MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE INITIAL PERIOD OF A MODERN WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100770001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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~--- .~ - -
TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20'505
8 July 1974
ME~RAND[7M FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Initial Period of a Modern
ar
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Zviilita Thou t". This
article by e e o e oviet erations irectorate states t the
existing concept of the initial period of war has become archaic and bereft
of all practical meaning. The presence within the armed forces of numerous
means of attack and the feasibility of applying the whole complex of means
in various sequences and in any desired combination predicate the possi-
bility of several variants for the beginning of a war. The possible
periods of a modern war, including non-nuclear, nuclear and final, are
characterized, and it is concluded that under modern conditions primary
attention should be concentrated on ensuring the readiness of the country
and the armed forces for conducting a brief nuclear war. This article
appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, re its from this publication have been
assigned the Codewor~~~ soxi-xuM
i iam ~ e on
Deputy Director for 0 erations
FIRDB-312/02424-74
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
fine Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs '
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1967
SUBJECT
Page 3 of 20 Pages
312/02424-74
8 July 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): On the Question of the Initial Period of a
ern ar
Documentary
SurrQna~?
e following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal '~Iilita
Thou t" The author o is artic a is o one - nera ova iy. This
artic e by the Chief of the Soviet Operations Directorate states that the
existing concept of the initial period of war has become archaic and bereft
of all practical meaning. The presence within the armed forces of numerous
means of attack and the feasibility of applying the whole complex of means
in various sequences and in any desired combination predicate the possi-
bility of several variants for the beginning of a war. The possible
periods of a modern war, including non-nuclear, nuclear and final, are
characterized, and it is concluded that under modern conditions primary
attention should be concentrated on ensuring the readiness of the country
and the armed forces for conducting a brief nuclear war. '
End of Su~ana
50X1-HU
'omment:
0 one -General M. Povaliy was First Deputy Chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces for Operations. He wrote 'T~Iilitary Strategy and
Economics", Milita Thou t, No. 4, 1971, the RESTRICTED version,
(FIRLT-313/0 - une 1973). The SECRET version of Milita Thou t
was published three times annually and was distributed down to a eve o
division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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On the Question of the Initial Period of a Modern War
Y
Colonel-General M. Povaliy
The rapid progress of science and technology causes an unusually
intensive expansion of the sphere of military-technical and operational-
strategic problems and requires solving many questions in a new fashion.
Basic qualitative changes in the materiel base for the conduct of war,
occurring usually eve~ssix ~o ~ ~_yEars~ and accompanied by important
advances in military theory and practice, evoke corresponding forms and
methods for the conduct of armed conflict and give rise to a series of new
concepts, understandings, and terms. Some categories of the military art
lose their significance, while others acquire completely different meaning
and new content.
In these circumstances the task is to determine the urgent problems on
a timely basis, to find an advisable solution to them, and to proceed
boldly and without hesitation to the review of individual tenets as to
whether they are justified by practice or come into conflict with the
combat capabilities of modern means of armed combat.
V. I. Lenin, in his "Letters on Tactics", instructed Communists:
"...it is necessary to master that unchallengeable truth that the Marxist
must consider real life and precise facts of reality instead of continuing
to cling to yesterday's theory..." (Collected Works, Volume 31, page 134).
These Leninist precepts sound timely to y as never before.
Becoming particularly important at the present time is the possible
division of a future war into strategic periods. The urgency of such a
formulation is caused by the fact that the views held until recen 1 ,
according o which it was considered characteristic o a omic war to
have an initial period o? decisive importance to the course and outcome of
the war, have already begun to contradict objective reality and seriously
hamper the development of the theory and practice of military affairs.
It is well known that the preliminary, strictly scientific deter-
mination of the possible periods of war and the detailed elaboration of
their content and role constitute an indispensable condition of strategic
planning and of purposeful preparation of the armed forces and the whole
country for war. Scientific foreknowledge of the probable course of the
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war and its expected sequence of development is expressed in this division
into strategic periods. The more closely this division reflects actual
reality, the fewer surprises will be encountered at the beginning of the
war and the greater will be the grounds for counting on its successful
conclusion.
Consideration of a new division of war into strategic periods is, to
begin with, closely connected to the theory of the initial eriod of war
and with the necessity for its critical review in e i t o new
political, economic, and particularly, military, conditions.
