MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE ANALYSIS OF TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR SURFACE BURSTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100350001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
DATE 4 April 1974
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Destruction of
Enemy Groupings wi Nuclear Warheads
Using Surface Bursts 50X1 HUM
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50X1-HUM
The Destruction of Enemy Groupings with Nuclear
Warheads Using Surface Burs s
by
General-Mayor of Artillery A. Matveyev
Doctor of-Technical Sciences, Professor.
and
Engineer Major Yu. Orlov, Candidate of Technical Sciences
Nuclear surface bursts are still employed rarely in
operational training or in troop exercises to accomplish
various tasks in an operation. In our view, this is
explained, on the one hand,.by . ear of the e f fec__t of
radioactive contamination of the terrain on our own troops
and fear of-limiting their maneuver capability as and, on the
other hand, by an incomplete picture of the effectiveness of
such bursts in destroying enemy personnel.
Indeed, if there is a moderate wind blowing toward our
troops, there does exist a certain danger that our personnel
will receive unacceptable doses of radiation, depending on
the depth and yield of the nuclear strikes. Thus, in
respect to the nuclear warheads considered in this article,
the safety of our own troops can be assured only when
destroying groupings which are at least 150 to 200
kilometers from the line of combat contact. If the wind is
blowing toward the enemy, it becomes possible to destroy
advancing troops only when they reach the areas in which the
nuclear strikes are to be delivered or in actions on
contaminated terrain (mainly when they are negotiating zones
of radioactive contamination). However. 24 ky rs after the
delivery of a aroun,nurlpar strike the leveler of tion
harless. In this case, the possibility of using surface
bursts-will be determined by the ra.te.s _.of advance. And it
may be assumed that, on the average, under favorable
conditions, group nuclear strikes with surface bursts can be
delivered against enemy targets located at a distance of 50
to 100 kilometers from the forward units of the advancing
troops.
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50X1-HUM
Regarding the effectiveness of such strikes, the
following must be noted: it is precisely in destroying
large groupings occupying sizable areas that radioactive
contamination of terrain (together with other destructive
factors) substantially increases the effectiveness of
surface bursts in comparison with aerial bursts. In
addition, surface nuclear bursts will not only destroy
personnel and combat equipment in the enemy's operational
rear but will create broad zones of radioactive
contamination which will immobilize his troops and prevent
the approach of reserves and the bringing up of materiel to
the battlefield.
The present article offers an approximate methodology
for planning the destruction of groupings of troops in
concentration areas with surface nuclear bursts, and
substantiates the need for calculating the destruction of
enemy personnel from radioactive contamination of terrain.
It is known that a surface nuclear burst causes
radioactive contamination of terrain both in the area
surrounding the center of the burst and along the path taken
by the radioactive cloud. And although the zone of
radioactive contamination of terrain in the center of the
burst is considerably smaller than the total zone of
destruction (from the shockwave, thermal radiation, and
penetrating radiation) and does not inflict any additional
destruction on the enemy within this area, enemy personnel
along the path of the radioactive cloud may be destroyed at
distances of tens, and sometimes even hundreds, of
kilometers from the center of the burst.
The putting of personnel out of action during
radioactive destruction depends on the dose of radiation
they receive while on contaminated terrain. It is
characteristic of this situation that the number of
personnel put out of action by one and the same dose of
radiation will change with time. Thus calculations show
that if a dose of radiation equal to 300 roentgens is
received, only 10 percent of the personnel will be put out
of action during the first hour (after receiving the dose),
while 85 percent will be out of action by the end of the
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first 24 hours (i.e., by this time a unit or subunit will
have lost its combat effectiveness completely). 50X1-HUM
The following factors, in addition to the length of
time spent on radioactively contaminated terrain, influence
the amount of the dosage: the yield of the nuclear warhead,
the distance of the target from the center of the burst, the
average wind direction and velocity, the degree of cover
(protection) of personnel, the type of ground on which the
burst occurs, forested areas in the path of the fallout
pattern from the cloud, atmospheric precipitation during
formation of the radioactive fallout pattern, and other
factors.
The first four factors are taken into account directly
in the calculation formulas for determining the radiation
doses which are correct for non-friable soils (clay, loam,
rock), for exposed and semi-exposed terrain, and for when
there is no atmospheric precipitation. If nuclear bursts
take place on sandy soils, the level of radiation within the
fallout pattern from the cloud will increase on the average
by a factor of 2.5. The degree of contamination of terrain
and atmospheric precipitation will increase to a certain
extent.
