STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. BOYCE AT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE OF U. S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00993R000100100008-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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STATEMENT OF
CHRISTOPHER J. BOYCE
AT HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ON
U. S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
APRIL 1985
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(36-4-0
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Mr. Chairman, several weeks ago I spoke to the Minority Counsels of
?*his Subcommittee about-my recollections-and personal?feelings concerning
espionage and the government's personnel security programs. All of my adult
life I have seen government as a steamroller headed in my direction, a thing
to be opposed at all costs. The Minority Counsels surprised me. During those
conversations I felt for the first time that persons from authority were
speaking to me as one human being to another. As long as I can remember I
have tried to tear down that which I could not accept instead of trying to
build something better. It is my hope here today that I am performing a
constructive act by relating my memories. I have come here in good faith to
assist this Subcommittee if I can, but perhaps I need to say these things even
more than you need to hear them.
In early 1975 at the age of twenty-one. I took my first stumbling
steps towards the KGB. I was a totally naive imateur. I lacked even the most
rudimentary skills this Subcommittee would associate with espionage. But even
today I am still astounded at how easy the thing was to begin and, given the
security system, how near impossible it was to prevent. Regardless of
expensive and elaborate security systems, I suggest that espionage arrests are
made mainly when beginners make artless, blundering mistakes. And such a
policy that gets results primarily by picking up the pieces after a Security
breach instead of active individual-directed prevention is an extremely frail
method on which to base security. I think that ?the counter-intelligence
elements of government and the personnel security programs of the defense
industries are missing the boat, and if you will bear with me I will try to
speak my-way-through-to-the-rooe;of--the-weakness--as--1-see?itrE.--
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-Christopher J. Boyce 2.
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-On April 28.1977,-41 the age of twenty-four. 1 was convicted on eight
counts of violating the espionage statutes and given a sentence of forty
years. My boyhood friend and codefendant, Andrew Daulton Lee, was convicted = :
in a separate trial on twelve counts of espionage and sentenced to life
imprisonment.
In mid-1979 I was finally sent to Lompoc Prison where I was put in the
incorrigible unit with the hardcore convicts. One day I was reading a book on
my bunk and one of the gangs entered the cell next to me en masse and stabbed
4711: neighbor to death. I remember watching his blood puddle out On the
f. And not long-after that, they did the same thing in exactly the same
way to t-. 2;oan in the cell behind me. I heard it all, the screams, the death
gurgle. I was the son and nephew of former FBI agents. I did not expect to
live long at Lompoc and I decided that being shot off the prison fence was a
better death than the knives. But I wasn't shot; I got away one night in
January 1980. For eighteen months I remained a fugitive, despite a manhunt
by the U.S. Marshals Service and the FBI. While the government followed leads
as far away as Costa Rica, South Africa and Australia, I spent my days in
Idaho and Washington State. It is a frightening life believing that every law
officer in the country would be proud to put a bullet in you. I was
desperate; I thought returning to prison meant my death. To live on the run,
I began holding up federally insured banks. I learned about that 'from all the
idle talk in prison. It was terribly wrong, but I never intended to harm
anyone, and I didn't. All during this time, I did not hide my true identity
and past from dozens of new friends in the Northwest -they were fully aware of
'what had gone on between the Russians and myself and they knew I was a
?
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Christopher J. Boyce
Finally.-1-was-Urned in by 1Cfriend -wanting -to -collect -the reward,
end I was arrested on August 20, 1981 in Port Angeles, Washington. I pled
guilty to everything and now have sixty-eight years instead of forty. The .
government now keeps ri locked in an isolation cell in Marion, Illinois. where
I have a lot of time to think about all. this in peace.
