MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE CONCEALMENT OF AIR DEFENSE SITES FROM SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100810001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 8, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Problems of Camouflaging the Air Defense
Forces of the Country Against Space Reconnaissance
by
General-Leytenant V. Sozinov
In the activities of US space reconnaissance, which is being conducted
with ever-increasing intensity, a major place is assigned to obtaining data
on the structure and technical equipment of air defense of the Soviet Union
and other countries of the socialist camp. Various types of artificial
earth satellites are used to perform these tasks.
Thus, photographic reconnaissance from space is carried out by means
of Samos satellites, which have photographic equipment with a high
resolution capability (I to 2 meters) mounted on board. Radiotechnical
reconnaissance is conducted by Ferret-type satellites, the equipment of
which makes it possible to determine not only the nature of an emission,
but also its function, as well as the locatton of the operating station.
Reconnaissance tasks also are performed by Discoverer satellites; photo or
radiotechnical reconnaissance equipment may be mounted on them.
The conduct of space reconnaissance by the American military command
naturally requires developing and implementing corresponding counter-
measures, among which camouflage is of paramount importance.
Camouflaging the Air Defense Forces of the Country is a highly complex
matter. The forces and means of formations of the Air Defense Forces of
the Country are distributed over considerable territory. Accordingly the
disposition of airfields, launch positions, command posts, radar centers,
technical bases and other installations remains unchanged for an extended
period of time. The troops continuously carry on their combat duty to
protect the air space of the Soviet Union and systematically engage in
combat training, which requires the constant peacetime use of radio-
electronic means, aircraft flights etc. 50X1-1UM
We intend to express a few observations on organizing the camouflage
of the air defense system, based on the experience of the Moscow Air
Defense District. Before doing so we would like to note, however, that
despite the development of space means, aerial reconnaissance conducted by
using photo and radiotechnical means has not lost its importance. This is
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corroborated by the experience of the Vietnam war, and also by the
exercises of the US strategic air forces. Therefore, measures to camou-
flage troops against space reconnaissance means must be accompanied by
measures to camouflage against aerial reconnaissance activities, taking
into account the fact that the principles of camouflaging troops and
installations against both space and aerial reconnaissance (especially
photoreconnaissance) are essentially the same.
Camouflage against space reconnaissance includes a body of measures,
of which the main ones are: organizing the warning of troops about the
approach of artificial earth reconnaissance satellites; camouflaging launch
positions, command posts, airfields and installations against space photo-
reconnaissance; and camouflaging radioelectronic emitting devices against
space radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance. In combination with camou-
flage, measures to deceive the enemy must also be implemented.
The planning and organization of camouflage and deception measures on
the scale of a formation, as experience has shown, should be done by the
district headquarters or separate air defense army. The camouflage and
deception plan developed must reflect the measures implemented by the
troops both in peacetime and during combat actions. In particular, it is
necessary to project the order of priority and time required for carrying
out the work to camouflage launch positions, airfields, command posts,
radio and radar means and various installations, based on the way in which
they are located in an area and in the overall air defense system; and to
determine the forces and means required for camouflage. In accordance with
the formation plan, the subordinate staffs develop similar plans for large
units and units.
Organizing the warning of troops regarding the time of overflight of
artificial reconnaissance satellites. When there is a continuously
operating system of monitoring space, the time of passage of a satellite
over any one area or installation may be determined in advance (with a lead
of several days). On the basis of this forecast commands and staffs are
able to warn troops in advance and take steps to counteract reconnaissance
from space. Our calculations have shown that the command posts of air
defense formations must receive information regarding the flight of
artificial satellites over their territory with a lead time of up to three
days. This information, after appropriate processing, must be transmitted
to subordinate troops to allow it to be received by large units two days,
and by units no later than one day, before the reconnaissance555-KI:Ntes of
the probable enemy enters their perimeters.
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The information must contain the coordinates of the points at which
the satellites are projected to orbit the surface of the earth within the
perimeters of the large units (units), the date and time the satellite is
to overfly these points, and also the altitude of flight. The information
obtained is processed by the personnel of the duty shifts of the command
posts. For this purpose plotting boards are set up at the command posts,
and globes, maps, warning systems and other equipment are used.
The commanders and staffs, having received information regarding the
overflight of reconnaissance satellites, implement the necessary camouflage
measures in accordance with the plans.
Camouflage of combat dispositions against2h9.oreconnaissance_
satellites. Camouflage procedures and methods are largely determined by
the length of time the combat dispositions have been located in a given
place. It is one matter if the airfield or position has been functioning
for a long time, and another if it is just being established.
