MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100320001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 8, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE 7 50X1-HUM1973
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Reflections on the
Initial Period of War
50X1-HUM
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR
by Colonel (retired) G. Isserson
The altered conditions for waging armed conflict which have
been brought about by the appearance of nuclear weapons lend new
significance and new substance to the initial period of a war.
A historical look at this problem shows that the in
period of war became a sDecial nhenotmQnnn in the s
gc
nine e n century . This was roug about by the condition
or mobilizing anrmy (converting it from peace to war footin
for concentration toward the border along rail lines, and for
strategic deployment to the theater of military operations.
As refinements were effected in the organizational struc-
ture of troops, in motorizing and mechanizing them, and in im-
proving the system of mobilization and transport capabilities,
as well as the development of air forces making it possible with
air strikes to begin a war directly, the manner of conducting a
war and the character of the initial period chan ed.
In the second half of the nineteenth century and in World
War I there was a set period of time which elapsed between the
moment of declaration of war and the deployment of main forces
in the theater of military action and their entry into battle.
(In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 this time period was
twenty-one days; in World War I it was sixteen days.) This time
period was limited to actions of forward, border units, and to
the conduct of particularly significant preliminary operations.
Historically this period even took on the name "initial;" it
preceded entirely the main operations of the fully deployed army.
This phenomenon has long since passed on into history. New con-
ditions began more and more to constrict its limits in tim- I
space. 50X1 MM
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Between the First and Second World Wars the view of the .
initial period changed sharply. First there appeared the theory
of echelon entry into war--according to this theory, strong
"covering armies" were maintained in the border zone even in
peacetime, but mobilization and concentration of the main body
of forces was still carried out after the beginning of war. In these conditions the initial period had to be comprised of the
first operations of the forward armies, under cover of which
all the fully mobilized forces were concentrated and committed
to the main operations. Strategic deployment took on an echelon
chara~te~r, But this means o entering into war did not prove
out either, and concepts of the initial period showed themselves
to be outdated.
Prior to World War II the military press, especially the
German-fascist press, began writing openly that modern warfare
will begin all at once using all forces, said forces having been
previously and secretly concentrated, and the main operations
will develop fully from the departure position to the achieve-
ment of the established strategic goal. Under these conditions
the initial operations are converted directly into the main opera-
tions, and all distinction between them in space and time dis-
appears.
War is unleashed all at once as a sudden, stunning blow.
Its initial period encompasses the entire opening campaign of
the main operations. The side which began the war and holds the
initiative conducts these operations on the basis of its initial
strategic deployment to achieve the established strategic goal,
and it continues all the way to a culminating or turning point,
when the capabilities of the initial deployment have been ex-
hausted and the resulting situation requires a change in the
strategic plan, regrouping of forces, and concentration anew.
This in fact is what happened in the Great Patriotic War. Then
the initial period essentially lost all of the specific charac-
teristics which had been attributed to it in previous conceptions
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and which had comprised its basic content; every element of a
beginning or preliminary character was shown to have been emas-
culated from it. Thus the basic difference came down to the fact
that while previously the deployment of all main forces had taken
place after the beginning of war, starting with World War II this
was accomplished ahead of time, before the beginning of war.
End into war with all forces deployed ahead of time was
the main operations of all concentrated forces, was removed from
the arena of war as a separate phenomenon.
In contemporary conditions the character of the initial
period of war emerges as a function of the kind of war and how
it will begin. With the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons
of vast destructive force and effective global range, this
question for the first time in history assumes a significance
which is basic and decisive for determining the character of
future war. This question hinges on whethe nuclear weapons
will be used, and how: right away, ox after a certain time
interval; with all their force, or only to a limited degree; on
a strategic, or only on tactical and operational scales.
In this regard it will be more accurate to speak not about
the character, but about the type of war, for every type can
have a different character. Nuclear/missile weapons are capable
of directly resolving strategic tasks, and therefore they make
for a special type of war.
The type of war first of all determines the alternatives:
what will be the main target of attention--the economic base,
e in an organize3tashion. The initial period, to precede
longer possible during the initial period to count on getting
them fully mobilized and concentrated, and sending pinto
the beginning of war catches armed forces undeployed, it is no
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the cities, the population, the whole rear area of a country?
Or just the armed forces at the front? Also, what weapons will
be used? These alternatives arose back before the appearance
of nuclear/missile weapons as a product of the development of
long-range bomber aircraft. Now the choice of these alternatives
is predetermined by the very factor of nuclear/missile weapons.
If nuclear/missile weapons are to be used (and of this, appar-
ently, there should no longer-be-any doubt), then a war will
inevitably become war against the entire rear area of a country
This follows from the nature of nuclear weapons, which are cap-
able of at once rendering destruction to the entire rear area
of a country.
However, the use of nuclear weapons at the outbreak of war
is such a decisive act and is associated with such grave his-
torical responsibility that all-out use of them in their full
scope would apparently be resorted to only in_the mOLt._extreme
circumstances. The degree of employment of nuclear weapons
therefore allows for a number of variants. In this regard at
least three types of contemporary warfare are possible: local
V ithout use of nuclear weapons; limited war with use of nu--
weapons on a tactical or not more t an opera iona_ sca e;
eeramc1ear war, __with-'"unlimited-global emplovmentt of
ar/missile weapons. 50X1-HUM
All-out nuclear war is, of course, the optimum variant.