. I have been told that the facts underlying the original charges
against myself and Daulton are generally known by the members of. the
Subcommittee. I don't think I need to recount a long narrative of what we
4 Suffice it to say that from March 1975 through December 1976. I removed.
k , '72hed a sizeable number of_ classified documents from the highly
secret "black vault" of TRW, a CIA contractor in Redondo Beach, California and
sent them on with Daulton to the KGB in Mexico City. I was able to obtain
those documents through my position as a specially cleared TRW employee,
working in the black vault, located in building MAI. On more than a dozen
occasions I removed documents from TRW and photographed them. On
approximately six occasions, probably more. I personally photographed
documents while within the vault itself. Daulton, in turn, delivered and sold
the.; -Ats to KGB agents working out of the embassy in Mexico City. The
? lents pertained in part to the existence and operation of then highly
secret intelligence satellites.
As an employee of TRW, I not only received Confidential, Secret,-Top.
Secret, and Special Projects clearances, but I also was supposedly restricted
by the prescribed physical security measures for classified documents.
ObviOusly, neither the government's clearance procedures nor the company's
Isecurity procedures worked very well. In fact, the company's security
:.procedures were a great helprito me iniempromising a .CTA. prOject to the
Russians'. There are some obvious reasons why.
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Christopher J. Boyce
Let we begin with the_questioh: of Clearances. ..14_1975,_when I_sent
Daulton off with the first classified documents to the Soviets, neither of us
was a professional spy, to say the least. 'We knew as much about espionageas
we did about hieroglyphics. On my part, I was not even a professional or
longstanding member of the intelligence community. After dropping out of
college, I went to work at TRW in July 1974. My only prior interest in the
Intelligence community had been one of suspicion and distrust. At twenty-one,
in an era of Vietnam, assassinations, Chile, and Richard Nixon's resignation,
I had a strong distaste for government. I considered the CIA as, if anything,
the enemy. When I came to TRW I had no idea that my work would, in any way,
involve the CIA.
I got the job through what one might call the "ole boy network." My
father, a former FBI agent who then worked in security at another large
defense contractor, was a friend of Mr. Regis Carr, also a former FBI agent,
and then manager of TRW security for Top Secret contracts. It was Mr. Carr
who hired me.
I started at TRW as a general clerk making approximately $140 per
week. I was immediately given what is known as a "Confidential" clearance.
Almost immediately my supervisors submitted my name for receipt of a Secret,
then a Top Secret clearance, then access to two Special Projects, and,
finally, access to NSA codes. By-December .all .those clearances had been
approved and I was assigned to the "black vault," which I subsequently learned
to be one of the most secret and classified areas of work at TRW. It was only
then that I learned that I would be working on a Special Project involving the
CIA.
S.
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-;Christopher J. Boyce-
I was*assigned,':mith my immediate supervisor, to monitor and process
___-secret Jcommunications.traffic _between She CIA, TRW, and other_CIA contacts
around the world. ::ply work included daily contact with the Intelligence
!:satellite program.
In looking back, I remember being surprised that I was given such
relatively free access. so very quickly to these supposedly highly guarded
materials. I used to sit for hours and stare into the satellite guts. It was
all science fiction to me. I doubt that I would have gotten a job in the
project so quickly except for my father's friendship with Mr..''Carr.
Unfortunately, if you just accept someone because his father is a friend, it
negates the entire security system.
I believe that on the day that I was hired, and prior to applying for
or receiving any security clearances, the decision to place me in the vault
had already been made. On that day, Mr. Carr 4ntroduced me to the Director of
Security 3 Special Project in building 144 as "the man you will be working
for". Later I learned that this was the Rhyolite Project. Mr. Carr told me
that I would be temporarily doing relatively routine and boring documentation
work for the first few months until my clearances came through for my
permanent assignment.
I've been told that in other espionage cases, there were some.obvious
"red flags" of potential security violators which went unnoticed in back4round
Investigations and by co-workers: heavy financial indebtedness, sudden
affluence, alcoholism, disgruntlement.
What was my red flag? Using those indicators, probably none. I was
the oldest son in a well-respected,-__ stable, upper middle :class, Catholic
.
. ,
.4amily,:g My:father had a. finelireputationSh professional Positions of trust.
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Christopher J. Boyce -- 6.
