MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): NAVAL OPERATIONS IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100420001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 8 Pages
50X1-HUM
DATE 15 April 1974
50X1-HUM
MILITARY TfUOUCT!T (USSR) ; Naval Combat Operations Employing
Only Conventional ,eans of Destruction
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Naval Combat Operations Employing Only Conventional t.eans of Destruction
by 50X1-HUM
Rear Admiral A. Brezinskiy
A modern nuclear war may begin and he waged for a period of time with
conventional means of destruction alone, and it is extremely difficult to
predict the precise moment when a non-nuclear period will develop into a
nuclear period.
Consequently, throughout the period when the opposing sides are
employing conventional weapons, they must be in a state of constant
readiness to employ nuclear means and to eliminate the effects of nuclear
strikes. This gives rise to a duality of requirements in the organization
and conduct of combat actions: the constant threat of a surprise nuclear
attack compels our forces and means to operate in dispersed combat
dispositions, while the necessity of destroying the enemy by means of
conventional weapons engenders the requirement that their efforts be
concentrated in comparatively narrow sectors. How can this contradiction
be resolved?
Without attempting to set forth exhaustive recommendations for the
resolution of this contradiction, let us examine the procedures which can
be employed in certain situations. As a specific example, we shall attempt
to determine the number of aircraft and gun-equipped surface vessels
required to neutralize a US motorized infantry division defending a 60 to
100 kilometer coastal strip against an amphibious landing, if the landing
force is composed of a motorized rifle division reinforced b), a naval
infantry regiment and the landing front is 10, 20, 30 kilometers long. Let
us assume that the anti-landing coastal defense is set up on the principle
of mobile defense, that as much as SO percent of the defended area is
accessible to amphibious landings, and that the landing force can be
successfully landed if as much as 60 percent of the enemy reserves and
platoon strongpoints on the forward edge of the anti-landing defense and no
less than 75 percent of the artillery batteries in the landing area, are
neutralized. The neutralization of enemy forces and means in the forward
defensive area of the beach and at the forward edge of the anti-landing
defense is carried out by gun-equipped ships, each of which has four 130-mm
guns, and by front bomber m e belonging to the air army of
the maritime front. One gun-equipped ship i sitrnated_I Pack -platoon
strong of cnvP ng-m area of five hectares. Front aviation is
responsible for the neutralization of the divisional reserves. 50X1-HUM
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Analysis of the calculations made for the conditions we have stated
(and presented in the table) demonstrates that in actuality the number of
aircraft required to neutralize an anti-landing defense does not depend on
the width of the landing front. One bomber (fighter-bomber) division is
needed to support the landing of an amphibious force (if there is an
average of 1.5 aircraft sorties a day, which is fully practicable). Since
the landing is usually carried out during a troop offensive on the maritime
axis, it is quite reasonable to assume that the front will not be able to
supply the necessary air strength for its support on the very day of the
landing. Then this is the case, it will be necessary to have aviation
forces and means conduct preliminary neutralization of the anti-landing
defense two or three days preceding the beginning of the landing of the
amphibious force.
The table also shows that, should the force be landed on a broad front
(20 - 30 kilometers), the navy obviously would not have available the
number of gun-equipped ships necessary to provide fire support and to
support the actions on the shore.
Therefore, analysis of the calculations leads to the conclusion that
it is advisable to land a force composed of a reinforced motorized rifle
division on a relatively narrow front (no more than 10 kilometers). In
order to gain superiority over the enemy, it is very important that. the
landings be made at the fastest pace possible. For this purpose, use
should be made of high speed transport-landing craft and landing craft such
as helicopter carriers, launches on air cushions and h drofoils, and
amphibious equipment for ground forces. If the amphibious equipment of the
ground forces (armored personnel carriers, armored vehicles, amphibious
motor transport vehicles, etc.) is equipped with hydrofoils, the pace of
landings could be increased by a factor of almost 6 or 7.
Pquipping ships with rocket launchers would greatly facilitate gaining
fire superiority over the enemy. Calculations demonstrate that when 140-gin
caliber free rockets are employed, each ship, with its 10 to i2 autoratic
launchers (800 launching rails), when firing from a distance of 10
kilometers upon a 48 hectare area, can create a density of fire of
approximately 10 to 12 rockets per hectare, which is the equivalent of
employing 4 or 5 gun-equipped ships.
Naval operations that employ conventional means of destruction against
enemy strike groupings at sea while under the threat of enemy employment of
nuclear weapons, present problems of a somewhat different magnitude than
those involved in the support of an amphibious landing. 50X1-HUM
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It takes 6 to 10 hits by air-launched missiles or 12 to 15 hits by
submarine torpedos to put ships such as strike aircraft carriers out of
action. A sizable amount of forces, such as a minimum of two naval
missile-carrying aviation regiments, is required to achieve that many hits.