Large tracts of forest (because of the settling of
radioactive dust on the crowns of trees and because of the
screening effect of the forest) reduce the radiation level
by a factor of about two. However, such protective features
are characteristic only of forested areas which have not
suffered the effects of a shockwave and thermal radiation;
the features are considerably weakened in a zone of massive
employment of nuclear weapons.
Before proceeding to set forth the essence of the
proposed methodology, let us examine the basic factors which
determine the effectiveness of using surface nuclear bursts.
The amount of damage inflicted upon the enemy will be
considerably affected by the degree of detection of the
grouping being destroyed, the average wind direction, the
location of our aiming points, and a number of other
circumstances, as well as by the number of missiles employed
and their yield. 50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
Degree of detection (reconnaissance of targets.
Reliable knowledge of the position and nature of the
individual targets of the enemy grouping being destroyed
makes it possible to correctly determine the aiming points
of the missiles and to efficiently allocate the available
yields of nuclear warheads among the planned targets.
However, it is an exceptionally complicated task to
establish the position of all of the targets, let us say, of
a division located in a concentration area. At the same
time, there is no particular need to do this when delivering
a group nuclear strike (with 6 to 10 missiles).
An analysis of the effect of the degree of detection
(0) of the targets of a division located in a concentration
area on the effectiveness of a group strike (made on the
basis of comparative estimates) has shown that there will be
an appreciable increase in the average losses of a division
only if the degree of detection rises to 30 to 50 percent.
A further rise in this percentage will have no practical
effect on the effectiveness of a group nuclear strike. This
feature of dependence of average losses on the degree of
detection of individual targets is explained by the fact
that when 0 = 30 to 50 percent, a large portion of the
planned nuclear strikes are being delivered against specific
targets (and are consequently being employed with maximum
effectiveness). The expenditure of missiles in this case,
if the nuclear warheads are of equal yield, will be about
1.5 times less than when 0 = 0.
The average wind velocity and direction constitute
basic factors affecting the formation of the fallout pattern
of the nuclear cloud.
If nuclear strikes are delivered directly on a grouping
of troops, the average wind seed does not appreciably
affect the a ectiveness o destroying it (although with an
increase in wind velocity, some increase in average losses
is noted. The average wind direction may strongly affect
the amount o damage inflicted on the enemy by acting on the
zones of radioactive contamination and expanding them beyond
the bounds of the grouping being destroyed, if the nuclear
strikes are planned without considering wind direction.
Thus, in computer simulation of a group nuclear strike
against an armored division in a concentration area
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(6 missiles with a yield of 100 kilotons each) with a change
in wind direction from 180 to 270 degrees, there was a 10
percent change in the division's average personnel losses.
This emphasizes the necessity for taking wind direction into
account in planning a group nuclear strike with surface
bursts. This is all the more so since modern methods and
means of providing meteorological support to the rocket
troops make it possible to forecast the average wind in
enemy territory to a depth of up to 300 kilometers.
The precision with which nuclear strikes are prepared
influences the average troop losses mainly of those targets
against which these strikes are directly delivered; the
dominant factor in this case is not the effect of
radioactive contamination of terrain but the effect of the
main destructive elements of the nuclear burst (shockwave,
thermal radiation, and penetrating radiation).
However, if only the general outlines of the area
occupied by the enemy grouping are known (8 = 0), and the
aiming points are set uniformly for the whole area (taking
terrain into account, of course), then effectiveness in
destroying the grouping will not, for all practical
purposes, depend on the accuracy of the preparation of the
nuclear stri es. However, it must be taken into account
here that a low degree of detection of specific targets of
the grouping being destroyed will-have a considerable effect
on the pattern of losses, since, in this case, destruction
of personnel located in tanks, shelters, covered trenches
and slit trenches will be extremely low. Thus, if 6 nuclear
strikes of 100 kilotons each are delivered against an
armored division in a concentration area, with a uniform
distribution of aiming points, then compared to a fairly
high level of destruction of personnel in motor vehicles and
armored personnel carriers (about - 50 _ to_.6Q_-p_ercemt,) , losses
of personnel in tanks will total only 10 to 20 percent. The
efforts of reconnaissance means must therefore be directed
in the first instance toward the detection of tank
(self-propelled artillery) units and subunits. Only then
can we count on the most effective utilization of nuclear
warheads in a group nuclear strike, and on the sure
destruction of these very units and subunits.