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.:I-had performed moderately well in school.- While my background investigations
were underway, I heard that friends of my parents had been contacted as
references. Speaking as adults, they told the investigators that I was the
courteous, bright, responsible son of a good family, exactly as they were
expected to say. This was the extent of the investigation, as best as I can
tell.
What the investigators never sought was the Chris Boyce who moved in
circles beyond the realm of parents, teachers, and other adult authority
figures. To my knowledge, they never interviewed a single friend, a single
peer, during the entire background investigations.
Had they done so, the investigators would have interviewed a room full
of disillusioned longhairs, counter-culture falconers, druggie surfers,
several wounded paranoid. vets, pot-smoking and anti-establishment types,
beaded malcontents generally, many of whom were in trouble. In 1974 I believe
that the majority of young people of my s _inn could not be considered
politically reliable by CIA standards. I am sure you remember. Had the
investigators asked any of those friends what I thought of the U.S.
Government, and in particular the CIA, I would have never gotten the job. Had
they asked, they would have learned that I had first begun smoking pot at
sixteen and that I had experimented with a variety of other drugs along with
Everyone else I knew in my age group. Had they asked, they would have learned
thit one of my closest friends and later partner in espionage was Daulton lee,
whose record on drug charges and probation violations was, by age twenty-two,
quite extraordinary. Had Mr. Carr even bothered to query his own sons, my
hijh school claiimates, they could have easily, told him far more than the
:a0vernment's entire backgrouncrinvestigativ did.
or
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--thristopher-J.. Boyce
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From what I :tap ?-the.7 goverfiment's background investigation
. _ .
uncovered no substantial' evidence that the CIA. and Chris Boyce lived in
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separate Americas. Therfound no past Arrestrecord, ino -reason to distrust
me.. 1-suggest that, in an area of supposedly such grave national security
considerations, that alone is not enough. The government's background
investigation also uncovered no reason to trust me. I was twenty-one years
old. I had attended three different colleges and had no idea what I would do
with myself. I had no substantial work history except school jobs. I laid
concrete, I was a waiter, I had a paper route, I was a pizza cook, a janitor,
a liquor store delivery boy, I harvested barley one summer - certainly nothing
akin to the responsibility of handling highly classified spy satellite
communications. TRW was my first fulltime permanent job. In short, I had
never been? tested. In my view, that should have generated some caution,
especially given the tenor of the times in the early seventies - the
read questioning of authority and open political dissent within my own
generation. Yet, from what I can tell, TRW and the CIA never hesitated Ic
placing me, untested and untried, in their most sensitive area of employment.
I might add that the only thing I was asked to do to get these
clearances was to fill out a few forms. Although, at the time, my little
sister was polygraphed before she went to work at a 7-Eleven, I was never
polygrapheci. I .had trouble speaking with the.. Minority .Counsels about
polygraphs. Should the government be in the business of making windows into
men's minds? Perhaps when a person has a security clearance, it is proper
that he give up a part of himself for everybody else. I don't presume to
. know.
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-Christopher J. Boyce ?B.
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To continue ?741:vms 'never giv n -a -subject --interview.---A .year later,
After I had already started sending TRW/CIA documents to the KGB, I was given
*access to yet another Special Project after merely signing a few more forms.
No additional background investigation was done to my knowledge.
On the question of -physical security, at TRW's black -vault, I--can
answer it simply and quickly: there was none. In my view, and I believe in
the eyes of my fellow workers there, security was a joke, certainly nothing to
be taken seriously.
Take, for example, our project security manager, whom we regularly
to as our "token hippie." On lunch breaks, when not drinking with us
or others at the local bars, he would often be skateboarding around the
neighborhood. Sometimes he returned the worse for wear, with bruises and torn
pants. On one occasion, he told me he wanted the security atmosphere in M4 to
be as unintrusive as that on a college campus.
I can recall one incident where he did take an especially active role
in security. The M4 coffee fund for employees was found consistently short.
