MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RESTORING THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ROCKET UNITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 5(1X1 -HT TM I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2050
I ~5' 50X1 HUM
22 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Restoring the
Combat Effectiveness of Rocket Units
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles
of the Journal "Military Thought." The authors identify
actions necessary to restore launch capability to rocket units,
such as forming new units from partially effective units, re-
distributing targets, and reallocating command and communica-
tions responsibilities. They place much emphasis on the types
of fire threats to deployed rocket units. The article states
that a rocket unit is still combat effective if forty percent
of its launch components survive a nuclear strike. It appeared
in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
basis within recipient agencies.
Deputy Director for
CSDB-312/01385-73
TS #202988
Copy #1L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
50X1-HUM
CSDB-312/01385-73
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
TS #202988
Copy #Y2-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Early 1970
INFO.
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Restoration of Combat Effective-
ne3s of Rocket Large Units and
units in Operations
Documentary.
SUMMARY
N
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970 of the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Arti-
cles of the Journal "Military Thought." The authors of this
article are Col. P. Dubok, Col. B. Strelchenko, Lt. Col. V.
Milovanov, and Lt. Col. P. Morkovkin. Their proposals for res-
toration of combat effectiveness emphasize prosaic actions
such as redistributing targets from damaged to surviving units,
transferring control from destroyed higher control points to
lower-ranking units, and establishing reliable reporting sys-
tems for timely assessment of the post-strike situation. Much
of the article is devoted to discussion in detail of the types
of fires which rocket units will face under various meteoro-
logical and vegetation conditions. The threshold of effective-
ness for rocket units is given as forty percent, and fifty per-
cent for support elements.
Intelligence Information Special Report
CSDB- 312/01385-73
DATE 22 March 1973
END OF SUMMARY
50X1-HUM
Col. B. Strelchenko was the author of two articles which
appeared in the SECRET version: Issue No. 4 for 1960 titled
"Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets and Guided Missiles,"
and Issue No. 5 (60) for 1961 titled "Ways of More Effectively
Combatting Enemy Means of Nuclear Attack in an Offensive Opera-
tion" (CSDB-3,650,600 - 19 July 1962). He did not have his
doctorate at that time. He is also a senior instructor at the
TS #202983
Copy # fL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
Military Engineering Academy i/n Dzerzhinskiy. No identify-
ing information is available on the other officers.
Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry
of Defense in three versions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET
and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not
the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET
version is published three times annually and is distributed
down to the level of division commander.
TS #202988
Copy # /L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
Restoration of Combat Effectiveness of Rocket
Large Units an Units in Operations
by Col. P. Dubok
Lecturer and Candidate of Military Sciences
Col. B. Strelchenko
Lecturer and Doctor of Military Sciences
Lt. Col. V. Milovanov
Lecturer and Candidate of Military Sciences and
Lt. Col. P. Morkovkin
In our periodical press* and in recent training exercises,
much attention has been given to the restoration of combat
effectiveness of troops in present day operations. in this
connection we would like to offer some thoughts which directly
concern rocket troops.
The restoration of combat effectiveness of rocket (rocket-
technica large units and units which have suffered the effects
of weapons of mass destruction includes the restoration of dis-
ru l and the clarification (allocation) of combat tasks
by combat effective rocket (rocket-technical) units; the conduct
of rescue (medical evacuation) work and special treatment in
areas of nuclear bursts; and the replacement of losses in per-
sonnel, weapons, and equipment.
For the most part, there must be advance planning for
measures involving the restoration of disrupted control, aid to
casualties, the replacement of losses and special treatment.
These measures can be defined more precisely only upon receipt
of operational directives.
The commander (staff) of troops of a front (army) has
overall command of the organization and conduct of these mea-
sures. All of the basic work is done by the commander (staff)
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Nilitarv Thought
No. 1 (77), No. 3('7~ , 1966; No.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
of rocket troops and artillery and by the chief of service
(department) of rocket-artillery armament of a front (army).
