MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE USE OF TABLES FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATING NUCLEAR STRIKES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100360001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 8, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
8 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Use of Tables
for Planning and valuating Nuclear Strikes
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part
of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military
Thought". This article asserts that computers are inadequate for
planning and evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear strikes. Using
the BESM-3M and Minsk 22 computers, it is said to take 15 hours to
perform the necessary operations. The authors propose instead the use
of tables which they have created. The sample table presents nominal
data for the employment of the R-300 (SCUD) missile at various ranges
and yields against representative enemy units. This article
appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive,
this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within
recipient agencies.
William e son
Deputy Director for rations
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1969
FIRDB- 312/01292-74
DATE 8 April 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT USSR): The Tabular Method of Making Operational-
Tactical Calculations for Estimating the Effectiveness of Nuclear
Strikes
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal '1i1ita
Thou ht". The authors of this article are Colonel ur e o, Candidate
o litary Sciences, and Engineer Colonel N. Bazanov. This article
asserts that computers are inadequate for planning and evaluating the
effectiveness of nuclear strikes. Using the BERM-31 and Minsk 22
computers, it is said to take 15 hours to perform the necessary operations.
The authors propose instead the use of tables which they have created. The
sample table presents nominal data for the employment of the R-300 (SCUD)
missile at various ranges and yields against representative enemy units.
omment:
urchenko co-authored with M. V. Pedulov a book entitled
Defensive erations in the Course of the Offensive, Military Publishing
House, 1966. Engineer o Bazanov wrote an article describing network
methods of planning and possible applications of this method to military
problems, Red Star, 2 October 1965. He is also co-author with Col. V.
Vaneyev o article entitled "Information Theory and Control of Troops".
Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in
ire versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is
no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be
published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is
distributed down to the level of division commander.
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The Tabular Method of Making Operational-Tactical Calculations
for Estimating the Effectiveness of Nuclear Strikes
Colonel V. Turchenko, Candidate of Military Sciences
and Engineer Colonel N. Bazanov
At the present time, operational-tactical calculations are made on the
basis of operational exercises and war games in the military districts and
academies and with the use of various calculating means: electronic
computers and keyboard calculators (EVM and SKM), tables, slide rules,
special devices, graphs, and nomography. In doing so, particular attention
is given to using these means for calculating the estimated effectiveness
of nuclear strikes being planned and delivered both by our troops and by
the enemy. This is bound up with the fact that it is precisely these
calculations which make it possible to determine the relative strengths of
the two sides (overall and by axes), which in turn is necessary in order to
make decisions regarding further actions of the troops.
The advisability of using tables to make such calculations is dictated
by the fact that the presently existing machine methods, despite all of
their positive qualities and the advantage that they provide, have still
not been adequately perfected. Their use often involves very complicated
work by operating personnel and an intolerably great loss of time in
preparing the input data and processing the solutions, even though the
calculations themselves are made very rapidly by electronic computers.
For example, about twelve to fifteen hours are required to determine
the effectiveness of a mass nuclear strike by a front (120 to 150 nuclear
warheads) using the stationary electronic computers BSf-3M and Minsk-22.
It takes five to six hours to fill out the request form directly from a map
(preparation of input data for the calculations); one to two hours for the
transfer of input data onto a punch tape or punch cards and for the
calculating; about one hour for filling out the response form (for the
results of the calculations); and five to six hours for processing the
results, either by hand or using keyboard calculators (conversion of losses
from percentages to numerical quantities for targets being destroyed, and
totalling of losses for large units and operational formations). Addi-
tional time is lost in forwarding the input data from the command post of
the front to the computer station and sending back the results.
This information, of course, applies to the general-purpose stationary
electronic computers which are now in use in the armed forces. When
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special-purpose electronic computers are introduced into the troops, the
problem of rapid carrying out of calculations will be resolved differently
in many respects.
When the staff of a front has only a limited time in which to plan a
nuclear strike, the use of 'existing machine methods in the process men-
tioned above is, practically speaking, ruled out. This is fully confirmed
by actual experience in war games, in which it has been impossible, in
planning operations, to calculate the estimated effectiveness of an initial
nuclear strike by a front within the allotted time. Preparation time is
even more limited when a front has to deliver a nuclear strike during the
course of an operation. Faking such calculations with electronic computers
in accord with existing methods is justified only in the training process,
in scientific-research work, and in peacetime planning of operations, while
in combat actions it is justified only for calculating the estimated
effectiveness of group nuclear strikes (using a small quantity of
warheads).
In order to shorten the time needed to prepare the input data for
electronic computer calculations, use is sometimes made of averaged values
for: the probable deviation (average launch range of missiles), the yield
of nuclear warheads, and the dimensions of typical targets as derived from
their status (level of strength). However, in this case the results of the
calculations are flawed with great inaccuracy--up to five to seven percent
in expressing the losses of each destroyed target.