As is known, the initial period of a war is historically a transient
cate orization. It reflects only a specific form o e eginnin~ a
war, a specifically developing process y~ii arms c at isexpanded
during a specific period of time, which can take place only under certain
historical conditions. -
The concept of "the initial period of a war" was not used and could
not be used for the wars of slave-holding and feudal socio-economic
systems, because the aims of such wars were usually achieved then by the
combat operations of standing regular or militia armies, as a rule, in one
or several general engagements. The necessity for singling out an initial ~"
period did not arise till the beginning of the twentieth century, in the
era of imperialism, when conditions for the initiation and conduct of wars ,.1
fundamentally changed. The level of development of productive forces
provided an unprecedentedly high status of the materiel-technical base; for
the mass equipping of armies, there became available machine technology,
mechanical means of transport and comrmmications, automatic weapons, combat
aircraft, tanks, mortars, and submarines. All of this taken together led
to a manifold increase in the scale of war and in its territorial scope,
duration, and intensity. The role of economic and morale factors grew
sharply.
Under these conditions the achievement of war goals already required a
series of operations and the participation of multimillion-man armies.
However, not one state, not even the most developed, was strong enough to
maintain such armies permanently in peacetime. Therefore, for the conduct
of war it became necessary to fully mobilize and move forward into the
theaters of military operations, additional forces, often several times
greater in numbers than the original grouping of troops and in some
instances comprising ten to twenty percent of the country's population. In
order to maintain and use such forces, the whole economy of a state had to
be reorganized on a war footing, usually already during the course of
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military operations. Prior to the completion of these measures, the armed
conflict and the nature of the strategic tasks being accomplished had
specific features which provided the grounds for speaking of a special,
initial period of war.
Thus, of determining importance in singling out an initial period in a
war was the circumstance that because of the new conditions of the entry of
countries into war and of the deployment of multimillion-man armed forces,
the beginning of a war was distinguished by the specific character of the
conduct of combat operations and by strategic features not repeated in the
co
f
h
urse o
t
e war. These features included the increased urgency of the
fight to seize and retain the strategic initiative, the relative shortage
of forces in theaters of military operations, the lower operational
densities of forces than in the past, the continued formation of a
strategic front, the lack of necessary combat experience among the troops
and command personnel, etc.
' With the development of the means of armed combat
naturall
the
,
y,
content of the initial period of war changed, as did its role: the results
of combat operations by forces in precisely this period were exerting an
ever greater influence on the course and outcome of the war.
Thus, on the eve of 1914 the initial period of war was understood to
be the time from the declaration of war to the commencement of o erations
by the forces o t e first strate ice elon. Wi in is perio t e
mo i ization, initia concentration, an strategic deployment of the armed
forces were accomplished, and combat operations of limited scale were
carried out by the covering troops on the state borders. Under this
definition, the initial period of the First World War lasted for 15-16 days
on the Western Front and for 18-21 days on the Russian-German-Austrian
Front, after which border-area engagements involving large forces of both
sides developed.
Toward the end of the 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's, the
development of production in the leading countries made it possible to
carry out an important technical rebuilding of armies. The quantity of
aircraft increased, and the quality of aircraft improved. The first tank
and airborne units were established. The firepower of the armed forces was
increased. The weight of a divisional volley increased several times over.
The opportunity appeared for having in peacetime invasion armies capable of
beginning war suddenly and immediately developing active military
operations. At the same time, the dependence of the conduct of war on
economics grew. The rapid and organized conversion of production to a war
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footing assumed great importance. The threat of large personnel and
equipment losses predetermined the need for shortening the periods of
mobilization expansion of the first strategic echelons of the armed forces,
and for carrying out subsequent mobilization measures, in effect,
throughout the war.
0!ur military theory has evaluated all of these questions essentially
correctly. However, the specific conditions of possible conduct of armed
combat in the initial period of a war have not been fully taken into
account. It was considered, it is true, that at the very start of war,
armed combat would acquire wide scope and would employ active forms,
especially in the air, but on the ground the development initially of
border-area engagements between invading armies and covering armies with
relatively limited goals .was expected. It was assumed that during this
time complete mobilization of the armed forces would be accomplished and
the conditions established for the commitment to the engagement of the main
forces of the First strategic echelon and, later, subsequent strategic
echelons as well.
It is in accordance with this that the content of the concept of the
initial period of a war has been determined. In the operational dictionary
published by the General Staff Academy of the Red Army in 1940 it was
stated: "Wars today are usually not declared--they are simply begun by
enemies already prepared to one degree or another for action. Therefore,
today the initial period of war must be understood as being the period of
time from the start of milita erations to the ent into o erations
of the main body of the armed forces" underlined by us - M.P.).
As may be readily noted, such an understanding of the initial period
of war, while reflecting several new elements in military art, has
nevertheless failed to take into account the possibilities of the
antagonists already achieving major strategic results in the initial
operations. The possibility of early deployment of the main forces has
been lost sight of, as well as the new conditions for conducting
mobilization, particularly the danger of its disruption or disorganization
by the enemy. Full consideration has not been given to the changes that
have occurred in the arrangement of military-political forces, the
increased economic capabilities of countries, and the appearance of
qualitatively different means for a rapid and deep offensive in the form of
large formations of tank troops and powerful aviation.