While an operation is still in the preparatory stage, these
officers coordinate with the operational directorate (department)
and with the chiefs of arms of troops and services of a front
(army) regarding: the exchange of information on nuclea an -_
chemical strikes and on zones of contamination, devastation,
fl60-ding, and fires; mutual assistance among units of the
various arms of troops in eliminating the aftereffects of an
enemy strike with weapons of mass destruction; the replacement
of losses in weapons, combat equipment, and supplies; the evacu-
ation and repair of damaged weapons and combat equipment; and
the conduct of special treatment.
In case any of our rocket units (subunits) are put out
of action by enemy nuclear and chemical strikes while our own
rocket strikes are in the planning stage, our plans provide
for the redistribution of our strike objectives. For this
purpose several rocket battalions (launch batteries) are
designated for the destruction of important objectives, some
as primary objectives and others as alternate objectives.
In order to restore disrupted control in the staff of
rocket troops and artillery of a front (army) within a short
period of time, various possible alternatives are being de-
veloped for the transfer of control to the forward command v-
post P) (alternate command post - ZKP), or, if the command
post (KP) and the PKP (ZKP) of a front (army) are both out of
action at the same time, to the control point of the comman-
der of rocket troops and artillery of the army (division);
a procedure is also being established for transferring control
of a rocket brigade which is directly subordinate to the com-
mander of rocket troops and artillery of a front or army (see
Table 1).
TS #202988
Copy #I-L-
- -
T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
Possible Variants for Restoring Disrupted Control
0 Rocket Forces oa Front (Army)
Installations
Sustaining an
Enemy Nuclear
Measures for Restoring
Strike
Disrupted Control
KP of
Control of rocket troops is transferred to
the
the PKP (ZKP). The deputy commander of roc-
front
ket forces and artillery assumes command of
army)
the rocket forces of the front (army).
KP and
Command of the rocket forces is transferred
PKP (ZKP)
to the army (division) for a period of time
at the
to be indicated by message.
same
time
KP of a
The commander of one rocket battalion assumes
rocket
command and reports by message to the staff
brigade
of rocket troops and artillery of the front
(army).
In organizing the control of rocket troops, we also pro-
vide for the capability to receive a continuous flow of reports
on the status of rocket (rocket-technical) large units and units,
reports which are necessary for a preliminary evaluation of
their combat effectiveness. These reports, in the form of short
previously established messages, will be transmitted immediately
after enemy nuclear (chemical) strikes.
TS #202988
Copy # / 2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
In order to make a proper estimate of time factors and to
ensure a high quality of rescue and medical evacuation work,
it is necessary above all to evaluate the possible nature and
volume of this work in the foci of nuclear destruction; to
determine operating procedures for rocket and rocket-technical
large units and units in case they are subjected to a strike;
and to set up procedures for mutual assistance among units, and
operating procedures for composite detachments for the elimina-
tion of aftereffects.
To evaluate the nature and volume of work in centers of nu-
clear destruction, it is advisable to use the following method
of projection.
It is first necessary to establish the degree of over-
growth and the danger of fire in the siting area (area of
deployment) occupied by this or that unit (subunit) and the
necessary measures for their defense. The fire situation
in deployment areas of rocket (rocket-technical) large units
and units is estimated in accordance with the indicators of
fire danger (Table 2) and overgrowth (Table 3).
Table 2
Indicators of Danger from Fire
In a Coniferous Forest
Extreme
Dan er
Serious
Dan er
Insignificant
Dan er
No
Danger
Long spells
Long spells of
Frequent rains.
Several days
of very hot
hot weather
Relative hu-
of rain.
weather. No
with periodic
midity 70 to
Damp forest.
precipitation.
inconsequen-
80 percent.
High rela-
Air tempera-
tial precipi-
Forest floor
tive humid-
ture not under
tation. Rela-
damp.
ity.
200 C, rela-
tive humidity
tive humidity
50 to 70 per-
under 25 per-
cent. Dry
cent. High
forest.
pressure.
TS #202988
Copy # J L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
Overgrowth in a Wild Coniferous Forest
And the Probability o Fire
Slight
Overgrowth
Danger
of
Fire
Average
Over rowth
Danger
of
Fire
Dry grass, ground
20%
Dry grass, rein-
35%
covered with fal-
deer moss (li-
len leaves--fire
chen), ground
possible.
covered with
pine needles--
low-burning fire
possible.
