MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ARMY RECONNAISSANCE DURING MOVEMENT FROM THE INTERIOR INTO COMBAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100180001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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p, 50X1-HUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Army Reconnaissance
During Movement from the Interior into Combat
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Military Thought." This article is a commentary
on two previous articles on the same subject which appeared in
earlier issues of this journal. The author espouses reconnais-
sance in force and by helicopter. He agrees with a previous
author that reconnaissance by army elements should reach a depth
of up to three days' march, but takes issue with the other for
having reconnaissance elements move out with advance engineer
and air defense troops. He also comments in support of fuller
use of aerial and communications reconnaissance. This article
appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970.
basis within recipient agencies.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
W. E. Colby
Deputyf birecto for Operations
FIRDB-312/03002-73
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
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DATE OF Late 1970
INFO.
-3-
Intelligence Information Special Report
FIRDB-312/03002-73
DATE 22 June 1973
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance During the Advance
of a Combined-Arms Army from the Zone of Interior
and Its Commitment to Battle
SOURCE Documentary
SUMMARY
N
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Military Thought." The author of this article is
Colonel V. Tumas (Candidate of Military Sciences). This article
is a commentary on two previous articles on the same subject
which appeared in earlier issues of this journal. The author
espouses reconnaissance in force and by helicopter. He agrees
with a previous author that reconnaissance by army elements should
reach a depth of up to three days' march, but takes issue with the
other for having reconnaissance elements move out with advance
engineer and air defense troops. He also comments in support of
fuller use of aerial and communications reconnaissance.
The Russian word translated as "reconnaissance" may also be
translated "intelligence collection" or "intelligence." Colonel
V. Tumas coauthored two other articles in the Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" titled Some Problems
of Reconnaissance in the Preparation of the Initial Front Offen-
sive Operation" (Issue No. 3 [64] for 1962), and "Com at with
Enemy Sabotage and Reconnaissance Activities in an Army Offensive
LI'l Operation" (Issue No. 3 [70] for 1963). Military Thought has been
published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the
past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information
as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version. continues to be
published. The SECRET version is published three times annually
and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
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Reconnaissance During the Advance of a Combined-Arms Arm
from the Zone of Interior and Its Commitment to Battle
by Colonel V. Tumas
Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent
Recently, questions have been raised in the pages of the Collec-
tion of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" regarding the
organization and conduct of reconnaissance during the advance of
large operational formations from the zone of interior and their
commitment to battle.* The authors of these published articles, in
our opinion, are correctly calling attention to the many facets of
this problem, which has practical significance for staffs and troops.
In this article we intend to elaborate somewhat on the aforemen-
tioned articles and express our own opinion on individual problems
of the organization of reconnaissance during the advance of a
combined-arms army from the zone of interior and its commitment to
battle.
Direct planning of reconnaissance by the army staff begins
immediately upon receipt of the directive for commitment to battle
based on missions assigned by the commander and on receipt of the
operational instructions for reconnaissance from the front staff.
And we consider correct the suggestions by those comrades who
recommend that we have a reconnaissance plan (on the variants of
possible army actions) already available during peacetime. This
will undoubtedly save a considerable amount of time in its refine-
ment after the directive is received. However, we feel that the
development of only a graphic plan, as suggested by some of the
authors, is not the right approach. On the contrary, it is
possible to develop a written reconnaissance plan in peacetime
which will include a detailed presentation of the organization and
conduct of reconnaissance. Of course, it must have a map supple-
ment which will contain, in addition to the usual data, traffic
routes, areas and times for assembling reconnaissance units, areas
of daily halts, times for crossing the line of departure and
adjustment lines, communications support points, refueling points,
casualty evacuation points, and damaged equipment evacuation
points. The advantage of a written plan over a graphic onep in
our opinion, is that it provides for a faster and more complete
*Collection of Articles of the-Journal "Military Thought,"
1969, No. (86); 1970, No. (89).
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way of assigning missions to those who must carry them out. Also,
if necessary, it is more readily and quickly refined and amended,
e.g., to reallocate reconnaissance missions, to change the order
of advance of reconnaissance forces and means, etc.; and there is
a very high likelihood that substantive changes will be made in a
previously prepared plan after an army has moved out for commitment
to battle.
It should also be kept in mind that the planning and organi-
zation of reconnaissance under these conditions will differ somewhat
from its planning and organization by the staff of an army operating
in the first echelon. First of all, the staff of an advancing army
develops reconnaissance measures for the period the troops are
advancing toward the area of combat actions, as well as in support
of their commitment to battle. In addition, an abrupt change in
the situation at the front may cause a change in the army line of
commitment; therefore, it may be necessary in some cases to have
several variants of a reconnaissance plan instead of just one plan.
The most important task of the army staff under the conditions
being discussed will be the organization of reconnaissance in the
zone of advance by the troops to the area of combat actions. During
the advance, reconnaissance will be carried out by the forces and
means of the army and large units. However, during this period it
would be more advisable to use the forces and means of tactical
reconnaissance to obtain information on the traffic routes,
obstacles, devastated areas, and barriers in the army zone of
advance. As regards the means of operational reconnaissance, its
main efforts during this period must be directed at resolving
problems in support of the army's commitment to battle.
In those cases when reconnaissance of the zone of advance must
be carried out within a short period of time, it is advisable to
use some of the helicopters assigned to the army. This will make
it possible to scan a considerable area quickly, to discover the
locations of enemy units which have broken through to the rear
area, his airborne landings, his diversionary-reconnaissance
detachments (groups); to determine the existence of bridges and
crossings along the routes of advance; and to conduct radiation
and chemical reconnaissance along the routes of advance.
