MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RECOVERY OF COMBAT UNITS FROM CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR STRIKES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100670001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

50X1-HUM
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Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 13 Pages
50X1-HUM
DATE 18 June 1974
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Rapid Elimination of the Aftereffects of
Enemy Nuclear and emical Strikes
N
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The Rapid Elimination of the Aftereffects of Enemy Nuclear and
ChemicallStri es
by
General-Mayor of Technical Troops G. Ostapchuk
After the massive use of nuclear and chemical weapons, both sides will
strive to exploit the results of the strikes more fully and to forestall
each other with decisive offensive actions by groupings of ground forces.
It is perfectly obvious that the attainment of these goals will depend.
to a great extent on how quickly the two sides are able to assess the
changes that have occurred in the situation, refine the tasks for the
troops, and eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy strikes.
In the present article we should like to express certain ideas on
possible ways of shortening the amount of time necessary to assess the
aftereffects of enemy nuclear and chemical strikes and to adopt plans for
their elimination.
It seems to us that in seeking these ways, primary attention should be
given to forecasting the results of nuclear and chemical strikes.
First of all, it is necessary, obviously, to perfect the system of
plotting nuclear bursts. A radical solution to the problem would he the
creation in a front and in an army of an independent system of plotting--at
the present time on the basis of air defense special purpose radiotechnica]
means, and in the future on the basis of seismic, radiotechnical., and other
special instruments.
It is advisable to transmit data on enemy use of weapons of mass
destruction on special communications channels. In the exercises, for
example, it was found expedient to allocate to front analytical evaluation
stations separate channels for communications with the radiotechnical posts
of air defense, the analytical evaluation stations of armies, and the
analytical evaluation groups of the divisions of the front reserve. In so
doing, the time needed to collect data on nuclear and chemical strikes is
reduced and information gathered on the radiation and chemical situation by
analytical evaluation stations, analytical evaluation groups, and.
directorates and departments of front headquarters is improved, although
admittedly a certain increase in communications means is required
50X1-HUM
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In the interest of reducing the time required to process data, the
network planning method for the work of analytical evaluation stations
deserves attention. In our view, there must be an analytical evaluation
station not only at the command post, but also at the rear area control
post of the front.
It is advisable to forecast and assess the results of the initial
nuclear strike first of all in the most important individual areas. Of
great importance here is the early (even in peacetime) study of the theater
of military operations (statistical information on the prevailing
directions and. speeds of winds, averaged data on the degree of vertical
stability of the atmosphere on a yearly chart, etc.), analysis of the
possible scope and methods of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction, and
the preparation of various kinds of maps for forecasting probable areas of
destruction, flooding, fires, and zones with radioactive contamination of
the terrain.
For a quick approximate determination of the degree of combat
effectiveness of large units and units after enemy nuclear and chemical
strikes, previously prepared tables may be used. As one of the possible
variants, we cite approximate initial data (Tables 1 and 2).
By knowing the number of nuclear and chemical strikes, the dimensions
of the sectors of chemical strikes, and the number of personnel stationed
in these areas at the moment of the attack, it is possible using these
tables to determine quickly the degree of combat effectiveness of a large
unit or unit. For example, a motorized rifle division in a concentration
area is subjected to six nuclear strikes by the enemy, of which two have a
yield of 100 kilotons, three have a yield of 300 kilotons, and one has a
yield of 500 kilotons. Using Table 1 we find that the division may sustain
losses to personnel of roughly up to 54 percent. For fuller determination
of the combat effectiveness of a large unit, it is necessary also to take
into account losses in combat equipment.
There is no question that data on the combat effectiveness of large
units obtained by this method are especially tentative and require further
refinement of information from officer intelligence and of reports from the
troops.
Assessing the degree of combat effectiveness of an army in a short
space of time is more complicated. A combined-arms army may be considered
combat effective if it is in a position to exploit effectively the results
of nuclear strikes of the front and of the Strategic Rocket Troops, and
also to complete the destruction of the opposing enemy. 50X1-HUM
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A speed-up of the process of adopting a plan for the organization and
implementation of measures to eliminate tea tereffects of the use of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons can be achieved if, simulta-
neously with the assessment of the situation and the adoption of a plan to
restore the combat effectivenes of forces of a front and an army, tasks are
determined and assigned to special units and subunits for the immediate
elimination of the aftereffects, or at least the organization of their
advance toward the centers and areas of destruction. On the average, the
determination and allocation of tasks at army headquarters can require 20
to 30 minutes, and in front headquarters 40 to 50 minutes. The time it
takes for the special units and subunits to arrive in the work area will
depend on their location, methods, and speed of advance. In the exercises
and war games, it took an army from one hour and 12 minutes to one hour and
30 minutes, and a front from one hour and 20 minutes to one hour and 40
minutes.