* Operational Dictionary. Published by the General Staff Academy, 1940,
page .
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In the final analysis, this had a negative effect on strategic war
planning. In our plans worked out prior to the start of the war, for
instance, it was presumed that the accomplishment of complete mobilization V
and the concentration of the main forces would require about 15-20 days, 0
during which time the covering armies would contain the invading enemy
troops or, under favorable circumstances, deliver counterattacks against
them, press them, and thus create conditions for completing the
concentration of the main forces and their transition to an all-out ~
offensive. However, in the course of the Great Fatherland War, such a -
sequence of development of armed conflict was disrupted.
In reality, great significance has been acquired by such factors as
early complete mobilization and deployment of the armed forces, sudden
attack by large enemy air forces, and breaking into the enemy's first
strategic echelon by the rapid conduct of highly mobile operations.
Preparing for its lightning war against the Soviet Union, the German
fascist military command did not single out a special initial period: the !~
complete defeat of our country was envisaged in the course of one brief
campaign. All of the armed forces designated for delivery of the attack
had been completely mobilized and, during the course of several months
(still prior to the beginning of the war), had been moved to the east an
deployed in accordance with their assigned tasks. The German economy by
t is t1JilP had al Cn },coT, r.,mr,~ ctal ? rnn r
oo. e~. ~ _ 4 ~erted to nrov;de fnr the needs of
As a result of this, the fascist army had the capability to
immediately establish a decisive superiority on the main axes and to
develop successful attacks along the entire length of the Soviet-German
front. ~ 50X1-HUM
series of countries within a short period of time. For example, Poland and
France were overwhelmed by the Germans in the course of a few weeks.
However, in combat with a strong enemy, the aggressor was unable to achieve
Our armed forces, during the initial period of the war, had to repel
the attack of superior enemy forces, form a strategic combat front,
establish and deploy strategic groupings of troops by axes, carry out the
entire bulk of mobilization measures, prepare strategic reserves in the
rear, convert the whole economy to a war footing, and carry out massive
national economic, strategic and mobilization shipments.
On the whole, the experience of the Second World War showed that
having attack forces already prepared in peacetime, plus the advance
execution of many preparatory measures which were formerly carried out
during the course of a war, allowed the aggressor to inflict defeat upon a
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victory with one blow, since the means of waging war did not allow this and
the economy deep inside a country remained essentially beyond effective
enemy action. True, strategic (long-range) aviation dealt palpable strikes
on individual economic and administrative-political centers, but it was not
capable of destroying the military-economic potential of a country.
Therefore, the results of combat operations in the initial period of the ~--,
war, while exerting tremendous influence on its entire further course,
nonetheless could not predetermine its outcome.
In the early postwar years, the initial period of war was the center
of attention of historians, theoreticians, and practitioners of military
affairs. The basic reason making this period a primary problem of military
art in the 1950's lay in the further development of the weapons of armed
combat and the change in the conditions of its conduct. The complete
motorization and mechanization of armies, the improvement of tanks and
aircraft and, primarily the creation of atomic weapons greatly increased
the strategic capabilities of armed forces. As a result, favorable
conditions were created for achieving in the first operations decisive
strategic results, which could predetermine not only the further course but
also the outcome of an entire war.
f-' Despite all this, however, brief forms could not yet be adopted for
h!ar -in t e.-1950's For ~_relatively_long _~~~-i.~~--decia~_mean~__remained
,conventional branches__of the.__~rmed forces,_.~aving at their disposal a
`~(~'~comparatively limited c{uantity of atomic warheads and the means for their
delivery to the target. The capabilities of the first strategic echelon
were therefore insufficient for achievin the main oals of a war and for
ensuring the total defeat o t e enemy wi in a s ort erio o time. The
beginning of a war was not and could not e e c anon point o
_~ strategic efforts. During the course of military and economic
mobilization, it was necess~iy_~o__~iel.d._ ~,~hsP~~ ,~, nt _~second and third)
echelons of_completely mobilized and ui ed troo s whose commiament to
action was ton y poss_le means of accomplishing the main tasks of the
war . _ _ __. -
-' This requirement remained in force even when reserves of tactical J
atomic weapons had grown but sufficiently powerful strategic nuclear forces
~_.1had not yet been created. The lack of the latter made it impossible to
count upon the simultaneous destruction of the military-economic potential
,, __ and the armed forces of the enemy. In this connection, it was necessary to
~ifocus on the successive accomplishment of strategic tasks through the
-- conduct o a series o strategic operations.
