MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RESUMPTION OF COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER A NUCLEAR STRIKE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100540001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 3, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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THIS DOC[ID'~NT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2030'.5
3 May 1974
David H. Blee
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
NIE~IORANDIJM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Resumption of
o at erat~ons ter a Nuclear Strike
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'T~Iilita Thou ht". This
article by t e oviet ie o re mops stresses t e importance of
mastering the art of conducting decisive combat operations with surviving
forces and means after a nuclear exchange. Fie gives his criteria for
determining combat effectiveness, specifying 70 percent casualties as
making a large unit ineffective, and defining combat effective as 40 to 50
percent casualties. Soviet forces will maintain tank superiority after the
exchange, while Western forces will retain tactical nuclear superiority.
The author asserts the need for greater realism in relevant Soviet exercise
scenarios. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies.
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1967
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DATE 3 D'1ay 19 74
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Continuation of a Front Offensive
eration wit t e united Strength of Troops
Remaining After Enemy Nuclear Strikes
SOURCE Documentary
Su~mma~r
T~Fie following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita
Thou ht~". The author o t is article is Colonel-General A. Ba adzhanyan.
i'Ifi"s article by the Soviet Chief of Armored Troops stresses the importance
of mastering the art of conducting decisive combat operations with
surviving forces and means after a nuclear exchange. He-gives his criteria
for determining combat effectiveness, specifying 70 percent casualties as
making a large unit ineffective, and defining combat effective as 40 to 50
percent casualties. Soviet forces will maintain tank superiority after the
exchange, while Western forces will retain tactical nuclear superiority.
The author asserts the need for greater realism in relevant Soviet exercise
scenarios.
y~Co~mment: End of Summary
Armored Troop Academy imeni R, Ya. Malinovskiy. He is the author ofV~ ~-~v
Roads of Victo and is a prolific contributor of articles about armored
tanc troops, t e most recent appearing in A stator, No. 15, August 1972.
The SECRET version of Milita Thou ht was pu is ed three times annually
and was distributed down to t e eve of division commander. It reportedly
ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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Continuation of a Front Offensive eration with the Limited
~tren~t o Troors emaining ter emy clear tri ec~s -
Y
Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan
The need for mastering the art of conducting decisive combat actions
with the limited forces and means remaining after enemy nuclear strikes is
assuming particular importance, since huge troop losses are possible in
nuclear warfare.
Continuation of a front offensive operation with the limited forces
and means remaining after enemy nuclear strikes requires, first of all,
eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear attack and restoring, even if only
partially, the striking power of attacking groupings of the first-echelon
troops of the front in the shortest possible time period during conduct of
intense combat ac ions, and also finding and using the most advantageous
forms and methods for the combat actions of the troops corresponding to the
changing conditions of the situation. All this must be accomplished
simultaneously, in order to retain the initiative in actions and
successfully develop the offensive. In light of this, we would like to
express a few views.
The easiest and most reliable method of accomplishing the set of tasks
mentioned above (apart from the carrying out of measures for eliminating
the aftereffects of nuclear attack) is to replace the large units which
have lost their combat effectiveness by committing second echelons and
reserves to the engagement. However, it is doubtful that they can remain
intact and be used immediately in the numbers required while undergoing
massive nuclear strikes, since the enemy has the capability to use
high-yield warheads against them. Therefore, along with committing to the
engagement the large units remaining intact in the reserve or in the second
echelon, it will be required to devote special attention to restoring the
combat effectiveness of first-echelon units and large units which have been
subjected to a nuclear strike, and to using them for developing the
operation.
It seems to us that analyzing this problem, which still has been
_insufficiently explored in theory and tested in field training exeses,
ir~st-requires etermining the combat effectiveness criteria for divisions,
rocket brigades and other large units and units which have sustained
losses, and on this basis establishing some sort of general terminology
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characterizing the condition of the troops, This has practical
significance for finding methods of restoring the combat effectiveness of
the troops and properly allocating tasks to them based on their actual
capabilities.
As a preliminary, we will mention that the opinion recent has become
prevalent that supposedly the overall percentage of full strength in combat
equipment and personnel of large units does not fully reflect their combat
capabilities and therefore cannot be considered~a criterion of combat ~
effectiveness. One might agree with this assertion in principle if in
calculations one could be guided by such an unlikely fact as, for example, ~
tanks, comprising the basis of fighting power of a division, being put out
of action after an enemy nuclear strike while the personnel remain intact. r
However, tanks are more resistant to nuclear strikes. Therefore, if
overall losses in a division are, let's say, fifty percent, it is not
likely that tank losses will be greater. The reverse is most likely.
There undoubtedly can be exceptions, but we believe that they cannot be
considered in a general statement of the problem.