The foregoing was also the basis for concluding that it is advisable
to work out and use special tables for making calculations. In doing so,
the primary purpose was to gain time--to provide for making calculations in
a shorter time, and also to simplify the process and preserve accuracy.
This applies mostly to calculations for estimating the effectiveness of an
initial massed nuclear strike of a front, both one being planned and also
one already delivered at the beginning or during the course of an offensive
operation.
The tables proposed by the authors have been worked out on the basis
of the machine methods of solving the corresponding calculation tasks. In
order to compile the tables, we have carried out numerous electronic
computer calculations to estimate the effectiveness of the destruction of
various targets, taking into account the dimensions of the targets (as
derived from their location and status), the yield of the nuclear warheads
with which the troops are armed, and various probable deviations (circular
errors probable) determined by the launch range of the missiles.
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Having such tables, in essence, front staffs acquire the capability to
determine the effectiveness of nuclear strikes (by their own troops or by
the enemy) relatively quickly and accurately. The forms of the tables can
vary in accordance with the parameters used as a base: standard targets,
yields of nuclear warheads, launch range of missiles, and the magnitude of
probable deviation. Composite tables can also be drawn up taking all of
these parameters into account.
The procedure for preparing the proposed tables boils down to the
following (see Table 1).
First of all one must determine a list of standard targets (objec-
tives), each of which is usually destroyed by a single nuclear strike
(missile, antiaircraft, and artillery batteries; tank, motorized infantry,
and infantry battalions; command posts; airfields; etc.). One can also
take targets which require several nuclear strikes each for destruction
(missile, antiaircraft, and artillery battalions; tank, motorized infantry,
and infantry brigades, and even divisions). This is permitted in those
instances when the location of their subunits (batteries, battalions) is
not known at the time the strike is delivered. A list of standard targets
is entered in column 2.
For each target one must establish the dimensions in kilometers, by
extent and by depth (in accordance with location and status), and enter
them in columns 3 and 4. For example, if a full-strength tank battalion on
the march forms a column four to five kilometers in depth, then, at sixty
to seventy percent of full strength, the column will he correspondingly
shorter, covering 2.4 to 3.5 kilometers.
Column 5 indicates the main vulnerable elements of each target, the
degree of destruction which must be calculated. For each target we have
taken only two such elements, the destruction of which will cause the
target to lose its combat effectiveness. For rocket troops, for example,
these two elements are the launchers with their missiles and the personnel
of rocket subunits; for artillery--the guns and the personnel; for tank
battalions--the tank crews and the tanks; for motorized infantry-- the
personnel, in their armored personnel carriers (on the march or on the
offensive) or in shelters; for air defense troops--the launchers with
antiaircraft missiles or antiaircraft guns and the personnel of the
subunits; for aviation--the personnel and aircraft on airfields; for
command posts--the personnel and means of communications; etc.
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In columns 6 through 20 are entered the results of the electronic
computer calculations of the degree of destruction of the vulnerable
elements of each target, expressed in percentages and taking into account
the launch range of missiles of each specific type and the yields of the
nuclear warheads available for arming them. As can be seen from Table 1,
the launch range of an R-300 missile is given in multiples of fifty
kilometers. If the actual range should lie in between, say 125 kilometers,
then to determine the degree of destruction of the targets, it is
sufficient to take an average of the losses obtained for 100 and 150
kilometers. Tables can be set up for missile launch ranges in multiples of
twenty-five, ten, and even five kilometers.
Similar tables were compiled for three types of operational-tactical
and tactical missiles (the R-900, the R-300, and the R-65), for the nuclear
means of front aviation (taking into account both ground and air bursts),
and also Tor-enemy nuclear means (the Pershing, Sergeant, Lance, and Honest
John missiles; atomic artillery; and tactical aviation). The latter are
required for determining the effectiveness of enemy nuclear strikes on the
troops and targets of the front. Thus, up to ten tables in all are
required in the operations Ti rectorate of the front staff.
For convenience in using the tables in determining the effectiveness
of a massed nuclear strike, the operations directorate of the front staff,
should have a register of the combat strength of the enemy troops, which is
prepared and partially filled out ahead of time. Its form is given in
Table 2.
In planning a nuclear strike or upon receipt of information on a
strike which has been delivered, data from the aforementioned tables are
entered in the register.
The procedure for filling it out is as follows.
In column 2 there is cited a list of targets, and the corresponding
lines are intended for the summary data for each large unit (unit). In
columns 3 and 4, 9 and 10, 15 and 16, etc., there is given the quantity of
forces and means (expressed both as percentages and in numerical quan-
tities) for each target, large unit, and operational formation, as well as
for the overall number of troops at the disposal of the enemy prior to the
delivery of a nuclear strike of the front. All of these columns are filled
in in advance on the basis of the information available on the enemy at a
certain time.