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By analogy with past wars, there was every reason to consider two
periods in a future war also: the initial period and the subsequent ~' ~~
period. However, the time boundaries of the initial period came to be
determined not on the basis of the time required for the establishment of
certain groupings of the armed forces and their commitment to action, as
previously, but for the most part on the basis of the time in which it was
necessary to achieve the strategic goals and tasks being accomplished by
the troops in the course of armed combat. Thus, the initial period of war I~
came to be understood as the time interval from the moment of the war's ~"-'~
outbreak to the achievement of the immediate strate is oa s o e war. I
t was consi ere t t is perio wou e e most important, its asic ~tix--- _t
content being th ;mmPd;atP ~o~ivery of powerful atomic strikes against the~~;~ f
enemy, the simultaneous repelling of his air assault, and the development
and conduct of active, highly mobile offensive actions in .land and sea
theaters in the form of strategic operations. During this same time, it
was contemplated to carry out measures for accomplishing the complete 1
mobilization of the first strategic echelon of the armed forces, for the
mobilization expansion of subsequent echelons, and for conversion of the
national economy to production in accordance with wartime plans. It was
also intended that from the ve be i 'n Qf a war th.p~~ quantity of
combat-ready fQr~ _.~n _.lneans_ would be bro --~
__~gh~~.ntsZ_the .conduct of combat 1
rati with constant intensification of their efforts through the
p oyment of new formations.
During the subseauent nP_riod, the achievement of the final goals of
the war was contemplated. ,n
v For the 1_ Sn,s , -' early 1~ -lac c?~t, ~ ~~----,.,..+.~_ ,r ~L_ ~~
the initial period of a war was completely natural ~ since it fully
corresponded with t e level of development of the means of armed combat.
However. in the past 5-6 years, the qualitative condition of the armed
,~ forces of the greatest world powers has changed sharply. In the Soviet
Union and the United States, there have appeared strategic nuclear forces,
~ whose destructive power, effectiveness and speed of action cannot be
=? compared with any other means of armed combat. ~
The presence within the armed forces of numerous means of attack--
strategic and operational, nuclear and conventional--and also the
probability of applying the whole complex of means in various sequences and ~i
i.n any desired combination depending on the military-political situation, ~
~~ predetermine rhP r~~c;},;l;rv of aevPral variants for the. beginning of a '---
war. Thus, war today can be in imnmediatel with tmlimited use bathe
~ o onents of all means o co at, inc ing even strategic nuc ear weapons.
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l
It's po~s~,b~e that at the beginning the war may be waged for a while using
onl co ve~ntio~nal means awn jtactical nuclear weapons. Finally, it is not,
exc uc~e~' t~iat military operati wi~3~egin~wi'~l be conducted fog-a"~
certain period of time using nl conventional means. Each of these
i variants requires its own approa to a question o the initial period of
~ a war.
This period can be discerned to some extent in a ~.oca~ war and iri a I
world war--when it begins and is conducted for some ti `e.. only ~r~Gti~;
conventional weapons or conventional weapons and some tactic nuclear
weapons. However, the essence, time frame, and ~vr~nt of the initial
period under these conditions will obviously differ fundamentally from the 'I
concepts formulated in the 1950's which determined the theory of the
initial period of a nuclear war until recently.
First of all, this period can last only a ve short time under any
- ___ I
c~.rcumstances~ and, only to ~e_, r~-omenlr w_ en a e__opposing des ~o over to
the unilimitedm.use of~ ,~uc~,e~z .p~~., During this erioci~ t~, ie` mos~~iat can
be achieved are onl - ome theaters of
militarY_operations. Consequently, from the nature of the tascs
accomplished~an from the results achieved, the initial period obviously
can no lon er be considered the decisive eriod of a war. Nevertheless, in V
e course o it intense military operations wi 1 e conducted on the
ground, in the air, and on the sea, with the artici ation of lar a forces.
Both sides will strive to inflict destruction on a opposuig groupings o
troops of the other side's first strategic echelon, particularly his
nuclear means deployed ready for use in theaters of military operations.
A~n~ with this our~~~--~ly,..~.the factorable T,~/
opportunities, arisingfrom superiority over the enemy in_ground forces, ~
for tie rapi3-overcoming o~nuclear minefields and prepared defense lines ~
and the capture of important areas along the main axes, r
pn the whole, military operations i.n the period under consideration
can undoubtedly exert a considerable influence on the operational-strategic ~,
situation, particularly on the capabilities of both sides for subsequent
effective use of nuclear weapons and on the entire subsequent course of the
war. In any event, the greater the success achieved in this period, the
more favorable will be the situation of our armed forces and the entire
country at the time of the transition to nuclear war and the more
destructive for the enemy will be the strike of our strategic means in the
theaters of military operations, It is therPforP verb important euen~der ,~ ,~
present. cnnr, t, nnG t'n havP ,Hatt armArl fnrrcac capable of successfully
'
Operat____~
ng ,~n the first y~ of. a wary using oily conventinnal weapons or,
in case_of._necessity, tactical nuclear weapons.
