MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RECONNAISSANCE AT SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100650001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100650001-4
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THIS DOCUMBVT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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17 June 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance at Sea
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article discusses the need to conduct daily peacetime naval reconnaissance
in order to accurately deploy vessels into a combat area after the outbreak
of hostilities. The radio, radar, aerial and ship reconnaissance utilized
in this task are described. The article also considers the use of naval
reconnaissance in support of joint operations of the navy and front troops.
Specific reconnaissance operations by Soviet aircraft and submarines against
US surface vessels and submarines are described in which superior Soviet
performance is claimed. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference. reports prom this publication have been
assigned
William E. Nelscn
Deputy Director for Operations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Mid-1964
INFO.
1OP
RET
THIS DOCUMENT MAY NCT BE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
DATE 17 June 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance at Sea
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article
which appeared in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry
of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The authors of this article are Rear Admiral B. Bobkov and
Captain First Rank I, Khurs. This article discusses the need to conduct
daily peacetime naval reconnaissance in order to accurately deploy vessels
into a combat area after the outbreak of hostilities. The radio, radar,
aerial and ship reconnaissance utilized in this task are described. The
article also considers the use of naval reconnaissance in support of joint
operations of the navy and front troops. Specific reconnaissance opera-
tions by Soviet aircraft and submarines against US surface vessels and
submarines are described in which superior Soviet performance is claimed.
End of Summarv
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Comment:
There is no information in available reference material which can be
firmly associated with the authors. I
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Reconnaissance at Sea
by
Rear Admiral B. Bobkov and Captain First Rank I. Khurs
In combat operations at sea a significant place is allotted to
reconnaissance, whose role and significance have grown with the intro-
duction into the navy of nuclear weapons and the development of means for
their delivery. An extremely important aspect of reconnaissance at sea is
the fact that it is conducted over a great distance. Practically speaking,
in order to carry out reconnaissance missions against rocket/nuclear
forces, and to support the combat operations of our strike forces, it will
be necessary to organize reconnaissance over the entire depth of the
theater--from the approaches to the bases of our forces to the bases of the
enemy navy on other continents. In so doing, the depth of reconnaissance
in each specific case is determined by the goals of the operations of the
strike forces in the theater. Thus, for naval missile-carrying aviation
at, for example, six-hour readiness for takeoff, to deliver strikes against
enemy carrier strike forces prior to their approaching the area of combat
maneuver, reconnaissance should extend about 2600 kilometers, while to It,
support the combat operations of nuclear submarines deployed from bases--
about 3900 kilometers. (For strike screens of diesel submarines, recon-
naissance should be conducted to a depth of 1000 to 1500 kilometers in the
direction of the enemy from the strike screens.) Also unusual is the
frequency of reconnaissance at sea. In order to detect in time, for
example, a carrier strike large unit prior to its approach to the line
where its aviation will take off to deliver a strike, and to guide our
submarines and aviation toward it, more than 40 flights by aircraft from
reconnaissance units of the navy and long-range aviation will be required,
and 12 to 15 diesel or 3 or 4 nuclear submarines must be brought in, as
well as other reconnaissance forces (such as radio reconnaissance).
In view of the actual proximity of the day-to-day disposition of the
rocket/nuclear forces of a probable enemy to the objectives of a strike, we
may assume that in a system of reconnaissance at sea, reconnaissance
conducted in peacetime is of special importance in supporting the first
operations of the initial stage of a war. Conditions in naval theaters
make it possible in peacetime, given sufficient reconnaissance means, to
keep the main forces of the probable enemy under continuous observation.
Thus, naval reconnaissance possesses the capability not only to warn the
command in time about preparations for an attack by enemy naval forces, but
also to discover in time his plans, the makeup and combat capabilities of
his forces, the areas of operations, and methods of operational-tactical
TosEe
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iuse. These reconnaissance capabilities become highly significant also
because the time required to deploy even nuclear submarines into areas of
combat operations is considerable, and submarines, as is known, must be
moved into these areas well in advance. Thus, information on the enemy
obtained in advance will enable us to determine more precisely the
direction of their operations. For example, it takes submarines ten days
to reach the east coast of the US, six days to reach the Hawaiian Islands,
and up to three days to reach the southern part of Japan.
Daily reconnaissance in peacetime makes it possible even now to
1,,discover and determine the location of up to 80 percent of aircraft
'carriers and about 40 percent of nuclear submarines. This, of course,
allows faster deployment of our naval forces directly into the areas from
which the enemy intends to begin his military operations.
As the situation becomes more complex, the navy, possessing advance
information, can quickly intensify its reconnaissance. Thus, in the period
when the crisis was building up in the area of the Caribbean Sea, our navy,
in addition to intensive radio reconnaissance, conducted active ship and
aerial reconnaissance in the Atlantic. An analysis of naval reconnaissance
activity during this period shows that it revealed fairly completely the
operational situation in the ocean theater, and on the whole provided the
command with the necessary reconnaissance data.