The old night janitor was suspected of theft. One evening the project
security ?.lager phoned me in the vault and told me that I was to come
upstairs after work to help him "catch a thief." We then drilled a hole in an
office wall so that he could watch the coffee fund without being seen. For
the rest of the evening the project security manager sat in the dark peering
through the hole, eventually catching the janitor pinching ea few quarters.
When the "surveillance" began, I went back down to the vault and made myself a
drink, wondering at the lunacy of it all. The system could catch a janitor
stealing coffee money, but itwas incapable of hindering me in any way from
:passing the entire project to Dolton an,d onto the KGB.
go.
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Christopher J. Boyce
9.
_
I suppose most?people view security regulations as-quaething that
should be held in awe by employees. That:was clearly not the case at TRW. A
number of employees made -phony security badges as pranks. My immediate :
- supervisor once -made a -security badge with a monkey's face on it and, to
everyone's amusement, used it to come in andcwt-of the building.
The security identification badges themselves were not strictly
accounted for. There were boxes of old badges that employees had previously
used that were not destroyed for months at a time. These could have been used
for improper entry. Prior to coming to the black vault, I worked in-badges
for awhile. There was no accountability over the materials used in
manufacturing identification. I could have made a badge and I.D. for anyone,
giving them access to a number of classified areas. On one occasion, in late
1974, before being sent to the Rhyolite Project, a Special Project Manager
arrived at Badge and I.O. accompanied by an outside consultant. I refused to
make badges and identification for the consultant because he was not
accompanied by the proper clearance paperwork. The Special Project Manager
swore revenge and she later got it by having me temporarily transferred out of
security.
Aside from badges, there was almost no supervision over access to the
building and the vault. Although my comings and goings at building M4 were
-logged by the security guards, there was nothing to stop me from entering at
any-time during the day or night. On occasion I returned to the vault late at
night without being questioned or even raising suspicion. There was simply no
questioning on after-hours access as long as one mentioned any plausible
? excuse in passing, such as, "Irforgot my tennis racket." And once inside
:there was no monitoring of my afterhour activities in the vault. None of the
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_thristopher J. Boyce
10.
?1":".,security guards who ?would log uy entrance or inspect-the-premises had
.authorized access to the black vault. During some of these After-hour visits,
I 'photographed and removed documents. For awhile I used to come to work at 4
a.m. to process the teletype traffic from Langley and then shut back down and
lock up at 5:30 a.m. in order to hunt jackrabbits with my Harris Hawk at
sunrise. I would then return to work around 7:30 a.m. and reopen the vault:
No one ever questioned this. I could come and go whenever I wanted. I
remember laughing about this with a girl I knew who was a bank teller. She
used to tell me that Security Pacific would never allow their employees to
open and enter their vaults at will, unsupervised, at any time.
Ccrtrols on access beyond the black vault area were hardly much
better. As part of my courier duties I made deliveries to the CIA facility.
Although I had no clearance or authorization to do so, on occasion I wandered ?
into their code room. Once I recall talking to a female employee inside the
vault there. On a clipboard hanging on the wall beside her was a list of all
the code words for every station on their circuit. Because I was naturally
curious about everything that went on there, I began to note all the
"handles." She caught me reading it, paused to flip the board over, and just
smiled. I do recall that one employee did ask me to leave because I was
unauthorized.
Within the TRW vault, management had effectively- "compartmentalized"
security away. By making the vault such a highly secret area those of us
inside had been given, in effect, total autonomy. We worked under our own set
of rules, or more accurately, lack of rules. We brought in an uncleared
. company locksmith and altered the numbers on the vault tumblers by half clicks
Ao prevent unauthorized acces; by our superiors.
an
We -did. pot7want them
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:Christopher J. Boyce
..trespassing on our private preierie. regalAiIi=partiedjand:bcozed :it up -
during working hours within the vault. Bacardi 151 was usually stored behind
the crypto machines. Under 'security regulations we were required to destroy
the code cards for the machines daily in a destruction blender. We chose
instead to throw the code cards towards, but not necessarily in, canvas bags
in the corner. We used the code destruction blender for making banana
daiquiris and mai-tais. Although only about eight people had authorized
clearances to the vault, often many non-cleared members of our "club", so to
speak, would be in the vault for libations. On occasion the Project Security
Manager would join us for a drink on the house.
