MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES BY THE LONG-RANGE AIR FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100750001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100750001-3
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
1FC'RFT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305
31 July 1974
The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Support of Ground Forces
by the Long-Range Air Force
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article describes the role of long-range aviation when it is called on to
support the offensive operations of the ground forces. Such long-range
support in delivering nuclear strikes becomes necessary when the
capabilities of the ground forces are inadequate to penetrate into the
depth of enemy positions. The author elaborates on a previous article in
this series but differs on lining of lpngange aviation support. This
article appeared in Issue No 1 (83) for
2. Because the source of this repor is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been
assigned the
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William E. Neilson
Deputy Director for operations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
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DATE CW
INFO.
Early 1968
DATE 31 July 1974
SUBJECT
///
MILITARY THCUGHT (USSR):
The Employment of Long-Range Aviation in Support
of Ground Forces
SOURCE
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (83) for 1968 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The author of this article is General-Leytenant of Aviation S.
Shiiniidy. This article describes the role of long-range aviation when it
is called on to support the offensive operations of the ground forces.
Such long-range support in delivering nuclear strikes becomes necessary
when the capabilities of the ground forces are inadequate to penetrate into
the depth of enemy positions. The author elaborates on a previous article
in this series but differs on the timing of long-range aviation support.
End of Summary
5
Comment: 0X1-HUM
General-Leytenant S. Shimanskiy, was assigned to an unidentified Air Force
academy in February 1973. He was co-author of "Actions of Front Aviation
in the Initial Front Offensive in the Initial Period of War", Collectionof
Articles of the Journal"Military Thought", Issue No.2 (63) for 1962
(FIRDB-312/03836-74, 4 September 1973). The SECRET version of
"Military Thought" was published three times annually and was distributed
dawn to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication
at the end of 1970.
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The Billployment of Long- e Aviation
In Support of Ground orces
by
General-Leytenant of Aviation S. Shimanskiy
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The problems in the employment of long-range aviation in support of
ground forces require a thorough and very detailed examination. Many
interesting and useful thoughts on the subject are expressed in an article
by General-Mayor of Aviation V. Barkovskiy.* We would like to elaborate
and amplify somewhat a few of his ideas.
In our opinion, long-range aviation may_have to be be used in support
of ground forces because of the need to deliver powerful nuclear strikes
against the deepest enemy targets in the zone of the offensive of the fron
operating on the main axis, and especially against those targets which
cannot be effectively destroyed by front forces and means.
It is a known fact that modern front offensive operations can be
conducted in a zone 400 to 500 kilcaiiFs. wide and 1,000 kilometers or more
in depth. A significant number of major enemy targets will be located in
such a large area.
The capabilities of the forces and means of fronts (and of the navy on
a maritime axis) to reliably destroy enemy targets aTaighout the depth of
front operations will frequently prove to be inadequate. They will have to
be reinforcedby powerful and long-range forces and means, which include,
first of all, large units of long-range aviation. The utilization of the
latter in support of offensive operations of fronts will have to be planned
for in advance and, consequently, their tasks-ZIT?also be assigned them on
the eve of the operation. Therefore, it is hardly possible to agree with
the author in the article mentioned earlier that large units of long-range
aviation, in the majority of cases, will have to operate during an
operation against targets which were not planned for them beforehand.
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". No. 2 (81),
1967.
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In principle, we share the author's point of view that large units
(units) of long-range aviation will operate directly in support of ground
forces according to the plan of the troop commanders of the fronts after
completion of the_ first.a.i.L2p_and sometimes, even during it. But
We consider it advisable to define specifically the time of its use.
First of all, it must be noted that fronts, of course, are interested
in having long-range aviation give them support right from the beginning of
military operations. But on the first day of the operation, long-range
aviation will pperate in accordance with the plan for the use of strategic
nuclear forces. Therefore, it is doubtful whether it is possible to bring
in long-range aviation immediately at this time in support of offensive
operations of ground forces (i.e., in accordance with the plan of the troop
commanders of the fronts). The close of the second or third day of the
operation should oEVIUEly be considered a more realistic time to use it.