(See Table 1 on following page.)
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Table 1 Page 7 of 13 Pages
Approximate Incapacitation of Personnel in the Area of a Nuclear Burst
Type of Losses to personnel in percent from
Burst aftereffects of nuclear bursts, by
yield in kilotons
Motorized rifle division in
a concentration area of 600
sq. km.
50 100 300 500
4 7 13
Motorized rifle division
Air
6
8 13
during deployment for an
offensive from the march
6
Motorized battalion, missile
Air
55
65 80
(artillery) battalion on the
march; length of column six
kilometers
! 25
12
100
Tank division in a
concentration area of 600
23 .I
sq. km.
11 I
Tank division during
deployment for an offensive
7 12
23
from the march
Tank battalion on the march;
length of column six
kilometers
Air
or
Surface
21 25
50
Rocket and antiaircraft
missile means in a
20
30
deployment area of up to
2.5 sq. km.
Front control posts (50 sq.
rrn area) *
6 j
9
Army control posts (20 sq.
km. in area) *
3 I
4 I 12 1
18
* Control posts are equipped with dugouts.
44 1 60
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Approximate Incapacitation of Personnel in the Area of a
Chemical Strike
Possible losses of personnel based
on type of protection, (in percent)*
Type of leans and Methods of Use Unprotected, in In combat On covered
Toxic I open trenches E san d trans- slit trenches,
Substance slit trenches port vehi- dugouts,-or in
I I Iles woods of average
density
Missiles, rocket
artillery and aviation
10-15 minute tube
artillery strike
Salvo. 30-second
artillery strike
Missiles and aviation
10-15 minute tube
artillery strike
50-60
40-50
30-40
30-40
50-60
25-30
20-25
15-20
10-15
10-15
10-15
* The data cited here apply to conditions where a surprise enemy attack is
possible in terrain of average ruggedness under average meteorological
conditions. In attacks with toxic substances where the element of surprise
is not present, and personnel have protective means, losses amount to F. to
12 percent.
Taking into account the fact that the allocation of tasks for special
units on the scale of a front will require 40 to SO minutes, and advancing
them to the centers and areas of contamination. will take up to one hour and.
40 minutes, we may state that specialized assistance to large units that
have been subjected to massive nuclear strikes will arrive not sooner than
two hours and 20 minutes after the enemy nuclear and chemical strike. Such
a period of time, especially after contamination with chemical weapons,
cannot be of much help to the troops. In the centers of chemical contami-
nation, first aid must immediately be rendered by the forces of the very
troops subjected to contamination by toxic substances. Specialized
subunits should be transported by helicopter into the areas in nrrlnr to
fulfil their tasks. 50X1-HUM
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In order to quickly adopt a plan for the elimination of the after-
effects in the areas of destruction by nuclear weapons, maximum economy of
time is important in reconnoitering the centers of destruction. Officer,
and also chemical and engineer reconnaissance patrols, should be appointed
for this purpose. The officer reconnaissance patrols ascertain the overall
situation in the centers of destruction and determine the volume of rescue
and reconstruction work to be done. In order to fulfil the tasks in a
short space of time, it is best to carry out the reconnaissance in
helicopters.
The amount of time required for reconnaissance in the centers of
destruction will depend on the method, forces, and means that are used. It
can be determined by previously prepared tables based on the types and
yield of nuclear bursts. If the nature of the destruction, losses, and
damage was established by engineer and chemical patrols, the measures for
bringing aid to the victims cannot be taken any sooner than 20 to 30
minutes after the conclusion of ground reconnaissance of the centers of
destruction. In order to speed up the adoption of a plan for carrying out
these measures, data from air reconnaissance should be used. Measures
requiring the greatest amount of labor are the removal of obstacles from
roads leading to the centers of destruction, the clearing away of barriers
and landslides in the centers of destruction, and the extinguishing or
localizing of fires that hinder rescue work. Thus an engineer road
construction and repair platoon or a siting platoon can complete this work
in the center of an air nuclear burst with a yield of 30 (50) kilotons in
1.5 to 3 hours, of 100 kilotons in 2.5 to 3.5 hours, and of 300 kilotons in
3.5 hours.
In order to reduce the amount of time needed to clear and lay roads
for the evacuation of the wounded and the casualties, more decisive steps
must be taken to supply technical means to the troops. In particular, we
should, as soon as it is possible, increase among large units and units
the number of bulldozer attachments on combat and transport vehicles,
create engineer devices that operate on the principle of taking advantage
of the horsepower of engines on combat and transport vehicles, and also
supply the troops with small-sized devices with self-contained engines for
carrying out earthwork.
