MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE USE OF NUCLEAR MEANS WHEN CONSTRUCTING OBSTACLES DURING AN OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100720001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 28, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25 :CIA-RDP10-001058000100720001-6
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25 :CIA-RDP10-001058000100720001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-001058000100720001-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
50X1-HUM
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20?5OS
28 June 1974
A'ff~70RAN1)I1~1 FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
~~~' MILITARY THOU(~iT (USSR The Use of Nuclear Paeans
en onstructing stacles During an Operation
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET t1SSR A1inistry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Tlilita Thou ht". This
article discusses nuclear munitions as an e icient an necessary means for
constructing obstacles to halt enemy forces. The use, deployment and
control of nuclear mines are briefly examined, emphasizing the lack of
Soviet expertise in this field, as compared with the US. The author calls
for increased research and development aimed at forming a body of tactical-
technical training information for the employment of nuclear mines. This
article appeared in Issue No. 1 (83) for 1968. 50X1-HUM
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For erence, reports from this publics5`oxi-HUr~e been
assiened the ~,.a......~~
illiam E. Nelso
Deputy Director for Ope ations
FIRDB-312/02284-74
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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T'S #205472
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1968
FIRDB- 312/02284-74
DATE 28 June 1974
MILITARY THOU(-1T (USSR); The Use of Nuclear Means When Constructing
stac es ring an eration
SOURCE Documentary
S x'
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (83) for 1968 of the SECRET USSR D~(inistry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'T4ilita
'T'hought". The author o t is artic a is enera - yor o ngineer roops
V. Bystrov. This article discusses nuclear munitions as an efficient and
necessary means for constructing obstacles to halt enemy forces. The use,
deployment and control of nuclear mines are briefly examined, emphasizing
the lack of Soviet expertise in this field, as compared with the US. The
author calls for increased research and development aimed at forming a body
of tactical-technical training information for the employment of nuclear
mines.
End of Summary
50X1-HUM
General-Ma or V. Bystrov wrote an article about engineering work in
areas it y nuclear missiles, Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 11, 1966, and another
on engineer support for a march t roug mountains, Soviet Milita Review,
No. 2, 1966. The SECRET version of Milita Thou ht was pu is a tree
times annually and was distributed down to t e eve of division commander.
It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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A Brief Discussion of an I ortant Sub'ectc
The Use o Nuclear 4eans en Constructin stacles
rin an eration
Y
General-D~ayor of Engineer Troops V. Bystrov
The operational importance of obstacles has sharply increased under
modern conditions. To ensure that the activities of our forces during an
operation are effective, it will often be necessary to construct within a
short period of time extensive barriers that the enemy cannot surmount, on
the flanks of attacking formations of our forces as well as in front of
large counterstrike groupings. The engineer forces and means available to
the troops are not in a position to fully carry out such tasks.
Thus, when repelling an enemy counterstrike, a motorized rifle
divisa.on using a mobile obstacle detachment consisting of one sapper
company can lay a 1.5- to 2-kilometer antitank minefield within 15 to 20
minutes on a likely axis of tank approach against only one tank battalion.
But it will take the mobile obstacle detachment at least 1 to 1.5 hours to
receive and lay a second unit of fire of mines. An army mobile obstacle
detachment (an engineer obstacle battalion) can lay 4.5 to 6 kilometers of
antitank minefields at a time, which is quite negligible when compared to
the overall width of the enemy zone of operations. Recently more and more
attention has been given to minelaying from helicopters. This is certainly
the most mobile method of constructing obstacles and has great potential,
but at present, unfortunately, it cannot be employed on a mass scale.
The defensive value of the obstacles and demolitions now used, as
analysis demonstrates, is also inadequate, and the expenditures of forces
and means are not in all cases the equivalent of the anticipated
effectiveness. Estimates show that during extremely dynamic combat
operations we will not be able to construct quickly enough the necessa
number of obstacles capable of stopping the enemy for the require perio
o tune.