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As already noted, it is possible to treat these operations, in a
certain sense and with the specified stipulations, within the concept of
the initial period of a war, as long as they are carried out in the special
situation of a highly critical battle for the strategic initiative, in
which both sides strive to avoid delay in committing nuclear weapons to
action and at the same time carry out major governmental and military
measures for the conversion of the country from peacetime to wartime
conditions. In particular, to a certain extent it will be possible to
carry out the conversion of the economy to war production, mobilization,
and evacuation of the population from large urban centers, and to take
other measures for defense of the country against possible enemy nuclear
strikes. It is, of course, difficult to count on such measures being ~
carried out without hindrance. Therefore, all efforts should be applied to
completing at least the first stage of mobilization and th~v_i}~_forward
Qf the main bulk of the reserves in the shortest possible time, since these
measures could be interrupted at any moment by transition to 5oxi-HUMOf
50X1-HUM
If strategic nuclear weapons are not used, then some. features
characteristic of the initial period remain to some extent valid.
In contrast to this, in a nuclear world war which be ins immediatel ,
with the unlimited use of a nuclear means, first o al strategic means,
t e l.nitia erio c letely oses its in ependent significance and is
aeprivea of its substance an any imitations as to time or space.
Armed forces today already can utilize enormous reserves of strategic
and operational-tactical nuclear warheads with maximum intensity in
attempting to inflict on the enemy the greatest possible destruction,
literally, in the first hours and days of a war. However, as is known, the
development of strategic means of combat continues at a constantly
accelerating pace. Their proportion in the armed fnrr-PS c,f the major world
Accordingly, the possible
results of their use increase, and, naturally, the time limits for
accomplishing strategic and large operational tasks decrease. Under these
conditions it is hardly possible to expect that a nuclear world war will be
~of long duration. On the basis of tie objective prerequisites created by
~j;the new weapons, it will most likely:be brief.
~ In the past, large countries, relying on their surviving economic
1 base, could repeatedly rebuild their armed forces during the course of a
war. In a nuclear world war, such a possibility is sharply limited becaus~
of the simultaneous destruction of the armed forces and the economy. It is
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understandable that if in the past it was required to capture all or most
of the enemy's territory in order to achieve the primary strategic goals
and deprive the enemy of his economic capabilities for waging war, at
present it obviously will be sufficient to seize only isolated surviving
vitally important areas, since those areas which will be subjected to
strikes of strategic nuclear weapons will lose their former military-
.., economic importance.
In this there appears a qualitatively new aspect of nuclear war--its
Ct~l.minatine moment coincides in time with its beginning. In such a
situation, it is i icu o unit some sort of special initial
period, and there is, indeed, no practical necessity for doing so.
Under present-day conditions, all nuclear war can be reduced to
committing to action fully combat-ready means, principally strategic
nuclear weapons, and to exchanging powerful and destructive rocket/nuclear
strikes in the space of a very short time. These actions will ensure the
achievement of the main (and not merely the most immediate) strategic goals
of the war and determine the subsequent military-political situation of the
world.
All of this makes it necessary to recognize that the existing concept
of the initial period of war is becoming archaic. It was characteristic of
former wars, which were more or less lengthy, and it reflected the state of
the materiel base for armed combat of that time. In a br' ~/
with mutual use of strategic nuclear weapons, the initial eriod is
completely swallowed up in the overall course o e war.
It is thus no accident that every attempt to apply the existing
concept of the initial period to a nuclear world war leads to serious
contradictions. Thus, according to the accepted views, the initial period
of a war lasts until the achievement of the immediate strategic goals.
Meanwhile, not only these goals, but also the main goals of the war, may
have been already achieved as a result of the first nuclear strike. It is
considered that the first strategic operations in the theaters of military
operations to achieve the immediate goals of the war will be conducted
within the framework of an initial period. However, such operations in a
nuclear war are conceived to be conducted to the full depth of the
theaters. The conduct of these operations .must complete the total defeat
of the enemy in each theater and .ensure the capture of all vitally
important areas of his territory, that is, the accomplishment of the main
tasks of the war. Therefore, in duration and in planned goals, the first
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strategic operations outgrow the bounds of the initial period as presently
understood.
military districts, air defense forces of the country, and forces of the
navy) may provide sufficient efforts by themselves for their achievement.
