MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON READINESS TERMS FOR FRONT ROCKET UNITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100150001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100150001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100150001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100150001-9
IN I c.i....1-1%.2c-INik?e. /A?..vtriNLY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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8 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Additional Views
on Readiness Terms for Front Rocket Units
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Military Thought." This article comments on an
article which appeared in a previous issue of this journal
(FIRDB-312/02796-73). The author argues that the earlier
article ignores the fact that the commander is concerned only
with the question of when rocket units will be ready to launch.
He therefore proposes terms incorporating time-to-launch
figures. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
basis within recipient agen
FIRDB-312/02797-73
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Deput Director for Operations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
TS #204324
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Late 1970
INFO.
-j-
Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
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FIRDB-312/02797-73
MATE 8 June 1973
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Degree of Readiness of
Rocket Troops for the Initial Nuclear Strike
SOURCE Documentary
SUMMARY
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970 of the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought." The author of
this article is Colonel I. Kochergin. He is commenting on an
article on the same subject which appeared in Issue No. 1 (89)
for 1970. He states that the earlier article dealt too much
with defining the conditions of readiness of rocket units,
which he asserts to be of no interest to the commander. Since
the interest of the commander, in his view, is when the units
can launch, he argues that the readiness terms should be ex-
pressed as the amount of time required for a unit to launch its
rockets. He recommends that these figures should be either one
hour, thirty minutes, or five minutes.
COMMENT:
END OF SUMMARY
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There is no information on this author in available
reference materials. Military Thought has been published by
the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past--
TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information
as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be
published. The SECRET version is published three times annually
and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
TS #204324
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THIS DOCUMEN Y NOT BE REPRODUCED
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FIRDB-312/02797-73
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The Degree of Readiness of Rocket Troops
for the Initial Nuclear Strike
by Colonel I. Kochergin
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In offensive operations in which conventional weapons are
used at the outset, with subsequent transition to nuclear weapons,
timely increase in the combat readiness of front (army) rocket
troops becomes exceedingly important.
This problem was discussed in the Journal,* but, in our
opinion, no satisfactory solution has yet been found. The essen-
tial deficiency of the proposed degrees of readiness of rocket
troops ("alert" and "maximum alert") lies in the fact that they
do not sp-EEIY7 the most important thing--the time factors of
readiness to deliver the initial nuclear strike, although this
criterion has always been a basic one. Because, in the final
analysis, it is not particularly important to the front (army)
troop commander what the rocket troops are doing at a given
moment, but how much time will elapse before the troops can par-
ticipate in an initial massive nuclear strike by the front.
On the basis of exercises conducted in the past, the conclu-
sion can be reached that, depending on the degree of threat, the
phased increase of readiness of front (army) rocket troops for the
initial nuclear strike requires the establishment of three degrees
of readiness: hour readiness, thirty-minute readiness and five-
minute readiness.
Hour readiness is that condition of rocket troops in which
they are capable of delivering a massive nuclear missile strike
against enemy targets in no more than one hour. This means that
the launch batteries of operational-tactical and tactical rockets
will be in Readiness No. 3. When the signal is given for rocket
troops to go on hour readiness, the rocket battalions (launch
batteries) occupying prepared site areas will continue to carry
out the assigned tasks to maintain Readiness No. 3. Commanders
of relocating rocket units (subunits) will take all necessary
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought,"
1970, No. 1 (89), page 76.
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measures to assure the rapid deployment of launch batteries into
unprepared site areas. The rocket battalions (launch batteries)
will go over to Readiness No. 2.
The longest time in preparation for a nuclear strike in this
case will be used by the relocating launch batteries. However,
according to existing norms, the average time for this should not
be over one hour.
? Thirty-minute readiness means that condition of rocket troops
in which they can launch a massive nuclear strike within thirty
minutes from the moment the signal is given to launch missiles.
This condition will apply to the following: 91(72 launch
batteries--Readiness No. 3 at the main (launch) position; 9K76
launch batteries--Readiness No. 2; and launch batteries for tac-
tical rockets--Readiness No. 3 while taking up prepared positions.
To shorten the time needed to launch nuclear strikes (espe-
cially against means of nuclear attack), the duty battalions
(batteries) and launch batteries targeted against enemy means of
nuclear attack should be in Readiness No. 2 or No. 2A. Upon
receiving the signal for the rocket troops to go over to thirty-
minute readiness, the relocating battalions (launch batteries)
will deploy into unprepared site areas and will be brought to a
state of readiness to launch missiles.
In this connection, it is advisable to refine somewhat the
meaning of Readiness No. 3 by applying it also to batteries which
have missiles on their launchers ready for combat use.
Five-minute readiness is that condition of troops in which
they are able to deliver a massive strike against previously
planned enemy objectives within five minutes. This condition
corresponds to Readiness No. 1. Thus, upon receiving the signal
for changing the rocket forces over to five-minute readiness, all
launch batteries that have assigned targets will go over to
Readiness No. 1. Duty launch batteries that have no assigned
targets will go over to Readiness No. 2A.
By adopting these phases of readiness for the initial nuclear
strike by front (army) rocket forces will assure orderly progres-
sion of readiness depending on the degree of threat and will
considerably simplify their control.
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