It should also be noted that the probable enemy is likewise already
conducting extremely active reconnaissance of our ship forces and coastal
objectives. During exercises by our fleets, the US and NATO naval command,
as a rule, intensifies reconnaissance in the areas of the exercises. In
July 1963 the NATO command conducted a special reconnaissance operation in
the zone of the Northern and Baltic fleets, involving the use of 76 air-
craft from naval aviation and a considerable number of reconnaissance
aircraft from the strategic naval forces of the US and Great Britain. Also
participating were 19 surface ships from the US, Great Britain, Canada, and
France, and up to 11 submarines (two of them nuclear) from the US, Great
Britain, and Norway.
It is characteristic of reconnaissance at sea that there is great
diversity in the tasks to be carried out and a large number of objectives
which must be observed in the interests of organizing and conducting combat
operations. Thus, for example, in supporting combat operations against a
NATO strike fleet in the northeast Atlantic, it will be necessary to recon-
noiter simultaneously, besides "purely" naval objectives--four carrier
strike groups and one or two carrier search-strike groups, and groupings of
forces of antisubmarine and antiair defense and rear services support,--up
to 30 primary bases for ships and naval aviation, naval depots for nuclear
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missile weapons, as well as the system of long-range radio navigation and
control of enemy naval forces.
For the conduct of reconnaissance at sea the navy has at its disposal
all types of reconnaissance, among which radio and radiotechnical
reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, and ship reconnaissance have become
especially important. This is due mainly to the wide use of electronic
means of the probable enemies' system of control of naval forces, and their
active use in day-to-day and combat activity. But in a period of worsening
international relations the number of functioning electronic means in-
creases, as does the intensity of their use. Thus, in the area of the
Caribbean Sea in October 1962. the overall growth of radio networks and
radio communication links of the US Navy in the Atlantic theater amounted
to 60 percent (two-thirds of which were for short-range communications).
Shore radio reconnaissance units of long-range radio communications
are able by their observations to cover the entire world ocean and discover
the makeup and even the deployment and nature of the activity of naval
forces, as well as steps being taken by the enemy to prepare forces and
naval theaters for war.
Of the greatest importance is reconnaissance against enemy forces by
also observing their short-range communications (through the functioning of
shipboard means of radar and radio navigation). It is sufficient to note
that the basic organization of a carrier strike large unit provides for the
allocation of almost 60 percent of short-range radio frequencies (as was
the case, for example, in the FALLEX-60 maneuvers). In addition, three
carrier large units have as many as 225 radar sets of various functions and
over 20 active means of radio navigation.
Reconnaissance in short-range radio communication nets also makes it
possible to discover the sailing and combat dispositions of large units of
ships, the operational formation of enemy forces, and also to determine the
place in the formation of the targets of a strike. But because of the
short range of radio emissions, reconnaissance in short-range radio nets
can be conducted most effectively in remote areas of the ocean (sea) not by
shore radio reconnaissance units, but by forces of ships, boats, and air-
craft having radio reconnaissance means on board.
A study of the system of radiotechnical equipment and its modes of use
shows that these means are a significant basis for the effective conduct of
reconnaissance by units and means of radio and radiotechnical reconnais-
sance. Therefore, considerable importance is attached in the navy to the
perfection of existing--and the development of new--means of radio and5oxl -HUM
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radiotechnical reconnaissance means, and the equipping both of shore units
and reconnaissance aircraft, submarines, and surface ships with them.
For the conduct of aerial reconnaissance at sea, naval aviation
contains reconnaissance aviation regiments (TU-16R and TU-22R recon-
naissance aircraft). For carrying out particular reconnaissance missions,
missile-carrying aircraft and antisubmarine aviation are brought in.
TU-16R aircraft are able to conduct reconnaissance up to a depth of 2000 to
2500 kilometers. By refueling in midair their range can be increased by 25
to 30 percent after each refueling. Thus, in view of the geographical
conditions in our naval theaters, aerial reconnaissance by naval forces can
be conducted mainly within the probable areas of combat maneuver of carrier
strike large units and on the nearest approaches to them.
The conduct of aerial reconnaissance in more remote areas can be
carried out by TU-95 aircraft (of long-range aviation), whose tactical
range enables it to detect and carry out observation of aircraft carriers 4
days before they reach the areas where the carrier aircraft are to take off
to deliver strikes against coastal objectives. Landing forces and convoys
can be sighted 9 to 10 days before their arrival from rear bases in the US '-
to European waters or the western part of the Pacific Ocean.
Aircraft reconnaissance involves the use of radiotechnical means of
reconnaissance, radar sights, cameras, and hydroacoustical means. In
practice the fleets have obtained the following detection ranges for
carrier groups: with radar sights--from 120 to 400 kilometers (initial
observation of ships in pattern is provided up to 310 kilometers); oblique
photography of ships is possible under favorable conditions from 25 to 30
kilometers or less. Detection ranges of carrier groups and individual
ships at sea by the operation of their radar sets amount to 100 to 140
percent of the range of operation of shipboard stations against aerial
targets. Based on the experience of the Pacific Fleet, US aircraft .,,
carriers can be sighted at a distance of 400 to 450 kilometers by 7''
aircraft-borhe search sets (in flight at an altitude of 10,000 meters).
The most difficult task for aerial reconnaissance is the identification in
a pattern of classes of ships, and also the determination of the elements