 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that this inadequately
states the attack warning implications. He believes that the Soviets actively consider attack
plans which do not involve the movement of a 25-30 division force from the USSR to Central
Europe before an attack.
4
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9 -- -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
that their tanks were unable to penetrate NATO forces they would have
to rethink their strategy and contemplate radical redesign of their
forces.'
The Soviets probably consider that NATO's tactical air forces could
blunt or perhaps even halt this Pact ground offensive. Because of this,
the Pact evidently plans a massive, theater-wide air offensive during the
initial, non-nuclear phase of a war, aimed at destroying NATO's tactical
air forces and other nuclear systems and facilities. This attack is to be
conducted by tactical aircraft and by bpmbers of Soviet Long Range
and possibly Naval Aviation. The all-ounature of this scheme and
deficiencies in the ace in of most Pact aircraft would make it a
highly risky operation, its success depending heavily on surprise to in-
sure that NATO's air defenses are not fully prepared and mobile nuclear
systems not dispersed.
The quantity of Pact tactical nuclear delivery systems has been in-
creasing in recent years, and this would enable the Soviets to conduct
nuclear warfare in Europe at higher intensities before having to use
2 The Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that
the Soviet military leaders would be far more conservative than the Estimate indicates in their
assessment of the balance in Europe and of the ability of Warsaw Pact forces to execute a
successful offensive deep into West Germany.
Soviet military writings do describe a sequence of first containing a NATO attack and then
launching a smashing counteroffensive deep into Germany.
There are a number of reasons to doubt that Soviet military or political leaders would have
confidence in carrying it out with only the forces already in Central Europe.
- The Soviets have been extremely cautious in reckoning their requirements for any military
operation, defensive or offensive. This was vividly demonstrated in the last Soviet military
operation in Europe-the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
- Numerical force ratios which strongly favor the Soviets may not appear nearly so advan-
tageous in Soviet eyes. The Soviet military leaders would be prone to calculate on a worst-
case basis and use assumptions different from the West. If the Soviets assumed that West
Germany began to mobilize before the Pact, they would see Pact troops being quickly
outnumbered.
- The Soviets, moreover, would be inclined to credit the West with advantages in character-
istics of equipment. This appears to be the case especially with aircraft, and there are
indications of Soviet apprehensions over the air operation which their strategy projects,
as this Estimate points out.
- Finally, Soviet behavior in MBFR suggests that the Soviets today are far more conservative
in calculating their force requirements in Europe than they were ten and 15 years ago.
This view of the Soviet assessment of the chances of success in the operations described in
the Estimate suggests that the Soviets would much prefer to reinforce before starting operations
in Germany if they could, and that failing such reinforcement they would have substantial
doubts over their capability to launch an offensive deep into West Germany. The reason for
practicing initiation of operations before reinforcement appears to be a Soviet judgment that
there may not in fact be time to bring forces forward before the war starts.
5
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
their USSR-based systems. There is, however, no direct evidence that
they are deliberately seeking an alternative to using their USSR-based
nuclear forces in large-scale theater nuclear war. Available evidence,
although inconclusive, suggests that the Soviets have nuclear weapons
in Eastern Europe, but we can only roughly approximate how many
nuclear weapons might be stored in the likely storage facilities.
Soviet military doctrine categorizes toxic chemical agents along with
nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and implies that the
Pact would use chemical weapons once nuclear weapons were in use.
We have little doubt that the Soviets possess substantial stocks of toxic
chemical agents but cannot estimate the size of their stockpile. We have
good evidence, however, that some toxic chemical munitions are avail-
able to Soviet air forces in Eastern Europe. Pact forces emphasize train-
ing and equipment for defense against chemical and radiological effects
and we judge they could operate in a CBR environment more effec-
tively than NATO forces.
Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have carried out a major expansion
and renovation of their theater forces:
- In the ground forces, the numbers of tanks and artillery pieces
have been substantially increased and a variety of other changes
in organization and equipment have brought about larger and
more modern divisions. Motor transport capability has been added
not only to supply ammunition for the added weapons, but also
to improve overall logistic capability. Modern ground-based air
defense systems are being assigned to the ground forces in large
numbers. Technical improvements, particularly in air defense and
artillery weapons, and the improvements to the APCs also con-
tribute to greater theater force capabilities. Despite these im-
provements, however, ground force units still have a mixture of old
and new equipment and some units in the USSR have substantial
shortages.
- The Soviet tactical air forces opposite NATO have remained rela-
tively stable in numbers but have begun acquiring a new genera-
tion of aircraft and weapons that is enabling them to change their
traditional air defense orientation toward a broader range of offen-
sive as well as defensive missions. But the full realization of these
possibilties is still some way off. Despite the acquisition of some
new aircraft with capabilities similar to the better NATO aircraft,
the majority of Soviet and East European tactical aircraft still have
short ranges and low payloads and lack the sophisticated weap-
onry and avionics of US aircraft.
6
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
We have recently acquired a piece of evidence that suggests the
Soviets have, or plan to have, nuclear artillery rounds.
In the East European forces, reorganization, expansion, and force
modernization has allowed them to assume greater responsibilities in
Pact military plans. Although improvements in East European ground
forces have generally followed the Soviet lead, they have tended to lag
by a few years and to proceed more gradually.
The momentum of the Soviet drive to maintain superiority of theater
forces in Europe seems likely to lead to gradual expansion and further
technological improvements in Soviet theater forces through the end
of the 1970s.3 If the trend of the last two years or so continues, the over-
all size of the Soviet theater forces will increase by about 100,000 men
by the early 1980s, when they would then have a total of more than
2.1 million.
7
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
DISCUSSION
1. SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROLES OF
THEATER FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
A. European Security Role
1. The Soviets have maintained large theater
ground and tactical air forces since the end of
World War II. Even in the early 1960s after the
drastic cuts imposed by Khrushchev they never
numbered much less than 1.5 million men.
2. We do not have direct evidence on Soviet
force planning objectives, but an important theme
of recent Soviet military thought, as evidenced in
theoretical writings and in Soviet doctrine for prose-
cuting theater war, argues the necessity for large
ground forces in peacetime. The argument is based,
first of all, on a firm determination not to be caught
unprepared again as the USSR was by Hitler's on-
slaught in 1941. Clearly, the Soviets intend that any
future European conflict would take place in West-
ern, not Eastern territory and they stress the need
for large combat-ready forces and reserves to be
available at the outset of hostilities to stop a sudden
enemy attack and launch counteroffensives. Soviet
analysis of the probable character of a war in Eu-
rope apparently has led them to the conclusion
that, even should large-scale nuclear exchanges oc-
cur, large ground forces would still be needed to
defeat surviving NATO forces and seize Western
Europe.
3. The Soviet Union considers its military
strength in Europe fundamental to the protection
of its national interests, to the maintenance of its
strategic posture vis-a-vis the West, and to its man-
agement of foreign policy. One of the values of
Warsaw Pact forces to the USSR lies in their role
as an effective deterrent to a perceived danger from
NATO. In effect, the Soviets view Warsaw Pact
forces as constituting a buffer between NATO and
the Soviet heartland. This helps to explain the
Soviet Union's willingness and determination to
maintain force levels in Central Europe over a long
period and at considerable expense, despite pressing
demands from the nonmilitary sector of both Soviet
and East European economies. However, the size
of the Soviet/ Pact forces in the forward area, their
doctrine of the offensive, and the across-the-board
efforts to improve the capabilities of their forces
cannot fully be explained in terms of protection
against perceived threats from NATO, control of
Pact allies, or maintenance of the status quo. Rather,
they suggest a desire for more ambitious policy
options. At a minimum these would include the goal
of clear conventional superiority to support political
pressures, as well as to prevail in the event of mili-
tary action.
4. The Soviets appear committed to maintaining
a demonstrable numerical edge over NATO in some
key elements of the theater forces such as divisions,
tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. They do not,
however, separate Europe from the larger context
of the overall theater and strategic resources avail-
able to the USSR and to the West. Given this larger
view of the balance, the Soviets evidently have
8
Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
little confidence that they can either foresee or con-
trol the course of a conflict with NATO and are
therefore inclined to be very cautious in the use of
their military force in Europe.
7. There are, however, certain instances when
Soviet use of Warsaw Pact forces for plainly politi-
cal purposes might be justified by the high stakes
involved:
B. Protection of Soviet Interests Within
the Warsaw Pact
5. It is clear that the USSR considers a NATO
contingency paramount in its defense planning for
the European theater, and that there must be co-
hesion among the Pact members for that planning
to be effective. The presence of large well-equipped
Soviet forces stationed in East European countries
and the availability of additional Soviet forces
across their borders affords the Soviets considerable
leverage in exerting control over these countries.
C. Political Roles of Warsaw Pact Forces
6. Recent years have witnessed a growing em-
ployment of Soviet military forces to advance politi-
cal objectives in the Third World-most frequently
in naval activity around Africa and in the Middle
East. Toward Western Europe, however, the USSR
has been increasingly circumspect in its use of
Warsaw Pact forces for political purposes. Basically,
there appear to be three reasons for this:
- The stakes (and concomitant risks) are much
higher in Western Europe, since the funda-
mental security of the USSR and its Warsaw
Pact allies is at issue. Thus, political-military
behavior which might be acceptable in the
Third World could be considered "adven-
turism" in Europe.
- It is unnecessary. From the perspective of the
USSR's primary defense concern-protecting
its national security-the impact on NATO
of a powerful Warsaw Pact serves that purpose
simply by its existence.
- It is undesirable. Although the Soviets see a
substantial military presence as necessary to
support their European diplomacy, military
bluster or the creation of incidents has proven
to be counterproductive. Detente has afforded
the USSR many more opportunities for culti-
vating and intensifying bilateral relationships
in Western Europe.
- The Soviet Union will seek to maintain the
status quo in Eastern Europe. West Berlin
remains a key potential pressure point.
- While the Soviets have thus far shown little
disposition actively to try to take advantage
of the recent trouble between Greece and
Turkey, they might in the future make more
vigorous political efforts to meddle in the
troubles of NATO's southern flank. Soviet use
of force for intervention, however, seems re-
mote, but Moscow might provide military as-
sistance or resort to some show of military
force.
- The Soviet Union clearly wishes to see Yugo-
slavia remain an avowedly Communist state,
or, at a minimum, prevent its alignment with
the West. The possibility of Warsaw Pact
intervention serves to inhibit Yugoslav moves
toward the West.
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE
NATURE OF FUTURE WAR IN EUROPE
A. The Khrushchev Era
8. Soviet military doctrine under Khrushchev
stressed the preeminence of nuclear weapons and
discounted the need for large conventional forces
to conduct a theater war. Khrushchev and his sup-
porters asserted that any war involving the Soviet
Union and the West would be a decisive global
conflict between the superpowers with its outcome
largely determined by massive nuclear exchanges
during the first hours. Strategic exchanges also
would decide any European conflict between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact and would occur
on a large scale at the outset. Most Soviet nuclear
strikes _against European targets were to be de-
Iiv ed by missiles and bombers based in the
western USSR.
9. Because Khrushchev closely linked war in
Europe to a decisive nuclear exchange, he saw
little need to allocate resources to conventional
forces. Following Khrushchev's lead, the prevailing
9
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Soviet planners believed that strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons could replace the massed artillery
and tactical air formations of World War II. Those
forces which appeared to have limited utility in
a nuclear war, particularly artillery and tactical
air forces, suffered massive cuts. But ground forces
proponents argued, with some success, that large
armored forces were still necessary to exploit nu-
clear strikes and successfully conclude a campaign
in Europe. Thus, despite the cuts, the armored
elements of ground forces survived largely intact.
B. Since Khrushchev
10. Once Khrushchev was removed in 1964,
changes in the Soviet view of war in Europe began
to emerge. An immediate impetus to these changes
was provided by the attitude of the new leadership
toward military force structure and balance. In
eschewing Khrushchev's reliance on a single war-
fighting option, i.e., nuclear war, the collective
leadership has supported the expansion of con-
ventional forces to complement the growing Soviet
strategic arsenal.
11. The views of the conventional forces pro-
ponents were reinforced by changes in NATO
doctrine and capabilities that were also occurring
during this same period. By the late 1950s the US
policy of massive nuclear retaliation to any Soviet
aggression in Europe was being openly questioned
in the West, and throughout the early 1960s more
flexible and less drastic options for conducting a
war in Europe were being examined in NATO.
12. Although "flexible response" was not made
official NATO doctrine until 1967, the Soviets knew
by 1965 that NATO was moving toward the option
of delaying the use of nuclear weapons in a Euro-
pean conflict until the Pact was on the verge of
overrunning NATO's defenses or had used nuclear
weapons first. By the mid-1960s, Soviet strategists
had incorporated into their doctrine the notion
that war in Europe would most likely begin with
a conventional phase and that Pact forces and
tactics should be adjusted accordingly.
13. A related post-Khrushchev development that
affected the Soviets' views on the likely nature of
a European war was their anticipation in the late
1960s of achieving rough strategic parity with the
US. Whereas a war in Europe during the Khrush-
chev period was postulated to be nuclear from the
start, and then only part of a larger intercontinental
conflict, the Soviets could now consider the possi-
bility that war in Europe might not trigger a global
exchange. Achievement of strategic parity probably
served to reinforce Soviet beliefs that a war in
Europe would begin conventionally because of the
mutual hesitancy of the US and USSR to use nu-
clear weapons in a theater conflict that could
quickly escalate to global war.
14. In the 1960s, Soviet doctrine held that once
a war with NATO developed to the point that the
introduction of nuclear weapons became inevitable,
the USSR would conduct massive, theater-wide
nuclear strikes to preempt NATO nuclear capa-
bilities.4 Soviet doctrinal writings indicate that by
the late 1960s serious consideration was being given
to the possibility of Soviet limited use of nuclear
weapons in/Europe. By 1970, Soviet planners were
being instructed to develop concepts and forces for
conducting a variety of nuclear operations in
Europe.
15. We are uncertain of the full extent to which
Soviet doctrine on limited nuclear war has advanced
since the early 1970s. Our evidence on Soviet
theater war-fighting concepts during the last few
ave reflected a variety of
Soviet actions ranging from non-use of nuclear
weapons to large-scale, theater-wide nuclear strikes.