Heavy
Overgrowth
Dry grass, dead
trees, stumps,
ground covered
with pine
needles--low-
burning fire
possible.
Danger
of
Pi re
Very Heavy
Overgrowth
Danger
of
Fire
Dry debris from
timber-cutting,
dry grass, twigs
and branches,
ground covered
with pine
needles--low-
burning fire
spreading to
treetop level.
It is then possible to determine zones of irrecoverable and medi-
cal losses, zones of damage to combat equipment, and zones of
barriers and fires, by taking into account the nature of the
TS #202988
Copy # /Z
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
enemy nuclear strike expected (the presumed yield and type
of burst) and the disposition of personnel and combat equip-
ment within each unit's area. By using a previously prepared
transparent overlay, it is possible to determine the elements
of a combat formation which fall within the given attack zone,
and to determine the possible volume of rescue and medical
evacuation work which will be needed in the center of nuclear
destruction.
It is recommended that the measures for the restoration of
combat effectiveness of rocket and rocket-technical large units
(units) be added as an explanatory note to the plan for the
combat use of rocket troops and artillery of a front (army), and
the data necessary for control be included in the control chart
for rocket troops and artillery.
The following is a general work plan of a commander and
staff of rocket troops and artillery of a front (army) for the
restoration of combat effectiveness of rocket and rocket-tech-
nical large units (units) after employment by the enemy of
weapons of mass destruction: the restoration of disrupted con-
trol of rocket troops; the evaluation of the combat effective-
ness of rocket and rocket-technical large units and units; the
clarification of combat tasks for combat effective units and
subunits; the organization and carrying out of rescue and medical
evacuation work in areas of a nuclear burst; the reforming of
units and subunits which suffered casualties; the creation of
composite rocket battalions and technical subunits; and the re-
placement of personnel and combat equipment losses.
Besides restoring disrupted control, the commander and staff
of rocket troops and artillery simultaneously assess the combat
effectiveness of rocket (rocket-technical) large units (units)
against whom the enemy has delivered nuclear and chemical
strikes; and the radiation, chemical, and fire situation de-
veloping in siting and deployment areas and the influence of
this situation on the organization of combat operations and on
the conduct of rescue and medical evacuation work in centers
of nuclear and chemical destruction. They also study data which
allow them to estimate the nature and scale of subsequent enemy
use of weapons of mass destruction.
TS #202988
Copy #/ Z__
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
By combat effectiveness of rocket and rocket-technical
units, we mean the quantitative and qualitative indicators
of their combat condition and capability which permit assigned
tasks to be resolved within prescribed time frames and with the
required effectiveness. Thinking of combat effectiveness of
a large unit (unit) in the narrow sense of the word should
become a thing of the past. Proceeding from this, three types
(levels) of combat effectiveness may be established: combat
effective, partially combat effective, and not combat effective.
Loss of combat effectiveness can be permanent or temporary.
What are the criteria for assessing the combat effectiveness
level of rocket troops? The fact that they are composed of
various dedicated units (subunits) makes it necessary to ac-
count for the component units separately, not only according
to the degree to which each unit is built up with personnel
and combat equipment, but also according to the tasks to be
carried out. Therefore, in assessing the combat effectiveness
of a rocket brigade (battalion), we must consider whether they
are able to carry out strikes without any delay, i.e., the main
criterion should be the number of remaining launchers and control
points. So far as rocket-technical units are concerned, the
criterion for their combat effectiveness is their functional
and transport capability, of which the former is the more
important.
a. for a rocket brigade:
effectiveness ,_its commun
a brigade has partially lost
ss in tr cman svs tem of
battery to battalion to commander of rocket troops and artier
of a front (army) have became u stable, but it retains at least
50 to 60 percent of its launch batteries, one rocket-technical
platoon, two meteorological stations and a technical battery;
a brigade is not combat effective if more than 60 percent of
its launchers have been lost, its command system disrupted, and
its rocket-technical subunits destroyed;
b. a mobile rocket-technical base may be considered combat
effective if it has communications with the chief of rocket-
artillery armament service (department) of a front (army) and if
the assembly brigades, technical and transport (parkovoy)
TS #202988
Copy # / 2-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
batteries retain their functional capability. Partial loss of
combat effectiveness of a base occurs when its capability to
assemble and transport rockets has been reduced no more than
50 percent.
