MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): COMBAT WITH ENEMY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 6, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
R
50X1 -HUM
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Page 4 of 8 Pages
50X1-HUM
Combat Against Enemy Radioelectronic Means
(Based on the experience of exercises of the
Transcaucasus Military District)
by
General-Leytenant I. Katyshkin
and
Colonel B. Lukashev
In recent years the headquarters of our district has made a detailed
study of the various ways of planning and organizing measures for combat
against enemy radioelectronic means. As a result, we have been able to
establish the fact that it is most advisable to incorporate into a single
plan everything pertaining to the organization of combat against enemy
radioelectronic means in the operations of a front (army). Such a plan
ensures the purposeful and most effective use offorces and means
called upon to destroy and neutralize enemy radioelectronic means, and it
will also facilitate control.
A single plan gives the troop commander a complete picture of the
extent to which tasks are being carried out in combat against enemy
radioelectronic means.
In order to correctly plan all measures of combat against enemy
radioelectronic means, it is necessary to collect, collate, and analyze a
large amount of diverse data on our own troops and those of the enemy;
assess the operational formation of the enemy, his grouping, and compo-
sition; clarify the purpose of an impending front operation, and,on the
basis of all this, plan the use of all means of destructionand radio
jamming. For this reason we believe that the planning of combat against
enemy radioelectronic means in an operation should be performed jointly by
the front operations directorate and the ninth department under the overall
direction of the chief of staff.
It goes without saying that representatives of directorates of arms of
troops, special troops, and air army headquarters should also be brought
into this work.
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Page 5 of 8 Pages
50X1-HUM
The conveying of tasks to their executors, the directing of jamming
forces and means, the organization of coordination, as well as the function
of control, would best be assigned to the ninth department of front
headquarters.
The experience of exercises confirmed that what is the clearest and
most convenient for the leadership is a graphic plan for combat against
enemy radioelectronic means that is worked out on a map and supplemented
with the necessary calculations and legends. Based on our experience the
map should reflect the following basic questions:
- the goal of combat against the enemy radioelectronic means;
- the grouping and characteristics of radioelectronic installations
that have been discovered;
- reconnaissance and final reconnaissance against enemy radio-
electronic means, the forces brought in for this purpose, and the amount of
time needed to fulfil these tasks;
- the most important enemy radioelectronic installations and control
points to be jammed by SPETsNA2 radio units, or to be destroyed by
missiles, aviation, artillery, assault landings, and sabotage groups, and
the time required to fulfil these tasks;
- antiradar camouflage measures for troops and installations of the
front;
- the procedure for the coordination of forces and means taking part
in the destruction and neutralization of enemy radioelectronic means;
- the organization of control and communications with special units;
- measures of radio deception.
The chiefs of arms of troops and special troops have no need to
develop special plans for combat against enemy radioelectronic means; it is
much better for all this to be incorporated into plans for using arms of
troops. Measures to protect our radioelectronic means from enemy jamming
and from destruction by weapons must be developed with parti7_17171i,..4-e.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
flX1-HTTM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Page 6 of 8 Pages
Experience shows that it is advisable to convey tasks to their
executors by combat instructions that are easily adaptable into a standard
form.
* * *
Research conducted in the district points to the fact that the
presently existing decentralized control of radio and radiotechnical
jamming units in the district, which are, as is known, the basic means of
combat against enemy radioelectronic means, is not justified.
We believe that front headquarters should contain a single organ to
carry out both the plUElEk and the direction of the combat activity of
jamming units. If we consider that control at all levels strives for
simplification, the reduction in the number of intermediate echelons, the
organization of direct communications between the directing agency and the
executors, and the extensive use of the means of mechanization and auto-
mation, then centralization in the area of control of radio jamming would
ensure more economical, expedient, and effective use of jamming forces and
means. This, moreover, will simplify to a considerable degree the process
itself of planning, coordination with radio reconnaissance, as well as the
direction of combat training and combat activity of jamming units.
