MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): CONVENTIONAL SOVIET LONG RANGE AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY AIR BASES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100290001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASH I NGTON, D.C. 20505
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2 October 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Conventional Soviet
Long Range Air Force Operations Against Enemy
Air Bases
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles
of the Journal "Military Thought". This article discusses the
tactics of the Soviet Long Range Air Force against enemy air
bases under conventional warfare conditions. The only aircraft
mentioned is the TU-16, in both bomber and missile-carrying
variants. Some of these aircraft have nuclear loads and are
concealed for the eventuality of transition to nuclear warfare.
Assuming the dawn and twilight hours to be the most favorable
times for attack, the author elects to attack at twilight, when
only a few crews are on duty to mount a counterattack. This
article appeared in Issue No. 2 (87) for 1969.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a
basis within recipient agencies
strict need-to-know
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William E. N lson
Deputy Director for Operations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of National Estimates
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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DIRECTORATE Of
OPERATIONS
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Mid-19 6 9
INFO.
SOURCE
Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
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DATE
2 Oct 1973
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Defeat of Enemy Aviation
Groupings in a Theater of Military Operations in
a Non-Nuclear Period
Documentary
Summary
The following report is a translation from - ?sian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (87) for l9G of the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Co tion of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of
this article is Colonel-G. Lebedev. This article discusses
the tactics of the Soviet Long Range Air Force against enemy
air bases under conventional warfare conditions. The only
aircraft mentioned is the TU-16, in both number and missile-
carrying variants. Some of these aircraft have nuclear loads
and are concealed for the eventuality of transition to nuclear
warfare. Assuming the dawn and twilight hours to be the most
favorable times for attack, the author elects to attack at
twilight, when only a few crews are on duty to mount a
counterattack. Neutralization of enemy air defense is viewed
as very difficult under conventional warfare conditions: The
author recommends the use of a narrow flight path to targets,
after air defenses along that path have been hit by strategic
and tactical aircraft.
End of Summary
Comment:
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There is no information in available reference materials
which can be firmly associated with the author. Military
Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in
three versions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED.
There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET
version continues to be published. The SECRET version is
published three times annually and is distributed down to the
level of division commander.
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The Defeat of Enemy Aviation Groupings
in a Theater of Military Operations
in a Non-Nuclear Period'
by
Colonel G. Lebedev, Candidate of Military Sciences
The problem of defeating enemy aviation groupings in theaters
of military operations in a non-nuclear period is extremely urgent
at present. It is no coincidence that this topic is being examined
in a number of articles in the journal Military Thought. It was
covered most fully by General-Mayor of the Air Force G. Yarotskiy.*
It seems advisable to express an opinion on several problems in the
planning of air operations to defeat aviation groupings and in the
conduct of combat actions in air operations by forces of long-range
aviation.
First of all, we shall note that General G. Yarotskiy's
approach to determining the long-range aviation forces required for
a simultaneous strike against all active enemy airfields can hardly
be considered correct. Estimates show that_far_th;., destruction at
an airfield of sixty percent of the bombers or tactical fighters of
Oil-6tuadron, a test_range_group must comprie. five_ or six TU-16
aircraft with OFA-250 bombs, or four_or_five aircraft with RBK-500
bombs. If one takes into account that, as a rule, one air wing is
based at an airfield, an alx_regiment_sbouldssigned for each
airfield, since some of these aircraft (six to nine, but not a
detachment) will be supporting the activities of the strike groups
(final reconnaissance, illumination and marking of targets, radio-
jamming cover for bombers). An attack on a large air ba,se- which
has up_to__twp aJ. r wi. ngs ep lcyea onj_e_s_s___tham_two
al-r-x-agimezIs. Furthermore, from the experience of combat training
of long-range aviation units we know that tw_o_al:3:_ikes_on_a_landing
strip_regpire allocation_of up to six TU-16 aircraft with FAB-500
bombs, and three strikes require eight_to_ten aircraft. Hence, it is
evident that the combat capabilities of long-range aviation units are
limited in action with conventional weapons. Therefore, the mission
cannot be accomplished by one strike, but only by conducting an air
operation to defeat an air grouping by using long-range and front
aviation forces. pv defeat we men
to sixty percent of the enemy aircraft at airfields and in aerial
_co.
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"
No. 3 (85), 1968.
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Since an air operation to defeat an air grouping with conven-
tional means of destruction can be conducted in two or more theaters
of war, to achieve the goal of the operation requires that long-range
aviation use part of its forces to hit targets first in one theater
(axis of the theater), then in the others. Massed strikes must be
combined with echeloned actions of small groups of aircraft to
neutralize and harass the enemy. In a number of instances long-
range aviation units will be forced to move and land at airfields
of another large unit, or of another branch of aviation, and
immediately commit their forces to battle. At times it may become
necessary to redeploy to another theater of military operations.
