MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE TRANSITION FROM CONVENTIONAL WARFARE TO NUCLEAR WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100410001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 16, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/18: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100410001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/18: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100410001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/18: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100410001-0
N43
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
16 April 1974
MEr-XORAN'DIN FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . MILITARY THOUQ-fT (USSR) : The Transition from
onConventional warfare to Nuclear Warfare
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita r Thought". Ti s
article assumes the inevitable transition of a future world war from
conventional to nuclear warfare. The characterization of the conventional
phase therefore stresses vigilance to detect enemy nuclear strike
preparations, the identification and destruction of enemy nuclear
capability, and the readying of one's own nuclear weapons for use. The
authors point out that the initial nuclear strike must be coordinated and
authorized, and that authentication procedures should be adequate to
preclude unilateral nuclear weapon employment by commanders in threatened
situations or cut off from higher commands. This article appeared in Issue
No. 2 (81) for 1967.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies.
William E. Nelton
Deputy Director for ~perations
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Page 1 of 15 Pages
FIRDB-312/01470-74
py ~, %?
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
TS 20535 3
Copy #j
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BCD
Intelligence Information Special Report
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DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1967
FIRDB- 312/01470-74
DATE 16 April 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR : The Transition by Troops from Combat
Operations with the Exclusive Use of Conventional '!eans of
Destruction to the Use of Nuclear Weapons
SOURCE Documentary
Summary
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal " ii.lita
Thou ht". The authors of this article are Colonel A. Postovalov and
Colonel I. Pivovar. This article assumes the inevitable transition of a
future world war from conventional to nuclear warfare. The characteri-
zation of the conventional phase therefore stresses vigilance to detect
enemy nuclear strike preparations, the identification and destruction of
enemy nuclear capability, and the readying of one's own nuclear weapons for
use. The authors point out that the initial nuclear strike must he
coordinated and authorized, and that authentication procedures should he
adequate to preclude unilateral nuclear weapon eriplo)m!ent by commanders in
threatened situations or cut off from higher commands. End of Summary
50X1-HUM
There is no information in available reference material which can be
firmly associated with the authors. Military Thou ht has been published by
the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET,
SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the
TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is
published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of
division commander.
TS #205353
Copy #1-2
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FIP1)1),-312/0147f-;4
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The Transition by Troops from Combat Operations with the Exclusive
Use o Conventional :leans o Destruction to t e I?se o 'Tuclear 'lea ns
Colonel A. Postovalov and Colonel 1. Pivovar
In our army, as in the armies of our probable enemies, primary
attention is being given to developing theories for the conduct of nuclear
war. This is quite natural, since a future world war will in all
probability be nuclear. But the possibility cannot be excluded that a
world war may also be initiated without the employment of the means of mass
destruction. however, it will inevitably escalate to a nuclear war, since
the enemy, upon suffering defeat, will undoubtedly employ all of his
available forces and means, including his means of mass destruction, to
change the situation in his favor.
Thus, a war initiated using only conventional means of destruction.
will be waged under the constant threat of escalation to unlimited r clear
war.
This circumstance sharply reduces the possibilities that forces of
either side will be defeated, a circumstance which cannot but- give rise to
substantial changes (when compared to a nuclear ~,=ark in the nature,
methods, and forms of troop combat actions. However, one should not
suppose that the nature of combat actions under these conditions will }tavc:
much in corm on with operations of the past war, since the constant threat
of the use of the means of mass destruction and the indispensably high
state of readiness of forces and means to employ nuclear weapons will
markedly distinguish future combat actions,
Cne of the most important and difficult problems of conducting coy-,,,bat
actions using only conventional means of destruction is the transition to
the use of nuclear weapons. The achievement of the goals of an operation
tiill depend to a decisive extent on how successfully nuclear weapons are
used and, at the same time, on the prevention of massive casualties f750X1-HUM
enemy nuclear strikes.
Proceeding from this, the following are the most important tasks for
troops advancing in an offensive in which only conventi
l
ona
means of
destruction. are employed: the timely detection of enem intentions to
deliv
er a nuclear strike; the reduction to a minimum of the effecti~Tncess.
of such a stri}:e; and the maintenance of constant readiness for swift
transition to the use of the means of mass destruction.
O 'G5? 3
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h e _e1~ detection of enemy intentions to use nuclear ~'ea,ous is
extremely difficult, because a relatively high degree of readiness has been
achieved in nuclear attack means from the technical point of and,
therefore, only a very short time is needed to prepare the delivc~n? of the
initial nuclear strike. The technical specifications of opcrat icr