Certainly if a rocket battalion, which for the time being is the only
means of employing nuclear weapons in a division, is put out of action, the
division's combat capabilities, especially in actions separated from the
main forces of the army, are significantly reduced. However, the absence
of the battalion cannot serve as the basis for considering the division
even partially not combat effective, since the deficiency in nuclear means
can be quickly compensated for by strikes of army and front means. There
is one rocket battalion to a division. The enemy will search for it and
try to destroy it. The commander of .the army planning the operation has to
provide for this and be ready to compensate for possible losses of the
battalion during the operation by strikes with his own means.
Thus, when operationally assessing our troops, the overall percentage
of full strength of large units can be the criterion for their combat
effectiveness. This permits quickly assessing the situation and assigning
tasks to the troops with consideration of their combat capabilities,
without waiting for the receipt of developed data on combat and numerical
strength presented via the various departments, directorates, and staffs of
the arms and services of the front field headquarters. The situation is
different within the divisions, and even more so within units. There the
commanders and staffs must specifically account for each item of combat
equipment and weaponry on hand and determine combat capabilities on this
basis. Proceeding from operational training experience, we have accepted ,
the following criteria as a guide for determining the combat effectiveness ';
of large units.
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We consider as having lost combat effectiveness those divisions in
which more than seventy percent o t e personne combat equipment and
command posts have been put out of action, and their organizational
structure has been completely disrupted. In these cases, depending on the
situation, composite detachments can be formed from the remnants of large
units and units, but if this is impossible, it is advisable to use them to
reinforce other units.
Divisions having lost more than fifty percent, but not more than
seventy percent, of their personnel and equipment, can be considered to
have artiall lost combat effectiveness. If the organizational structure
of the ivision is-` not disrupte , t en it obviously must continue the
offensive without carrying out any reorganizations. If the organizational
structure is partially disrupted, but combat-effective battalions of
various regiments and some of the command posts remain, it is advisable to
form composite regiments. But if the division organizational structure is
completely disrupted and the command posts destroyed, composite detachments
can be formed from them. Composite organizations also are possible in the
Rocket Troops if some brigades and battalions retain launchers but their
means of control are destroyed, and others, on the contrary, have means of
control but no launchers.
Divisions should be considered to have tem~oraril lost combat
effectiveness if their losses have been relatively dig t ut t eir command
posts an materiel reserves have been destroyed or their personnel have
received dangerous doses of radiation or have been contaminated by chemical
or bacteriological means. Restoring the combat effectiveness of such large
units requires a certain amount of time to establish command posts (finding
command personnel, means of communication and transport within the
divisions, or allocating these means from the staff of the army), and also
to deliver materiel reserves and carry out personal cleansing and
radioactive decontamination.
If divisions have about forty to fifty percent losses, they clearly
should be considered combat effective. Granted, their combat capabilities
will be reduced, but t ey wi e a e to carry out characteristic, though
limited, large unit tasks. From the experience of the past war, we know
many instances in which large units and units having up to a fifty percent
deficiency in combat equipment and, particularly, personnel carried out
their assigned tasks. Of course, present-day conditions will have several
characteristic special features which can't be overlooked. If in the past
war primarily the first-echelon troops, and especially the infantry, bore
losses in preserving the integrity of large units whose combat effective-
ness had gradually fallen during the operation, then in nuclear war we
observe a completely different phenomenon. In the first hours the
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groupings of troops will be subjected to destruction throughout the depth
of the theater of military operations. Whole military organizations--
units, large units, command posts, etc.--can be put out of action almost
simultaneously.
Undoubtedly, the determination of the degree of combat effectiveness
of large units, especially from the standpoint of percentages, of losses,
is purely approximate and requires further study, research and verification
through the experience of exercises. Thus it is important to determine the
total number of specific measures for restoring the combat effectiveness of
the troops and for establishing composite regiments and composite detach-
ments and the time periods needed for carrying them out.
As a result of enemy nuclear strikes and resultant losses, and, what
is no less important, as a result of our own nuclear strikes, the situation
may change so much that the forms and methods of combat actions of the
troops outlined while planning the operation will no longer fully ensure
achieving the goal of the operation under the new conditions. All of this
requires refining not only the plan of the operation but also the tasks for
the troops, forces and means. However, during the time that must be spent
on this, the front troops must continue the offensive in their original
disposition an~th their previous tasks in order to retain the initiative
and not give the enemy an opportunity to put his troops in order and close
the gaps in his operational disposition formed as a result of our nuclear
strikes. The exception may be rocket troops and front aviation, which must
immediately start fulfilling new tasks in accordance with the changed
conditions of the situation.