Gn the economic side, the capability for waging such a war and its success
must be prepared for in advance in peacetime.
With the indicated conditions applicable to a nuclear war all of the
In characterizing the initial period, some authors take as its basis
the battle of the opposing sides to attain their immediate strategic goals,
while other authors take the composition of the forces and means committed.
Some contend that the initial period ends with the commitment to the
engagement of subsequent strategic echelons, others, that it ends with the
first fundamental turning point in the strategic situation. Some allow
that generally it is possible to manage without defining time limits of the
initial period, etc.
It is impossible to resolve these and other contradictions while
holding to the tenets of the existing theory of the initial period.
Sometimes, it is true, it is proposed to regard the first two or three days
or even the first few hours as the initial period of a nuclear war.
However, the time factor is only one indicator, and not the decisive one at
that. The most ortant thin is that in conductin a war with unlimited
use of nuclear means o estruction a main strate is tas s will e
acco lished not successivel as in the past, but simultaneously and at
t11G VCil UC 1lti11I1 o e war. W1 t is, t e orces o e first
strategic a eon t e strategic rocket forces, groups of forces and border
elements which determined the initial period of war theory as formed in the
1950's disappear. The theory is bereft of all practical meaning. In
addition, preservation of the term "initial period of war" involuntarily
orients our military personnel, not toward the future, but toward the past,
weakens their attention to measures ensuring maximum combat readiness of
the troops, and leads in many instances to an incorrect evaluation of the
role of the various branches of the armed forces, particularly that of the
strategic nuclear forces, in modern warfare. No matter how much the
decisive role of the initial period is emphasized, recognition of its
existence in nuclear war leads some generals and officers (and sometimes
even workers of central government planning organs) to the incorrect idea
that the war is only beginning with this period, that the main military
operations are still in the future, and that in case the first operations
are unsuccessful, some sort of opportunity will appear in the subsequent
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period to change the course of the war (as was the case in the past). This
already represents a definite danger for us.
The existing concept of the content of the initial period applied to
nuclear war actually conveys nothing. The concept is not corroborated
either by the experience of operational-strategic war games or of
operational exercises carried out by us in recent years. In fact, these t/
exercises studied combat operations not confined to the established
J,, division of war into periods. Our probable enemies have long since
abandoned the concept of the initial period in their actual strategic ~-~
planning and training of the armed forces.
If we analyze the actual conditions for conducting armed combat in a
war with unlimited use of nuclear weapons, and if we proceed from
operational training experience, then we must recognize as correct a
fundamentally different division into periods.
Characterizing the content of a strategic operation in a theater of.
military operations, Minister of Defense NSarshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy, in his
analysis of one of the strategic war games in 1965, noted the possibility
of dividing it into three periods, namely: a eriod of non-nuclear
o erations a eriod of decisive nuclear erations an~c a -erio of
concl in o erations. t t e same tune, a pointe out t wi certain
con itions t is ivision into periods can be extended also to a modern war
as a whole.
A characteristic feature of this new division into periods is that it
takes into account all currently operative, political, economic, and
military factors, and proceeds not from a sin~7P ~Mr;a?r ~~ +~,~ :...-----_~__
iauai.ii~
.~f war but rather from the possibility of its breaking out in various
forms. There is also the consideration that such an extremely complex and
unexplored phenomenon as nuclear war cannot be reduced to a stereotype.
Therefore, the armed forces must be ready to carry out successful military
,;operations regardless of the conditions under which the war begins and
"progresses, possessing for this purpose the appropriate means,
organization, and training.
Naturally, there could be no question, in past wars, of coincidence
between the periods of a war and the periods of strategic operations
comprising a part of that war. Under modern conditions, however, war as a
whole and strategic operations in the main theaters of military operations
will, in essence, develop jointly in time. Therefore, the periods of a
strategic operation will, in principle, be characteristic of the whole war.
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However, even so, the two cannot be completely identified with each other.
This can only be done conditionally, since the content of the periods of a
war is broader than that of periods of operations. 50X1-HUM
I~ First of all, war is a much wider concept than a strategic operation
in a'~ieate`r of military operations. In addition to such operations, war
~' i
ncludes the erations of strate is nuclear forces the
~repellin~ of enemy nuc ear strikes a ainst the internal areas o ur_
~1s~,_ ., ~eets on a ocean li.ne__s~m~nimication, etc.
Alp o t ese must be included in 'the content of the periods of~a war.
_Sec~ondl~, with the completion of the first strategic operations in the
esters of military operations, individual military operations in their
distinctive forms may still continue. 'rdl and finally, strategic
operations may begin at different times in different theaters of military
operations, because of which the periods of individual operations in the
main and secondary theaters may not coincide i.n time or content.