4 For Soviet views on the concurrent use of chemical
weapons with nuclear strikes, see paragraph 64 below.
10
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
16. We consider it likely that Soviet thinking
on theater nuclear war and on the links between
theater and intercontinental war is fluid and that
further changes may become apparent in the next
few years. The position at which the Soviets had
arrived by 1970 retained some features of the
Khrushchev doctrine-especially as to the decisive
nature of nuclear weapons-but also exhibited
major differences that reflected the realities of the
current strategic balance and Soviet perceptions of
NATO's military doctrine and capabilities. The doc-
trine had shifted away from its former preoccupa-
tion with a single catastrophic response to any
NATO use of nuclear weapons. At the same time,
however, it held only a little hope of limiting the
intensity of theater nuclear war in Europe once
it is begun.
17. In any case, having once embarked on the
search for alternatives to automatic nuclear escala-
tion, the Soviets are unlikely to have abandoned
the search. We estimate that the following con-
siderations characterize current Soviet concepts of
the initial stages of a war in Europe:
- The Soviets believe that a war in Europe
probably would begin with both sides using
only non-nuclear weapons.
- The Soviets also believe that the Warsaw Pact
would quickly contain a non-nuclear NATO
attack, go on the offensive, and achieve early
successes in penetrating NATO's defenses.
- The Soviets would seek to continue to use
only non-nuclear weapons as long as possible.
- NATO would initiate the use of nuclear
weapons to compel Pact forces to halt their
offensive.
- If NATO's initial use of nuclear weapons were
selective and limited, we could not confidently
predict the Soviets' response. They might con-
tinue purely non-nuclear operations. Or they
might launch a massive nuclear strike-the
response which they practice most frequently
in exercises. But we cannot exclude the possi-
bility that they would respond with limited 25X1
strikes of their own-they have considered
this alternative.
- The Soviets reckon, however, that once nu-
clear weapons are introduced by either side,
the risk of escalation is very great because
the side that struck first massively would
have the advantage. The likelihood of an at-
tempted preemption by one side or the other
with massive, theater-wide strikes would in-
crease greatly.
- Available classified Soviet writings are vague
with regard to the issue of nuclear escalation
from the European theater to a US-USSR
intercontinental exchange. Unclassified writ-
ings characterize such escalation as likely. We
cannot now discern current Soviet thinking
on the limits of escalation.
- Soviet military doctrine has not set any fixed
size for the Warsaw pact's initial nuclear strike.
Its size would depend on military objectives.
While doctrine will influence Soviet decisions,
it is not likely to be the force driving the po-
litical leadership's decision concerning the
actual response.
III. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND
WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGIES
18. We do not have access to the Soviets' war
plans but we can infer the general nature of their
military contingency plans from the information
available from Warsaw Pact military exercises, from
Pact writings on military strategy and tactics for
war with NATO, and from the current disposition
of Pact forces. Because of the USSR's geographical
position as a major continental power in Eurasia
and the Soviet perception of the USSR as having
potentially hostile neighbors on virtually every side,
the Soviet military apparently have developed con-
tingency plans for military operations on all of their
land frontiers. In peacetime, they maintain large
ground and air forces in all of the border regions
facing these frontiers as well as in Central Europe
and the Mongolian Peoples Republic. Altogether,
the USSR has about 170 divisions at varying
strength levels in its peacetime ground forces and
some 4,600 aircraft in its tactical air forces (see
Tables 1 and 2). The Navy has some 220 active
11
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces
1 July 1975
Tan
Motorized
k Rifle
Airborne
Tot
al
Area
Divisions Opposite NATO Central Region
East European
East Germany .......................... 2
4
....
6
Poland ................................. 5
91
1
15
Czechoslovakia .......................... 5
5
....
10 + 1 b
rigade
Total East European .................. 12
18
1
31 + 1 b
rigade
Soviet
GSFG (East Germany) .................. 1
0
10
....
20
NGF (Poland) ..........................
2
....
....
2
CGF (Czechoslovakia) ...................
2
3
....
5
Baltic MD .............................
3
4
2
9
Belorussian MD .........................
8
2
1
11
Carpathian MD .........................
3
8
....
11
Total Soviet .......................... 28
27
3
58
Divisions on NATO's Flanks
East European
Hungary ............................... 1
5
....
6
Bulgaria ................................ ...
.
8
....
8 + 5 b
rigades
Romania ............................... 2
8
....
10 + 2 b
rigades
Total East European .................. 3
21
....
24 + 7 b
rigades
Soviet
SGF (Hungary) ......................... 2
2
....
4
Odessa MD ............................. ...
.
7
1
8
Leningrad MD .......................... 1
7
1
9
North Caucasus MD ..................... 1
5
....
6
Transcaucasus MD ...................... ...
.
11
1
12
Total Soviet ..........................
4
32
3
39
Divisions in Eastern USSR and Mongolia
Soviet Forces in Mongolia .................. 1
1
....
2
Central Asian MD ......................... 1
6
....
7
Siberian MD .............................. 1
4
....
5
Transbaykal MD ..........................
2
8
....
10
Far East MD ............................. 1
18
....
19
Total in Eastern USSR and Mongolia......
6
37
....
43
12
Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces (Continued)
1 July 1975
Motorized
Tank Rifle Airborne Total
Other Soviet Divisions
Moscow MD .............................. 2 3 1 6
Ural MD ................................. 1 2 .... 3
Volga MD ................................ .... 3 .... 3
Turkestan MD ............................ .... 5 1 6
Kiev MD ................................ 6 4 .... 10
Total Other Soviet ...................... 9 17 2 28
Of Which
Soviet .................................. 47 113 8 168
East European .......................... 15 39 1 55 + 8 brigades
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Forces 1
1 July 1975
Counter- Ground Reconnais-
air Attack sance/ECM Total3
Aircraft Opposite NATO Central Region
East European
East Germany ............................ .... 35 15 50
Poland ................................... 120 260 95 4754
Czechoslovakia ............................ 135 155 75 365
Total East European .................... 255 450 185 890
Soviet
GSFG (East Germany) .................... 390 250 105 745
MGF (Poland) ............................ 130 125 55 310
CGF (Czechoslovakia) ..................... 80 .... 20 100
Baltic MD ............................... 80 135 50 265
Belorussian MD ........................... 125 130 35 290
Carpathian MD ........................... 125 210 45 380
Total Soviet ............................ 930 850 310 2,090
13
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
TABLE 2
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Foreesl (Continued)
1 July 1975
Counter-
air
Ground
Attack
Reconnais-
sance/ECM T
otal3
Aircraft on NATO's Flanks
East European
Hungary .................................
....
....
....
....
Bulgaria ..................................
80
70
35
185
Romania .................................
....
75
15
90
Total East European ....................
80
145
50
275
Soviet
SGF (Hungary) ...........................
135
95
35
265
Odessa MD ...............................
135
40
55
230
Leningrad MD ............................
....
125
45
170
Transcaucasus MD ........................
130
70
70
270
Total Soviet ............................
400
330
205
935
Aircraft Opposite China
Soviet Forces in Mongolia ....................
90
85
....
175
Central Asian MD ...........................
125
85
55
265
Transbaykal MD ...........................
90
205
65
360
Far East MD ...............................
120
205
90
415
Total Opposite China ......................
425
580
210
1,215
Other Soviet Aircraft
Moscow MD ................................
100
40
30
170
Turkestan MD ..............................
85
40
15
140
Kiev MD ..................................
80
....
....
80
Total Other Soviet ........................
265
80
45
390
Of Which
Soviet ....................................
2,020
1,840
770
4,630
East European ............................
335
595
235
1,165
1 Includes all combat aircraft (except trainers) assigned to what the Pact calls "Frontal Aviation,"
or air forces for the support of fronts. It does not include some 2,600 Soviet and 730 East European
fighter aircraft that are subordinate to the national air defense commands with the primary mis-
sion of strategic air defense over the territories of the Warsaw Pact countries. In an emergency,
limited numbers of these aircraft-particularly East European-might be assigned tactical air
defense missions. Aircraft models of the Soviet strategic air defense forces (PVO Strany), however,
are different from those of the tactical air forces and for the most part would not constitute a
suitable replacement pool without special logistical arrangements.
2 Based on training, aircraft models, and roles observed in exercises. Some Pact tactical air units
are cross-trained in other missions to varying degrees.
3 All figures in this table represent the number of operationally available (OA) aircraft that are
assigned to active combat units of the Warsaw Pact tactical air forces. In most units this
would include a few aircraft above the normal unit equipment (UE). The figures do not in-
clude some 900 combat-capable trainers that are in Pact tactical air units or some 2,500 aircraft
assigned to Pact (mainly in the USSR) operational conversion units and pilot training schools.
These aircraft probably could serve as maintenance and attrition replacements during hostilities.
The table does not include aircraft in storage.
4 Includes 50 aircraft subordinate to the Polish Naval Air Forces.
14
Top Secret
7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
major surface combatants and 260 general purpose
submarines.
A. Possible Theaters of War With NATO
19. Soviet strategists have identified at least three
theaters of military operations in which they en-
visage potential land conflicts with NATO. These
theaters are described below along with brief char-
acterizations of the types of military operations
which the Soviets appear to envisage for each.
Also, the military forces which probably would
be available for early use in each theater are de-
scribed. Pact planning is sufficiently flexible to
allow for variations in any of these elements
indicates
that the Soviets envisage a theater of military op-
erations based on the Leningrad Military District
which would encompass the Scandinavian penin-
sula. This information implies contingency plans for
the defense of the Murmansk and White Sea areas
including Northern Fleet installations, and for the
neutralization or seizure of the lightly defended
NATO facilities in northern Norway. Whether plans
exist for early offensive operations into central
regions of Norway is unknown, but these areas
are rugged and considerably more defensible than
those in the north. In any event, the Soviets are
constrained by the distances involved from bring-
ing their ground and tactical air forces to bear
against most of Norway in the initial phase of a
war. Their large Northern Fleet, including 56 active
major surface combatants, 130 general purpose sub-
marines and some 65 naval combat aircraft, prob-
ably would be used against NATO naval forces
and merchant shipping. There are nine Soviet divi-
sions, one an airborne division, in the Leningrad
Military District-the only district opposite the
Northwestern Theater-and about 170 combat air-
craft in its Frontal Aviation units. Also, there is a
Naval Infantry regiment in the Murmansk area
wits amphibious lift avaiIab-le`toit.
21. Western Theater. The Western Theater would
include East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
on the Pact side and the FRG, the Benelux nations,
Denmark, and France on the NATO side. The bulk
of both NATO's and the Pact's theater forces are
either located in Central Europe or earmarked for
use there. Pact forces currently in Central Europe
Warsaw Pact Country
NATO Country
Faeroe Is.
.W IoenI
JUnite
Kingc
ao,do,,
15
Top Secret
797
'~ ", g? 1
(a Gemyn
1 B I
~Fagono l % r Gem. Rep
as Republic- war
of Germany
Mun,h~
wars,
Poland
?w,n~.aw
Belgrade
:1`111:...,k
Bulgaria
Sofia
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
include 58 ground divisions and 2,045 tactical air-
craft. An additional 31 Soviet divisions, including
3 airborne divisions, and 935 tactical aircraft are
stationed in the western USSR adjacent to the re-
gion and are primarily intended to be used in a
Western Theater. The Soviet Baltic Fleet with
45 active major surface combatants and some 210
combat aircraft and the Polish _andEast German
avies wou -d-likely be used to_ -g_ain control - of
the altic Se`a, to support amphibious operations
in the-Western T-1e tter and_to assurepassa to,
fhe open ocean. See paragraphs 82-96 for details
o possible Warsaw Pact operations in this theater.
22. Southwestern Theater. Soviet planners en-
vision military operations against Greece and west-
ern Turkey, and possibly northern Italy and Austria.
operations
against Greece and Turkey would be launched from
Bulgaria and the Odessa region of the USSR to
secure the Turkish Straits and support naval op-
erations in the eastern Mediterranean. Opera-
tions against northern Italy intended to secure
the southern flank of the Western Theater might
be launched from Hungary through Yugoslavia
or Austria. There are 28 Pact divisions and 7
brigades and 540 tactical aircraft in Hungary, Ro-
mania, and Bulgaria. In the Odessa Military Dis-
trict, there are an additional eight Soviet divisions
(including one airborne division) and 230 tactical
aircraft primarily for use in a Southwestern Theater.
The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, with 61 active major
surface combatants, 25 submarines, about 120 com-
bat aircraft and a Naval Infantry regiment, and the
much smaller Bulgarian Navy would support op-
erations to gain the traits acid neutralize NATO
naval forces in the Mediterranean and Black S as.
23. The Soviets also probably have contingency
plans for operations against eastern Turkey. About
18 divisions (including one airborne) and 270 com-
bat aircraft in the North Caucasus and Trans-
caucasus Military Districts could be used in these
operations.
24. General Reserves. In addition to the forces
evidently earmarked for early use against NATO
in potential theaters, 22 additional Soviet divisions
(including one airborne) are located west of the
Ural Mountains in the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and
Volga Military Districts. There is little evidence 25X1
on where or when the Soviets would expect to
use these divisions. The central location and low
state of readiness of the motorized rifle and tank
divisions suggest, however, that initially most of
them might be held as a general reserve for use
in any of the theaters opposite NATO. They could
also be used in a Far Eastern theater in the case
of a Sino-Soviet war.
CENTRAL ASIAN
16
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
C
25. Soviet Theater Forces Facing China. There
are an additional 49 divisions and 1,355 tactical
aircraft in the Soviet military districts east of the
Ural Mountains and in the Mongolian Peoples Re-
public. We believe that these forces are intended
mainly for the contingency of a war with China
and that, barring a radical improvement in Sino-
Soviet relations, most of them would be retained
in the Far East even during a Soviet war with
NATO.
