MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ANOTHER VIEW ON THE DETERMINATION OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION NORMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100390001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
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50X1-HUM
DATE 11 Anril 1074
50X1-HUM
SUBJECT
I;ILITARY THOUGEff (USSR): Determining Norms for the Stockpiling
and Expenditure o- Ammtmition by Artillery 50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
Determining Norms for the Stockpiling and Expenditure of
Ammunition by Artillery
by
Colonel G. Yefimov
While agreeing with the opinion of retired Colonel-General of
Artillery I. Volkotrubenkol concerning the majority of the questions and
cats 1ations set forth-in his article, it is hardly possible to agree with,
some of the data recommended by him for practical application.
It is asserted in the article that the norms established by a decree
of the Committee of Defense of the Council of People's Correnissars in 1938
regarding the mobilization reserves of ammunition were clearly overstated
and that the war introduced corresponding amendments in them. As evidence
the article cites data concerning the actual annual expenditure of
aninnition per gun during the war, which proved to be appreciably less than
that provided for in the 1938 decree. However, it would obviously be
inadequate to use only these data out of the very rich experience of World
War II. We must not, for example, forget the numerous facts testifying
that the expenditure of ammunition during the war was much less than the
actual requirements of the troops and was determined in the majority of
instances not by need but by available reserves and transport capabilities
for hauling them.
The war offers many examples in which a shortage of ammunition delayed
the time of the beginning of offensive operations, brought advancing troops
to a standstill, etc. A particularly acute situation developed with regard
to ammunition for defense where we were often limited to one or two rounds
per gun for a 24-hour period and firing of 152-mm and 203-mm rounds was not
permitted at all. Because of this, our defense was condemned to be
passive. With impunity the enemy constructed engineer works, carried out
missions, and maneuvered his forces and means without suffering losses. An
even worse situation developed in repelling the enemy's advance.
Our troops experienced a shortage of ammnmition during the first days
of the war. Thus, operations of the Northwest Front for 23 June 1941
1 Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought",
1970 No. 1 T797.
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showed that an acute shortage of every type of artillery ammunition was
felt during the development of the first day of combat operations.l
On 27 June 1941 the commander of the 12th Mechanized Corps reported to
the commander of the troops of the Northwist Front that the divisions
completely lacked shells for 152-31m guns.
In a report of the 8th Army to the Chief of the General Staff on the
first two months of the war, it was stated that breakdowns in supplying
203-mm artillery shells for Model 1931 guns were felt with special
acuteness, as a result of which these systems were withdrawn to the rear,
There was also a shortage of shells for 76-mm guns.3
The operational-tactical essay "The Defense of Sevastopol", published
by the Military Historical Department of the General Staff in 1943, stated
that by 29 June 1942 "combat conditions ... for our units ... were becoming
more and more difficult because of the acute shortage of ammunition .... By
this time some batteries had only 10 to 12 rounds left per gun (page 53-
54), and in the period 25-26 June the shortage of ammunition led to almost
complete inactivity by the antiaircraft artillery .... The overall shortage
of ammunition ... left the infantry without artillery support..." (page
58).
There is no doubt that if the troops defending Sevastopol had had
adequate ammunition, the enormous enemy losses (The enemy lost about
300,000 officers and men at Sevastopol.) would have been even more
considerable, and he would have needed not 250 days to take the city but a
great deal longer.
In the book The Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union the failure
of the operation of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov
Front, conducted from January to April 1942 with the goal of freeing
Leningrad from the blockade, was ascribed to the shorta e of ammunition,
among other reasons (page 136). On page 138, it is indicate that the
absence of the necessary amount of equipment, weapons, and annunition had
an adverse effect on the rates of advance. On page 161, it is noted that
the shortage of ammunition was felt acutely by our troops during the
unsuccessful Kharkov Operation in 1942.
-------------------------
1 Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Fatherland {'Jar,
Volume 34, M. i itary Publishing House,
2 Ibid., page 122. 50X1-HUM
3 ~i .., page 230.