Rescue operations in the center of destruction must be carried out in
the shortest possible time, since delay can lead to considerable additional
losses. Rescue groups must include forces and means capable of simulta-
neously removing casualties from under barriers and wreckage, setting up a
post for the assembling and sorting of casualties, and training personnel
for evacuation to medical installations of operational formations. To
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determine quickly the time needed to carry out these measures, previously
compiled data should be used (Table 3).
To reduce the time needed to carry out rescue operations in the
centers of destruction, it is essential to make wide use of helicopters
equipped with appropriate interchangeable containers for the evacuation of
personnel. A maneuver by helicopters on the scale of a front or an army
will make it possible to bring aid to the victims in a sign icant number
of centers.
There are also other realistic ways of solving this problem. Basic
among them are: more effective use of non-organic detachments for
eliminating the aftereffects of the use of weapons of mass destruction not
only in units and large units, but also in specific zones or areas; broader
utilization of civil defense units to fulfil this task in rear units and
installations of a front and of armies; raising the capabilities of the
units themselves and off-installations to eliminate the aftereffects of the
use of weapons of mass destruction.
The implementation of measures to eliminate the aftereffects of
strikes by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is a complex matter.
The forces themselves that have been subjected to a massive strike will not
always be in a position to cope with this in the shortest possible time.
The absence in rocket and technical rocket units of any means for doing so
makes it impossible to carry out special work (especially, full special
treatment).
(See Table 3 on following page.)
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Approximate time needed to carry out rescue operations
and medical-evacuation measures in a center of destruction
by nuclear weapons, by forces and means of an allocated
group (separate medical detachment, medical battalion)*
Amount of time (in hours) needed for
Targets of
Type of Burst
rescue and medical-evacuation operations
Destruction
in the center of a nuclear burst with a
iven yield in kilotons
:Motorized rifle
Air
0.4
0.5
0.9
2
3 5
di
i
i
i
th
v
s
on
n
e
concentration
Surface
0.2
0.3
0.4
1
1 2
area
torized rifle
Air
0.8
1
2
4
6 -
division during
deployment for
an offensive
Surface
0.4
0.8
1
1.7
2 3
from the march
`Tank division
Air
0.3
0.4
0.7
1.5
2.4 4.6
in a concentration
area
Surface
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.8 1.3
!Tank division
Air
0.6
0.8
1.3
2.8
4.2 -
deployment
,for an offensive
,from the march
Surface
0.3
0.6
0.7
1.2
1.5
2.3
Missile and
Air
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.3
-
antiaircraft missile
means in a
Surface
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
-
siting area
Front and army
Air
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.5
0.6
-
control
1
posts
Surface
0.1 0.2 0.2
0.4
0.5
0.6
* We have chosen a case where one allocated group (separate medical detachment, medical
battalion) can render first aid and evacuate 180-200 casualties in one hour. 50X1-HUM
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At the same time, measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the use of
weapons of mass destruction can be carried out effectively and in a short
space of time if the forces are taught the proper methods and are equipped
with the necessary means. For example, full special treatment by forces of
a separate chemical defense battalion in a motorized rifle regiment takes 2
to 2.5 hours, and in a tank regiment 1.5 to 2 hours. These periods can be
shortened if the troops are equipped with DK-4 chemical warfare decontam-
ination sets and KSO-1 personal treatment sets. In addition, in divisions
and rocket units that have suffered heavy casualties, army or front forces
and means must be used. In this connection, armies and fronts, in ur
view, should be assigned an increased number of special treatment units
equipped with new high-efficiency machines.
The question of increasing the number of special units in combined-
arms and rocket large units also deserves attention. For example, in
motorized rifle and tank divisions it is advisable to have a chemical
defense battalion, in a rocket brigade a chemical defense company, in a
mobile rocket-technical base an engineer chemical company. Reserves of
special treatment means should be created at all troop levels, even in
peacetime.
It will be very important to have stable radio contact two steps down
the chain of command, so that the senior commanding officer can assume
direct control of, large units and units should their control posts be put
out of action, and also that he be able to ascertain the true condition of
the troops after enemy use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
In conclusion, I should like to call attention to the fact that the
successful resolution of the problem under examination on the whole, will
depend to a great extent on the morale of the troops, the timely prevention
of panic among personnel in units and large units that have been hit. To
achieve this we must inform all personnel in the shortest possible time of
the nature of the situation that has developed and of the help being given
to the wounded and the sick. We must also take measures to create a
correct understanding of the condition of those forces and means remaining
after an enemy nuclear and chemical attack, and thus instill confidence in
the possibility of fulfilling combat tasks. To assist commanders and
political workers of large units and units that have been subjected to
nuclear strikes or the effects of chemical. and biological weapons, a
sufficient number of political workers from the army and front reserve
should be allocated.
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The elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear and chemical
strikes is an enormous task for all front and army forces, in terms of
scope, complexity, and labor required.. The search for new ways to speed up
its fulfilment must be the concern of commanders and staffs of all levels.
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