In order to attain the more critical objectives of an air
operation it is necessary to find ways of increasing the combat
capabilities of long-range aviation large units and units. One of
the important measures for increasing the effectiveness of long-
range aviation aircraft operations with conventional bombs is to
equip them with auxiliary suspension systems, which permits an
increase in the bombload. The echelon with conventional weapons
can also be reinforced by relTIIns_part of the TU7.1?__AiLzy.a1I.
from the nuclear echelon wEen using a combined suspension system
of nuclear meani-1=71-es and bombs); by selecting more effective
types of air munitions in relation to specific tasks; and by mixing
the loads of TU-16 aircraft of the non-nuclear echelon.
A very important consideration in planning combat actions is
the organization of the transition from actions with conventional
weapons to actions using all means of warfare. The main attention
should be focused on ensuring continuous high combat readiness of
the nuclear echelon in the non-nuclear period, protecting it from
enemy strikes, and increasing the reliability and efficiency of
the control of its forces.
To accomplish these tasks requires a whole series of measures.
The viability of the nuclear echelon may be ensured, in our view.
first and foremost by its concealed withdrawal to dispersal air-
fields, apart from non-nuclear subunits if possible. During the
take-off of aircraft with conventional weapons it is important to
conceal the presence and basing of the nuclear echelon on the
ground and to give the appearance that all long-range aviation
forces are participating in the delivery of a massed strike. This
may be accomplished by skilful radio deception and camouflage. To
conceal our forces and means from the enemy in the last war we made
use of weather conditions, hours of darkness, background camouflage
of terrain, dummy airfields, and other factors. These measures
have not lost their significance even now. It may even make sense
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to fully or partially change the basing of the nuclear echelon
during combat actions with conventional weapons.
It is also imperative to resolve the problem of how to use
the non-nuclear echelon in a situation in which combat actions are
initiated with the use of nuclear weapons, or in which the echelon
is in the air and carrying out a previously assigned mission
when it receives the command to use these weapons.
In our view, in planning the actions of the non-nuclear echelon,
consideration must be given to two tasks, the fulfilment of which
depends on the time the orders are received to use nuclear weapons.
If, when these orders are received, the echelon is on the ground
and has conventional weapons suspended, then steps must be taken
to prepare it for the nuclear variant. If it takes off for actions
with conventional weapons and reaches enemy territory, it should
continue to carry out the mission. However, if the aircraft have
not reached the front line, it is desirable to return them and
replace their munitions. Thus, because of its readiness at take-
off, this echelon is like a second nuclear echelon.
The article by G. Yarotskiy states that in an air operation
to defeat an aviation grouping the first massed strike should
be planned thoroughly and in detail. We think that actions in-
volving the use of conventional weapons require detailed planning
for the whole operation, or, in any case, the first day. And the
second massed strike by long-range aviation forces (selection of
targets of actions, organization of overcoming air defense) may
be planned in advance in as much detail as the first. This will
allow crews to spend the minimum amount of time in preparing for
the next take-off. The clarification of targets by individual
subunits and crews is not excluded from this planning.
The most complicated and important task carried out in support
of the first long-range aviation strike is the final reconnaissance
of targets, which will preclude strikes against unoccupied airfields.
Its planning must provide for the arrival of reconnaissance crews
at the targets early enough to ensure the timely and accurate
guidance of strike groups to the targets. This is achieved not
only by having the reconnaissance crews take off sooner, but also
by having them operate from the forward airfields of front aviation.
Reconnaissance crews, as a rule, overcome air defense independently.
The basic method of final reconnaissance of airfields still is
visual observation, supplemented by aerial photography. Radio-
electronic reconnaissance can detect operating airfields by the
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radio communications means working at these airfields. Final re-
connaissance results must be transmitted immediately by ultrashort-
wave radio communications through relay aircraft to the aircraft
of strike group commanders, as well as to the command posts of
long-range aviation large units and units and to interested staffs.
It is possible to have different variants of the commencement
of combat actions in an air operation to defeat aviation groupings:
at dawn or thirty minutes to an hour before dawn; before nightfall
and at night.
In a war game conducted by the Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces
in 1968, the "East" forces delivered the first massed strike against
enemy aviation at dawn. Such a variant has a definite advantage.