The determination of levels (types) of combat effectiveness
significantly shortens the time needed to assess the status
of rocket and rocket-technical large units (units) after sus-
taining nuclear (chemical) attacks; speeds up the assessment
of our capabilities for mounting rocket strikes; and facilitates
the planning of combat actions (with due consideration to changes
in the composition of rocket groupings) and the deployment of
reserves to replace losses.
A prelimin4~jy of__troop combat effectiveness
after enemy nuclear strikes can be made by the coiimander &nd
staff of rocket troops and artillery on the basis of messages
a4d reports from the commanders of rocket large units an units.
The exchange of such radio messages takes relatively little
time. Thus, in exercises in the Leningrad Military District in
1965 and in the Belorussian Military District in 1967, from _two
to five rninut 5 were ra.a,,; rr~r~ fnr ocka rnr p
and_artillery of a front to receive signals.. .and_ messages._.1.tom
rocket, ro-ckeet-Technical, and artillery large units and units.
'I eS-GTnessages keep the staff of rocket troops and artillery
supplied with the necessary information to assess the status of
rocket (rocket-technical) large units (units) after an enemy
nuclear strike and to decide whether to mount rocket strikes
with our remaining large units and units. Rocket subunits and
units which do no reply within the stipulated time to a message
from the commander of rocket troops and artillery are considered
to be out of action and incapable of fulfilling their previously
assigned combat tasks. Enemy objectives (targets) not yet
destroyed will be distributed among the combat effective units.
Approximate losses of personnel and combat equipment in
areas of a nuclear burst may be determined very simply by the
graphic estimate method: the center (ground zero) of a nuclear
burst is plotted on a map, and, on the basis of the yield and
type of burst, zones of destruction to personnel and of damage
to combat equipment are indicated thereon, after which the number
of subunits in the zones of destruction is derived.
TS #202988
Copy #LZ
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
It is advisable to make an assessment of fire hazards by
analyzing the condition of the forest, the meteorological con-
ditions in the areas of the nuclear burst, and the deployment
of units; and then, from the basic indicators as to how a con-
vection column would behave, to determine what type of forest
fire might develop and how it might influence the fulfilment
of combat tasks and the conduct of rescue (medical evacuation)
work. (See Table 4.)
The staff of rocket troops and artillery of a front
(army) will receive more complete information on the 'situation
which developed after enemy nuclear strikes in reports from
the commanders of rocket (rocket-technical) large units (units)
after they have issued instructions to subordinate units (sub-
units) for the launching of rockets (preparation of combat units
and delivery vehicles). These reports must include: which
elements of the combat formation of a large unit (unit) sustained
nuclear strikes and the approximate yield and type of burst;
personnel and equipment losses including the amount of special
treatment needed; the levels of radiation and zones of radio-
active contamination; measures taken to eliminate the after-
effects of nuclear strikes; and the necessary assistance re-
quired from the senior commander.
After completing their assessment of the combat effective-
ness of rocket and rocket-technical large units and units, the
commander and staff of rocket troops and artillery will prepare
a report for the commander of troops of the front (army).
In our opinion this report should include the following
data: which rocket (rocket-technical) and artillery large
units (units) have sustained enemy nuclear strikes (the num-
ber, yield and type of burst sustained by each large unit
(unit); personnel and equipment losses of these units and an
assessment of their combat effectiveness; the units in areas
with high radiation levels and requiring withdrawal to uncon-
taminated areas; the level of dosage to which personnel will
be exposed while in areas of radioactive contamination; the
number of personnel and equipment requiring special treatment;
and the measures which must be taken to restore the combat
effectiveness of rocket troops. The conclusions will include
TS #202988
Copy #-i L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
ro
0
ro
t)) .s~
a)
-
U
a)
44
4J
k
m O 4-
r~
Q O G
0
C)
44
C
?-4 Id
\ 4J C) 4J ?.4
0
0 ?
4J (d
rd 4-4
r4
0
a)
w
E; 4-a k r.
v
U 4J
>, 43
b 0
A
0
E
I~ m
ru
m ?rl ?rl
m
G
m ru (n
r. O
rl
a)
k
RS
T
M k 4-4
\
a) rd
a) -ri
?r4 4J a)
M
m
?ri
0
H
k
b a?