New technical means are needed to achieve a high level of
effectiveness o obstacles on an operational scale, to sharply reduce the
amount of time needed to construct t em, an to increase their mobility.
Nuclear munitions may constitute such means. A similar idea of using
T ECRET
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"nuclear land mines" for the construction of defensive obstacles was
outlined by General of the Army P, A, Kurochkin.*
The range of conditions under which nuclear mines (in our opinion a
more accurate term) can be used to construct o stac es is rather broad, In
addition to their basic use in battle and in an operation on the rimar~
~erational axes, nuc~3e~r -'mines used in conjunction with conventiona
explosive means and natural barriers, make it possible to cover sectors of
the front where, at a given moment, offensive operations are not being
conducted, or sectors of the national border that are under the threat of
the initiation of a new front of armed combat, The construction of such
obstacles will require a negligible amount of forces.
Nuclear mine obstacles will definitely bring enemy forces to a halt,
thus permitting our rocket means and aviation to deliver strikes against
them, These obstacles are fully adequate to the exceptionally mobile
nature of combat operations which requires that not only the known axes of
the enemy offensive be covered, but also that we react swiftly to a
transfer of forces from certain axes to others, A4oreover, they spare us
the unavoidable "tying up" of the forces, assigned to prepare operational
obstacles in advance and maintain them, that occurs when conventional
explosives and mines are used,
Nuclear mines in an obstacle s stem can be used to destroy large
bridges, roa structures an groups o t em, tunnels, hydrotechnical
structures, the overhead cover of mountain passes, and to create flood
zones and radioactive contamination of the terrain.
Since we do not have the opportunity to set forth in a long article
the technical problems involved in the use of nuclear mines to construct
obstacles and demolitions, let us examine, by way of example, their use for
the purpose of destroying a group of structures. At large road junctions
and at crossings of medium and wide rivers there are usually several
automobile and rail bridges and overpasses that, from a modern point of
view, are compactly situated. To destroy each one of them by conventional
means would take tens of tons of explosives, a large amount of personnel,
and, most important, a great deal of time. This entire group of structures
could be destroyed by one nuclear mine of the a ro riate
case the quota of personnel assigned would be substantiallylreducedn ourt
troops could use the structures prepared for destruction with absolute
safety up to the moment of the burst, and the reliability of destruction is
total, Because of the extremely high levels of radiation, the enemy can
egin work on building a bypass arourid_the obstruction formed only after
some time has elapsed following the burst.
* Collection of Articles of the Journal 'TTilita Thou ht" No. 2 (78)
1966.1 ~
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True, some are of the opinion that the same result could be achieved
by using a rocket or an aircraft to deliver the nuclear charge. However,
in that case, because of the law of dispersion, the required yield of the
charge would increase tens of times and the required degree of obstacle
effectiveness might not be achieved.
The basic advisability of using nuclear mines in a s stem of
operational obstacles seems to us to e eyon c a enge. ince they are
hig lh- e'er ctive, eiw gh little, and can be reliably handled by remote
control, they can fundamentally alter the entire organization of obstacle
construction and make it best conform to the way in which modern operations
are conducted.
Here we might mention that in using nuclear mines, for the first time
in the history of warfare, the conditions are created whereby, either
incidentally by the construction of obstacles or by design, heavy losses of.
manpower and equipment can be inflicted. on the enemy.
Which levels should have the right and capability to employ nuclear
mines to construct obstacles, what range of yields will the charges have,
and who will lay the mines and activate them? These and other important
questions could constitute a subject for discussion in special articles.
We would like to express a few of our ideas in quite general terms.
In view of the fact that obstacles constructed using nuclear mines
should be employed primarily to facilitate the accomplishment of major
operational tasks, and that the consequences of nuclear mine bursts will
have an impact that is far from local, we must keep in mind the fact that
the use of such obstacles is probably for the most part the rerogative_of
a front and of an army, and only to a very limited degree o a ivision.