Part of our informal duties included frequent runs to. the liquor store
with "orders" from various employees throughout the building. We used the
satchel for classified material as a cover to bring in their peppermint
schnapps, rum, Harvey Wallbanger mix, what have you, along with our stout
malt, back into 144. In doing so I sometimes used the satchel to take
classified documents out. To return the documents. I used packages, potted
plants, and camera cases. Packages and briefcases were never searched by the
guards.
On one occasion I needed to return a rather large ream of documents
that I had taken out earlier in the satchel on a Rhyolite beer run. ',went to
a floral shop and bought two large clay pots about two feet tall. I put the
ream of documents in one after wrapping them in plastic, covered it with dirt
and then stuck bushy plants in both pots. I brought one of the plants into
the building myself and asked the security guard to carry the plant holding
the documents back into theibuilding. He obliged.
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Christopher J. Boyce 12.
A more severe security breach regularly entered 'Our-Vault over the
encrypted teletype link from Langley. Routinely we would receive from the CIA
'immunications operators misdirected TWXs on other contractors' projects. We
were not cleared for these projects and there was no accountability for the
misdirected TWXs we received other than a lackadaisical request to 'destroy"
typed from the Langley communications operators.
To briefly return to badges and identification - the camera and film
used to photograph employees for their picture identification were stored in
one of the black vault safes on a shelf directly beneath the NSA crypta-todes.
It always struck me as both odd, but still typical at TRW, that objects such
as these would be stored together.
I remember only two government inspections in the vault during the
entire time I was there. It amazed me that even though we were using all this
highly secret equipment that belonged to the government, the government wasn't
even around to oversee it. As for TRW's own security, Mr. Carr, the Security
Director, could not take two steps towards the vault without our knowing about
It - the security guards always warned us in plenty of time concerning his
movements. As a result, as far as I could tell, Mr. Carr was completely
unaware of the security breaches in the vault. He gave his orders from inside
a bureaucratic cloud.
I distinctly remember one of the two government inspections. The code
cards for the crypto machines came in checkbook-style binders sealed in clear
plastic envelopes. The envelopes were to be unsealed and the binders removed
only at the beginning of the month they were to be used. We were given books
of these codes sometimes Fon
five ths in advance of their date use, despite
? . ?
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*"10bvious'security-risks. I waffamazed that NSA would let half a year's worth
. ?
an
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of their codes sit anywhere. out of their possession.
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-tbristopher-J. Boyce .._
13.
At the time of the inspection - I had bin unsealini:some of these
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?flituren -codes;tremoving Ahem.4and photographing them. I would reseal the
plastic with the heat from an iron or with glue and then replace them in the
vault. They were all packaged in an official established manner. The
inspector came across one code binder that I had replaced upside down and face
down, and then resealed. Once tampered with, the plastic envelopes never
looked quite the same, despite my botched efforts at resealing them. He
noticed it, looked puzzled, but instead complained about some other relatively
insignificant missing item - one that no one could remember. He had looked
closely at the displaced code card binder, but chose to pass over the broken
seal.
Document control itself was poorly supervised. It was one of my tasks
to take TWXs and other messages to our reproduction center. From there, I
would distribute copies to various authorized recipients in TRW. On numerous
occasions I would see different employees later reviewing these classified
documents even ttough they were not cleared for access to them. At times
employees would ask me for additional copies of these classified documents
given them since they couldn't find or had lost their assigned copies.
