MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PROTECTION OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100850001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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.? -TOP-SEGRET-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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2 October 1974
MEMORANDUM The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT ?
MILITARY THOUGHT (3USSR): Protection of Electronic
Equipment from Nuclear Weapons Effects
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based an the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article states that the equipping of enemy forces with more advanced
nuclear munitions necessitates increasing the radiation resistance of
communications means and radioelectronic components of armaments.
Conditions which are most characteristic of the combat utilization of such
equipment are examined in an effort to ascertain the degree of need for
protection and the best methods for providing it. A table and graph
illustrate the radii of the zones within which radioelectronic armaments
will be put out of action by the shockwave and the neutron flux. TN,Tal-HUM
article appeared in Issue 1 (86) for 1969.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been
assigned the Codeword
FIRDB-312/03018-74
David H. Blee
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
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-TrIP-SPELIFFT-
Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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7010-SEERF--
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FIRDB-312/03018-74
TS #205582
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444P-4MGROM__
COUNTRY USSR
DATE CW
WM Early 1969
THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
Page 3 of 9 Pages
FIRDB- 312/03018-74
DATE 2 October 1974
MILITARY THCUGHT (USSR): Protection of Electronic Equipment from Nuclear
Weapons Effects
SOURCE Documentary
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (86) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military
Thought". The author of this article is Engineer Lieutenant-Colonel V.
tarkov. This article states that the equipping of enemy forces with more
advanced nuclear munitions necessitates increasing the radiation resistance
of communications means and radioelectronic components of armaments.
Conditions which are most characteristic of the combat utilization of such
equipment are examined in an effort to ascertain the degree of need for
protection and the best methods for providing it. A table and graph
illustrate the radii of the zones within which radioelectronic armaments
will be put out of action by the shockwave and the neutron flux.
End of Summary
Comment.
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually
and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly
ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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Increasing the Radiation Resistance of Ground Communications
Ream and Electronic Components of Armament
by
Engineer Lieutenant Colonel V. Barkov
The extensive and ever-increasing equipping of the forces of our
probable enemy with nuclear munitions of various types and yields
(including extremely low), as well as the tendency toward the creation of
nuclear weapons comprising several warheads with a high overall capability
of destroying objectives, compel us to turn our attention to the change in
the correlation of the distances of destruction of ground communications
means and radioelectronic components of armament from the shockwave and the
penetrating radiation of a nuclear burst.
Requirements of a mechanical and climatological nature were taken into
account in developing the military radioelectranic equipment which is
currently in use in the armed forces, but no consideration was given to its
resistance to the effects of penetrating radiation from a nuclear burst.
The equipping of the US Army with nuclear munitions having a TNT
equivalent of 0.02 kiloton and more necessitates increasing the radiation
resistance of communications means and radioelectronic components o
armament against weapons using such munitions. This must be done in such a
way that the operating viability and basic parameters of the equipment
remain within their norms after exposure to penetrating radiation from a
nuclear burst in all instances in which mechanical damage does not affect
the electrical and structural components of the system and cause it to
fail.
It is known that with a change in the yield of nuclear charges, there
is also a change in the radii of the destruction zones from a shockwave and
the penetrating radiation. Thus, if the nuclear bursts have a yield of
less than one kiloton, the radii of the zones within which combat equipment
and armament are put out of action by the shockwave are reduced more
rapidly than if the bursts are of high yield, since the duration of the
shockwave front will be less with bursts of law yield and the objectives
will withstand strong overpressures.
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The yield of a burst will also affect the correlation between gamma
radiation and the energy of the penetrating radiation emitted in the form
of a neutron flux. For example, with a burst having a yield of 0.1 kiloton
and at a distance from ground zero such that the total dose of radiation
received equals 100 to 400 roentgens, approximately 63 percent of the
energy of the penetrating radiation will be emitted in the form of neutron
flux, while only 10 percent will be emitted in this form if the burst has a
yield of 100 kilotons; 90 percent will be emitted in the form of gamma
radiation.
Thus, as the burst yield diminishes, there will be a decrease in the
radius of the zone within which objectives with radioelectranic means are
put out of action by the shockwave, but there will be an increase in the
radius of the permissible neutron flux zone and the effect of penetrating
radiation will take on decisive significance among the remaining
destructive factors of the nuclear burst.
Let us examine the conditions which are most characteristic of the
combat utilization of ground communications means and electronic components
of armament, those conditions under which they may be subjected to the
effects of a nuclear burst.
At the control posts and communications centers of operational
formations and large units deployed in the army and front rear services
area, these conmunications means and components of diiiiight will, as a
rule, be located in previously prepared shelters, either temporary or
permanent. We must expect such installations to be subjected to the
effects of nuclear munitions of 50 kilotons and more, the main destructive
factor being the shockwave. The mobile comunications means and electronic
equipment used at these installations are placed in shelters of the dugout
type, which decreases the destructive zone by a factor of only 1.3 to 1.5.
At stationary installations and in shelters for missile systems,
considerable attention must be given not only to increasing the strength of
the structures but also to protecting the components and materials used in
control equipment, onboard missile systems, and electronic launching
equipment, from the effects of the penetrating radiation of a nuclear
burst.
At the tactical control level, portable and transportable small-sized V/
communications means and electronic components are employed extensively in
armament, tanks, armored personnel carriers, etc. The mobile nature of
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combat activity explains the fact that communications means are on the move
as much as half of the time. Because of their proximity to the front line,
it will most probably be nuclear weapons with a yield of 10 kilotons or
less which will be used against these objectives; in this case, the radius
of the zone within which radioelectronic means are put out of action by
penetrating radiation will be greater than the radius of the zone within
which they are put out of action by the shockwave.