26. Soviet Strate is Attack Forces iforrTTheeaater
Nuclear War. Elements of all the Soviet strategic
attack forces-Strategic Rocket Troops, Long
Range Aviation, and ballistic missile submarines
of the Soviet _Navy-would be -available to partici-
pate in Warsaw Pact nuclear strikes on NATO
Europe. Most of the 496 operational MRBMs and
the 87 IRBMs are targeted on Europe; the MRBMs
are aimed mainly at NATO's Central Region and
the United Kingdom while the IRBMs are aimed
mostly toward the northern and southern European
areas. Some 530 intermediate range bombers lo-
cated west of the Ural Mountains are mainly in-
tended for strikes against NATO Europe. Also,
some 11 of the Soviets older model ballistic missile
submarines, with a total of 33 launch tubes, are
probably earmarked for use in Europe. We doubt
that any of the Y-class or D-class SSBNs would be
diverted from their deterrent mission for use in
Europe. (See Table 3 for a listing of systems chiefly
intended for European use.)
27. We believe that only a relatively small por-
tion of the 1,600 Soviet ICBMs would be used to
strike targets in NATO Europe. The 140 strike-
configured long-range bombers are mainly intended
for intercontinental strikes but are capable of strik-
ing European targets.
28. Soviets Views on the Importance of Central
Europe. However hostilities began, the Soviets
would expect Central Europe to be the decisive
theater of a large-scale conflict. Europe's major
population and economic centers are there, as are
the bulk of NATO's and the Pact's theater forces.
Whether the Soviets would launch offensives on
NATO's flanks concurrently with any campaign
in Central Europe is uncertain and would depend
on the circumstances at the time. We believe that
the Warsaw Pact has the means to conduct limited,
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Chiefly Intended
For Theater Operations Against NATO
1 July 1975
Land-based Missiles (launchers)
SS-4 (MRBM) ....................... 496
SS-5 (IRBM) ........................ 87
Total .............................. 583
Long Range Aviation Bombers 2
TU-16 Badger ........................ 350
TU-22 Blinder ........................ 165
TU-Backfire ......................... 15'
Total .............................. 530
Submarine Launched Missiles (Submarines/Launchers)
C-I SSB ............................ 2/6
C-II SSB ............................ 5/15
H-II SSBN .......................... 4/12
' Most Soviet MRBMs and IRBM launchers have a refire
capability. The Soviets may have as many as four missiles
available for each operational launch crew operating out
of soft sites. Refire missiles may be available at IRBM
silo launchers. Refire missiles are probably not available
at MRBM hard sites.
2 The Soviets also have 105 TU-95 Bear and 35 M-Type
Bison intercontinental bombers which could be used against
NATO targets.
'While initial deployments suggest that the Backfire is
targeted on peripheral targets, its estimated performance
capabilities make it a potential intercontinental threat. See
the upcoming NIE 11-3/8 for further details.
but not general, offensive operations in the North-
western and Southwestern Theaters while simul-
taneously carrying out an offensive against the
NATO center. The Soviets would view the outcome
of such flank operations, especially one against the
Turkish Straits, as significantly influencing the suc-
cess of their naval operations. These operations
might also draw NATO ground and air forces away
from Central Europe. We judge that early Pact
offensive operations toward the Turkish Straits and
northern Norway are more likely than in the other
flank areas such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia.
29. Early operations against northern Italy and
Scandinavia-aside from northern Norway-would
appear to offer little advantage to the Soviets com-
mensurate with the cost in diversion of Pact forces
from more urgent objectives. The Soviets are un-
17
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
likely to anticipate any serious threat from Italy
to a Pact operation in Central Europe. Neither are
they likely to feel seriously threatened from eastern
Turkey.
30. The Soviets must view the recurring crises
in the eastern Mediterranean area as weakening
NATO, but at the same time these events, and the
prospects for a Yugoslav succession crisis after Tito,
probably loom in their eyes as potential sources of
dangerous East-West tensions. In this sense, they
probably consider the risk of conflict to be higher
in the Southwestern Theater than elsewhere, but
they would still see Central Europe as the decisive
arena.
B. Soviet Strategies and Objectives in a
War in Central Europe
31. Soviet Views on Initiation of Hostilities. De-
spite the emphasis on NATO aggressiveness
it is likely that the
Soviets reckon that both sides are effectively de-
terred from deliberately starting a war between the
two alliances. They probably believe that East-West
hostilities-if they occurred at all-would arise
from a snowballing of events growing out of internal
disorders, a localized dispute in Europe such as a
Berlin problem, or a crisis in another area such as
the Middle East. The Soviets would envision a
period of heightened tension before a war, and they
might expect both sides to begin making military
preparations. They would recognize that once either
side began mobilization, tensions would rise sharply
and the danger of accident or miscalculation would
increase. Moreover, once military preparations were
under way, the Soviets would believe that one side
or the other might see advantage in preemption to
take advantage of its preparations and to thwart
those of the other side.
32. Doctrine of the Offensive. Soviet military doc-
trine centers on the offensive. Warsaw Pact strategy
for war with NATO derives from that doctrine. No
matter how hostilities began
the military plan for
successful. termination of a war involves quickly
launching a large-scale Pact offensive to destroy
the main NATO forces and seize, at the least, the
territories of the FRG, the Benelux nations, and
Denmark in a campaign lasting less than a month.
Recent evidence does not reveal Soviet intentions
toward carrying such a Pact offensive into France.
The Soviets might prefer not to attack France if
French forces remained out of the conflict and other
NATO forces did not enter French territory. Also,
the independent French nuclear capability could be
a deterrent because French involvement in the con-
flict would increase the risk of nuclear escalation.
33. The Strategic Initiative. As a corollary to the
doctrine of the offensive, Soviet strategists empha-
size the critical importance of seizing and maintain-
ing the strategic initiative. The principle applies not
only to the ground campaign but also to Pact ef-
forts to achieve air superiority and, ultimately, to
the use of nuclear weapons in the theater. It is an
important factor leading to the Soviets' great con-
cern with combat readiness and to a strong inclina-
tion toward preemption that recurs in their mili-
tary writings. It also is consistent with Warsaw
Pact efforts to maintain a rapid mobilization and
emergency deployment capability, and with the
Pact's expectations of accomplishing some buildup
covertly before its general mobilization is declared.
Finally, it is manifested in Pact ground forces or-
ganization and tactics, with their emphasis on the
tank-dominated forces, surprise, and blitzkrieg.
34. In a conflict with NATO, the Soviets would
hope that, by seizure of the initiative, they could
interrupt NATO's mobilization and forestall US re-
inforcements. But they recognize that this would be
complicated by a period of political crisis and ten-
sion that almost certainly would precede a war
and provide impetus to NATO preparations. If their
offensive is begun sufficiently early, however, they
might even hope to overrun NATO territory so
rapidly as to limit the prospects that NATO tactical
nuclear weapons could be used to retrieve the situ-
ation.
35. The Dilemma of the Nuclear Transition. So-
viet military writings confirm that Warsaw Pact
planners are faced with a dilemma in the prospect
that a war with NATO could begin non-nuclear and
escalate rapidly to large-scale nuclear war. On the
one hand they would wish to mass large concen-
trations of forces where they chose to attempt
breakthroughs. On the other hand they fear that
NATO might take advantage of their vulnerability
while massing for an attack and launch a preemp-
tive nuclear strike.
18
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
CS
36. The dilemma has another aspect. It has driven
the Soviets to plan a risky, massive, non-nuclear
air attack on NATO's air and nuclear facilities-to
which they would commit the bulk of the Warsaw
Pact tactical air force and much of the Soviet stra-
tegic bomber force-in large part in the hope of
eliminating most of NATO's theater nuclear poten-
tial at the very outset of hostilities. (See paragraphs
94-96 for further discussion of Pact air operations.)
37. Pact planners hope to reduce their vulnerabil-
ity while massing for attack, by doing so as much
as possible during darkness and by conducting the
operation with great speed, thereby denying NATO
the opportunity to use nuclear weapons before
Pact forces have closed with and, theoretically,
penetrated NATO's defenses. Also, they place much
stress on efforts to divine NATO's intent to use nu-
clear weapons on a large scale in time to make a
Pact preemptive attack. To this end, they expect
to keep their own nuclear delivery systems in a
high state of readiness and to conduct a vigorous
reconnaissance and intelligence collecting program
against NATO's nuclear units and facilities as well
as its communications networks on which imminent
use of nuclear weapons might be presaged. Despite
their efforts, the Soviets are not confident that they
could solve the problems of transition from non-
nuclear to nuclear war in Europe.
C. The Strategic Backdrop of a War in
Europe
38. The Soviets perceive great danger of escala-
tion to a strategic exchange in the event of a war
with NATO. In a period of high tension they would
take measures to improve the readiness of their
strategic nuclear forces and enhance their war fight-
ing capss ilities. They would, for example, probably
alert the Strategic Rocket Forces and heighten their
efforts to acquire early_ warning of a US decision
to launch an a`- t`tack on the USSR. In addition they
might wish to demonstrate their strategic readiness
despite the inherent risks of causing NATO to ready
itself or initiate hostilities. Overt measures might
include massive civil defense activities, the de ov
ment of fleet elements, the movement of aircraft,---
or relocation of key government and military ele-
ments.
39. Furthermore, during any military involvement
in Europe, the Soviets would feel themselves vul-
nerable to Chinese exploitation. They would prob-
ably take steps to achieve a maximum deterrent
posture with their forces opposite China.
IV. WARSAW PACT PLANNING FOR INITIAL
OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE
A. Forces
40. The Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite
NATO in Central Europe, and those primarily in-
tended for use there, are on the whole larger,
better equipped, and more rigorously trained than
other Pact forces. Also, these forces are generally
at a higher level of peacetime manning and are
more combat-ready than the others. (See Table 4
Warsaw Pact Theater Forces Opposite NATO in
Central Europe and in Western USSR
1 July 1975
In In the
Central Western
Europe' USSR 2
Men:
Ground Forces ............ 950,000 274,000
Tactical Air Forces ........ 200,000 52,000
1,150,000 326,000
Tanks ..................... 16,000 7,500
Divisions:
Tank .................... 26 14
Motorized Rifle ........... 30 14
Assault Landing ........... 1 -
Airborne ................. 1 3
58 31
Tactical Aircraft: '
Counterair ................ 855 330
Ground Attack ............ 825 475
Reconnaissance/ECM ...... 365 130
2,045 935
' Includes only Pact forces in East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. Pact forces in Hungary probably would
not be part of an offensive against the NATO Central
Region, although so-capable, but would more likely be used
either to defend the southern flank of the Pact forces against
possible attack from Austrian or Yugoslav territories, or to
conduct offensive operations through those countries.
2Includes forces in the Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian
Military Districts.
' Does not include combat-capable trainers or some 730
aircraft assigned to the East German, Polish, and Czech
National Air Defense Commands.
19
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
for details on ground and tactical air forces op-
posite NATO in Central Europe and the western
USSR. Details on the Baltic Fleet are in NIE
11-15-74, Soviet Naval Policy and Programs.)
Ground Forces
41. The ground forces are the key element of
Warsaw Pact theater forces, with the bulk of the
manpower and the primary offensive combat roles.
Roughly half of the Pact ground forces in Central
Europe are Soviet (27 out of 58 divisions) and
two thirds of the total which we believe are in-
tended for early use there are Soviet (58 1 out
of 89).
42. Peacetime Status. We have previously esti-
mated that all Soviet units in Central Europe were
at or near intended wartime personnel strength.
This judgment was based on observations of high
activity in Soviet garrisons and training areas, the
emphasis on combat readiness in Soviet writings,
and the apparent lack of locally available Soviet
reservists that could be called up to fill shortages.
During recent years, however, we have acquired
evidence which does not comport with this judg-
ment.
- Documentary evidence indicates that one So-
viet motorized rifle company in East Germany
is authorized only 88 men as against the 107
which we estimate to be the unit's wartime
TO. Another document indicates that a Soviet
motor transport company in East Germany
had 15 percent of its slots vacant and marked
to be filled from reserves.
the TOE of his motorized rifle regiment in
East Germany which indicate that the regi-
ment was authorized 10 percent fewer men
than we estimate for its wartime TO.
- Several sources have reported that discharged
Soviet servicemen are retained in East Ger-
many as civilian employees-but in ready re-
serve status-to fill critical technical positions
in Soviet units.
2
5X1
Nevertheless, the observed high activity levels of
Soviet units in Central Europe and the evidence
associated with Soviet troop rotations suggest that
generally high manning levels are maintained in
those forces.
43. More information and further analysis are
needed to determine how many and what kinds
of units are affected by the above conditions and
the extent to which mobilization might be used.
The available evidence suggests, however, that some
individual Soviet combat regiments are manned as
much as 10 percent below their intended wartime
strength. Some support units may be manned even
lower. We do not believe, however, that the lower
manning levels reflected in available evidence
would significantly reduce the combat readiness
of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. We continue to
believe that these forces are manned and equipped
at levels which would permit them to conduct \ )
effective combat operations on short notice.
44. None of the East European ground forces
are fully manned in peacetime. We have good
evidence from a variety of sources that the East
European combat units are at varying reduced
strength levels ranging from as high as around 90
percent of war strength for East German divisions
to as low as 25 percent for a few Czechoslovak
and Polish cadre divisions. East European support
units are mainly at low strength levels.
45. The range of manning levels of Soviet
ground forces in the western USSR resembles that
of the East European ground forces: some are
at relatively high levels and others are low-strength
cadre units. Most of the East European units and
the Soviet units in the western USSR do not have
their wartime allocation of general purpose trucks
but rather would receive civilian trucks requisi-
tioned from the economy. The Soviets, in particular,
have a system in which certain civilian truck en-
terprises are especially selected and maintained
20
Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
C
under military supervision with specific mobiliza-
tion designations to report within a matter of hours
to combat units being mobilized.
46. Availability for Combat and Mobilization
Capability. The Warsaw Pact ground forces in Cen-
tral Europe are maintained in a status that would
enable them to react defensively in emergencies
with little prior preparation. We believe that the
Soviet divisions are capable of vacating their gar-
risons in two hours and would be prepared soon
thereafter to conduct either defensive or offensive
operations. The majority of the East European
divisions are sufficiently manned to conduct limited
military operations and detailed alerting procedures
are maintained and rehearsed frequently.