4 The Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945,
A Short History, Military
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Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, in his memoirs, speaks very
clearly of the shortage of ammunition at the front at the beginning of
1942: "The ammunition situation was particularly bad.... It will probably
be difficult to believe, but we had to set the norm for expenditure of
ammunition at one to two rounds per gun per 24 hours. And this, take note,
during an offensive." In a report from the front to the Supreme Commander-
in-Chief on 14 February 1942, it was stated: "As shown by battle
experience, a shortage of shells makes it impossible to conduct an
artillery offensive. As a result, the enemy's fire system is not being
destroyed, and our units, attacking enemy defenses which have been poorly
neutralized, are sustaining very large losses without achieving appropriate
success." 1'
Even in 1943 (for example, in the Battle of Kursk), despite the
enormous concentration of ammunition in the front(s), there was enough only
for the first days of battle. Our troops were particularly deficient in
the supply of 45-mm and 57-gran shells for antitank artillery and 76-mm
shells for field artillery, i.e., in those calibers which were extremely
necessary against enemy tanks 2Some large units and formations arriving
from the Reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were short
of ammunition for small arms and artillery when they were committed to the
battle.3
Similar examples provide sufficiently convincing evidence that the
expenditure of ammunition during the last war must not be identified w th
e actua ammtmi_t ion re u ements o the troops. 'these are comzpletel
different things. It is apparent that the author, too, understands this
,
since, for determining the requirements for the first two to three months
of war, he recommends being guided by the data set forth in the book The
Front Offensive Operation to the Full Depth of a Theater of Military
erations, published by the Academy of the General Staff. _T-cc- oor ing to
these data, the ammunition requirement for the troops in he_W n
Thea er of ~ , ry Operations, for example for 122-mm howitzers, will be
13 units of fire for two months nfwar while accorr~in"g ~o'~fieexper~ence
of World War II, the average yearly requirement of the troops for this
caliber is only ten units of fire. These are the figures taken from
wartime experience which the author recommends as the basic data for
--------------------
G. K. Zhukov, Recollections and Reflections, published by
Novosti Press Agency, -T967,
2 G. A. Koltunov and B. G. Solovyev, The Battle of Kursk,
M. Military Publishing House, 1970.
3 Ibid.
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determining the requirements for a year of war. The incorrectness of such
an assertion is obvious.
We consider that in determining the ammunition requirements for the
Western neater of Military Operations (being guided by the experience of
exercises), it is necessary fo'proceed on the assumption that two to three
successive front operations will have to be conducted.
. If we take the ammunition expenditure for, .howitzers for an .
operation (without the use of nuclear weapons) as equal to 6_inits of fire
(as recommended in the book cited and with which the author is in
agreement), then the overall requirement of the troops for ammunition of
this caliber for the Western Theater of Military Operations will be_12_to
18-units of fire, or an average of 15 units of fire (1,200 shells_pex.gjjn).
Since front o erations within the framework of.a strategic operation
in a theater o military operations must be conducted successivelx,, wi hog"
app, .c,iahleeintervals between them, t1F ndicated amount of'ammunition may
be required within the first.~o.three montk a?..war. As regards the
annual requirement, we elieve that it can be set only as purely a point of
orientation, and we should scarcely assume here that industry will be able
to produce a sufficient quantity of ammunition during a nuclear war, as the
author points out on page 68. Under these conditions industrial
capabilities will be severely limited and will he reduced to zero for
certain types of ammunition. Therefore, the ammunition reserves set up for
a theater of military operations must fully satisfy the requirements for an
entire nuclear war, and also for war without the use of nuclear weapons, if
only for the first two to three months.
Calculations show that two-month to thrPa-mnnrf, reserves for
conductijg non-nuclear war will in th .ma.inprovide fob tfi6 requirements of
nuclear war as well. There'5bre, they should very probably be taken as-3-
I. Volkotrubenko's article absolutely correctly points out that it is
impossible to establish the same ammunition expenditure for all guns and
complexes, as is often done in exercises. Such an approach is even more
unallowable in determining norms for the overall stockpiling of ammunition
for a war. In this case, perhaps we should be guided not only by
operational-tactical considerations but also by economic considerations.
In calculating the ammunition requirement for an operation (and this
calculation is fundamental for all subsequent calculations), we musl5ox1-HUM
proceed from the possibility of carrying out the most numerous fire
missions with the simplest and cheapest ammunition. Thus, for striking
enemy personnel to a depth of 2 to 5 kilometers, it is most advantageous to use
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mortars, and to 5 to 10 kilometers--122-ran and 152-mm howitzers.
l1W =--..n hould be used mainly for counterbattery boinbarc eht -and for
striking
nucl_par, attack means and other important targets within the depth ?
of the
m
di
iti
o
A
d
y
ene
sp
s
on.
s regar
s the heavy systems,.2O3-rm and 240
they must be used mainly for destruction fire.
The importance of taking these features into account is confirmed by
the cost of the arnnunition required to neutralize the personnel of an
attacking enemy infantry battalion. If we take the cost of the 82-im
mortar shells needed to carry out this task as 100 percent, then the cost
of 122-mm howitzer shells will be 340 percent, 130-mm gun shells will 1-
740 percent, and Grad rocket launcher rounds will be 760 percent. 50X1-HUM
These are some of the considerations which we believe must be kept in
mind in the practical application of the recommendation expressed in the
article by Colonel-General I. Volkotrubenko.
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