In delivering nuclear strikes, the enemy will try, just as we do, to
detect and destroy, first of all, the main grouping of front troops.
Therefore it is quite natural that the large units whicfi Tave remained most
intact may turn out not to be on the axis of the main strike of the front,
as a result of which the grouping of the troops of the front often will not
correspond to the aim of the operation.
From the foregoing stems the need to carry out a transfer of combat-
effective large units to the main axis. However, despite the fact that the
enemy also will sustain large losses on that axis, such a solution of the
problem will not always prove to be advantageous. To gain time, it
frequently will be more advantageous to temporarily change the axis of
concentration of the primary efforts of the front, with a subsequent
transfer of them to the previously selected ax si of the main strike, if, of
course, it has not lost its significance as a result of the destruction by
nuclear weapons of the most important targets wthin__ de _ o enemy
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territory, the capture of which was the task of the front offensive
operation. --`
In theaters with a difficult terrain contour, the movement of troops
from the secondary axes to the main axis can be caused by the advisability
of developing an offensive at high speeds on terrain which is more
accessible for the actions of all arms of the branches of the armed forces.
In that case, it will be more advantageous to transfer army reserves, since
pulling first-echelon large units out of action entails considerable
difficulties.
As is known, our operational-tactical nuclear means and especially our
strategic nuclear means are capable~of decisively destroying enemy reserves I
throu
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same time, with the existing arming of large units with tactical nuclear
means, our capabilities for destroying the enemy immediately in front of j
the advancing troops are comparatively small.
As a result of such a ratio of nuclear forces, one can expect that
after the massed nuclear strikes by both sides, the enemy will be deprived
of combat-effective reserves to a considerable degree, with relatively less
losses in first-echelon troops. Along with this, one should take into
consideration that with identical losses, the surviving combat strength of
our divisions and those o the probable enemy will not be equal. While
retaining superiori~ove~_him_is~-taa}ks ???? *?1 ~ ~ ~P ~nfPri or in tactical
n ar means, artillery, antitank means and ago in~ma,npoa~rPx.
Under such conditions, the primary efforts of the front, in continuing
the offensive operation with the limited troop strength remaining after
enemy nuclear strikes, must be directed to overcoming the resistance of the
first echelon of the enemy. Allowing for the results of destroying the
reserves in the depth, successful destruction of the first echelon of the
enemy will make it possible to develop a rapid front offensive for
attaining the final goal of the operation. This will be carried out,
first of all, by nuclear strikes on those axes where it is planned to
continue the offensive into the depth under the new conditions of the
situation.
As we already noted, the enemy has the potential capabilities for ~
destroying our second echelons and reserves with high-yield nuclear b't
weapons, delivered mainly by aviation. However, with the pre~se~nt_~-da \Q
development of our air defense means, the aviation is very vu~nerab~e,
i.e., the effectiveness of its actions may be significantly reduced.
Therefore, to some extent we can count on a certain portion of the second
echelon and reserves of the front retaining their combat effectiveness
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after the enemy nuclear strikes. For developing the offensive these
forces, obviously, must be committed to the engagement as quickly as
possible in the gaps of operational disposition of the enemy or on those
axes where the enemy has sustained the greatest losses. The offensive
should be continued on the other axes by first-echelon troops which have
retained their combat effectiveness, or by composite regiments and
composite detachments. Immediate commit~en? o t e second echelon and
reserves to the engagement will give us the opportunity to forestall the
enemy while he is building up his efforts, overcome the resistance of his
first-echelon troops, and quickly transfer the primary efforts of the front
into the depth.
The inevitability of high losses in the first hours of the operation
leads to the conclusion that in planning the commitment to the engagement
of the second echelon or reserves of the front, we must particularly
carefully consider the need for timely bui~c~-up of the efforts of the first
echelon to continue the offensive, which may arise right after the exchange
of massive nuclear strikes by the sides. Therefore the_,position~.th~t.
supposedly the. econd echelon of the front, as a rule, is^committed to
fulfil subsequent tasks?is,_ in our o~ui on, wrong today,? This must be
taTcen into consideration and tfie~~correct conclusions drawn concerning the
place of the second echelon in the operational disposition of the troops of
the front, its distance away, the degree of dispersal, and the sequence of
movements forward for commitment to the engagement.
In connection with the changed conditions of the situation as a result
of losses sustained, the need can arise to change the methods of conducting
the offensive operation. If the planned aim was to conduct the offensive
on some of the shortest axes until attaining the final goal of the
operation, then due to shortages of forces and means the number of axes
might be reduced. In a case where the offensive is planned along
converging axes to encircle and destroy an enemy grouping, one, obviously,
has to abandon such a method of combat actions when one has limited troop
strength remaining after enemy nuclear strikes. This will be caused not
only by a shortage of forces but also by the fact that after our massive
nuclear strikes such groupings may not exist, and encircling isolated enemy
units which have sustained large losses only wastes time and reduces our
capabilities for developing the offensive into the depth.