G r-I
k ro
k u
m
k
[L4
r4
aJ
N G
0
0
Cd m 0
4) m
m 0
a N G
0
;s
a)
G
A
4-
a) r-4
u1
4J 4J
4-) rd
a
0
>
tT)
4
4 ro m 0
1
'ti r-4
k 4J rd
4-- k 4) Er
U
a)
ri
4- r-1
>,
(0
-P G G > r-1
?d,
s~ r?i
rd Rd a)
m m N
0
r-1
?ri 0
rd
U
-H ?r1 rd a) O
r4 -rl
a U k
u a4"4
U
r
m
3 3 U ru u
rd
3 3
tom
En m r0 d?
4-4
. J
CY) 44
0
ri
m
rd
0
m G 0
r-i r4
4-4
CSC -S4
4-4 0 U)
LO
4J
ro r4
Cn O
G O
44 r4 r4
U
G
s~ r; s~
G
? ri F4
b O rd
ri
O
ri 3 0
H >t
41 m
a ? ri k
+~
3 rn
iJ ?IJ
rd
4J r4 ? ri
U)
a)
i~
a) a) r-1
G ? ri
m 4-1
rO r4 O O
?-I
>
4J ; 4 O
(d U
r-i O
C." M Z U
k
0
r i
,G G U
r-4 O
rd
a)
?
0
to r?i rU
to r-I
Q a)
a G
4.)
U
H a G a)
a)
U
U
m aC - H-
U
a)
r4 rd ~4
>
(2)
G
3 0
M
X
a) 0
U)
>, a) m
O E~ aJ G
~
fi
44
>
0
r-4
m
0 4
ro
F
4J 0 In
r i
r-""
E
r
4
d
144
r4
'H
f
Cn
r? ~. ? ri
0 ri
a) a1
- ri 4-4 0 F. 44
3 m k rd
u 3m
x m a
cct o U U) 0
a)
a) >1
.
x
O
4.4
4
4) 4+ rd
U
U
U
r4
0
0
? ri 0 k
Cd
R1
rd
i)
0
U
U)
3
Lt7
q
cQ
Q) Gl
I
k
I
H
>y
O
I
4 44
>
0
0 1 1
4j
4-) ?
O 0 'Cl in ro
b
1
0 44
4-4 rd
r4
4-
U 4 o a)
-ri
a)
U G (1)
G
G
A r-I 0
0
O
a) o m
u
G a
iJ rd 04
d
O
rd a
rn c
U
'0 > ? ri
O
9 rd
r .G -4
U
0
$-
- r1
a u)
G 4
C) N a)
G 0% O k
r-1
a)
G
-
(L) 01 (a 4J
G
! k
()
U
44
? ri
4)
? rd
0
a)
k a)
G
O
4
4-4
4
?H G 4 a) U
>
r
U)
O 1
? r
a) u)
- r4 a) a F. I
G
0
U
r4
a) 4-1
-r-I
? r4
a) 0
44 ? rl +?l G
u E{
4-4 G 4J O a
a)
a)
0
E
s4
4.1 Td
4J
71 04
0 m >r a) ri
b
a) a) M 0
LO
a)
>
U
r4 ? r-I a)
al
u
rd
ri r4 Er
r.
m a)
FO 0 E: 0
U
a
044 . U)
a)
(1)
Er G
I k ri 04-r.1
a
I 4J
k
>
U 4) 44
> r0
>
? 4
?--l b o k
U)
r-1 o a3 ,G
a
H
4-4
0
~ G
)
O
I
4J ~ o
U M
3 N E
Z 4-
H Q4
3
U
!)
I
-4
4-
a
a
0
a)
G
ZT
G
0 >,
0 0)
k
% ?ri
l~
?ri
4-) r4 -'L7
4) -( G
C)
? H
? 1 G
O 1
Z.
a) a) ro
a) a) O
a
;L,
m 3 k
k 3
k
0> rd a)
v> k
>,
a) 0
?1J 0
k a) a) 4J
k a) 43
Ei
3 r-i A
cn r4 A
E$ r-t 3 W
H r 1 U)
TS #202988
Copy $) Z
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
an assessment of the combat effectiveness of the rocket troops
and artillery of the front (army) as a whole and will show how
many launchers are avail ble to carry out tasks.