47. Before launching a coordinated, large-scale
offensive, however, Pact ground forces would re-
quire major preparations including general mo-
bilization in all the East European countries, con-
centration of combat forces in assembly areas for
attack or in reserve areas, and establishment of
field depots and other support bases. Other meas-
ures would include establishment of communica-
tions networks, activation of command posts and
exchange of staff and liaison personnel, reconnais-
sance, preparation of field fortifications and weap-
ons emplacements, and the preparation and issuance
of orders. The Pact would probably attempt initially
to conceal or disguise their preparations but, on
the whole, the scale of activities would be unprece-
dented ' since World War II.
48. The entire process of preparation has, of
course, never been rehearsed on a scale approach-
ing that required for war. Most of the elements are
practiced on a partial scale from time to time,
especially those involving the tactical preparations
of the troop units. We have little evidential basis
for estimating how long the Pact would take to
make all of the preparations necessary for a co-
ordinated offensive. We can, however, estimate how
long after the forces were alerted certain key actions
would take.
- All 27 Soviet divisions in Central Europe and
the six East German divisions probably could
move from their garrisons to their concentra-
tion areas in about 24 hours.
- Seven Czechoslovak divisions in western
Czechoslovakia could be filled out and moved
to their attack locations in about two days.
- The nine Polish mechanized and tank divisions
in the Pomeranian and Silesian Military Dis-
tricts could be filled out and moved into
northern East Germany in three to four days.
The Polish airborne and sea landing divisions
would be available within 24 hours but their
movement would largely depend on the avail-
ability of Soviet transport.
- The remaining seven Czechoslovak and Polish
low-strength divisions could be filled out in
about three days and would then be available
to be moved.
- The 31 Soviet divisions in the western USSR
could also be filled out in from one to three
days, depending on their peacetime manning
levels, and made ready to begin movement
westward.
Various calculations of Soviet capability to move all
of these divisions and their associated headquarters
and support units into their concentration areas
in Central Europe have been made in the US and
elsewhere. Depending upon the assumptions used
as to road, rail, and air capacities, availability of
trains, and organization and priority of units and
supplies to be moved, these calculations yield
figures ranging roughly between 10 to 20 days.
No interference by Western actions is assumed in
any of these calculations. (See paragraphs 82-93
for a discussion of Soviet planning with respect
to the timing of these forces' movement and their
likely role in combat.)
49. Airborne Troops. The Soviets have seven
airborne divisions?-six of them located west of
the Urals-which could be used in any theater.
large 25X1
airborne formations would be used in conjunction
with other forces in operations across major water
barriers, for example in an attempt to seize the
Danish islands and the Turkish Straits. In smaller
regimental- or battalion-sized units, they could
be used to seize bridgeheads in close proximity to
advancing ground forces in land campaigns, or to
21 25X1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
conduct raids on small but critical enemy installa-
tions. Sufficient military air transport is available
to lift the assault elements of about two airborne
divisions simultaneously, but conflicting require-
ments for relocating tactical air forces and con-
ducting high priority movement of personnel rein-
forcements and supplies could reduce the number
of transports available for airborne operations in
the early stages of a war.
Air Forces
50. There are about 2,045 tactical aircraft (1,155
Soviet and 890 East European) based in East
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Another
935 are located in the three western military dis-
tricts of the USSR and could reinforce those al-
ready in Eastern Europe on short notice (see
Table 4). The largest concentration of Pact tactical
air power opposite NATO is the Soviet air army
in East Germany which has some 745 combat air-
craft on 18 bases. The Soviets also have ? smaller
tactical air forces in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
51. The Poles and Czechs have sizable tactical
air forces of their own and, with the Soviets, these
units would have major responsibilities for offensive
air operations in the northern and southern sectors
of the Western Theater. East Germany has estab-
lished two tactical air units-previously it had
only national air defense units.
52. About 40 percent of Pact tactical aircraft-
primarily MIG-21s and MIG-23s-opposite the
the NATO Central Region are fighters in counterair
units that have the mission of destroying NATO's air
forces through aerial engagements or attacks on
bases. Another 40 percent are ground attack air-
craft-mainly SU-7/17 and MIG-17 fighter-bomb-
ers-with the mission of destroying NATO ground
targets either in support of the ground forces or
as part of the initial theater-wide strikes. The re-
mainder of the force consists of reconnaissance and
other specialized support aircraft that provide tar-
get location and electronic warfare support to the
counterair and ground attack units. In addition,
there are 40 ECM-equipped AN-12s assigned to
Military Transport Aviation which would operate
in support of the tactical air forces.
53. Aside from their tactical air forces the Soviets
have some 530 intermediate-range bombers of
Long Range Aviation based in the western USSR.
These bombers, possibly augmented by Soviet
naval aircraft, would be used for strikes against
targets in the NATO rear area that require large
conventional or nuclear payloads.
54. Soviet Military Transport Aviation would pro-
vide the main airlift capability for Pact forces
opposite NATO. Equipped with some 650 AN-12
medium assault and 60 AN-22 and IL-76 heavy
cargo transports, one of its primary missions would
be to lift airborne troops. Military Transport Avia-
tion would also be extensively used to support
tactical air deployments and for logistic and re-
supply tasks, such as the transport of nuclear
weapons. The Soviet civil air transport organiza-
tion, Aeroflot, can substantially augment Military
Transport Aviation. It could potentially double the
Soviet capability to airlift passengers and has some
200 AN-12s that could be used to transport bulk
cargoes.
55. Some 1,000 light, medium, and heavy heli-
copters are assigned to Soviet Frontal Aviation in
East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the
three western military districts. About 425 heli-
copters are in the East German, Polish, and Czech
air forces. Most Pact helicopter units would be
responsible for airlifting combat troops and logistic
and liaison tasks. As new models are introduced
and new equipment is retrofitted to existing models,
these forces are increasingly capable of conducting
air assault, ground attack, and anti-helicopter opera-
tions.
56. Peacetime Status and Buildup Capability.
Pact air forces are generally maintained at or near
their wartime personnel and equipment levels and
would require little preparation before combat.
Redeployment of tactical air units, possibly in-
cluding reinforcements from the USSR, would
likely occur prior to an attack. Many units in
Central Europe, particularly some equipped with
older, short-range aircraft, are currently located
where they cannot reach critical NATO targets
without staging to forward bases. In general, most
tactical air units with air-defense responsibilities
are located where they can provide coverage from
their peacetime bases.
57. If the Soviets considered air reinforcement
to be necessary in a war with NATO, we estimate
that several hundred tacital aircraft, along with a
minimum required amount of ground personnel
22
Top Secret
r\
c
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
and equipment, could be moved from the western
USSR to bases in Central Europe in from one to
three days. The actual time involved would depend
upon the amount of air transport support allocated
to the reinforcement effort. This does not take into
consideration, however, the potential effects of
incalculables such as adverse weather or military
counteractions by NATO.
Theater Nuclear Forces
58. In addition to the USSR-based strategic sys-
tems that could be used for massive nuclear strikes
against NATO Europe, the Soviets have a variety
of tactical nuclear delivery systems in their ground
and air forces. The quantity of delivery systems has
been increasing in recent years, and this would
enable the Soviets to conduct nuclear warfare in
Europe at higher intensities before having to use
their USSR-based systems. There is, however, no
direct evidence that the Soviets are deliberately
seeking to provide themselves with an alternative
to using their USSR-based nuclear forces in large-
scale theater nuclear war.
59. Numerically, the most important nuclear
delivery systems in Eastern Europe are Soviet
tactical aircraft. We have identified some 20 Soviet
tactical air units in East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia which-based on their training and
exercise activities-are believed to have a mission
of delivering nuclear bombs. There are about 850
combat aircraft assigned to these units. There is
good evidence, however, that only about 300 of
the pilots, the most experienced, in these units are
qualified-according to Soviet standards-to drop
nuclear bombs. We expect that the number of Soviet
tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe with nuclear
missions will continue to grow as they train addi-
tional air crews and re-equip units with nuclear-
capable aircraft such as the MIG-23 Flogger and
SU-17 Fitter. There are some 100 aircraft in Czech
and Polish units that train in nuclear delivery
techniques.
60. Ground forces nuclear delivery systems in-
clude the FROG, Scud, and Scaleboard missiles.
The Pact is estimated to have 57 FROG battalions
with some 200 launchers and 19 Scud brigades with
190 launchers in East Germany, Poland, and Czech-
oslovakia. The Scud has an effective range of
about 160 nm and the FROG about 40 nm. None
of the 500-nm Scaleboard launchers is believed to
be located in Central Europe but we estimate that
three Scaleboard units with a total of up to 36
launchers are part of the forces in the western
USSR earmarked for Central Europe.
61. We have recently acquired evidence that,
25X1
suggests t125X1
the Soviets either have now, or expect to have,
nuclear artillery rounds.
62. We have identified 12 facilities in East Ger-
many, Poland, and Czechoslovakia that we believe
are for the storage of tactical nuclear weapons.'
Available evidence-though inconclusive-suggests
that nuclear weapons are stored in these Soviet-
controlled sites in peacetime. A lack of information
on Soviet storage practices makes it impossible
to determine precisely how many nuclear weapons
might be stored in these sites, but it is estimated that
they could hold from 1,200 to 2,300 warheads and
bombs. We do not believe that the Soviets have
placed nuclear weapons in the hands of their East
European allies. We do not know the circumstances
under which non-Soviet forces might receive nu-
clear weapons, but we judge that they would be
provided weapons once a European conflict esca-
lated to a nuclear stage. We estimate that, even in
wartime, the Soviets would retain control over all
warheads.
63. The Soviets have widely equipped their forces
with a variety of good quality radiological and
chemical defensive equipment-on a par with the
better US equipment. The Soviets have devoted
more resources than the US to radiological and
chemical defense, reflecting the high level of con-
cern the Soviets have for the survivability of their
forces in war when nuclear and chemical weapons
are being used.8
7 Another two facilities in Hungary and three in Bulgaria
have been identified.
8 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that
this paragraph misstates the key aspects of Soviet abilities
for operating in a radiological and/or chemical environment.
Although the best Soviet equipment is on a level which
does not exceed US technical capabilities, the Soviets have
produced and deployed in quantity some types of equip-
ment-for example, the TMS-65 decontamination apparatus
and the BRDM-KhR chemical reconnaissance vehicle-
which US and Allied forces do not possess.
23 25X1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
(CBR) Warfare Capabilities
64. Soviet military doctrine categorizes toxic
chemical agents along with nuclear weapons as
"weapons of mass destruction" and it implies that
the Warsaw Pact would use chemical weapons
once nuclear weapons were introduced in a NATO-
Pact war. Furthermore, chemical weapons, like nu-
clear weapons, are controlled by the Soviets and
their use almost certainly would require Moscow's
approval. We do not believe the Pact intends to
use chemical weapons except in concert with nu-
clear weapons. However, we cannot exclude the
possibility that the Soviets might use chemical
weapons independently.
65. The Pact forces have a variety of systems
capable of delivering chemical agents. These in-
clude artillery (including multiple rocket launch-
ers), mortars, FROGs, Scuds, aerial bombs, and,
possibly, spray tanks. We have little doubt that
the Soviets possess substantial stocks of toxic chem-
ical agents but cannot estimate the size of their
stockpile. We have good evidence, however, that
some toxic chemical munitions are available to
Soviet air forces in Eastern Europe.
66. The Warsaw Pact forces emphasize CBR
defense more than NATO. They have developed an
extensive CBR organization with specialized units
down to the division level for technical recon-
naissance and decontamination and have furnished
their forces with a variety of good quality CBR
equipment. In recent years Soviet forces have been
receiving newer models of equipment designed to
improve their effectiveness in a CBR environment.
New APCs and perhaps new tanks and some trucks
as well as various types of support equipment are
equipped with advanced filtration and protective
systems. CBR training for the forces is extensive
and frequent; training of chemical defense units
includes use of toxic chemical agents. All these
measures enable the Pact forces to operate in a
CBR environment more effectively than NATO
forces.
67. All the Warsaw Pact countries have signed
the international agreement prohibiting the pro-
duction, storage, and use of biological weapons.
There is good evidence that, in the past, the Soviets
conducted extensive research on biological agents
and protective techniques and they probably have
facilities that could be used to make biological
Naval Forces
68. Soviet, East German, and Polish naval forces
in the Baltic Sea would. support-Pact-operations in
Central Europe.
ilitary
writings indicate that amphibious operations in-
volving the Polish assault landing division, an am-
phibious assault trained East German motorized
rifle division, and the Soviet naval infantry regi-
ment in the Baltic area are planned in conjunction
with airborne troop landings to seize key Danish
islands and link up with Pact ground forces attack-
ing through Jutland. The purpose would be to
secure the Danish Straits, deny the Baltic to West-
ern naval units, and int re dic NATO supply lines
in the--North Sea.
69. Pact surface ships, submarines, and naval
aircraft would-have the mission of sweeping he
Baltic Sea and its approaches of hosts a n'l aval forces
early in the war: Large mine=laying operations to
prevent later penetrations by NAT O_forces prob-
ably would also occur.
70. NIE 11-15-74, Soviet Naval Policy and Pro-
grams, presents a detailed treatment of the mis-
sions, forces, and capabilities of Pact naval forces
in a war with NATO.
Strengths and Weaknesses
71. Ground Forces. Pact ground forces' doctrine
and organization are centered around the medium
tank. The rapidly advancing offensive that the Pact
intends to conduct depends on the shock, firepower,
and mobility of their tanks. Compared to Western
forces, Pact units have more tanks overall (16,000
in Central Europe) and a much higher proportion
of tanks to men.
72. In a ground offensive the Pact would. seek
to attain favorable force ratios in local areas over
NATO forces and use its mechanized infantry, tanks,
and supporting artillery to break through NATO's
defenses. Pact tank columns would then commence
high speed drives toward their major objectives-
on the Rhine River and beyond. Once committed
to deep penetrations, the tank forces would have
to rely largely on their own firepower, air defenses,
24
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
and logistic support to avoid being cut off and
destroyed.
73. Soviet ground forces, in recent years, have
acquired more tanks and more and better divisional
artillery. Also, Pact ground forces have acquired
an extensive, integral air-defense capability that is
without parallel in NATO. The variety of antiair-
craft guns and surface-to-air missiles currently in
the ground forces can provide multi-weapon air-
defense coverage at all altitudes likely to be used
by NATO tactical aircraft. Most of these systems
are mobile and capable of accompanying other
rapidly maneuvering combat formations.