The district has a department of officer-specialists (the ninth
department) which at present has no responsibility for the training units,
since the units are not subordinated to them. Officers of the department
are often in the units and perform a great deal of work there, but all this
is by way of giving assistance. At the same time, actual responsibility
for combat training falls on the chiefs of communications and air defense
troops, for whom problems of combat against enemy radioelectronic means are
not paramount.
We believe it would be more expedient to free the chiefs of communica-
tions and air defense troops from the responsibility of directing radio
jamming units and of the control of radio jamming, especially since they
are now confronted with a more important task which has yet to be solved--
namely, the protection of their own radioelectronic means from mutual
jamming, from jamming by the enemy, and from destruction by enemy weapons.
Radio and radiotechnical jamming units should be placed under the ninth
department of district headquarters.
* * *
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Page 7 of 8 Pages
50X1-HUM
The experience of exercises and an analysis of the capabilities of
radio and radiotechnical units revealed another important fact: the number
of jamming units and jamming means in them that are authorized to the 17,
district (front) are insufficient for effective combat against enemy
radioelectronic means.
Also of concern is the fact that front aviation does not as yet.
possess sufficiently effective jamming-Fie-Es, which greatly reduces its
capabilities for successfully overcoming a modern air defense system.
We believe that in peacetime it is extremely desirable for border
districts to have one radio battalion for jamming shortwave radio com-
munications of an operational echelon of control (12 to 15 sets for jamming
shortwave communications), and one radiotechnical battalion to neutralize
onboard enemy radioelectronic means (12 sets for jamming radar, 4 sets for
jamming ultrashortwave radio communications, and 2 sets for jamming
short-range radio navigation).
Armies should contain subunits for jamming shortwave, ultrashortwave,
and radio-relay communications of a tactical echelon of control (4 to 6
sets for jamming shortwave radio communications, 3 or 4 sets for jamming
radio-relay communications, and 5 or 6 sets for jamming ultrashortwave
radio communications), while an air army should have one squadron (9 to 12
aircraft) with equipment for jamming radar detection and guidance sets.
With these means at our disposal we cspld considerably improve radio
reconnaissance against the radioelectronic means of contiguous capitalist
countries in peacetime and neutralize them most effectively at the
immediate outset of war.
Radio jamming companies would enable army headquarters to work out the
practical organization of radio jamming at exercises and the organization
of coordination with army radio reconnaissance units, and also to provide
more fruitful instruction for staffs of large units and units in the
control of troops by radio under jamming conditions.
It is quite obvious that the presence of radio jamming battalions in a
district and radio jamming companies in armies would ensure the training of
personnel for the formation of radio jamming units at wartime levels and
the rapid preparation of these units for combat activity. scal-Hum
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7
Page 8 of 8 Pages
In wartime the quantity of means in a front battalion for jamming
radio communications must be doubled, army companies reformed into
battalions, and the quantity of jamming means increased by 2.5 to 3 times.
To cover basic groupings of troops and the most important installa-
tions of a front or army from aimed bombing, the front must have about 30
to 36 sets for radar and 30 to 40 sets for jammingultrashortwave
radio communications of aviation guidance and control and short-range radio
navigation (2 or 3 radiotechnical battalions for jamming onboard
radioelectronic means).
An air army must have an aviation regiment with special modern equip-
ment for jamming ground radar sets and control systems of surface-to-air
guided missiles.
In order to jam ultrashortwave and radio-relay communications, sets
carried by air are needed, capable of neutralizing enemy ultrashortwave and
radio-relay communications to a depth of 150 kilometers. It is extremely
important to accelerate the supplying of radiotechnical battalions with
jamming sets in the 225 to 400 megahertz range in order to neutralize
ultrashortwave communications of aviation guidance and control, as well as
with sets for jamming short-range navigation.
There exists a need to develop jamming transmitters of one-time use
which could be launched by aircraft and rockets into areas of enemy radio
centers, as well as small-size receivers to detect such transmitters when
they are launched by the enemy into areas of radio centers of control posts
of our troops.
sets.
And, lastly, front aviation needs modern effective aircraft jamming
Needless to say, other methods of combat against enemy radioelectronic
means must be perfected in equal measure, but we shall not(1.11 HUMimon these
50X1-
in this article.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100800001-7