But leading up to this there are a number o i -diate sages
which imperceptibly blend one into the other and form a whole
series of escalating variants. First, local war can involve
more and more countries, e and geographically, and turn into
world war--which in turn chi become nuclear. Second, limited
war can grow into genera uclear war. In a situation where the
theater of military operations is limited in depth and tactical
or--more likely--operational, nuclear weapons are being used, it
would shortly become very difficult to distinguish a limited war
from a general nuclear war; at that point the latter could unex-
pectedly be at its inception. Third, a world war by no means
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necessarily has to begin as all-out nuclear war; rather, it can
through a series of stages approach the point where, depending
on the course of events, nuclear weapons will be put into play
in a subsequent period. The question is--at what stage will
this happen?
The likelihood of one type of war turning into another shows
that the character of a future war depends not only on the type
of war, but also on the role which will be assigned to the dif-
Iferent means of armed combat and different branches of the armed
forces in a war. For the problem of the initial period this is
of decisive significance. Especially important also is the place
which ground forces are to have in the onset of a modern war.
There are at least three__possible variants in the onset of
a modern war. The first is when a general nuclear war begins
with sudden, massive nuclear strikes using strategic means and
simultaneous introduction of all other branches of service into
the conflict. This is the ost optimum of the variants. The
second is when a war begins with nuc ear strikes which are fol-
lowed by the introduction of other branches of service. The
third is when a war begins with conventional means of destruc-
tion and strategic nuclear weapons are brought into play only
later.
It is quite evident that each of these typical cases, which
can have differing variants, creates a variety of conditions for
the onset of a war and determines the differing nature of its
initial period. From this it is clear that it is impossible to
speak of certain characteristics of the initial period of a modern
war as being common to all cases.
It is evident that the first variant for the onset of a
modern war is all-encompassing, the most threatening and dan-
gerous variant. It is with the nature of this variant in min
that the initial period of war must be examined. D
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As was pointed out above, the experience of World War II
has already shown that the initial period has lost its former
distinctive features and has incorporated all initial operations
of the main forces; also, the characteristic of being of a pre-
liminary nature has vanished as one of its elements. Now under
conditions of a nuclear war all the characteristics of the
initial period face further evolution yet and shift from opera-
tional-strategic scale to the strategic-global scale.
This means that the problem of the initial period of war
no longer has any sort of independent significance, expressible
within defined limits and separate from modern warfare as a
whole. In the sense that it is a process which runs a course in
time and space, war has a beginning and an end and its phases,
including an initial one. But this initial period now flows
directly into the general course of the war and is absorbed by
it. It is eliminated as an independent, specific phenomenon,
separate and distinct from the general course of the war; it
loses its independent boundaries in space and time.
Thus, under current conditions the initial period of a nu-
clear war becomes transformed directly into the commencement of
the war in its full scale and o timum scope, and thereby loses
the special qualitative content it previously had. It should be
pointed out, however, that this is not to say that the beginning
of a war will be like its end, that the phases of a war will not
be different one from the other, or that the initial period--like
any of the other periods--will not have its own aspects. The
point is, the initial period is the actual beginning of a war
in its full scope. There is no special period (osobyy period)
to count on to complete concentration and deployment of one's
orces.
It goes without saying that in some cases a war can develop
in such a way that there is still an initial period as an inde-
pendent phenomenon, having its boundaries in space and time.
This can happen in local wars, and even in some variants of a
world war.
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The task of scientific research has not been just to estab-
lish the line of historical development and show what has become
of the initial period in present day conditions. This problem
also has great practical significance, and serious practical
conclusions must be drawn from it. Fundamental reexamination
is required of a number of questions concerning the composition
and training of armed forces during peacetime, and of techniques
of their secret mobilization and strategic deployment during a
period of threatening danger. This is necessary in order that
at the moment of the possible beginning of war they may be fully
armed and not subject to surprise.
Modern strategy faces tasks of enormous importance in this
regard. These tasks call for studying what kind of war will
break out, what will be the conditions of its onset, and how it
will begin and be waged. These questions embrace all the con-
cepts of the initial period of war in its current sense, and re-
quire research even during peacetime into a number of problems.
For this it is essential to conduct scientific analysis of many
social, political, economic, technical, and military questions.
First and foremost, a strategy based on mobilization, concentra-
tion, and deployment of all forces in a theater of military
operations at the beginning of a war should be rejected. A
totally new concept of readiness of armed forces for war is neces-
sary. The very concept of "mobilization" in its previous sense
must be reexamined. It must be replaced by a concept of "readi-
ness" in successively higher stages, a readiness which is
organically provided for by the entire system of the composition
of the armed forces in peacetime in accordance with the develop-
ment and complexity of military-political circumstances.
The treatment of strategic questions is complicated by the
fact that up to the last minute we will not be able to know
definitely just what sort of war will develop and what forms it
will take. Further, strategy cannot fully apply the experience
of previous wars. Strategy accordingly bears a heavy respon-
sibility. 50X1-HUM
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