Specifically how do the nature and content of the possible periods of
a modern war present themselves?
The non-nuclear eriod may under certain conditions be the beginning
of a war. is is especia ly probable when it is preceded by an armed
conflict arising in one of the secondary theaters of military operations.
This might even happen in the case of a clash of opposing sides in a main
theater, the western theater of military operations. In Europe this period
will obviously last for a relatively short time--from a few hours r~ a fPw
such a lengLn is probable for the other theaters of military operations as
wel"1, since, in the__even~-- limited use of
nuclear weapons. in a main theater,_su~e-must assume that they will
~
_
~
simultaneously in all Q?~_ tithe-r- ~#~t~rs-a -we-11. This is caused by the
presence of powerful, aggressive military blocs and also by the deployment
of groupings of the American armed forces in practically all of the
theaters of military operations.
Along with this, one must take into account that there cannot be any
non-nuclear period at all if a war would begin everywhere at once with the
use of the entire arsenal of nuclear means.
In the course of the non-nuclear period, events, of course, may
develop in different ways. It can't be excluded that active military
operations will begin suddenly in all theaters or that various areas will
be drawn into the sphere of armed conflict successively, with the
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50X1-HUM
commitment of even newer groupings of troops. At a certain stage,~enemy'
forces ma o over to the limited use of tactical nuc ear weapons, ich
will immediately an s arply ~.ncrease the dynamism, intensity, an~~
decisiveness of th armed combat. ~enerall~3gea~cing, at any moment during
this perio t ere, y eve op a critical situation, in which the enemy
decides to use all his nuclear means, including strategic. For this
reason, out strategic and operational-tactical nuclear means must be in a
constant state of high readiness for immediate actions. The assurance of
such readiness, and also the ceaseless elaboration of the plans for their
combat use in accordance with the changing situation, will constitute the
most important task of the commands and staffs at all levels of leadership,
starting with the General Staff and ending with the large unit commanders.
The_non-nuclear period (if there is one) may in a certain sense be
regarded as the initial period of ~r_,___as has_ alrea y een note a say
accomplishment of any large strateF?s asks wil scarce v P n- ~~;f,~~v-
Q th1S eriod. , S1' ~ i~CPly_ t}1P7y jai li h~~root ~~~~~6~ tiY:~
---
ax cxerii
-
~
p
~
.
Moreover, it wi to completely mobilize the armed forces
and convert the economy to war production ~~all of these measures are not
begun in advance in ov.r ways before the start of a war.
;,~~, ,- ,~2 ..~ --
~= The nuclear eriod is the decisive eriod of the strate is o erations
and o t e entire war. It may begin just after a non-nuclear perio or the
entire war may begin immediately with it. A most intensive exchange of
nuclear strikes by the opposing sides will comprise the basic content of
this period. At the same time, exceptionally intense combat operations by
the antiaircraft, antimissile, and antispaFe defense forces for the
disruption of enemy nuclear strikes will develop. Within the framework of
strategic operations in the theaters of military operations, there will be
conducted highly mobile offensive and defensive operations of the ground
forces, in which the main role may be played by the rocket troops of the ~
fronts, and the tank and mechanized troops. T~}e ,fleets will carr~,~out
nava o erations for the destruction f enemy carr'M`t... ""'"
~~ ...~, .Q ~ ].~ _.S tx~ ~'~~,ge. lIIl1 t. s ,
sia~rin" e~orces ~I3"~T nes of ommuni ation._ The forces and means of
civilian a ense wi go into action.
1-j It may be presumed that the nuclear period will be very short. It is
not impossible that it will also be the one and only period of a war.
During the course of it the sides-will strive to achieve their main
strategic goals, primarily through the use of nuclear weapons. In this
matter, the first strike of strategic nuclear forces, using most of the
combat ready means and the most powerful nuclear warheads, will acquire
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t
t
tmilitary operations, will be contaminated, as a result of whichtoperations
by surviving groupings of the ground forces on many axes of operations will
be extremely difficult or altogether impossible. It will be impossible to
count on carrying out mobilization measures on a large scale. In any case,
the destruction of the main centers of the country, multimillion losses of
people, and the disorganizat; cm~f e~?a,~,~,n,o?+fl, and military control and of
~ atl c_
o~lica~e
.mobilization. In view of this, mobilization may assume a special character
and be conducted only in relatively. untouched individual areas. As for the
economy of the country, it will be disorganized to such a degree in the
course of this period that for a lo_ n~ t~ it w; i i t,a ;, T~,~~; ~,i p to
reestablish production, especially of complex military equipment.