And this is the time of the greatest need for long-range aviation in
support of fronts. This is explained by the fact that in the course of two
days, the front iViation bases may fall behind somewhat and front aviation'
may suffer?r?Fertain reduction in its combat capabilities; Eallahile, the
enemy can reinforce his aviation and rocket groupings, unload and concen-
trate his troops, move up his strategic reserves, carry out amphibious and
airborne la4dings, etc.
It is necessary, it seems to us, to speak more definitely also about
the resources of long-range aviation allocated to the fronts. The major
criterion in determining these resources, obviously is the number of major
enemy targets in the zone of the advance of troops which are located beyond
the range of front forces and means, and also the importance of the tasks
being carried-47E7V the troops of the fronts in a strategic operation in a
th.rpApniqf military operations.
According to calculations made by us for the most favorable
conditions, it is advisable that the resources of long-range aviation
allocated to a front operating on the main axis consist of k to 8
regimental flights using 18 to 20 nuclear munitions and chemical and
conventional means of destruction. These forces and means are c Dabic_a
des troyin the strate:ks_magan,tim
al cra t a cuu,I. so?ts of ag 2
pr 3 depots o nuclear munitions.
All the following tasks will be accomplished according to the plans
for the use of long-range aviation as a whole: combat with enemy amphibious /
landings in areas of loading and boarding transports and during their sea
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passage; actions against ship groupings; the neutralization of airborne
landing forces in their areas of concentration; and the destruction of
military-transport aviation on their airfields.
The successful fulfilment of tasks by long-range aviation in support
of offensive operations of ground forces demands its close coordination
with the front troops. Here it is necessary to coordinate: the procedure
of supporT-Uriarge air units and units with the actions of other forces
while overcoming enemy air defenses, and also with material-technical means v//
in case aircraft land on the airfields of the air army; the procedure for
the exchange of information, communications, and mutual identification; and
the time and areas for the delivery of nuclear strikes; In addition, it is necessa
to report the forecast of radiation conditions in the flight zone of
long-range aviation.
The basis of coordination is the plan of the troop commanders of the
fronts. The coordination will be determined by the nature of the targets
and the time schedule for their destruction, the time combat actions are to
take place (day or night), and by the depth at which the targets of the
strike are located. When strikes are delivered by aviation against targets
located beyond the range of the forces and means of the fronts, coordina-
tion will be primarily on questions of the support of its actions. When
strikes are delivered by aviation against enemy targets located within the
range of the forces and means of fronts, coordination takes place on the
targets of the strike, the time aiinclaes of flight, the exchange of
reconnaissance information, and on questions of control and comprehensive
support. In all cases of the organization of coordination, particular
attention should be given to measures to assure that long-range aviation
overcomes enemy air defense systems on flight routes and in the target
area.
It is advisable that the control of the forces of long-range aviation
allotted to fulfil the tasks in accordance with the plan of the troop
commanders of fronts be carried out in a centralized manner from the
command post of the of long-range aviation or of the commander of
the independent bomber co ?s e responsige
aviation operations group (which is best located at the command post of the
commander of the front air army) is to maintain continuous coordination and
to assure the effective use of the forces and means of long-range aviation
allocated in support of front troops. 50X1-HUM
In conclusion, we shall note the following. If during the course of
an offensive operation, a request from the front command post necessitates
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the delivery of a strike by long-range aviation within a limited amount of
time against a newly detected important target, then, in such cases (based
on the experience of operational and combat training of troops), the tasks
must be allotted to the unit (subunit) of long-range aviation no later than
2 to 3 hours before the strike. Sometimes the tasks can be clarified in
the air after a raid, but in this case it is necessary to allot them no
later than 40 to SO minutes before the weapons are used.
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