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A group nuclear strike using surface bursts against a
large enemy grouping is prepared and delivered by decision
of the commander of the army (front); on the basis of
analysis of reconnaissance data concerning the enemy, the
situation, the nature of the tasks to be carried out by his
own troops, and an estimate of the capabilities of the
rocket large units (units), he determines the required
degree of destruction, the number of missiles and their
yields for the group nuclear strike, and fixes the time of
the strike.
After the adoption of the decision for a group nuclear
strike, the commander and staff of the rocket forces and
artillery of the army (front) determine the coordinates of
the aiming points and the sequence of the nuclear bursts,
refine the estimates for the effectiveness of the nuclear
strikes and for the safety of our troops, assign tasks to
the commanders of rocket large units (units), and monitor
the course of preparation for the strike.
Let us dwell in greater detail on the methodology for
deciding the most important questions involved in preparing
a group nuclear strike. As an example, let us examine the
destruction of an armored division in its concentration
area, for which a variant disposition of combat units is set
forth in Figure 1. The following conditions, which we
regard as typical, are assumed here. The enemy will require
at least one hour to evaluate the radiation situation after
the strikes and to withdraw his troops from the areas of
radioactive contamination; the combat effectiveness of units
(subunits) of ours which have been subjected to destruction
by nuclear weapons will be estimated by the enemy for 24
hours and more ahead of the moment of delivery of the
nuclear strikes; troops will be withdrawn from contaminated
terrain in motor vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and
tanks, with the use of individual means of protection.
In calculating the average personnel losses in each
target (and the division as a whole), we used a method of
statistical analysis based on a model worked out by Colonel
S. B. Borshchevskiy.
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The effectiveness of destruction of an enemy grouping
of forces is evaluated according to the number of combat
units and subunits destroyed (losing their combat
effectiveness). When surface bursts are used, however, it
is fairly complicated to determine the estimated results of
the destruction of each separate target. This can be done
most correctly and accurately only with full detection of
the grouping to be destroyed and with the use of computers.
At the same time, we can recommend a less complicated method
of estimating the effectiveness of surface nuclear bursts
which is accurate enough for practical use. This method is
based on the fact that if several nuclear strikes are
delivered, and if the zones of destruction of the enemy
grouping cover the area to a sufficient degree (40 to 60
percent and more), then the extent to which the area is so
covered will coincide roughly with both the percentage of
combat units (subunits) put out of action and the percentage
of personnel destroyed. If 30 to 50 percent or more of the
targets are known, the percentage of combat units (subunits)
and personnel put out of action will be equal to or slightly
greater than the percentage of the area covered by the
strike, while if B = 0, it will be less by an average factor
of 1.3.
The graphs (Figure 2) set forth the average values for
an area covered, taking into account the radioactive
contamination of terrain for one surface burst. The graphs
are drawn for fixed yields per nuclear warhead under the
most typical conditions of personnel deployment.
The vertical axis of each graph shows the average value
for the area covered S 1 by one nuclear burst, and the
horizontal axis the distance R from the aiming point along
the axis of the fallout pattern up to the limit of the area
occupied by the grouping. The curves correspond to the
different types of protective cover of personnel.
For a given type of personnel cover, and observing the
distances recommended below between the axes of the fallout
patterns from the radioactive cloud, the average value of
the area covered Sn by several bursts is determined 5OX1-HUM
according to the formula
S = Si- + Si- + ... + S1 ,
(1)
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where S, S , ..., S} represent the average value of the
area coveredn y the firs, second, ..., through the nt5oX1 HUM
bursts.
If the personnel within the grouping being destroyed
are deployed in shelters of various types, the average area
covered by the strike will be determined as the sum of the
products of the proportion of personnel deployed in a given
type of shelter multiplied by the average area covered by
all bursts, to be calculated according to the formula (1)
for the given type of shelter, i.e.
S K S + K S + ... + K S
n 1 nl 2 n2 n nn
(2)
S 11, Sn21 ..., S represent the average area covered'
from all bursts for tie first, second, ... through the n
type of personnel shelter;
K1, K2, ..., K n represent the proportion of personnel
deployed in shelters of different kinds.
For armored, mechanized, and infantry divisions of our
probable enemy, the following values of the coefficients K
may be taken as average.