At the same time, because of the continual threat of enemy employment
of nuclear weapons, a certain part of the naval missile-carrying aircraft
must be maintained in a state of readiness for sorties with nuclear
missiles. As a result, the task of destroying enemy aircraft Carrier
groupings with conventional weapons can be fulfilled only partially. To
successfully and fully fulfil this task, it will be necessary either to
increase the complement of naval missile-carrying aviation (for example, by
creating a reserve of the Naval High Command), or by making wide use of
inter r moves of aviation and, besides, to use long-range aviation
or this purpose.
A different situation also arises when submarines are employed against
enemy strike groupings. Because of the threat of enemy employment of
nuclear weapons, and the long period of time required. by submarines to
deploy in areas of combat operations, each submarine will have to carry a
prescribed number of nuclear missiles or torpedos. This means that
submarines will have fewer rockets and torpedos with conventional charges
than they could have. Consequently, in order to destroy enemy strike
groupings at sea, more submarines will have to be called upon.
Combat with missile submarines has also become more difficult. In
order to destroy the largest possible number of enemy missile submarines
prior to the time nuclear weapons are used, we must make rraximum effective
use of our antisubmarine forces. Since each aircraft and helicopter can
handle only a relatively small quantity of antisubmarine weapons while they
are simultaneously carrying nuclear munitions on board, their combat
capabilities during non-nuclear operations are sharply reduced; we
therefore consider it advisable to have readied nuclear munitions at the
airfields of antisubmarine aviation or on antisubmarine helicopter
carriers. Then the transition to the use of nuclear weapons can be
accomplished by sending regular aircraft (helicopters) to carry out
missions with nuclear munitions on board.
Unfortunately, antisubmarine submarines, like those of any other type,
have lower combat capabilities during the period of non-nuclear combat
actions than they would have if they carried only conventional munitions on
board. A similar situation exists with surface antisubmarine ships.
However, it is true that, because they carry a large number of munitions in
their unit of fire, their combat capabilities are decreased to a somewhat
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lesser degree than those of submarines. The decrease in the combat and
operational capabilities of the antisubmarine forces can be somewhat
compensated for (and comparatively quickly, besides) by moving
antisubmarine aviation from other theaters. 50X1-HUM
The problems examined in this article permit the following conclusions
to be drawn:
-- the basic ways to resolve the contradiction between the need to
conduct combat actions in dispersed combat dispositions to effect an
amphibious landing and the need to concentrate efforts in a narrow landing
sector, can be: by extensively employing front aviation and gun and
mortar-equipped ships to neutralize the anti handing defense; by echeloning
landing force detachments in depth; and by increasing the pace of
debarkation;
-- the swift debarkation of the landing force will be greatly
furthered by equipping amphibious troop equipment with hydrofoils, by
employing high-speed landing craft, and by including helicopter carriers in
the composition of the landing forces;
-- naval missile-carrying aircraft have the main burden of destroying
enemy aircraft carrier strike groupings, and it is extremely important that
they be moved from other theaters for this purpose;
-- the most practical method of raising the operational and combat
capabilities of the antisubmarine forces is to increase the number of
antisubmarine aircraft, antisubmarine submarines, and antisubmarine surface
ships;
-- all other factors being equal, during non-nuclear combat actions
the side (large unit, unit) that is better equipped with more sophisticated
conventional weapons will have the advantage. This final observation is
elementary, but it must be made in order to focus attention once again on
the need to further modernize conventional weapons and the methods of
employing them. 50X1-HUM
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A'trnber of Fire S=port Ships and Front Aviation Aircraft Needed to Support the Landing
- of an Armhibious Force Coose of a Reinforced totorized Rifle Division
Chiectives to be
Neutralized
155 on self-propelled
howitzer batteries
152 on stationary
shore batteries
Platoon defensive
points
1Tank battalion.
S?
Honest John batteries
c? 203 m r. self-propelled
howitzer batteries
atta ions
n
u
v',otorized infantry
battalions
Vu?nber of Targets in
an Anti-Landing De-
fense Front of 60 km
Lan in, orce Front
Number of Targets in
an Anti-Landing De-
fense Front of 100 in
Landi Force Front
HI
N-anber of aircraft required when: * the bombing altitude is 2-3 km
** the bombing altitude is 10-12 In
Required Contingent of Required Contingent of
Forces in an Anti- Forces in an Anti-
ding Defense Front Landing Defense Front
of 60 km of 100 km
in force Front, rce Front
From 11-22 bombers with OKhAB-1O(, or
from 36 to 108 bombers with RBK-250, and
also armed with PiAB-2.5; or 24 fighter-
bombers.
12 fighter-bombers with rocket end ean;ryon
armament.
12 fighter-banters with rocket and cantwn
armament.
ran to ers wi
100. or from 108-180* to 354-540**bombers
with RBK-250, and also armed with PtAB-2.5;
or from 60* to 108**fighter-bombers with
rocket and cannon armament.
From 9-18* to 13-36**bombers with 0 1Q0,
or from 11-22* to 22-43**bombers with RBK-
250, and also armed with AO-1; or from 24*-48**
fighter-bombers with rocket and cannon
armament.
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