My experiences at TRW have caused me to come to certain conclusions
about personnel security. I know that a number of changes have been made in
the way the government conducts background investigations that supposedly
alert the investigators to potential security risks. I have been told that
there is now greater emphasis on peers in background investigations. This was
a basic reform if it has stuck. Friends of my parents could simply not give a
true insight into what made Christopher Boyce tick. As I said before, if this
had been done, I believe that I would never have gotten the job in the first
place.
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_ ,,Christopher_J....poyce _14.
Secondly, I should have been interviewed in great detail regarding my
"r
lifestyle and attitudes. I. was never questioned about these points which seem
_to. me to be important.indicators for future security breaches. Had I been
Interviewed in this manner, I also believe that I would have never been
assigned to that sensitive position.
Thirdly, I know that if I had been polygraphed solely on attitudes
toward the government and the CIA or even marijuana use, I probably never
would have been considered for the job, but then neither would most of the
friends I grew up with.
There are also a number of changes in security procedures that would
have deterred my brazen acts and also greatly increased my chances of getting
caught. Although these suggestions might not stop the professional spy, they
would clearly have affected amateurs like myself.
First, supervision over Special Projects such as the one I was
Involved with must be strengthened, especially supervision over the security
sections of the Special Projects. There was little, if any, outside influence
over our day-to-day activities. We were project security and we viewed
security as a joke because we could easily circumvent it by our insulation
from the usual management controls. What little security we saw was
ineffective and incompetent. If we had been strictly supervised, perhaps I
would have thought twice before acting as I did. Instead I decided that the
intelligence community was a great bumbling, bluffing deception.
Second, a policy of inspecting every parcel, briefcase and package
going into and out of buildings such as M4 should be implemented. Although
this in and of itself would not have prevented me from concealing material on
my person, it would have increased'my awareness of security as well as my
chances of getting caught.
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'-thristopber J.-Boyce 15.
ffbird, imetal-detectors --should ibe installed An bui)dings -such as 114
yhere there are highlyprojects. ;Such devicesmight have prevented me
--y-ron bringing "tre- rarintrtliit-Datiltori gave-be repeatedly-in and out of the
project area.
Fourth, if there had been encoding devices on the classified documents
that could be monitored at building exits, I would have never attempted to
take the actual documents out. I am aware of similar devices on library books
and items of merchandise that sound alarms if one attempts to remove them.
Fifth, a policy on limited polygraph examinations at the time of
termination of employment on the question of unauthorized disclosure should be
implemented. This policy should be explained to the applicant for employment
at the time of hiring. He should be reminded of this policy throughout
employment. If I had known this, I would never have considered an act of
espionage. Contrary to assurances to me by the KGB officer in Mexico City
that they had ways to beat the polygraph, I knew I could not pass a polygraph
and greatly feared it. That same fear heightened my resolve never to accept
direct employment with the CIA although on two separate occasions it was
offered. This policy, distasteful as it is, should be considered one of the
best deterrents to those toying with the thought of espionage.
Sixth, for the same reasons, I think that limited use of the polygraph
at the time of an employee's update investigation would heighten the fear of
being caught sooner in a case such as mine, but fear alone cannot achieve
security.
Seventh, the number and scope of onsite investigations by the
government should be increased. Both of the two inspections I recall at TRW
appeared to be pro-forma, just requiring us to show the inspector that we had
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_ Ate seo
1^
_
--thristopher-3.-Boyce - - 16.
-certain items on their checklists. Never once were we questioned on knowledge
of or compliance with security procedures. Never once, -as I recall, were
' -"questions asked concerning our very cluttered workplace. Never once were we
questioned on destruction of old ciphers or other classified materials.
Eighth, I recommend some system of anonymous complaints concerning
security breaches that would be directed to the government and not the
company. If I had seen posters on some sort of hotline system operating
within the company, it would have given me pause to consider what I was doing.
It would not only have deterred espionage, but everything else.
All of this brings me to another point I would like to raise. I am
convinced from my own experiences that what I say now is by far the most
useful contribution I can make to this Subcommittee's study of personnel
security. While I think these security regulations you review are important
to maintain the integrity of the government, I believe they are next to
worthless if each of the four million Americans with security clearances do
not have a grasp of hew espionage would affect them personally.