Type of personnel shelter
Armored Mechanized Infantry
Division Division Division
In tanks
In armored personnel carriers
0.3
0.15
0.10
and combat infantry vehicles
0.5
0.6
0.05
In motor vehicles
0.2
0.25
0.85
The value of the coefficients set forth in Table 1 is
derived from the conditions of destroying the main elements
of the combat units and subunits of the indicated large
50X1-HUM
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units: in a tank battalion, personnel are destroyed in
tanks; in a motorized infantry battalion--in their armored
personnel carriers, etc.
The percentage of area covered is determined as the
relationship of the covered area to the area occupied by the
given grouping.
As noted above, when 30 to 50 percent or more of the
targets are detected, the percentage of combat units and
subunits put out of action (Mb ) and personnel destroyed
(M zh.s ) is taken as equal to :he percentage of area
covered, while if the detection is near zero, it is taken as
equal to the percentage of area covered reduced by a factor
of 1.3.
Example 1. Estimate the effectiveness of the
destruction of an armored division, in its concentration
area (when 0 = 100%), deployed over an area of 450 square
kilometers (Figure 1), if it is planned to deliver 7 nuclear
strikes against the following targets: the 1st Tank
Battalion, 2nd Tank Battalion, 3rd Tank Battalion, 3rd
Motorized Infantry Battalion, 4th Motorized Infantry
Battalion, 6th Tank Battalion, and a Battalion of Honest
John missiles; the yield of nuclear warheads is 100 kilotons
each, surface bursts, and average wind direction (direction
toward which wind is blowing) 225 degrees.
Solution. The distance R is measured off on the map,
followin g he average wind direction from the planned aiming
points up to the borders of the area occupied by the
grouping. The average value for the area covered by one
burst S1 is then determined for these measured distances
from thi graph (Sketch 2,a), and the average area covered Sn
from all bursts is calculated according to formulas (1) and
(2) using the coefficients in Table 1. The sequence of
calculations is set forth in Table 2.
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50X1-HUM
r ets fiance
of R, in km
nuclear strikes
t Tank Bn (No.
2nd Tank Bn (No. 2) 18
3rd Tank Bn (No. 4) 14
3rd Motorized Inf Bn (No.7) 18
4th Motorized Inf Bn (No.9) 10
5th Motorized Inf Bn (No.14) 7
Bn of free-flight
rockets (No. 18)
Acc-orUing to formula(l)
Average areas S-L covered
Personnel in Personnel in ersonne in
tanks armored per- motor
ZD
20
20
20
19
13
sonnel carriers vehicles
40 YZ
40 66
37 56
40 66
28 44
21 35
11 14
ni n2
27
S = 36b
n3
According to formula (2) S = 0.3 ? 125 + 0.5 220 + 0.2 ? 366 = 220.7 km2
n
S = 220.7 ? 100 49%.
n 450
Since the example assumes 9 to be greater than 30%,
then taking into account the detection of the targets, the
coefficient Ke = 1, and hence Mb.p. = M zh.s. 49%.
For comparison, Table 3 sets forth the results of
calculating the average value for personnel destroyed for
each target, obtained by the method of statistical analysis.
As may be seen from the table, errors in calculating the
effectiveness of destruction of personnel will not exceed 5%
with this method.
Targets
1st tan n 54
2nd Tank Bn 52
1st Motorized Inf Bn 61
3rd Tank Bn 60
2nd Motorized Inf Bn 58
1st Artillery Bn 80
3rd Motorized Inf Bn 91
HQ, 1st Brigade 54
ark ets
4th Motorized n
4th Tank Bn 2
5th Tank Bn 13
2nd Artillery Bn 47
HQ, 2nd Brigade 70
6th Tank Bn 54
Sth Motorized Inf Bn 6
3rd Artillery Bn 42
Targets
HQ, 3rd rigs e
Bn of free-flight
rockets 93
Artillery Bn 40
HQ, armored div. 35
Recon Bn 28
= SIT
zh.s.
Mb.p. = 57%
50X1-HUM
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Determining the expenditure of missiles with nuclear
warhea s AAs the basis for an approximate methodology for
determining the expenditure of missiles with nuclear
warheads, the method was adopted of comparing the area which
must be covered by the destruction zones of surface nuclear
bursts (with a given degree of destruction) with the
destruction zone of one burst of a given yield. Figure 3
gives the size of the average area covered by one burst, in
relation to the distance R, for various nuclear warhead
yields and various large units of our probable enemy.