Because the construction of such obstacles is of an extremely
specialized nature, hi~hl~ mobile, s ecialist en ineer units and subunits
rr~st be _formed, equipp- etc wit t e appropriate nuc ear means an capa a of
ca~ytifg out tasks with a small number of forces and with a high degree of
effectiveness.
A manual id.e must be developed that strictly regulates the rights
and duties o persons dealing with the problems involved in using nuclear
munitions to construct obstacles. It is especially important to determine
who will give the order to activate these obstacles and what procedure will
be used. Unfortunately, at the present time we do not even have a document
regulating the use of conventional means to perform demolitions, even
though it is known that during World War II this very question was the
source of many serious misunderstandings.
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The ran e of fields of nuclear char es used to construct obstacles and
demolitions can. pro a y e etermine on y after a serious study of the
special characteristics of the theaters of military operations and
estimates are made of the destruction of standard targets. To some degree
it will depend on other factors as well, in particular on the transporta-
bility of the nuclear mines, capabilities for quickly laying them, and the
composition of the servicing crew. However, it can even now be said that
to destroy large dams, bridges, and other unique structures within builtup
areas requires nuclear mines with a TNT equivalent in the range of q = 0.01
0.5 kt; to construct obstacle complexes -- q = 5 20 kt; to form flood
zones in river valleys -- q = 50 = 200 kt.
At the present time it would be premature to discuss the specific
tasks of the units and subunits designated to use nuclear mines to
construct obstacles, and even more premature to discuss the methods to be
used in carrying them out. Both will largely depend on the equipment which
they receive into their armamen-~JI"f seems om us t7iat these units and
subunits, n~~addi ion to tie means--to be used directly in work with the
nuclear devices, should have the most up-to-date technical equipment for
boring holes, excavating mine chambers, and accomplishing other work within
a short period of time, as well as fast, cross-country transport means,
including helicopters. And, of course, they must have at their disposal
means that provide them with reliable, interference-free remote control of
the nuclear mines which they have laid.
Foreign armies are also extensively studying the problems involved in
constructing and negotiating obstacles. Thus, the i1S Army as long as ten
years ago put the use of nuclear munitions in the construction of obstacles
and demolitions on a practical footing: several types of r_uclear destruc-
tive charges with a_,yeld_r~gr~g from 0.2 tons to 47 kilotons were
developed, and s~.ecial_engineer subunits were formed. Both in the iIS and
in the Federal Republic of Germany, cadres capable of using engineer
nuclear charges are being trained.
The US and NATO armies regard obstacles containing nuclear munitions
primarily as a means for supporting offensive activities--to cover flanks
and axes on which, for the moment, no advance is planned, or to support the
deployment of troops and their transition to the offensive. The
compactness of existing engineer nuclear munitions in the US and the speed
of their installation increases the possibilities of setting up obstacles
within a short period of time during mobile combat operations.
Of course, the fact that nuclear mines are used does not at all mean
that they will replace existing engineer obstacle means. Further
development and improvement of the latter are planned. Extreme discretion
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must be exercised in using nuclear mines to construct obstacles, and they
must be employed only in those cases when the situation urgently requires
their use and when their detonation will not impede our troop movements.
In training practice and combat preparation of troops, there are at
the present _ta`~i[e na wniform ~ta~~~,__. _B~zclear? means _that _could be
employed to construct_obs.tac~es. Therefore it is difficult to calculate
their anticipated effect, determine the methods and time of laying the
mines, and the personnel and auxiliary means required, and also solve the
problems of camouflage, control, security, and defense of nuclear
obstacles. To fill this gap it would be extremely desirable to de~vel_o_p a
body of tactical-technical training information on engineer nuc eat r m es.
finis woula ensure uni fie an consistent solution o t e entire problem and
would spare our officers the necessity of using tactical-technical data on
American nuclear means of destruction.
TOP T
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