One of its shortcomings is that at the beginning of combat actions
the enemy can call upon up to seventy-five to ninety percent of his
aircraft and use them throughout the daylight hours against our
airfields and other targets. Even in.a-situation in which the
first massed strike by our aviation is-delivered against fifteen toi
twenty airfields in that theater, retaliatory strikes by an enemy
with large aviation groupings can be quite significant.
During the daylight hours our front aviation can deliver up to
three massed strikes, but we must not forget that up to ninety
percent of enemy aviation in the Western Theater of ilari--FaW
Operations isibas-lerat-a-depth-ef-more than 21/0 -kilometers, i.e.,
beyond the maximum range of our fighterbothers dfitizEi.- At
the same time, the forces of long-range aviation will deliver no
more than one massed strike at dawn, if it is calculated to be a
surprise strike. The second strike can be carried out seven to
nine hours after the first; however, long-range aviation units
will be forced to wait for nightfall and run the risk of enemy air
actions against their airfields.
In determining the time when aviation combat actions should
commence, and if the initiative lies with us, very careful
consideration should be given to the duration of daylight and
nighttime hours. If there is less daylight than nighttime, it
might be advisable to begin combat actions in the pre-evening
twilight hours (the "evening" variant). What does this achieve?
First, the maximum forces of front and long-range aviation are
used in the initial massed strike. The enemy can use only night
crews in his retaliatory attack (up to twenty-five percent of the
tactical aviation forces). Second, long-range aviation forces take
off at minimum intervals and will be able to deliver one or two
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It is not possible to agree with the opinion of G. Yarotskiy
on the necessity for neutralizing SAM batteries and other air
defense means in all of the areas of operations of front aviation
and in all of the flight zones of long-range and military-transport
aviation. One of the characteristics of operations using conven-
tional strike means is that it will be impossible to exert any real
effect on enemy air defense objectives even if the initial massed
strike includes up to t2,EiLimE.amt of our fighter-bomber and
fighter forces. For this reason, it is advisable that large units,
not only of long-range but also of front aviation, fly to their
targets within a limited number of flight corridors of limited
width on the strike axis of the main forces, in which enemy air
defense means can be neutralized. This situation will also affect
the determination of the strike targets to a certain degree, in the
sense that they will have to be selected in individual areas
and not throughout the theater. It must also be taken into account
here that lowering the combat capabilities of our units will decrease
not only the number of targets struck but also the depth of the
strike and the width of the zone of operations along the front line;
and the organization for overcoming air defenses will have to be
changed.
The experience of exercises shows that the forces of long-
range aviation must overcome the air defense in a theater of
military operations in one or two narrow zones up to fifty to sixty
kilometers in width, and along several routes in each zone (at
safe intervals of ten to fifteen kilometers between them). Thus,
if one zone runs through a SAM battery grouping, then the other
must, if possible, go around a large grouping of air defense means
(over a sea or over a mountainous region). In overcoming the air
defense of a pre-frontal zone in a narrow sector, it is possible
to set up high-density radio-jamming; and this reduces the number
of targets against which action must be taken. Under these
conditions it is important to concentrate the efforts of front
aviation on the neutralization and destruction of Hawk batteries
and fighter airfields. SAM fire zones must be overcome by flying
at low and very low altitudes, which precludes counteraction by
Nike-Hercules SAM batteries and reduces the capabilities of Hawk
batteries. Minimum losses from fire by the latter are sustained
when the time intervals between aircraft in a combat formation
are no more than ten seconds.
In some instances air defense targets in the flight path of
the main forces of long-range and front aviation must be neutra-
lized by long-range aviation missile carriers. To achieve this
it is desirable to use a regiment of TU-16 aircraft with a combined
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suspeniion of weapons (missiles with passive homing heads, and
bombs). Such a regiment can use missiles to neutralize the radar
stations of control and warning centers and posts, and the stations
providing target designations to SAM batteries; and it can use
aerial bombs to destroy enemy fighters at airfields and SA11 fire
batteries. As estimates show, the proper complement of a tactical
group assigned to destroy (neutralize) air defense means is two
detachments with a combined suspension of missiles and bombs and
one detachment with jamming means to cover the missile carriers.
Such a group can put two or three targets out of action in the
following variants: a control and warning post and a fighter
airfield; a control and warning post and a Nike-Hercules battery;
or two Nike-Hercules batteries. The neutralization of these
batteries is important for units of both long-range and front
aviation, when it is required to support the flight of aircraft at
medium and high altitudes to attain maximum range, and also to
support the actions of missile carriers against targets protected
by such SAM. As a whole, a missile-carrier air reainent using
conventional weapons can neutralize up to six to nine air defense
targets
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