The basic method of continuing the offensive under the conditions
described will be to deliver frontal strikes into the depth through zones
of massive nuclear strikes and gaps in the operational disposition of the
enemy, in conjunction with flank strikes against enemy groupings which have
retained their combat effectiveness. Deep raids by tank large units and
units widely separated from their main forces must be widely used, in
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conjunction with the actions airbo to seize or
destroy important targets in the epth of enemy territory.
As a result of massive enemy nuclear strikes, the troops will also
sustain large losses in transport means and materiel reserves, including
fuel. Massive destruction, obstructions and fires will occur, and vast
areas with high levels. of radioactive contamination will be formed. As a
consequence, the maneuvering capabilities of the troops will be reduced and
supplying materiel to them will become complicated.. Under such onditions
we can hard~unt on attaining an offensive rate o a vance of seventy to
~'ig ty i ometers per~ay,"?'e' vhf ~on selected aze~ :`~ ~'?~ ~? ~ -
As for the depth of the assignment of tasks to the troops, in this
case one must proceed from the combat strength of the armies and take into
account the actual capabilities of their large units. Composite regiments
and composite detachments are not divisions, and therefore the depth of
their tasks may be less. However, their aggressive actions, even with
tasks which are limited in depth, will be important, since they make
possible moving forward to the missile deployment areas of surviving enemy
tactical nuclear means and containing his troops on secondary axes,
ensuring development of the offensive on the axis of the main strike. Even
if the remnants of defeated and demoralized enemy units appear before the
front of the composite regiments and composite detachments, they can and
must continue the offensive to a great depth.
Continuing a front offensive operation with the limited strength of
troops remaining a t~-enemy nuclear strikes is inconceivable without
co rehensive support. The following will be important: actions of
c emical defense units, engineer units, and units of other troops to
eliminate the aftereffects of enemy nuclear attack; stable radio
communications with two echelons lower so the senior commander can
immediately assume control of large units and units in the event their
command posts are destroyed and clarify the status of the troops after
nuclear strikes; the conduct of reconnaissance, first of all, to ascertain
the surviving nuclear means and also the results of our nuclear strikes,
and to detect the most vulnerable places in the enemy disposition; combat
against radio-electronic means to deny the enemy an opportunity to restore
his disrupted control; and the conduct of deception to create for the enemy
a false impression of the status of our troops. Restoring the functioning
of the rear, especially ensuring the delivery of nuclear warheads, missile
propellant, and fuel, will also be very important.
In conclusion, we should speak, if only briefly, about the
organizational structure and the operational and combat training tasks of
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the troops, stemming from the possible nature of the conduct of present-day
offensive operations.
The organization of our large units must be flexible and equally
suited for conducting combat actions both in the non-nuclear period of a
war as well as, particularly, in the decisive nuclear period of a war,
including even after massive losses sustained as a result of enemy nuclear
strikes. The organization basically meets these requirements. However, in
improving the organizational structure of the troops, it is necessary to
critically take into account the experience of the makeup of the armies of
the principal capitalistic countries. We s ecificall should s d to what
extent the presence in the d;y; s;onc n~ _ p y ~~..~:-''R"~-?--~-
_-___r_ _ ~ _- _ -ot'. r Tr~bable_ _ enemie s fl a
considerable amount of artil emery, capable of using nuclear munitions of
very ow yie , an a ence of separate battalions [artillery or
rocket], battalions (divizion) and headquarters of brigades, reflect
or~aniz~tional 1Px;h;i;r~ a?~ Pnsure the conduct o~~~bat astiQns.._iz~ the
non-nuclear and n,ll'~Pa ~Ar;nr~c ofd war, and sho_u_ ld _draw from it_ _specific
theoretical and practical conclusions.
A correct understanding of the possible nature of combat actions in
the decisive nuclear period of a war also will make it possible to draw
practical conclusions on improving the methods of operational training.
To command personnel and staffs should be prepared to be capable of
controllinr~ tTie combat actions of the trn~n5 G~nP or ~~ PrhP1 nns hi uher _
While conducting exercises and war games we should more decisively
"put out of action" large units and whole elements of the operational
disposition, "inflict more losses", and work out practical measures for
restoring the combat efficiency of the troops, i.e., we have to create a
situation which is close to the real situation.
Such an overall view gives the special features of continuing a front
offensive operation with the limited strength of troops remaining after
enemy nuclear strikes as well as several problems arising in conjunction
with it which require comprehensive research.
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