74. The Pact also benefits from the logistic and
command advantages that accrue from having
ground forces that are more homogeneous than
NATO's in terms of organization and equipment.
Almost all combat equipment in the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact forces is of Soviet design and the
units are generally organized after the Soviet model.
This should facilitate the coordination of support
and operation of East European forces with Soviet
armies.
75. Significant shortcomings in the Pact's ground
forces remain, however. Although large quantities
of a variety of modern weapons have been intro-
duced into the ground forces in recent years a few
types of equipment are still in short supply. For
example, there still are fewer APCs available than
Pact doctrine and organization require. For APCs,
as well as for other items of equipment, the Pact
has used a mixture of different types of old and
new equipment to fill out units-thereby compli-
cating supply and maintenance operations. Soviet
improvements in non-nuclear artillery and tank
ammunition effectiveness have not kept pace with
those of the US, although the Pact greatly out-
numbers NATO in quantities of artillery pieces and
tanks.
76. On balance, however, developments since
the early 1960s have largely erased the former pic-
ture of Pact armies as a horde armed with masses of
simple, rugged, easily maintained weapons. The
Pact ground forces are now maturing as modern
forces of a sophistication comparable to that of
Western armies.
77. Air Forces. A strong feature of the Warsaw
Pact's air forces is the large number of versatile
aircraft available and the extensive, hardened air
base system. The Pact has sufficient airfields and
logistic supplies located in Eastern Europe to sup-
port a variety of deployments, reinforcements, and
air attack operations over extended periods. Pact
air units are well versed in deployment and dis-
persal techniques. Moreover, Pact pilot training
now provides the force with greater mission flexi-
bility than in the 1960s.
78. Most Pact ground attack aircraft still have
a short range, small payload, and poor all-weather
capabilities when compared to NATO's aircraft.
This has resulted in Pact reliance on the obsoles-
cent and vulnerable Soviet intermediate-range
bomber force for deep strikes when using con-
ventional bombs. Pact tactical air forces also lag
considerably behind NATO's in the availability of
sophisticated air-to-ground munitions such as tac-
tical air-to-surface missiles and laser-guided bombs.
79. Deficiencies also exist in the air defense cap-
abilities of Pact tactical air units. Almost all Pact
air intercept training is conducted under strict
ground control within the range of the friendly air
surveillance network. There is evidently little em-
phasis placed on free air combat outside the con-
trol system. This could limit the Pact's wartime
ability to seek out and destroy airborne enemy air-
craft over NATO territory.
80. The Soviets have developed chaff and active
jammers to cover virtually all of NATO's radar
frequencies-the A through J bands-and their
forces exercise frequently in an electronic warfare
environment. We do not know, however, how ef-
fective these systems would be against NATO air
defense systems.
81. The development and deployment since the
late 1960s of improved aircraft and airborne weap-
ons reflect a Pact recognition of the shortcomings
of its air forces, especially for non-nuclear war. As
the proportion of the force equipped with new
systems increases and its capabilities expand, we
expect to see a continuing evolution of Pact air
doctrine away from its traditional preoccupation
with air defense, and toward a wider range of of-
fensive and- defensive missions. Current Pact pro-
grams to improve the air forces are discussed in
more detail beginning at paragraph 144.
C, 25 25X1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secre
B. Pact Concepts for Launching an Offensive
in Central Europe
82. We have heretofore estimated that, before
launching offensive operations against NATO in
Central Europe, the Soviets probably would con-
duct a large reinforcement of ground forces from
the western USSR. This judgment was based on
the early
1960s and on our then-current assessment of the
forces. At that time the East European forces were
relatively ineffective and could have made only
a minor contribution to a Pact offensive. Also, at
that time, the Soviets believed that nuclear weapons
would be used massively at the outset of a conflict
and, therefore, that it was imperative to bring for-
ward the additional Soviet forces deemed neces-
sary for an offensive before NATO could destroy
or interdict them. Although this offered NATO
more lucrative nuclear targets, the Soviets seemed
willing to accept the increased vulnerability that
reinforcing units massed in the forward area would
entail.
'ntelligence information
acquired since the late 1960s indicates that the So-
viets now consider it likely that their operations-
including major offensives-would begin prior to
their carrying out a large-scale reinforcement.
features:
- NATO is always portrayed as the aggressor
but the Pact is never caught unprepared be-
cause the NATO attack follows a period of
greatly increased tension.
- During the days or weeks of crisis that pre-
cede hostilities the Pact takes steps to im-
prove its military posture but Pact general
mobilization does not occur until hostilities are
clearly imminent-no more than a few days
before war begins.
- The initial ground reinforcements from out-
side Central Europe consist of from one to
three Soviet armies which are committed
by the end of the first week of combat, but
these do not begin moving westward from the
USSR until war has begun.
- Follow-on reinforcements from the USSR are
usually not brought into play for yet another
week, and even then their role is ambiguous.
They could be used for an invasion of France,
serve as replacements for first-line units-
particularly if the war had gone nuclear-or
be used to eliminate pockets of NATO forces
bypassed earlier in the offensive.
85. In our view, these recurring themes indicate
that Pact planners no longer see war with NATO
as necessarily preceded by large-scale reinforce-
ment of their ground forces prior to hostilities in
Europe. This change does not necessarily represent
a Soviet preference for initiating hostilities prior to
large-scale reinforcement but rather, from their
point of view, reflects a prudent planning assump-
tion. They may simply calculate that there will
not be sufficient time for a massive ground move-
ment before any likely crisis escalates to open war-
fare. They may also reckon that, for a variety of 25X1
reasons, large-scale ground reinforcement prior to
a conflict could be counterproductive. It could, for
25X1
example, invite preemptive action by NATO, in- "
cluding the early use of nuclear weapons. It might
also cause NATO to begin a buildup of its own
that would work against the Pact's initial numerical
superiority of forces in the area.
86. In any event, the Soviet military evidently
25X1
25X1
believe that Pact ground forces are superior to 25X1
NATO's. They also believe that Pact forces now in 25X1
Central Europe are not only capable of containing Lo~C1
a NATO attack in the early days of a conflict, but
are also capable of conducting a non-nuclear of-
fensive into West Germany before the first Soviet
ground reinforcements reach the combat zone.9
The Pact, of course, has a variety of options avail-
able with regard to the use of its sizable ground
reinforcements in the USSR. The evidence clearly
indicates to us, however, that Soviet planning per-
spectives currently hold the above scenario to be
the most realistic.
87. There are several possible reasons why Soviet
planners evidently no longer consider a ground
26
Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secre
forces' buildup before an offensive against NATO
to be a realistic planning assumption. One is that
the organization, equipment, and training of the
East Europeans has increased to the point where
they can play a major role in initial operations
against NATO.
88. Another factor has been the addition to Pact
forward strength of the Soviet Central Group of
Forces in Czechoslovakia.
C. Wartime Organization
92. For initial wartime operations against NATO
in Central Europe the Pact plans-if given time-
to organize its forces in East Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia into three fronts. Although the
composition and internal organization of the forces
in each front could vary, their general zones of re-
sponsibility would be as follows:
- Central Front. The main Pact effort would
clearly fall to this front. It would be primarily
composed of forces operating from southern
East Germany and would have the task of
destroying NATO forces in West Germany
roughly between Hanover in the north and
Mannheim in the south. This front could en-
gage forces from as many as six of NATO's
eight corps areas. It would be the largest Pact
force in the Western Theater with as many
as 25 divisions, including most of the Soviet
forces in East Germany and Poland and per-
haps three of the East German Army's six
divisions.
89. The Soviets may also believe that the rein-
forcement process is not as severely threatened
by NATO nuclear attack as it was in earlier years,
but that reinforcements massed in the forward
area would still be critically -vulnerable to NATO
air attack. Pact doctrine now holds that NATO
use of nuclear weapons is less probable at the out-
set of a war than a decade ago.
90. A final consideration that probably has af-
fected the Soviets' thinking regarding ground rein-
forcement derives from the importance their doc-
trine places on seizing the initiative. Soviet plan-
ners see a greater chance of success if the Pact
could launch its offensive before NATO could
fully build up its forces and prepare its defenses.
They may, therefore, wish to avoid any provocative
actions, such as a major ground reinforcement, that
could precipitate a NATO buildup.
91. This appreciation of Pact offensive concepts
has important warning implications for NATO. In
particular, the movement of a 25- to 30-division
force from the USSR into Central Europe, which
perhaps was the clearest indicator, may not take
place before an attack.
- Northern Front. Pact forces in the north would
be responsible for engaging NATO forces in
Denmark as well as those in the two northern-
most NATO corps areas of West Germany.
20 divisions.
- Southwestern Front. The majority of the forces
comprising this front would be Czechoslovak,
with the addition of the five Soviet divisions
in Czechoslovakia. This front, with some 15
divisions, would have the responsibility of ad-
vancing as far as the Rhine in an area roughly
between Mannheim and the Swiss border.
93. The organization of Pact forces is flexible
and operations subsequent to the initial days of a
27
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
conflict may take several forms.
'25X1
fore they are fully organized. The achievement of `,___.,25X1
tour ront-using one to three of the initia re-
inforcing armies from the USSR-which probably
would be formed after a week or so as the geo-
graphic breadth of the campaign area expanded.
94. Initial Air Operations. Pact doctrine em-
phasizes that the success of a ground campaign
in Europe is highly dependent on the proper utili-
zation of air power. The Soviets probably consider
that, despite the Pact's superiority on the ground,
NATO's tactical air forces could enable NATO
forces to blunt or perhaps even halt a Pact ground
offensive. Because of this the Pact evidently has
determined that the most effective application of
its air forces in the early conventional phase of a
war would be in the form of massive, theater-wide
strikes aimed at destroying NATO's tactical air
forces and other nuclear systems and facilities.
These attacks are to commence immediately at the
onset of hostilities and be conducted by Pact tac-
tical aircraft and bombers of Soviet Long Range
and possibly Naval Aviation.
95. These theater-wide strikes probably would
be centrally controlled. Some allocation of air sup-
port to the fronts can be expected during the initial
air operations phase, but control of the tactical air
forces probably would revert to the front command-
ers only when the objectives of these attacks had
been met.
96. We lack direct information concerning the
Pact's view of its own aircraft requirements for
sustained conventional or nuclear air operations in
Central Europe. Given present Soviet capabilities
to reinforce their forward-based tactical air forces
and the large numbers of aircraft already in place,
however, we believe that the Pact would have suf-
ficient forces to conduct conventional operations
while initially withholding a sizable portion for
nuclear contingencies.
a breakthrough would depend on a number of
factors such as surprise, rapid movement, and the
massing of forces. The 58 Warsaw Pact divisions
in Central Europe give the Pact the capability to
initiate offensive action after a relatively brief
period of mobilization and without major reinforce-
ment. Even if their forward disposition and rapid
mobilization allowed them to achieve tactical sur-
prise and deprive NATO of a prolonged warning of
impending war, they would still have to mass
their attacking forces in order to achieve sufficient
local superiority in numbers to overwhelm the
NATO forces at the points at which they chose to
attack. This would make them vulnerable to attack
by nuclear weapons.
98. The Pact's strategy calls for sharply limiting
the period of time in which forces are massed in
order to reduce vulnerability to NATO nuclear
attack. After the forces moved out of dispersed
assembly areas, they would hope to move directly
into initial contact with the enemy, deploying
directly into combat from the march. This is an
extremely complicated maneuver requiring well-
trained, highly mobile forces, reliable reconnais-
sance, and effective command, control, and com-
munications. It calls for an audacity and dash
which is in sharp contrast to the deliberate and
ponderous style which generally characterized
Soviet offensive preparations in World War II.
Soviet training does, however, emphasize many of
the tactics and techniques that would need to be
carried out with high effectiveness if such a
maneuver were to succeed.
V. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF
WARSAW PACT STRATEGY
A. Capability of Pact Ground Forces to
Break-Through NATO's Defenses
97. Pact strategy for a successful offensive in
Central Europe is heavily dependent on rapid
28
Top Secret
100. Soviet forces are provided with reconnais-
sance support at all tactical and strategic levels.
Fronts and armies have signals intelligence and long-
range reconnaissance units, while divisions have
organic reconnaissance battalions. In addition, there
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
C
is airborne visual, photo, and electronic reconnais-
sance, as well as numerous agents in West Germany.
This support should provide the Warsaw Pact forces
with extensive information concerning NATO de-
ployments and battlefield conditions, but the Soviets
have not solved the problem of locating NATO's
mobile nuclear delivery systems once they have
been deployed.
night capabilities, although the use of marker
beacons could provide some fighter-bombers with
the required guidance to target areas. Even so,
most of the fighter-bombers in the present Pact in-
ventory could not reach NATO airfields except by
flying at the relatively vulnerable medium to high
altitudes. The Soviet bomber force, except for the
new Backfire, would also be forced to use the
more vulnerable altitudes due to aircraft perform-
ance limitations.
B. Warsaw Pact Air Operations
101. Faced with the threat from NATO's air and
nuclear capabilities, the Soviets have evidently
decided that the initial Pact air campaign in the
non-nuclear phase of a Central European war
should focus on reducing NATO's tactical air and
nuclear strength. Massive counterair operations
using Pact tactical air forces and USSR-based
bombers probably would be mounted early in a war
to destroy NATO's air forces through aerial en-
gagements and attacks on airfields. At the same
time, Pact air attacks would be directed against
command and control centers, nuclear depots, and
mobile nuclear delivery systems. During these initial
air operations, Pact ground commanders probably
C could count on little direct air support.
102. Soviet planners recognize that these initial
air operations are likely to result in high aircraft
losses, and they may attempt to minimize such
losses by creating breaches in NATO's air defenses
to provide access routes for strikes in NATO's rear
area by Pact aircraft. Despite the risks, the Soviets
probably would consider high aircraft losses ac-
ceptable-viewed in the perspective of a short,
intensive war-if: (a) NATO's air forces were
sufficiently preoccupied with repelling these attacks
to permit Pact ground forces to achieve their of-
fensive goals relatively unimpeded by air attack,
and (b) a sizable portion of NATO's tactical nu-
clear delivery assets were destroyed. The success
of air operations depends heavily on surprise to in-
sure that NATO's mobile nuclear systems are not
dispersed, and that NATO's air defenses are not
fully prepared prior to the initiation of hostilities.