When new weapons systems are being deployed it is necessary to
thoroughly consider camouflage requirements, beginning from the moment the
project documents are prepared. Even in the process of searching out a
location for them on the basis of aerial photography and analysis of radar
maps of the terrain, the possibility of concealing the installation and
combat equipment from reconnaissance from space must be determined.
When selecting areas in which to construct the installations, the
composition of the reconnaissance groups (commissions), must include
camouflage specialists, and the technical documents on carrying out
camouflage operations at the installations should be given to the con-
struction organizations even before construction is begun. It seems to us
that this procedure needs to be legally formalized, and that new installa-
tions must be turned over for operation only after all of the camouflaging
operations have been carried out. Only in that instance will it be
possible to maintain camouflage in proper condition and, through improve-
ment, achieve the effective concealment of installations and troop
groupings.
Of especially great importance is the camouflage of roads, which are
the main revealing features of all large-scale air defense installations.
Projected roads and those under construction should be integrated into the
existing road network and the minimum number of forks, crossroads and
deadends should be planned, while the intra-installation roads should be
camouflaged especially carefully, taking terrain conditions into account.
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The concealment of roads through technical procedures is possible only on
individual segments; attempts to conceal large segments of roads as a rule
are not yet producing positive results.
Data from monitoring aerial photography show that by skilful use of
the camouflaging properties of the ground and terrain features, combined
with the use of standard and improvised means, it is possible to achieve
high camouflage effectiveness. However, it is not always possible to
eliminate the revealing features of positions and large areas which possess
sharply defined outlines of roads and installations; therefore, to
camouflage the most important installations and troop groupings, in some
cases dummy positions and installations should be created which make it
possible to conceal the overall system of actual troop combat dispositions.
The distance of the dummy positions from the real ones is chosen so as to
rule out the destruction of a combat position in the event of a nuclear
strike in the vicinity of the dummy one. They should be prepared at the
same time as the real ones. To maintain the dummy installations and
positions, special camouflage groups should be formed in air defense large
units and units, since the implementation of the whole body of camouflage
measures involves a considerable amount of work.
Dummy positions prepared from standard inflatable mock-ups of combat
equipment are best made up when the threat of the onset of combat actions
arises, since their deployment in peacetime might be detected by ground
visual reconnaissance and, in addition, it is expensive.
The most prevalent and rapidly effected camouflage procedure, and
therefore the one most acceptable in the troops, is to color equipment and
structures the same as the terrain background. With the proper combination
of protective and distorting paint this procedure is a good contribution to
concealing the equipment and installation from recognition. However the
manufacturing plants paint equipment one color, e. g., dark green or light
green; to repaint it in several colors under field conditions twice per
year (summer and winter) is quite expensive.
The problems of camouflaging troops against enemy space reconnaissance
have to be worked out daily--in the process of routine activities, and also
in exercises, training sessions, etc. For example, an overflight of photo-
reconnaissance satellites requires covering combat equipment with camou-
flage means, limiting the movement of personnel and transportation, etc.
At dummy positions, combat activity and the movement of people and
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transportation are simulated.
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An effective camouflage means may be to smokescreen positions,
airfields, radar centers, radio centers and rear installations. However,
the use of smoke right in the combat dispositions of units and subunits may
affect the combat effectiveness of the troops; therefore it has to be used
mainly to camouflage important structures and rear installations. It
should be noted that the effectiveness of enemy photoreconnaissance
activities may be affected a great deal by complex meteorological
conditions (for example, cloudiness, fog). This has to be taken into
consideration when implementing practical measures to camouflage against
enemy photoreconnaissance activities.
Camouflage against radiotechnical reconnaissance from space includes
implementing measures to conceal the emissions of the radar means of the
radiotechnical and antiaircraft missile troops, and also of the systems for
controlling fighter aviation and troops in the ultra-shortwave band. These
measures at the moment of overflight of an artificial earth satellite may
involve:
- the strict limitation of the operation of emitting means;
- the prohibition of the emission operation of new models of
radioelectronic equipment;
- the development of dummy sources of electromagnetic emissions by
using obsolete types of radar sets and specially developed simulators
operating in a wide frequency band. The development of special, simply
constructed, and cheap simulators is very much a burning question. Such
simulators, in our view, must operate in various emission modes and ensure
the creation of false radioelectonic conditions.
We now will dwell on the operating routine of radioelectronic means.