From these graphs it may be seen that with surface
nuclear bursts, the effectiveness of warheads with a yield
of 10 and 20 kilotons is less by an average factor of 5 and
2.5, respectively, than that of warheads with a yield of 100
kilotons; consequently the expenditure of these nuclear
warheads will be greater by the same factors. It is
therefore inadvisable to use nuclear warheads of less than
20 kilotons in surface bursts; they can be used for aerial
bursts against targets lying near the border of the area
occupied by the grouping and not already covered by the zone
of radioactive contamination of terrain.
The procedure for solving the given problem is as
follows: the required level of destruction of the enemy
grouping Mt is established, after which the area which must
be covered ~ith destruction zones Sn.tr is determined
(taking into account the coefficient R9, which depends on
the degree of detection of the targets within the grouping
to be destroyed). In this we use the formula
Sn,tr = K9Ntr Sn
where S is the area occupied by the enemy grouping.
n
Since one of the accepted rules is a more or less
uniform distribution of aiming points, we can assume that
the sum of the distances from the aiming points to the
border of the area of the grouping, divided by the number of
aiming points, is approximately equal to the radius of a
circle equal in area to the area of the grouping being
destroyed, i.e.
50X1-HUM
Rsr
(3)
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50X1-HUM
According to the value of R s and the yield of the
nuclear warheads which can be used to deliver the group
nuclear strike, the size of the area to be covered by one
nuclear burst Snl is found on the graph (Figure 3).
If nuclear warheads of identical yields are used for
the delivery of a group nuclear strike, the number of
warheads equals
N S f (4)
If nuclear warheads of different yields are used for
delivery of the strike, the number of warheads is determined
by the fact that the area to be covered is equal in size to
the area covered by the zones of surface nuclear bursts of
different yields (for a given value of Rsr).
Aiming points are designated in conformity with the
recommendations set forth below, in which the aiming points
for the lesser yields are designated closer to the borders
of the area of the grouping from the downwind side.
Example 2. Determine the expenditure of missiles for
the destruct on of 60% of the combat units and subunits of
an armored division, in its concentration area, deployed
over an area S = 400 km 2, if only the area occupied by
the division (i = 0, and I~ = 1.3) is known. The actual
distribution of targets corresponds to Figure 1. To carry
out this task we may employ six missiles, each with a
nuclear warhead of 300 kilotons or six missiles, each with a
warhead of 100 kilotons.
Solution 1. We determine the value
400 11 Ian.
R sr = s
TT / -M.
2. From the graph (Figure 3,a) for R sr = 11 km, we
determine the average area covered by one burst: for 300
kilotons--40 km2, for 100 kilotons--30 km2; using formula
(3), we calculate the required area to be covered by
destruction zones
Sn,tr = 1.3 ' 400 = 310 km2
S n tr
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3. In order to reduce the total number of missiles
used for a group strike, we first make a calculation for
nuclear warheads of greater yields (having in mind 6
missiles, each with a nuclear warhead
determine their area of coverage
of
300
kiloto
ns and
Sn=6 ? 40 = 240km2.
4. The difference between S n t
and
Sn
is
310 - 240 - 70 km2. From formula '(1)
we determine
that to
cover this area two more missiles are needed (70:30 2),
each with a nuclear warhead of 100 kilotons.
Thus the total expenditure comprises 8 missiles: 6
missiles of 300 kilotons each and 2 missiles of 100 kilotons
each.
The location of the chosen aiming points is shown in
Figure 1, in which aiming points No. 7 and No. 8 are
designated for the missiles with a nuclear warhead of 100
kilotons each.
For comparison, Table 4 sets forth the results of
calculating the average value of destruction of personnel
for each target in a division (results obtained by the
method of statistical analysis for an instance in which
their actual disposition is known); the results also confirm
the high accuracy of the proposed method of determining the
required number of missiles (the average error in
determining the effectiveness of destruction of a grouping
does not exceed 2% in comparison with that Given here).
Targets 14
1st Tank
2nd Tank Bn 20
1st Motorized Inf Bn 72
3rd Tank Bn 15
2nd Motorized Inf Bn 65
1st Artillery Bn 36
3rd Motorized Inf Bn 75
HQ, 3rd Brigade 81
Targets M9. Targets A
4th torize n 3rd iga e
4th Tank Bn 32 Bn of free-flight
5th Tank Bn 52 rockets 91
2nd Artillery Bn 86 Artillery Bn 87
HQ, 2nd Brigade 81 HQ, armored div 63
6th Tank Bn 10 Recon Bn 92
5th Motorized Inf Bn 18
3rd Artillery Bn 74
Mzh:s. 62%
b. p.