103. The current re-equipment program for So-
viet tactical air forces is still far from complete
and a high proportion of the Pact fighter-bomber
force is composed of older model aircraft. These
aircraft have relatively small fuel and weapons
loads. They also have little or no all-weather and
104. The Pact's limited ability to provide timely
target data to attack forces could hinder the suc-
cess of Pact air operations, particularly in destroy-
ing NATO's mobile missile forces. This problem is
compounded by the relatively limited navigation
and weapons avionics on a large percentage of
Pact tactical aircraft, and by Pact training prac-
tices which stress the use of GCI and rigid execu-
tion of assignments. Once engaged in a heavy ECM
environment and facing active defenses, Pact pilots
are likely to experience difficulty in finding their
targets. Also, although the Soviets are developing
precision-guided munitions for aircraft, they prob-
ably have not yet made these weapons available to
Pact air forces. Use of the older, less accurate muni-
tions currently available would require more sorties
per target and consequent high exposure to NATO
air defenses.
105. Considering the multinational, multicom-
mand nature of initial Pact air operations, the ne-
cessity for close and coordinated timing, and the
large numbers of aircraft involved, the Pact would
be faced with a complicated command and control
situation. We have little basis on which to judge
whether current Pact command and control arrange-
ments would be adequate to this task-Pact exer-
cises generally rehearse only portions of the over-
all air campaign.
C. Control of Multinational Forces in a War-
saw Pact Offensive
106. The Warsaw Pact's ability to coordinate the
actions of large, multinational forces would be
critical to the success of an offensive. Pact strategy
with its emphasis on speed, both in concentration
of force before an attack and in the rapid prosecu-
tion of a campaign to its objectives once begun, is
a key factor contributing to the difficulty of the
29
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
control problem. In Central Europe this strategy
calls for the concurrent movement to operational
locations, within about three days, of 58 divisions
with the support necessary to sustain a large-scale
offensive. Not only must this movement occur
promptly to build up a strong initial combat echelon
but it must also clear the lines of communication
through Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia in time
to begin the early westward movement from the
USSR of up to about 30 more divisions and support
plus the first surge of large-scale resupply ship-
ments.
107. The problem in a Southwestern Theater
would be similar. Fewer forces would be involved
but the projected military operation is more com-
plex, involving combined land, sea, air, amphibious,
and airborne operations against the main objectives.
Also, all of the participating Soviet ground forces
must be brought forward from the USSR and, pos-
sibly, Hungary.
108. The key questions are:
- What means exist to plan, control, and coor-
dinate these highly complex operations?
- How effective would these means be?
joined it. (Its wartime function is still un-
known, however.)
- Major steps have been taken to improve both
Soviet and East European high-level communi-
cations facilities and to make them less vul-
nerable.
- Through training and improved communica-
tions systems the Warsaw Pact forces have
become more proficient in combined opera-
tions; the East German forces, in particular,
are integrated into the operational scheme of
the GSFG.
- The Warsaw Pact members are developing a
uniform command post system to Soviet speci-
fications.
109. In World War II, Soviet operations against
the German coalition were planned and coordinated
by the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and directed
by the Supreme High Command headed by Stalin.
This method served well enough because of the
deliberate pace of operations and because no im-
portant non-Soviet units were involved. Even so,
there were shortcomings and the span of control of
the Moscow authorities was stretched thin at times.
110. In the mid-1960s, when non-Soviet forces
began to assume major, critical roles in planned
Warsaw Pact operations, the problem of control
became acute. Unlike NATO's, the Pact's command
structure was not integrated and, except for a pro
forma Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, no
combined planning staffs existed. That the Soviets
were highly concerned about the problem became
obvious, but the full extent of their efforts to solve
it have remained rather obscure.
111. Several developments are known, however:
- The Warsaw Pact headquarters has grown
and more senior East European officers have
113. Whether it is the reluctance of the East
Europeans to accept more integration that has in-
hibited the development of a more rational system,
or the misgivings of the Soviet General Staff that
would have to relinquish much of its control over
operations, is not clear. Probably it is both. In
any case, the available evidence suggests strongly
that in any NATO-Pact war in the next few years
Moscow would control the operations of each So-
viet and East European front separately through a
variety of means-some directly and some through
the national command authorities of its allies.
114. Such an arrangement might work well
enough if operations went generally according to
the contingency plans-an unlikely event in war.
But it would seem to be particularly unsuited for
managing unexpected large diversions from planned
military operations such as enemy counterattacks
or the need to make unanticipated major force re-
groupments. It would be particularly vulnerable
to disruption in nuclear war.
30
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
- - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
115. We expect the Warsaw Pact to continue
its efforts to solve the critical and complex prob-
lems of coordinating operations of large multina-
tional forces in wartime. These efforts are likely
to include:
- Increased integration and standardization of
Soviet and East European command arrange-
ments and communications systems;
- Greater automation of troop control systems;
- Possibly, development of an intermediate
theater-level control of combined operations.
D. Warsaw Pact Logistical Capability
116. Since the late 1960s we have acquired exten-
sive information on Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine
and planning concepts from Pact military writings
and several former Pact logisticians. Soviet logistical
doctrine-which is, the model for Warsaw Pact
doctrine-is evidently derived from Soviet World
War II experience modified to take account of the
implications of postwar changes in military strategy.
We have no information on whether Pact logistical
doctrine has been further modified to reflect the
high supply expenditure rates experienced by the
US in Vietnam and by both sides in the 1973
Arab-Israeli war.
Ground Forces
117. According to Soviet logistical doctrine, each
front should maintain enough supplies in its depots,
and in the mobile stocks in its armies and divisions,
for 30 days of combat. Altogether, in a theater of
military operations-which might contain several
fronts-the Soviets prescribe stockage of from two
to three months of supplies. In addition to the
theater stocks, the doctrine calls for national re-
serves of materiel, supplies, and raw materials.
There is no information on the magnitude of na-
tional reserves.
118. We have calculated the theoretical capacities
of the identified Pact ground force ammunition and
POL depots. Ammunition and POL make up the
physical bulk of logistical stocks. Based on these
calculations and assuming that prescribed mobile
stocks are maintained in combat units-our infor-
mation suggests that they are-the available stocks
in Central Europe would be as follows:
Warsaw Pact Ground Force Logistic Depot Capacities
(Metric Tons)
Czechoslovakia .......
416,000
328,000
East Germany ........
430,000
531,000
Poland ..............
442,000
634,000
1,288,000
1,493,000
119. We have little information on the actual
contents of Pact depots, but, assuming they are
optimally stocked and using Soviet consumption
planning factors for ammunition and US factors
for POL, we have calculated that these stocks could
represent some 20 to 40 days' worth of supplies
for the 58 divisions located there in intensive non-
nuclear offensive combat. These figures are, at best,
a rough approximation of Pact supply status but
they do suggest that Pact stocks in Central Europe
accord with the doctrinal requirement to stock for
30 days. Such a stockpile would also accord with
Soviet strategic planning which envisages a Central
Europe campaign being completed in less than a
month.
120. Presumably the ground force logistic stocks
in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military
Districts would also be used in a Western Theater
of Operations. The capacities of identified ammuni-
tion depots in these districts are some 376,000
metric tons which would represent perhaps a 10-day
supply for the 86 divisions that we estimate are
earmarked for early use in a Western Theater of
Operations. Identified POL depots in these districts
could hold some 1,825,000 metric tons-perhaps a
50-day supply. These figures suggest that although
POL stocks currently available in the potential
Western Theater of Operations could meet the doc-
trinal requirement of two to three months' supply,
the ammunition stocks would evidently fall some-
what short.
121. Calculations further show that the identified
ground force ammunition depots in the central part
of the USSR-Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga
Military Districts-could hold some 2.2 million
metric tons and POL depots some 3.8 million metric
tons. Presumably, these stocks are intended as re-
serves for a potential war with China as well as
NATO.
25X1
31
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Air Forces
122. We have little information on Pact logistic
doctrine for air forces. The following estimates of
Pact capabilities to sustain air operations are de-
rived from calculations of air force depot capacities.
These calculations are susceptible to considerable
error, however, and we have recently acquired evi-
dence indicating that the current ammunition stock
levels at several Soviet airfields in Central Europe
are far lower than their estimated storage capacities.
Warsaw Pact Air Force Storage Capacities
(Metric Tons)
Czechoslovakia ...........
88,000
285,000
East Germany ...........
60,000
288,000
Poland .................
109,000
421,000
123. Assuming that these commodities would be
used by all Pact air forces (including National Air
Defense) currently based in East Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia, as well as Soviet tactical air
units deployed forward from the nearby western
military districts, the ammunition stocks implied
by the above figures probably could support con-
ventional air operations for about 50 to 65 days.
There probably would be enough aviation POL
available for some 30 to 40 days.10
124. We also have identified depots in the Baltic,
Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts
which could hold an additional 80,000 metric tons
of air ordnance and 1.5 million metric tons of avia-
tion POL. These supplies could also be made avail-
able to Pact air units operating against the NATO
Central Region.
125. The above figures imply that the Warsaw
Pact ground and air forces could have on hand,
in Central Europe and in the USSR west of the
Urals, sufficient ammunition and POL to last
through several months of war, assuming none was
destroyed by enemy action. If stocks of this size
are in fact available, they would probably be ade-
quate to sustain Warsaw Pact forces in combat
until production of new stocks in the USSR could
take up the load.
10 Calculations of ammunition and POL consumption as-
sume an initial three-day surge period during which fighter
aircraft achieve between 3 and 4 sorties per day. After this
period sorties are reduced to about 1.5 to 2 sorties per day.
126. Analysis of the Warsaw Pact's lines of com-
munication (LOCs) capacities in the light of our
estimates of Pact supply requirements and stock-
piles in Central Europe suggests that the Pact would
be likely to begin a massive effort to replenish sup-
plies from the USSR at the outset of hostilities. At
the same time, the Soviets would probably begin a
large-scale movement of troop reinforcements from
the USSR. During the first two weeks after hostili-
ties began, when these troop and supply movements
were straining the capacity of the LOCs, interdic-
tion of the Pact's LOCs could have particularly
critical effects. After this initial surge, the move-
ment would probably subside to a level which
probably could be sustained despite some damage
to the LOCs.
E. The Reliability of East European Forces
127. A major question mark for Soviet military
and political leaders would be the reliability of
East European forces. Soviet-East European rela-
tions have had a checkered history. The USSR
used force to suppress popular demonstrations in
Berlin in 1953, to invade Hungary in 1956, and to
occupy Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Pact has suf-
fered the open break with Albania and well-pub-
licized friction with Romania. While Soviet leaders
may have private doubts of whether the Pact co-
hesiveness would withstand the strains of war, they
have committed themselves to relying on East
European forces to carry out wartime functions po-
tentially critical to the Pact's prospects for success
in a war with NATO. In Central Europe, East
Europeans make important contributions:
- They provide over half the combat divisions.
- They permit the achievement of advantageous
force ratios without reinforcement from the
USSR.
- Polish forces in the north and Czech forces
in the south allow for concentration of Soviet
forces in the critical center.
- Primary Pact logistic routes run through
Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia
and the East Europeans commit heavy re-
sources to their protection.
- East European air defenses provide protection
for logistic and rear area operations.
32
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
C
L
Top Secret
128. In Southern Europe, national forces in Ro-
mania, Hungary, and Bulgaria have less critical
but nonetheless important combat roles on the
flank of the Pact:
- Soviet and Hungarian forces protect against
NATO operations through Austria or Yugo-
slavia.
- Bulgarian forces would be essential to Pact
operations against the Turkish Straits.
- Romania and Bulgaria provide and protect
Pact logistics routes for southern operations.
129. Many aspects of the Pact, dominated as it
is by Soviet officers, seek to assure the effective-
ness of the East European allies.
- Major Soviet forces are stationed in four key
countries.
- Allegiance is sought by the integration of East
European officers into the Pact command
structure where they participate on a con-
trolled basis.
- Promising East European officers are schooled
in the Soviet Union and indoctrinated with
Soviet views and attitudes.
- Most officers and about half the non-com-
missioned officers are members of Communist
parties or organizations; unreliable officers
are dismissed.
- The missions assigned to the East European
forces are intended to insure their early in-
volvement in a war.
- East German forces are interleaved with the
Soviets, to insure their reliability even against
other Germans.
- The missions assigned the Polish and Czech
forces are initially against their traditional
enemies, the Germans.
130. We judge that the armed forces of Eastern
Europe are loyal to their national regimes. The
basic question of reliability is whether or not an
East European regime will commit itself to Pact
wartime operations. This decision will be heavily
influenced by the perceptions of the national leaders
and the political circumstances leading to war.
We judge that neither NATO nor the Warsaw
Pact would initiate an unprovoked invasion of the
other side.
131. Should a general war erupt, however, we
judge that the East Europeans would fight.
- The period of tension prior to hostilities would
allow the Soviets to manipulate popular atti-
tudes and political leaders.
- The Pact's mobilization structure would be
set in motion and its momentum would carry
military preparations forward.
- East European refusal to participate at this
stage could be dealt with by force.
- Eastern Europeans would feel they had no
choice but to participate.
132. We have no basis for making the more im-
portant judgment with regard to the East Euro-
peans' commitment to their allies in the course of
hostilities. That is to say, we cannot judge the en-
thusiasm with which East Europeans will support
the conflict. Neither can we foresee how they would
view their own national interests in the course of
a conflict nor the inducements that would be re-
quired to make them quit the war.
VI. CURRENT TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT
THEATER FORCES
133. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have carried
out a major expansion and renovation of their
theater forces. We estimate that the manpower in
Soviet theater ground and tactical air forces overall
has been increased by about one third, from some
1.5 million men in the early 1960s to, more than 2
million at present. Procurement expenditures for
new equipment have gone up about 40 percent in
the same period as a wide range of newly developed
weapon systems of increased sophistication has been
assigned to theater forces, and the high proportion
of obsolescent equipment that formerly prevailed
has been considerably reduced. Overall, the changes
of the past decade have not only significantly ex-
panded the size of Soviet forces but have also made
them more balanced and operationally flexible,
with improved capabilities for both nuclear and
non-nuclear warfare. Changes in the East European
forces have been less dramatic.