Experience has shown that upon an overflight of radiotechnical reconnais-
sance satellites, by the decision of the commanders of units and subunits,
radar sets and ultra-shortwave band radio transmitters not engaged in the
direct performance of a combat task should cease operating. In addition,
it is necessary to limit or suspend periodic servicing and other operations
to check combat equipment involving emission into the ether. At the same
time, during the overflight of the radiotechnical reconnaissance satellites
and upon a signal from the unit command post, the obsolete types of
radioelectronic means set up at the dummy positions must be activated to
operate for deception purposes. In the radiotechnical troops, to ensure
operational efficiency during an overflight of reconnaissance satellites,
the use of radar sets, mainly of the obsolete type, should be provided for.
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Considering the whole complexity of radio camouflage measures
implemented in the troops and the capabilities of modern means of space
radio reconnaissance, we think it necessary to establish limits for
emission into the ether.
In this connection we would like to mention, that when new models of
radiotechnical equipment are developed and tested, the camouflage of radio
emissions still is not completely ensured. Certainly, to conceal the
operation of these means from enemy reconnaissance after they are received
by the troops is highly complex; we have to introduce certain limitations
on their use, which in turn causes additional difficulties in operating
these means and in the final analysis affects the combat readiness of the
units.
Constant attention must be given in the air defense forces to pre-
venting the disruption of the routines in which radioelectronic means of
all types are used. The difficulty of this important work is that all the
daily activities of the troops are based on the use of various types of
radioelectronic devices; the majority of these possess considerable
emitting powers and can be monitored even from space.
To counteract enemy reconnaissance it is desirable to systematically
monitor the radio camouflage of the radioelectronic means and their
operation on substitute antennas, to clarify the limits of zones of
possible reconnaissance of radioelectronic means, and to implement a number
of other measures. To ensure security of operation when checking and
repairing the onboard equipment of rockets at repair facilities, judging
from troop experience, good results may be produced by shielding the
ceilings and walls of the technological spaces in them with brass grids and
metallic surfacing. At the airfields of fighter aviation, shielded spaces
should be prepared for repairing and checking radio equipment on reserve
codes. However this work is still being done by the old method. If the
troops were given the technological designs for completing this work,
obviously it would be possible to increase the effectiveness of shielding.
Work expediters can make a substantial contribution to solving the
problems of camouflage. In our country, for example, the forces of
military specialists of repair organs have developed more improved
substitute antennas for missile guidance stations, which, when used,
facilitate radio camouflage in the antiaircraft missile troops and create
more favorable conditions for conducting combat training of troop
personnel. 50X1-HUM
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Industry and the scientific research institutes can provide a great
deal of assistance to improving radio camouflage equipment. They must
develop an improved security device in new models of radioelectronic
equipment, and also modernize the existing device appropriately.
An indispensable ally of radio camouflage under modern conditions is
radio deception. Only when they are conducted in combination, according to
a single, thoroughly considered concept, can good camouflage results be
obtained. Such a concept, in our opinion, must be developed initially for
certain theaters of military operations and strategic axes, with further
detail for each of the formations, large units and units of all branches of
the armed forces.
Practical consideration of a number of measures of camouflage against
space reconnaissance naturally helps the personnel acquire certain useful
skills and makes it difficult for the probable enemy to carry out recon-
naissance tasks. At the same time, despite the considerable work being
done in the troops on camouflage, it appears to us that there is still very
much to be done to arrive at the best solution to this important problem.
The troops still have no improved camouflage means and yet these means are
being developed without sufficiently allowing for the future development of
weapons and improvements in reconnaissance means, and as a result a number
of new models of camouflage equipment rapidly become obsolete after they
are accepted into the armament. The great diversity of camouflage means
makes it difficult to cope with them, and complicates the organization of
supply, repair and restoration.
The necessity to quickly provide the troops with effective camouflage
means is making itself very keenly felt, as is the need for a sound
assessment of the technical capabilities for, and the economic feasibilty
of, developing new camouflage means. Air defense formations and large
units obviously need to have an appropriate organ capable of training
troops and implementing a body of camouflage measures in a skilful manner.
It also has become very important to supply troops with operating
dummy equipment to simulate missile equipment, aircraft, motor vehicles,
etc. This work must be performed at a high technical level, using modern
materials, and must sufficiently ensure the deception of the enemy
regarding the true troop grouping. 50X1-HUM
In conclusion, we should point out that to counteract enemy space
successfully, a single strong, scientifically based system of camouflage is
needed for all branches of the armed forces and arms of troops. It must
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correspond to the nature and methods of conducting modern warfare, and
allow for the specific characteristics of each branch of the armed forces
and arm of troops, and the way and conditions in which they carry out their
combat tasks.
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