No matter what security procedures are devised, if a man built it,
another man can circumvent it and usually in the most simple way. At best,
physical security can only make things tougher. The increase of espionage
that you are experiencing will not be a passing phase unless popular myths
about espionage are debunked for the fraud they are.
I think, even in these responsible times, that if not carefully
monitored, the intelligence community of any Western nation can be,
potentially, a threat to an open society. But there is nothing "potential"
about the KGB. That state apparatus not only threatens every open society,
but it crushes open societies. That is the distinction I could not see at a
rebellious twenty-one. It is a distinction which Americans must see.
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-Nhe
?
Christopher -Jr-Boyce
?17.
The security organizations of both sides spy and engage in clandestine
'tactics. And in Mr. Gorbachev's new age of Camelot at the Kremlin, it will
--perhaps be easier for naive Americans to rationalize away the distinction
between the restrained secrecy that defends them and the stealthy menace that
seeks to deceive them. By your own estimates there are at least 500 KGB
agents in the United States. And, Senators, I respectfully suggest that the
overwhelming majority of the four million Americans with security clearances
are extremely naive in their conceptions of espionage. That is the root of
your problem.
When I was at TRW, I and several hundred other relatively fresh
employees were given a group talk on the perils of espionage. A clean-cut,
all-American type addressed us from the podium. Here I sat with the KGB
monkey already on my back, surrounded by all these young people who were being
fed totally inaccurate and inappropriate descriptions of espionage. They were
given the impression that espionage was some exotic, glamorous escapade.
Handt,ome Slav spies would seduce young American secretaries on their vacations
in Brussels and bend them into secret agents for the KGB. That type of
approach to preventing espionage was and is disastrous. That was just what
all those bored, young secretaries around me were dying to hear.
It was surreal. A government spokesman, automatically accepted by
everyone as competent, stood there entertaining all those naive,
Impressionable youngsters around me with tales of secret adventure, intrigue,
huge payoffs, exotic weaponry, seduction, poisons, hair-raising risks, deadly
gadgetry. It was a whole potpourri of James Bond lunacy, when in fact almost
everything he said was totally foreign to what was actually happening to me.
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? Christopher J. -Boyce
18.
Where was the despair? _Where were the. sweaty palms _and shakey bands?
This man said nothing about having to wake up in the morning with gut-gripping
fear before steeling yourself once again for the ordeal of going back into
that vault. How could these very ordinary young people not think that here
was a panacea that could lift them out of the monotony of their everyday
lives, even if it was only in their fantasies?
None of them knew, as I did, that there was-no excitement, there was
no thrill. There was only depression and a hopeless enslavement to an
Inhuman, uncaring foreign bureaucracy. I hadn't made myself count for
something. I had made my freedom count for nothing.
As we sit here a half dozen, perhaps a dozen, perhaps more Americans
are operatives of the KGB. Perhaps some of them have been in place for years.
I tell you that none of them are happy men or women.
And I would suspect that there are hundreds of other Americans out of
the four million with security clerances who have given serious thought to
espionage. Those are the people that you must seek out and reach with the
truth. It is infinitely better for you to make the extra effort to ensure
that your personnel understand beyond a shadow of a doubt how espionage wounds
a man than for more and more of them to find out for themsevles. No American
who has gone to the KGB has not come to regret it.
For whatever reason a person begins his involvement, a week after the
folly begins, the original intent and purpose becomes lost in the ignominy of
the ongoing nightmare. Be it to give your life meaning or to make a political
statement. Be it to seek adventure or to pay your delinquent alimony. Be it
for whatever reason, see a lawyer or a psychiatrist or a priest or even a
reporter, but don't see a KGB agent. That it a solution to nothing.
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? Christopher J. Boyce 19.
1 only .wish, 14enators,- that, before more ?Americans ?take that
irreversible step, they could know what 1 now know, feel what I now feel, and
sense my loss.
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