33
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approv
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
134. In this section we summarize the changes
that have taken place in theater forces and also
examine the prospects for further change in the
late 1970s.
A. Background
135. The strategic choices dictated by Khrush-
chev in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which
emphasized nuclear missiles and submarines and
deprecated conventional forces, forced large cuts
in Soviet ground and tactical air forces. Moreover,
those theater forces which survived the cuts were
relegated to a period of doctrinal stagnation and
increasing obsolescence. Then, beginning in the
mid-1960s, events created an entirely new situa-
tion for Soviet theater forces planners:
- Khrushchev's removal from office in 1964
permitted the views of Soviet conventional
force advocates to gain official acceptance.
- The adoption by NATO of a more flexible
nuclear response strategy persuaded the So-
viets that at least the initial stages of a Pact
offensive against NATO could be prosecuted
without nuclear weapons.
- The Sino-Soviet split became more severe
and Khrushchev's successors authorized a
major buildup of Soviet theater forces op-
posite China with a consequent step-up in
conventional arms production in the USSR.
- In 1968 the Soviets' invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia resulted in the establishment there of
a Soviet garrison where no Soviet forces had
been stationed since the early post-World-War
II period.
B. Growth and Improvement of Soviet Theater
Forces Since the Mid-1960s
136. The growth and improvement of Soviet
theater forces opposite NATO has been chiefly
the result of the creation of new forces, the expan-
sion of existing units, and the modernization of
equipment. Of these, the establishment, after the
1968 invasion, of the Soviet Central Group of
Forces (CGF) in Czechoslovakia had the greatest
single impact. Currently numbering about 78,500
men-much of this a net increase-the CGF added
five divisions and a small air force to the first-line
suggests that additional divisions may be orming
to replace two of the five CGF divisions in their
former western USSR garrisons. The Soviet buildup
opposite China, which added some 300,000 men
to Soviet ground and tactical air force personnel
strength, is described in NIE 11-13-73, The Sino-
Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects.
Expansion of Existing Force Elements
137. Much of the increase in Soviet theater forces
opposite NATO has come from enlargement of the
two primary ground combat units, the motorized
rifle division and the tank division. We estimate
that since the late 1960s the wartime TO of a
Soviet motorized rifle division has increased from
about 10,000 to more than 12,000 men, while the
tank division has increased from about 8,000 to
about 9,500. During the same period the au-
thorized number of vehicles and major weapons
systems in the motorized rifle division increased
from about 2,400 to about 2,900, and in the tank
division from 2,200 to 2,600.
138. The principal changes that produced the
larger divisions were made to increase their fire-
power and mobility. Field artillery weapons in
both tank and motorized rifle divisions increased
by around 50 percent. In a fully equipped mo-
torized rifle division APCs went up from slightly
over 200 to more than 300 and, concurrently, a
number of divisions that had formerly possessed
few or no APCs received their full allocations.
Also, in many motorized rifle divisions medium
tank strength was raised from 188 to about 255.
Additions were also made to divisional air defense
and antitank organizations and, at the same time,
more motor transport capability was added-not
only to supply ammunition for the added weapons,
but apparently also to give the division better
overall logistic capacity.
139. Not all Soviet divisions have attained these
equipment standards, but most, if not all, of those
in Central Europe probably have. Also, a number
of the divisions in the western USSR still have a
large proportion of older equipment and some sig-
nificant shortages such as in APCs and trucks.
34
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
',,_~' 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
Figure 5
THE SOVIET TANK DIVISION, 1964 AND 1975
1964 1975 1964 1975
Medium Tanks Artillery Pieces*
THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION, 1964 AND 1975
1964 1975 1964 1975
Medium Tanks Artillery Pieces*
1964 1975 1964 1975
Men Number of Divisions
140. Although of lesser magnitude than the de-
velopments in divisions, organizational changes
have also increased the strength of Soviet non-
divisional ground force units. In East Germany, for
example, eight regimental-sized combat training
units and some smaller support-type training units
have been established to train noncommissioned
officers and specialists such as tank drivers for
the GSFG. In wartime, these units, along with four
separate tank regiments and one battalion that also
have been formed by the Soviets in East Germany,
could be available for use as reserves. Together
they contain some 1,300 tanks. The Soviets have
also enlarged their nondivisional motor transport
units in Central Europe, in part to meet the in-
creased supply requirements of non-nuclear war
and also because of the larger ammunition require-
ments brought about by more tanks and artillery.
There have also been increases in the numbers of
Scud launchers, and each field army has acquired
a brigade of mobile SA-4 missiles.
Equipment Modernization
142. By the mid-1960s Soviet equipment pro-
curement had languished to the point where obso-
lescence was overtaking the theater forces. Not
only was there a large proportion of old equip-
ment in the forces but also the failure to introduce
many new designs-especially of aircraft-was
35 25X1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
further retarding the Soviets' efforts to maintain
effective forces facing NATO. More than half the
combat aircraft were old-model MIG-15, 17, and
19 fighters and IL-28 light bombers. The newer
models were still significantly inferior in range and
payload to Western aircraft of comparable age.
The ground forces still had large numbers of T-54
tanks-and even some T-34 tanks-and obsolete
BTR-152 APCs. Many divisions had few or even
no APCs. There were widespread shortages of
motor transport and many ground forces units in
the USSR were completely dependent on mobiliza-
tion of civilian trucks even to enable them to move
from their garrisons in an emergency.. Similar de-
ficiencies applied to communications equipment.
Field artillery, even after its strength was increased
in the late 1960s, had no armored, self-propelled
guns of the type most suitable to the Soviets' tank-
oriented blitzkrieg tactics.
142. The large upswing in production of theater
forces equipment that began in the mid-1960s and
still continues cannot be precisely charted with
the information available. It seems reasonably cer-
tain, however, that much of its initial impetus came
from the buildup opposite China which required
the outfitting of some 40 divisions and provision
of more than 1,000 additional combat aircraft.
Modernization and filling out of the forces facing
NATO was evidently constrained by the priority
going to the Far East forces until about 1970 when
that buildup tapered off. Most of what was pro-
duced in this period was of older, proven designs.
143. Since the late 1960s the pace of moderni-
zation of forces facing NATO has surged strongly
and also a larger number of newly designed types
and models of equipment has gone into full-scale
production.
New Aircraft
144. Of all Pact theater force elements, tech-
nology is making its greatest impact on the air
and air defense forces. Although the Pact air forces
opposite NATO have been relatively stable in num-
bers over the past decade, they have begun ac-
quiring a new generation of aircraft and weapons
which is enabling the Pact to change the traditional
air-defense orientation of the tactical air forces
toward a broader spectrum of offensive as well
as defensive missions.
145. Soviet planners, increasingly concerned with
the possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe, have
undertaken sizable equipment modernization pro-
grams to eliminate the main weaknesses of their
tactical air forces-short range, low payload, and
lack of modern ground attack ordnance. By the
Soviets' own calculations, their tactical aircraft have
lacked the range to conduct effective strikes on
most of NATO's airfields and other long-range
targets. This apparently did not concern them se-
riously in the early 1960s because in a nuclear war
these targets could be reached with USSR-based
strategic systems.
146. In the mid-1960s developmental work on
new, more capable fighter-bombers began. Initially,
new versions of the MIG-21 Fishbed fighter were
produced with improved payload and range, making
them more effective for offensive roles. Then, be-
ginning about the early 1970s the new SU-17 Fitter
C, MIG-23 Flogger and SU-19 Fencer became op-
erational. Compared to earlier Soviet tactical
fighters, these new aircraft have substantially im-
proved range, payload, avionics, and ECM capa-
bilities. Although still available only in limited
numbers, these aircraft already have improved the
operational flexibility and efficiency of the tactical
air force. Fencer, Flogger, and Fitter C are ca-
pable of striking targets in NATO Europe from
bases in the western USSR, especially if they re-
cover to bases in Central Europe. We believe that
during sustained conventional operations, Flogger
and Fitter C aircraft currently in the western USSR
would deploy to forward bases in order to make
maximum use of their payload and range capa-
bilities. The introduction of Backfire bombers into
Long Range and Naval Aviation is improving the
ability of these forces to survive NATO's air de-
fenses, particularly at low altitudes. The MIG-25
Foxbat has substantially improved the reconnais-
sance capability of Soviet tactical air forces and
may also have a high altitude nuclear weapon de-
livery capability.
147. To complement their growing inventory of
modern multi-mission aircraft, the Soviets are de-
veloping a variety of new air weapons. These in-
clude improved air-to-air missiles, a family of tacti-
cal air-to-surface missiles (including an electro-
optically guided system), and cluster and retarded
bombs. When combined with the improved pene-
36
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09TOO367ROO0500130001-9
New Tactical Aircraft
The Fishbed J, K, and L variants of the MIG-21 entering Pact
counterair units in recent years have improved multi-mission
capabilities over older models. They can carry a payload of
2,200 lbs. out to a radius of 400 nm.
The SU-19 is a large, swing-wing ground attack aircraft
similar to the US F-111. It is replacing older, light bombers in
the Soviet air force and probably will be used for deep strikes
against NATO targets that are beyond the range of other Pact
tactical aircraft. The SU-19 can carry four tactical air-to-
surface missiles (4,000 lbs.) to a radius of 1,000 nm.
SECRET
567036 9-75 CIA
The Fitter C is a highly-modified swing-wing version of the
SU-7 Fitter A fighter-bomber. It has much greater radius and
payload capabilities than its predecessor- 5,500 lbs. of ord-
nance can be carried to a radius of about 680 nm.
The MIG-23 is a swing-wing fighter that is currently
appearing in both air defense and ground attack versions. It
can carry some 5,500 lbs. of ordnance to a radius of almost
750 nm.
37
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09TOO367ROO0500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
tration capabilities of the new aircraft, these weap-
ons should greatly increase the potential effective-
ness of each tactical air sortie, particularly against
hardened ground targets. In addition, there has
been increased emphasis on ground attack training.
Ground-Based Air Defense Systems
148. During the early 1970s, ground-based air
defense systems such as the ZSU-23/4, the SA-7,
and SA-4, which were first introduced in substan-
tial numbers in the late 1960s, continued to be pro-
duced. At the same time, several new SAM systems
appeared: the SA-6, the SA-9, and, most recently,
the SA-8. Together these weapons form a mutually
supportive and highly mobile air defense system.
Increases in the effective range and mobility of
these systems and in the total number of weapons
deployed reduce the vulnerability of ground forces
on much larger areas of the battlefield. One of the
most important improvement trends has been
toward greater mobility which will adapt these
weapons to the fluidity of modern battlefield op-
erations. Development of extensive air defense in-
tegral to the ground forces has also enabled the
tactical air forces to direct more of their resources
to offensive missions.
The T-72 Medium Tanks
149. Recently, after at least 13 years of develop-
mental effort, the Soviets began full-scale produc-
tion of a new-model medium tank, the T-72. Per-
haps 1,000 of the T-72 production model are avail-
able. Production should increase markedly over
the next year or two. Currently, at least half of
the Soviet medium tanks in Central Europe are
T-62s; the rest are T-54s or T-55s. No T-72s have
yet been identified outside the USSR but at least
a few are likely to be in Central Europe. We have,
at present, no reliable technical description of the
tank.
APCs and Combat Vehicles
150. The BMP combat vehicle was first seen in
the late 1960s but did not appear in substantial
numbers in Soviet motorized rifle units until the
last three years. Although its mobility and fire-
power make it a versatile APC, it costs about three
times as much as the BTR-60PB-the other late-
model Soviet APC being produced. This high cost
along with operational considerations probably
will prevent the BMP from totally replacing the
earlier APCs. Some 40,000 BMPs would be required
if all Soviet motorized rifle units were to be com-
pletely reequipped with them.
151. Currently, both the BTR-60PB and the BMP
are being delivered as replacements for older-model
BTR-60s and APCs of the still earlier BTR-50 and
BTR-152 series. We estimate that a mixture of
APCs probably will emerge in the Soviet ground
forces, with only about one third to one half of
their APC requirements being met by BMPs. The
Soviets are also producing a new airborne assault
vehicle, the BMD, which is currently being added
to the airborne divisions. It will significantly im-
prove the anti-tank capabilities of these forces.
Self-Propelled Artillery
152. In 1974 self-propelled field artillery units-
122mm and 152mm-were first identified in the
Soviet forces. A self-propelled artillery piece costs
from 50 to 100 percent more than a towed gun
and its prime mover, and is more difficult to main-
tain. This may have deterred the Soviets from
adopting them earlier. But their superior cross-
country mobility and reduced vulnerability, as
compared with towed cannons, make them far
more capable of supporting fast-moving armored
attacks. These advantages have become more sig-
nificant with the Soviets' renewed emphasis on
non-nuclear combat capability.
153. The new self-propelled guns are being as-
signed initially-as replacements for towed guns-
in batteries of six guns each to the motorized rifle
regiments of Soviet divisions and in 18-gun bat-
talions to division artillery regiments. Eventually,
as more are produced, we expect that many Soviet
division artillery regiments will be completely re-
equipped with self-propelled guns. Some 1,000 of
each type of self-propelled gun had been produced
so far-roughly 12 percent of the inventory of
medium-caliber artillery in Soviet units.
Strategic Attack Forces
154. We believe that, for at least the next five
years, the missiles and bombers of the Soviet stra-
tegic attack forces will provide the bulk of the
38
Top Secret
25X1
- - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
New Air Defense Weapons
The ZSU-23/4 employs a target tracking radar in con-
junction with its quad-mounted 23mm guns. It was
introduced in the late 1960s for improved low-alti-
tude protection from tactical aircraft and helicopters.
The SA-8 is a new mobile SAM system which is
just entering service. It is expected to offer air
defense coverage below SA-6 coverage and
beyond the range of the SA-9. It may be in-
troduced in some divisions as an alternative to
the SA-6.