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In planning a nuclear strike or after it has been delivered, columns
5, 11, 17, etc. are filled in with data which in accordance with the
appropriate parameters, can be obtained from the tables. After its
conversion, columns 6, 12, 18, etc., are filled in. In columns 7 and 8, 13
and 14, 19 and 20, etc., there are entered data (in percentages and
numerical quantities) on the quantity of forces and means remaining at the
disposal of the enemy after a nuclear strike has been delivered against
him. Summary information on losses and on the presence of forces and means
after a strike is obtained by simply adding up the appropriate data for the
individual targets.
In order to obtain a complete picture of the results of a nuclear
strike of a front, columns can be added to the form of the register for
indicating the quantity and yield of nuclear strikes delivered against each
unit, large unit, and operational formation of the enemy.
Such a register is also compiled on the combat strength of a front.
Both registers can reflect not only the overall strength of the front and
the enemy but also the forces of the two sides by the axes of attack
Consequently, the proposed methodology for making calculations to
estimate the effectiveness of nuclear strikes boils down to filling out the
registers of the combat strength of our troops and of the enemy on the
basis of data from tables which have been previously worked out using
electronic computers, and also on the basis of the collated results of
nuclear strikes against large units, operational formations, and the troops
as a whole, obtained by summing up (with keyboard calculators or by hand)
the results of nuclear strikes delivered against individual targets
(objectives). Collated data on the losses and on the surviving forces and
means of both sides are also necessary input materials for the commander
and staff of a front in determining the relative strengths of the two sides
and in adopting a decision on subsequent actions of the troops.
The use of a tabular methodology for making calculations is entirely
possible not only at the front level but also at the army, corps, and
division levels. It requires nine table to do this for an army (th_san
as forefront, with the exception of the table for the R-900), while ?ix
tables are n eP ded for a corps cr division.
Experience of using the tabular methodology in war games has shown
that calculations to estimate the effectiveness of a massed nuclear strike
can be made within a sufficiently short time. Thus, for example, only
abut-three hours are required to estimate the effectiveness of a nuclear
strike of a front using eighty nuclear warheads.
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As is obvious from its description, the tabular methodology is very
simple, does not envisage complicated computations, and does not req jr
special training of generals and officers. In using it, the same precision
in calculations is achieve as r be with the use of electronic
comrnu ers .
In addition to gaining ti ma- the proposed tabular method has numerous
other advantages, including: convenience for the operating personnel-all
of the data necessary for the calculations are at their fingertips; the
capability to make calculations simultaneously for several large units and
operational formations with the artici ation in the work of the require
reliability of calculations, since t ere is
de ays in the forwarding of calculation results to the command post from
the computer station; and the ca-pa3~ili y to calculat eness of
a fl lea ctrl ka at the Sams' tune tha it is p1 ed, whereas, under the
present procedure of using machine methods, the planning of a nuclear
strike and the estimating of its effectiveness are done in sequence.
Determining the most advantageous variant for a nuclear strike
requires counting up only those single strikes which have not been provided
for in other variants (and not each variant in full).
The tables can be used for a relatively long period of time. As new
means of destruction with different tactical-technical characteristics
appear in the arsenal, the basic (input) parameters and other data for the
tables will have to be refined, which will not be particularly difficult.
It will also be necessary to introduce corresponding changes into the
tables with the improvement of methods for making operational-tactical
calculations with the use of electronic computers.
Thus, military districts, fronts, and armies can use the
aforementioned tables successfully in making operational-tactical
calculations, especially when they lack electronic computers. As already
indicated, this provides increased efficiency in their work.
It appears advisable to continue research in this field for the
purpose of finding specific ways to improve existing methods and to work
out new machine and tabular methods for calculation tasks in determining
results of the use of not only nuclear weapons but also chemical and
conventional weapons. Our task is to attain a sharp reduction i.n_.the.iime
required to make operational-tactical calculations.
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I
No. in sequence
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Table 2
Register of the Combat Strength of the Enemy Troops
Personnel ti
a
Large units,
L
osses Present
Present
units, and
before from after :o-?
nuclear
'
9'-
?
V)
nuclear
nuc~ ar
N ~
strike strife
ik
a
subunits
e
str
P?~v
N M
w o
O
yqN AyN ap~i cry
._ o
u
U
O
4J
F"
z
i E
y?~ E L
yF E fy
?
a
a '
a
,
i
0. q CL a
15-
21-
27-
33-
39-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8 9-14
20
26
32
38
44
Rocket Troops
Pershing battalions:
Sergeant battalions:
Total in Rocket Troops:
Air Defense Troops
Total in Air Defense
Troops
Aviation
Airfield No.
Total in Aviation
Ground Forces
Infantry divisions -
total
Motorized infantry
divisions - total
Tank battalions
Motorized infantry
battalions
Rocket battalions
Artillery battalions
Command post
Tank divisions - total:
Total in Ground Forces:
Total in enemy troops:
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