It should be mentioned that Colonel N. Krivopustov made sound
recommendations in his article when he suggested that large units
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should organize and conduct reconnaissance to the depth of a
twenty-four-hour march and the army to the depth of two or three
twenty-four-hour marches.* The timely receipt of reconnaissance
information at such a depth will allow the command to organize,
if necessary, a troop maneuver to bypass detected areas of
destruction and obstacles and to assure their uninterrupted advance.
Furthermore, reconnaissance groups sent out by large units and units
must operate at maximum distances; divisional units at seventy to
eighty kilometers; regimental units at forty-five to fifty kilometers.
In our opinion, when an army is advancing in the first days of
the war, reconnaissance detachments up to the size of a reinforced
motorized rifle (tank) battalion should be sent from the divisions
of the first echelon out on the main routes. These detachments, in
addition to conducting reconnaissance, will also be able, when
necessary, to destroy small airborne landing forces, diversionary-
reconnaissance groups, and enemy security subunits attempting to
inhibit our reconnaissance missions.
Also worthy of serious attention is a question brought up in
past articles of the Journal concerning the place, time, and order
for radio and radiotechn- cal reconnaissance subunits to be sent
forward to the area where the army is to be committed to battle.
We fully support the authors of these articles when they recommend
that these subunits must move out early to the army area of combat
actions so that they can be deployed on the line of commitment to
battle of large units about twenty-four-hours prior to the arrival
of the main forces. This will allow the acquisition of necessary
reconnaissance information before the troops approach the line of
commitment and will permit the commander to make, if necessary,
certain changes in his plan. Moreover, we do not agree with
Colonel N. Krivopustov's recommendation that these subunits move
forward "jointly with the road repair and traffic control units of
engineer troops, the first echelon of air defense units, and the
traffic control service."
There is no doubt that the radio and radiotechnical reconnais-
sance subunits are quite vulnerable on the march by themselves,
and the idea of providing cover for them during their advance is a
highly commendable one. However, we must not tie in the activities
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought,"
1969, No. 1 (86).
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of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance subunits with those of
such special troops as road repair and traffic control because the
latter will be forced to make stops along the way to repair roads,
bridges, etc.
In our opinion, the radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance
subunits must move directly behind the reconnaissance detachments
(strong reconnaissance groups) of large units of the first echelon.
In some cases, to provide cover for the aforementioned units on
the march, it is advisable to detail a motorized rifle or tank
subunit of company to battalion size. This subunit should be in
front of the radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance subunits in
order to protect the latter from enemy diversionary-reconnaissance
groups and airborne landing forces. It can also resolve certain
reconnaissance tasks along the advance route at the same time.
As regards the place and order of advance by the army radio
and radiotechnical reconnaissance battalions, we agree with
Colonel L. Shapovalov, who considers it advisable that they leave
the area of their next-to-last day of rest not along one, but along
two or three, army routes in the approach march formation ready to
deploy and conduct reconnaissance. During the march, the radio
reconnaissance subunits must constantly carry out radio intercepts
while on the move and must make only brief stops.
Reconnaissance in support of the direct commitment to battle
of the army requires, first of all, the use of strategic reconnais-
sance means. The most important mission of these means will be to
provide the commander and staff with all the information needed
for a massive and effective delivery of nuclear strikes by our
troops carried out during the period of commitment to battle of
large units. The fulfilment of this mission must be assigned pri-
marily to aerial, special, radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance.
During this period, aerial reconnaissance will be the most
efficient means of obtaining-information about the enemy, since it
is capable of observing large areas of enemy deployment within a
short time and immediately transmitting the information directly
from the aircraft. However, its main mission must be to locate
large objectives (reserves, second echelons, control points, supply
points of special munitions, etc.) and also to confirm the presence
of smaller important enemy objectives (launch installations, radar
installations, etc.) previously detected by ground reconnaissance
means.
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Important information in support of the delivery of the
initial massive nuclear strike by the army may be obtained by
special and long-range reconnaissance. They identify enemy nuclear
attack means and establish their coordinates, establish the approach
of enemy reserves or their area of concentration, and identify the
deployment of control points, nuclear munitions stores, and other
important targets.
Different interpretations have appeared in print concerning
the timing for dropping groups of special reconnaissance and long-
range reconnaissance into the enemy rear area.
In determining the most suitable time for dispatching long-
range reconnaissance groups into the enemy rear area, one must
proceed from the fact that they should be able to obtain the initial
information on important enemy targets before the arrival of our
troops at the line of deployment and, at the same time, that their
premature drop should not allow the enemy command to learn our
intentions concerning the commitment to battle of the army on a
given axis. Therefore, we agree with the suggestions on the
advisability of dispatching long-range reconnaissance groups six
to eight hours before the beginning of commitment of the large
units of the first echelon to battle.
The means used to dispatch long-range reconnaissance groups
into the enemy rear area will depend on conditions. In some
cases helicopters will be used, and in other cases, ground trans-
portation means (automobiles, armored personnel carriers, tanks,
and others). Therefore, we cannot agree with Colonel L.
Shapovalov, who rejects the idea of using ground means because
"much time will be lost in moving them out to the designated areas".
And the last matter to which I would like to call attention
is the need to make fuller use of radio reconnaissance means for
the collection of reconnaissance information.
Radio reconnaissance by radio intercepts of transmissions in
the clear, coded and enciphered radiotelegrams, radio station call
signs, authentication signals, and other messages, will lead to the
identification, to a significant degree, of enemy groupings, and the
substance and nature of his probable plan for action. This will be
further supplemented by direction-finding of operating radios of
enemy large unit command posts, airfields, and other installations.
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