The SA-6 is a mobile, low-to-medium altitude surface-to-
air missile system introduced in the early 1970s. It is re-
placing 57mm antiaircraft guns at the division level.
The SA-4 is a mobile, medium-to-high altitude surface-to-
air missile system which entered service in the late 1960s.
It has been assigned at army and Front level to replace
the SA-2.
The SA-9 consists of a BRDM-2 scout vehicle modified to
carry small SAM s-similar to the SA-7. Introduced in the
late 1960s, it operates in conjunction with the ZSU-23/4
to provide low-altitude protection for regiments.
39
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
New Ground Forces Equipment
The BTR-60PB is an eight-wheeled, amphibious armored
personnel carrier which carries an infantry squad and
mounts one 7.62mm and one 14.5mm machine gun in its
turret.
The BMP combat vehicle has a three-man crew and is
armed with a 73mm smoothbore, short-recoil gun with
automatic loader, a Sagger ATGM launcher, and a ma-
chine gun. The eight-man infantry squad is provided with
individual firing ports and CBR protection.
Figure 8
The 122mm and 152mm self-propelled artillery pieces
were developed in the late 1960s, probably to help Pact
artillery units keep pace with rapidly advancing armored
units. They also provide greater protection for their crews
in both conventional and nuclear environments.
This medium tank is one of a number of developmental
tanks referred to collectively in the West as M-1970s. The
new Soviet T-72 probably will be similar in appearance.
40
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
C
Warsaw Pact's theater nuclear strike capability,
although the numbers of Pact tactical nuclear de-
livery systems located in Central Europe will in-
crease substantially. The deployment of new ICBMs
equipped with MIRVs will substantially augment
the potential coverage of European targets. We
believe, however, that only a relatively small por-
tion of the 1,600 ICBMs would be used to strike
targets in NATO Europe.
155. We expect that the SS-X-20 IRBM, now
being tested with MIRVs, will be deployed with
mobile launchers. Such a missile could be available
for deployment in mid to late 1976 and would be
more survivable than the existing SS-4 and SS-5
systems. We do not know whether it will replace
any of these older systems. Its mobility may allow
the Soviets to launch intermediate-range missiles
from either the USSR or Eastern Europe.
156. The number of H-class submarines in the
Soviet Navy is expected to decrease as new SSBNs
are produced because the launchers on H-class
units would be counted in the total number of SLBM
launchers allowed to the Soviets under a SAL
agreement based on the Vladivostok accords.
C. The East Europeans
157. In the early 1960s the East Europeans, at
Soviet urging, began to improve their armed forces.
Reorganization, expansion, and force moderniza-
tion over the past decade have enabled the East
Europeans to assume responsibilities in Pact mili-
tary plans. Although improvements in East Euro-
pean ground and air forces have generally fol-
lowed the Soviet lead, they have tended to lag
by a few years and to proceed more gradually.
East Germany
158. Improvements in the East German Army
have proceeded slowly over. the past decade with
the gradual introduction of new APCs and new-
model towed artillery, some increases in division
artillery strength, and the recent appearance of
T-62 tanks. The number of East German tanks has
increased from about 1,400 to 1,700 due to an ex-
pansion of the tank battalions in motorized rifle
regiments and increases in the Ministry of National
Defense reserve. A second Scud brigade and an
SA-4 unit have recently been formed. The SA-9
has been introduced on a limited scale. The levels
of equipment and manpower in East German Army
units have grown moderately in recent years. We
estimate that the intended wartime strength of
motorized rifle divisions has increased from about
9,900 men in 1965 to 11,000 currently; tank divi-
sions have increased from 8,200 to 8,800. Overall,
East German ground forces manpower has in-
creased from 90,000 to about 99,000.
159. The East German Air Force is the most
modern of all the East European air forces. Almost
all of its fighter aircraft are MIG-21s-half of
which are late-model Fishbed Js-and the propor-
tion of new models continues to rise. The size of
the Air Force has increased by about 50 aircraft
since 1972 due to the formation of a ground attack
unit and a reconnaissance unit.
Czechoslovakia
160. Force improvements in Czechoslovakia have
been minimal since the 1968 Soviet invasion. Ground
and air manpower has actually decreased some-
what due to the Soviet occupation of several former
Czech installations and political purges of the mili-
tary. Although the estimated wartime manning of
motorized rifle divisions has increased from 10,000
to 11,500 since 1965 and that of tank divisions
from 8,000 to about 8,900, the number of divisions
has decreased and overall ground strength has
dropped from some 200,000 to about 155,000. The
equipment levels of Czech ground units have also
been increased since the pre-1968 period and new
force elements, such as FROG, Scud, and air de-
fense units, have been added. One significant area
of improvement has been the development of new
ground forces weapons. In addition to the domestic
manufacture of Soviet-designed equipment such as
trucks, APCs, and tanks, the Czechs have developed
new equipment of noteworthy value, e.g., their
new automatic reloading multiple rocket launcher.
161. The Czech Air Force is still primarily
equipped with older-model Soviet aircraft, although
some late-model MIG-21s have been acquired. The
size of the force probably will remain stable over
the next several years.
Poland
162. Improvements in Polish forces since the mid-
1960s have been extensive in terms of both equip-
41
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
ment modernization and unit expansion. The au-
thorized wartime manning of the Polish mechanized
division has increased from about 8,300 in 1965
to about 11,000, and the tank divisions from about
7,000 to about 9,000. The number of tanks, APCs,
artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and FROGs in
divisions has increased as well as the size and
number of many combat service and support units.
Electronic warfare regiments have also been formed
and SA-6s, SA-7s, and SA-9s are now being intro-
duced into the forces. Overall, the strength of the
Polish Army has increased by some 45,000 men
since 1965.
163. Poland has the largest of the East European
air forces. It is mainly equipped with older-model
Soviet aircraft although some late-model MIG-21s
and SU-17 Fitter Cs, have been acquired in recent
years. The size of the force is expected to remain
stable over the next few years.
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria
164. The ground and air forces in the southern-
tier countries are the least modern of all the Pact
forces. Re-equipment programs in these three coun-
tries have generally been less extensive than in any
of the northern three and most of the other im-
provement measures seen in Soviet forces, such
as the expanded tank battalion, have not appeared
at all. New aircraft, air defense systems, and ground
forces vehicles are gradually being acquired.
166. Production of new, sophisticated equipment
is continuing at a high rate and this trend is likely
to continue through the end of the decade. Pro-
curement for a number of recently introduced
weapons systems such as the new series of tactical
aircraft and the new air defense missile systems
is still far from complete. Other expensive weapons
systems such as the self-propelled artillery and the
T-72 medium tank have just entered full-scale pro-
duction and output of these weapons almost cer-
tainly will increase over the next few years.
167. Research and development on theater force
equipment is continuing and a number of new
systems now being tested probably will appear
over the next few years. Major-and costly-items
now undergoing developmental testing include a
new tactical aircraft and two new tactical surface-
to-surface missiles.
168. Whether, and to what extent, acquisition
of new equipment will cause further increases in
the overall size of the theater forces is difficult to
assess. The Soviets now have enough of most types
of weapons to fill the existing active units. Only
a few major items, such as APCs and helicopters,
are still in short supply. This may lead to a rela-
tively stable weapons inventory over the next few
years. Recently, most new equipment appears to
have been used to modernize the force by replac-
ing rather than adding to the equipment in active
units.
D. Recent Trends
165. The rate of growth of manpower and equip-
ment in Soviet ground and tactical air forces appear
to have slowed appreciably in the last two years
or so, particularly in comparison with the expan-
sion that occurred earlier in connection with the
Sino-Soviet and Czech problems. There is some
recent evidence, however, of ongoing organizational
changes that could lead to further gradual expan-
sion in the next few years. Further increases in
divisional artillery have been observed in some
units in the western USSR and a recent defector
has said that similar increases are intended for units
in Central Europe. Also, some small, previously
unidentified infantry elements which have recently
been observed with some Soviet tank regiments in
Eastern Europe, may portend yet another addition
to divisional manpower.
169. In the past, however, the replacement of
old items with new equipment has sometimes re-
sulted in overall growth because the Soviets formed
new units or expanded existing units using the older
but still useful equipment. For example, outmoded
heavy tanks and World War II vintage assault guns
were eliminated from divisions in Central Europe
more than a decade ago but some of these are
still retained in separate regiments and battalions
in the GSFG. Similarly, some of the antiaircraft
guns recently replaced by SA-6 missiles in a number
of GSFG divisions have been transferred to other
divisions-not yet equipped with SA-6s-to enlarge
their AAA units. This tendency to hoard older
equipment in active units suggests a potential for
further gradual increases which cannot be pre-
cisely estimated.
42
Top Secret
- - - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
170. Heavy Artillery. In the past three years we
have identified heavy artillery pieces at the Sverd-
lovsk Artillery Test Facility and at several missile-
associated ground force installations, all in the
USSR. The weapons were in battalion- or regi-
mental-sized groupings of 203mm gun-howitzers
and 240mm mortars. The 203mm gun-howitzer is
an obsolete weapon developed in 1931. The 240mm
mortar is also an older weapon, which first ap-
peared on parade in 1953.
171. We do not know what these developments
portend, but with the Soviets' renewed interest in
field artillery we would expect them to perceive
a requirement for heavy artillery. Heretofore, they
have had nothing heavier than 152mm cannons in
the active forces. Some association of these weapons
with Scaleboard and Scud units could be viewed
as a sign that they will have nuclear capabilities.
The range of the 240mm mortar is so short (9,700
meters) that its use as a nuclear artillery piece is
unlikely. We therefore believe it more likely that
the association simply implies that heavy artillery
units-if they become generally available in Soviet
forces-will be administratively grouped at front
level or in the High Command Reserve, as are Scale-
boards and some Scuds.
172. Soviet Response to Western Antitank De-
velopments. The Soviet ground forces are more
dependent upon the tank than any army in history.
If the time should come when the Soviets were
forced to conclude that their tanks were unable
to penetrate NATO forces, Moscow would face
an enormous problem. The Soviets would have to
rethink their strategy for a war in Europe and
contemplate a radical redesign of their ground
forces. At present, however, the Soviets seem to
be far from drawing any such epochal conclusions.
The Soviets have reacted to NATO's acquisition
of new antitank weapons with relatively minor
adjustments in their forces. Moscow has deployed
more tanks in Eastern Europe and possibly added
some infantry to its tank units.
E. Outlook for Further Growth in the Late
1970s
173. In Section VI. A., above, we noted a number
of factors that have motivated the Soviets to expand
and modernize their theater forces over the past
decade. Much of the expansion has been motivated
by tensions with China and by Czechoslovak po-
litical unreliability. Changes in Soviet military doc-
trine also had a major impact. Certain major equip-
ment development programs probably represent
Soviet attempts to counter specific areas of NATO
strength such as superior combat aircraft; tech-
nological advances have undoubtedly prompted
other equipment changes.
174. All of these factors together, however, do
not seem to us to explain the overall magnitude
and broad scope of the changes which have oc-
curred. As we suggested at the beginning of this
Estimate, the Soviet attitude toward theater force
goals is powerfully influenced by historical, ex-
perience of the catastrophic consequences of mili-
tary unreadiness. This outlook, reinforced by a
traditional xenophobia and a generally conserva-
tive approach to military planning, appears to lead
the Soviets to aim at achieving and maintaining a
demonstrably superior conventional force posture
in Europe.
175. This perception of Soviet goals does not,
however, make it possible to define the point at
which Soviet military planners would consider
them satisfied. There is little basis in evidence on
which to measure what they would consider a
demonstrably superior conventional force.
176. It is clear, at any rate, that the Soviet mili-
tary are extremely conservative in defining what is
"enough"-hence, likely to continue force develop-
ment programs beyond the point of numerical
parity. Also, Soviet military leaders have an in-
stitutional interest in continuing the process of
expansion and modernization. They have shown
a strong tendency in the past to seize upon any
improvement in NATO forces as another justifi-
cation for Soviet force programs. Indeed, by West-
ern standards they seem to overreact to changes
in NATO forces. At the same time they present
their own programs as strictly defensive and deny
that NATO might reasonably consider them
threatening.
177. This expansionary momentum has been en-
couraged by a political leadership that has been
generous with manpower and budgetary alloca-
tions. Sometime in the mid-1980s the amount of
43 25X1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Top Secret
manpower used by the military could begin to
conflict seriously with the demands of the civilian
economy, but this probably will not be a problem
for the immediate future. Also, the growing com-
plexity of the Soviet weapons inventory is creating
an increasing need for highly skilled manpower
which probably conflicts with the needs of the
economy, but this has not yet appeared to constrain
the military programs.
178. Similarly, the current share of GNP de-
voted to the military and the division of these re-
sources within the various institutional elements
of the military is acceptable to the Soviet leader-
ship. Although hard budgetary decisions are pre-
sumably made each year at the highest level, the
absence of the parliamentary constraints and public
scrutiny that exist in the West seems to allow a
powerful bureaucratic institution such as the Soviet
military considerable latitude to pursue programs
which it considers necessary.
179. Barring some major new development com-
parable to the Sino-Soviet rift of the 1960s, how-
ever, it is unlikely that this continuing theater force
growth will be as rapid or as large as that which
occurred between the mid-1960s and early 1970s.
If the more gradual expansion of the last two years
or so continues, the size of the theater forces will
increase by about one percent annually over the next
few years. By the early 1980s even this relatively
small annual increase would add 100,000 men to
the Soviet theater forces-which would then have
more than 2.1 million men.
Figure 9
SOVIET GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES MANPOWER"
'Changes in manpower over time are principally due to the buildup opposite China
(some 300,000 men), increases associated with the movement of Soviet forces into
Czechoslovakia (at least 30,000 men) and changes in the size of Soviet ground forces
180. In sum, the momentum of the Soviet drive
to maintain superiority of forces in Central Europe
seems likely to lead to gradual expansion and further
technological improvements in Soviet theater forces
through the end of the 1970s.11 To reverse this trend
would likely require. the ascendancy of new po-
litical leadership with different priorities and the
power base to overcome current institutional posi-
tions.
44
Top Secret
/ 7
z 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000500130001-9