On the whole, with the skilful and timely use by our side of the
entire panoply of nuclear means in the decisive nuclear period, the war can
be finished.
ew ys.
a
ne can expect that subsequently there will be a sharp decline
in the scale of use of these weapons, especially strategic means. However,
by this time the armed forces will obviously have sustained colossal
losses. Huge areas, both on distant continents and
h
h
n
in une. the whole, the strategic and operational-tactical nuclear
weapons will obviously be used most intensively in the course of the first
' f d
O
primary and decisive importance. Under especially favorable circumstances,
~ the first /n~u~clear strikes by the fronts and fleets may coincide with them
~T_
t? O
A concludin eriod is possible if the war is not ended in a preceding
perio owever, or a time being it is difficult to say anything
definite about it. It will obviously be characterized by the fact that the
main means of conducting combat actions will be conventional weapons
(mainly those types for which production can be organized relatively easily
during the course of a war) and a portion of the remaining nuclear weapons.
In this period, strategic operations in the theaters of military operations
may be completed, and subsequent individual-operations by limited surviving
forces in some areas and on individual axes may be conducted. Considerable
influence on the outcome of combat operations in this period will be
exerted by tank groupings and aviation, using conventional means, in
conjunction with individual nuclear strikes. Strikes delivered by
strategic and operational means will be particularly important. In any -~.
case, that side which is able to retain the larger quantity of nuclear
warheads and delivery vehicles will obtain undoubted strategic advantages
over the enemy.
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Thi"s in general is how we regard the division of a modern war into
periods.
The establishment of a correct division of war into periods is not a
simple formality. It is not at all a question of replacing certain terms,
but of a fundamental elaboration of the possible nature of armed combat at
a given stage of development of the technical means of waging it. It is
obvious that modern war will not develop by a steady building up of
intensity, but spasmodically, with unusually sharp transitions. Conse-
quently, the nature of such a war cannot be defined simply. It will change
repeatedly and extremely abruptly. In each period, armed combat will begin
in a specific form and have its own special features, unique methods for
fulfilling tasks, and special forms of conduct of military operations. Our
troops, commanders, and staffs must be prepared for all of this right naw.
Everything required for successful operations in the course of all the
possible periods of a war must be put into the organization, equipping, and
training of our armed forces.
From the substance of the new division into periods, it follows that,
under modern conditions primary attention should be concentrated on
e urinQ the readiness of the country and the armed forces for con3ucting a
brief nuclear war. Now it is necessary to consider within a different
s eme o r.ngs the role of the economy and politics in war, the
preparation and conduct of operations, and the seizure and retention of the
strategic initiative. Obviously, the seizure of the strategic initiative
will no longer be a one-time task; the opposing sides will face this task
at the beginning of each period of the war, and it will be accomplished
each time in different forms and by different methods.
On the whole, revision of the obsolete tenets regarding the initial
period of war shows the necessity of concentrating our main efforts on the
building of the armed forces, on the establishment and preparation in
peacetime of those forces and means--especially the strategic nuclear
forces and the air defense forces of the country--which would possess the
most powerful means of destruction and high combat readiness, making
possible. their immediate commitment to action under any conditions of
initiation of war by aggressors, and which would be capable of
accomplishing all of the main strategic tasks of a war in the shortest
possible time. The division of war into periods which is being considered
requires not a stereotyped but an exceptionally flexible approach (taking
into account the special features of each period) to the. resolution of all
the problems of operational and mobilization planning, preparation of the
country and population for war, establishment and use of materiel reserves,
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and also the further deVP?s,* of droop training methods. In doing so,
obviously, the main attention should be given o ensu~uig the readiness of
the armed forces to accomplish tasks, above all in the decisive nuclear
period. The strategic rocket forces and the air defense forces of the
country especially must be at a high level of combat readiness. A delay of
literally minutes in their commitment to action threatens serious
complications for our armed forces and our country as a whole.
In conclusion, we should note that in considering the nature of a
future war within the scheme of a new division into periods, we must
certainly not assert that a war will develop in only a certain way and not
othenaise, the more so since no one has yet felt the actual force of
massive nuclear strikes and their effect on morale. One thing is clear:
in determining the periods of a future war it is always necessary to
proceed from specific historical conditions. The division into eri
a ast war must not beta flied mechanically to a ~ tore war--~ ,Q~,~
_an_ me o oi- aQ ng war ar~~er?en~?"'""'~~P'" nnc rnnni rtP~ w; rH
determining-the content-of the periods of a modern war must be constantly
studied and thoroughly researched. In theoretical work we must strive to
attain a situation in which our scientific theory is vital, responds as
much as possible to the requirements of the practical work of building the
armed forces, and really lights the way for this work.
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