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Designating the aiming points. The general rules for
determining the aiming points for a group nuclear strike are
as follows.
When the degree of detection of individual targets
within t e grouping to be destroyed is sufficiently high
= 30 to and morel, e centers of the most
important targets are taken as the aiming points; first and
foremost the centers of tank battalions, battalions of
free-flight rockets and guided missiles, and divisional and
brigade control organs (posts).
If the position of individual targets is not known, the
aiming points are chosen in areas (sectors) in which ese
targets are most probably located on the basis of local
terrain conditions.
In both instances, it is advisable to distribute the
aimin ints more or less uniformly over the entire area
g destroyed. This will achieve surprise in use and, at
ben
the same time, the action of nuclear weapons on all the
troops of the given enemy grouping.
In order to keep from laying down excessive zones of
radioactive contamination of terrain, the distance between
the axes of the fallout patterns from the radioactive clouds
of adjacent bursts must be at least 3 to 4 kilometers. To
do this, the average wind direction must be taken into
account.
The timing of the nuclear bursts (in relation to each
other) is determined by the staff of the rocket troops and
artillery, in accordance with the established time frame for
delivering a group nuclear strike. The launching time for
each missile is set by the commanders of the rocket units
(large units).
In order to prevent failure of a warhead fuze device or
premature initiation of the nuclear device (which may happen
if a nuclear warhead passes through a radioactive cloud
formed by a previous nuclear burst), it is advisable to
deliver the strikes successively, beginning with the most
distant targets, at an interval of one or two minutes. If
the plan is for all nuclear bursts to occur simultaneously,
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP1O-00105ROO0100350001-7
Page 18 of 22 Pages
the distance between adjacent aiming points must be at least
5 kilometers for warheads of 100 kilotons and 6.5 kilometers
for warheads over 100 kilotons. 50X1-HUM
It has been noted above that, when surface nuclear
bursts take place, there is formed, within a certain time
from the moment of delivery of a group nuclear strike, a
dangerous zone of radioactive contamination expanding beyond
the limits of the area of the grouping being destroyed and
drawn out for 100 to 150 kilometers and more in the
direction of the wind. In negotiating this zone, enemy
personnel may receive such doses of radiation as to
significantly reduce the combat effectiveness of his troops.
This is borne out by the following example.
Let us suppose that one hour after the delivery of a
group nuclear strike by eight missiles with a yield of 300
kilotons each, with surface bursts, an enemy infantry
division whose personnel are predominantly in motor vehicles
advances toward a zone of radioactive contamination 50
kilometers from the area of destruction. Under these
conditions the division can begin to negotiate the
contaminated zone (without exposing itself to a dose of more
than 50 roentgens) only about 5 hours after advancing toward
it.
If the enemy nevertheless starts to negotiate this zone
from the march, then, considering their means of transport
(K 2), the personnel will receive a dose equal to 240
roll~gens. As a result, up to 15% of the division's
personnel will be put out of action by the end of the first
24 hours.
Research shows that the use of surface nuclear bursts
with a yield of 100 kt and more, under conditions providing
for the safety of our own troops, will be an effective means
of destroying enemy groupings, of making it impossible for
enemy troops to maneuver widely, and of delaying the
approach of reserves and the bringing up of materiel.
The methodology proposed in this article makes possible
a quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of surface
nuclear bursts in order to provide an adequate basis 50X1-HUM
planning their use in group nuclear strikes.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100350001-7
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50X1-HUM
Page 20 of 22 Pages
Figure 1. Armored division in its concentration area (variant)
mpb = motorized inf bn tb = tank bn
adn = artillery bn rb = recon bn
brtd = armored tank division "O-D" = "Honest John" bn
br = brigade Tp (t No.) = aiming point
1-8 No. (1-R)
50X1-HUM
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Page 21 of 22 Pages
a) average area covered by one burst with a yield of 100 kt.
SIn, KM2
I
e9
eti `ter
So eS~~
tt
Carr ers
Bonn ~
~n 1
;R,xn 50X1-HUM
30
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100350001-7
B1n, RM2
a) Average area to be covered by one burst of 10, 20, 100,
200, or 300 kt against an armored division.
5 10 15 20 25 30 R,K14
Page 22 of 22 Pages
b) Average area to be covered by one burst of 10, 20, 100,
200, or 300 kt against a mechanized division.
Sin, KM2
c) Average area to be covered by one burst of 10, 20, 100,
200, or 300 kt against an infantry division.
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