Rescue and restoration work in centers of destruction will
be conducted after a preliminary assessment of the radiation
and fire conditions. In line with a previously prepared plan,
neighboring units and composite detachments may be detailed
to assist rocket (rocket-technical) units which have sustained
nuclear strikes. See Table 5 for an example of organizing
mutual assistance among large units and units of the rocket
forces and artillery of an army.
Actions of Rocket and Rocket-Technical Units
Of an Army After a Nuclear Strike
(one variant)
Objectives Sustaining
A Nuclear Strike
Units Assisting
Those Attacked
Army rocket brigade
Army mobile rocket-
technical base
Mobile rocket-technical baser
regiment of an artillery di-
vision; composite detachment
of an army for elimination
of aftereffects.
Rocket brigade; regiment of
an artillery division; com-
posite detachment of an army
for elimination of after-
effects.
The staff of rocket troops and artillery of a front (army)
uses technical means of communications to transmit orders to
units (composite detachments for the elimination of aftereffects)
TS #202988
Copy # 1-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385-73
regarding actions in areas of nuclear bursts. These units are
given brief reports on the status of the centers of destruction
and a procedure for conducting rescue and medical evacuation work.
The commanders of rocket (rocket-technical) large units and
units must, in turn, determine the most favorable and secure
routes for moving launch (technical, transport) batteries and
assembly brigades out of threatened areas; routes for composite
detachments assigned to eliminate aftereffects and for evacu-
ating casualties to medical facilities (and for removing damaged
combat equipment to collection points for damaged vehicles);
and the most secure areas for forming units and subunits (and
collection points for damaged vehicles, special treatment, etc.).
Traffic routes will as a rule be designated along roads with
hard surfaces and wide rights-of-way, and deployment areas will
be determined on the basis of sparsity of growth and a large
number of water sources.
Rocket (rocket-technical) units and subunits which have
lost their combat effectiveness will be reformed on a front-
wide (army-wide) scale. For this purpose the commanders of
rocket large units (units) and the commander of the composite
detachment for the elimination of aftereffects must be assigned
areas for forming rocket battalions and technical subunits,
within which launch batteries will be the first to be formed.
In our opinion, personnel replacements for these units may be
drawn from batteries which are not combat effective, as well
as from support and service subunits. It may also become
necessary to take specialists for the preparation of control
systems, computers, engine installations, and topographic
geodesy from combat effective subunits, and transport from
support and service subunits. Also, part of the equipment
complement of reformed subunits may be obtained through the
repair of damaged equipment.
Regarding the restoration of mobile rocket-technical bases,
it is first necessary to form crews of technical batteries and
assembly brigades from the personnel and equipment which re-
mained combat effective after a nuclear strike. If it is not
possible to form such crews, then the personnel and usable
combat equipment of the base will be sent to a predetermined
area where it will subsequently be possible to form new rocket-
technical units and subunits.
TS #202988
Copy #1L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8
CSDB-312/01385--73
Rocket and rocket-technical subunits which have retained
their combat effectiveness will, as a rule, be transferred to
other rocket battalions and mobile rocket-technical bases.
Experience in creating such composite rocket battalions (mobile
rocket-technical bases) shows that it does not demand great
expenditures of time or special organizational measures; and
there are grounds for believing that this type of reforming
will find wide application in operations.
In taking measures to restore the combat effectiveness
of rocket (rocket-technical) large units (units), the staff
of rocket troops and artillery will work very closely with the
operations directorate (department) and chiefs of arms of
troops and services of a front (army).
This is dictated by the fact that rocket troops, because
of their inherent characteristics and the significance of
their tasks, have a particular need for the supplementary
detailing of forces and equipment for the elimination of
aftereffects following an enemy attack with weapons of mass
destruction. The restoration of their combat effectiveness,
which to a great extent predetermines the capability of a
front (army) to conduct active military operations and to
withstand enemy nuclear forces, represents the main task of
commands, staffs, and political organs of all levels.
TS #202988
Copy #
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100340001-8