Naturally, the equipment placed in mechanically more durable
structures and installations should also be more radiation resistant or
should have special protection against penetrating radiation. For fixed
installations this is achieved by creating screening structures of
reinforced concrete dirt, and other materials. Nbbile installations,
however, require other, special methods for increasing the protection of
radioelectronic equipment.
Penetrating radiation, comprising mainly gamma radiation and a neutron
flux, does not affect all electronic components simultaneously or in the
same way. Gamma radiation, propagating with the speed of light, interacts
primarily with the electron shells of matter and causes temporary,
reversible processes in semiconducting and gas-filled devices, resistors,
electrolytic condensers, and other components of equipment. In this case,
the operat viabili of the 'L ?.'- ?tn0 milliseconds
after II t. neutron flux r, which is delayed by e
surrounding medium, propagates somewhat more slowly than the gamma
radiation. It acts on the nuclei of the matter in equipment components and
causes irreversible changes in the electrical characteristics.
At the present time, the radiation resistance, against neutron flux,
of the communications means and the radioelectronic equipment of ground
armament which have semiconductor components is not more than 1011 to 1012
neutrons/cm2; and if fhey are subjected to such a neutron flux, there may
be interruptions the moment radiation takes place. Operation without
interruptions or distortions can be guaranteed only a neutron flux on
the order of 1010 to 1011 neutrons/cm2. The limit of resistance to the
effects of gamma radiation does not exceed 106 to 107 roentgens per second.
For convenience in comparing the radii of the zones within which
radioelectronic armament will be put out of action by the shockwave and the
neutron flux (as the form of penetrating radiation from a surface nuclear
burst which is most dangerous for radioelectronic means), let us examine
the data set forth in the table and the graph.
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Yield, kt
100
10
1
0.1
0.01
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in
o sets installed
automotive vehicles
Annored personnel
portable radio seta
1011
1010 neutrons
1
----neutron fluxes
---shockwave destruction
Radii of shockwave destruction zones and radii zones
with neutron fluxes of 10to to 1013 neutronsian 2
TABLE
2
Radius, lon
,t
4-)
eD en
eri
>?+
Radius of shockwave destruction zone, km
Radius of zone with otal
neutron flux, km
Heavy and
medium tanks
Armored person.
nel carriers,
portable radio
sets
Radio sets
in automo-
tive vehi-
cles
Dug-
outs
If flux per cm2 is:
1010
1011
1012
1013
0.1
1 ?
10
100
0.06
0.4
0.86
1.85
0.1
0.45
0.97
2.1
0.24
0.6
1.3
2.8
0.1
0.27
0.58
1.25
0.85
1.25
1.6
2.1
0.55
0.86
1.25
1.65
0.36
0.56
0.86
1.25
0.2
0.34
0.58
0.9
4-GP-sEekeT---
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It may be seen from the table that in a burst with a nuclear charge of
100 kilotons yield or greater, the radius of the zone within which the
shockwave will put mobile means out of action will exceed the radii of the
zones of permissible neutron flux (1011 to 1012 neutrons/cm2), i. e.,
armament will be put out of action by the shockwave.
With a nuclear burst of 10 kilotons yield, the radii of the
destruction zones of the shockwave and the penetrating radiation will be
approximately equal. However, interruptions in the operation of
radioelectronic equipment will be observed over large distances at the
moment of the burst Mien there is a flux of 1010 to 1011 neutrons/cm2).
With a burst of one kiloton or less however, e neutron flux will damage
the electronic equipment in tanks an th
d armored personnel carriers, and
installations in automotive vehicles, at distances appreciably exceeding
the damage from the shockwave.
A further reduction of the yield of nuclear warheads, for example,
down to 0.1 kiloton, will cause a threefold increase in the radius of the
zone of destruction from penetrating radiation in comparison with the
radius of the zone of destruction from the shockwave. Interruptions in the
operation of radioelectronic equipment will be observed over distances 5 to
10 times greater.
The data set forth here confirm) that in order to guarantee the
operating viability of the radiocommunications means and electronic
equipment of armament under conditions in which the enemy employs nuclear
weapons of extremely law yields, it will be necessary to increase the
radiation resistance of portable communications means and electronic
equipment insta e ? in ? armored personnel carriers to withstand at
least 1013-fieutrons/cm2, and that of installations in automotive vehicles
to withstand 1012 neutrons/cm2. If this is done, armament will be equally
stable and will achieve uninterrupted operation.
til the introduction into our forces of communications means with a
radiation ii
measures must be taken f conditions of
their operation in the field. First of all, an effort must be ma to
place these means deep in the ground, since even partial recessing of
installations will provide protection against neutron fluxes traveling at
low angles to the ground. Small-sized communications means must be placed
in dugouts and shelters at the earliest opportunity (at halts during a
march, pauses during an advance or defensive operations, etc. and brought
to the surface only when operating during combat. When small-sized radio
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communications means are placed in shelters they must be equipped with
antenna extensions of coaxial cable (similar to those attached to R-1051$1 or
R-123 radio sets when they are operated in tanks) or other devices not
having radioelectronic components. In order to conduct listening watches
with radio sets installed in shelters, it is advisable to employ law-angle
traveling-wave antennas of standard issue.
It should be kept in mind that with bursts of small-yield nuclear
munitions, the radii of the destruction zones of the shockwave are
virtually the same for dugouts, tanks, and armored personnel carriers,
although armored personnel carriers offer no protection against the neutron
flux, and tanks only weaken it by a factor no greater than 2. Breastworks
provide the necessary protection for dugouts even if they are shallow. We
can take as a rule of thumb that the neutron flux can be cut in half by
armor with a thickness of 11 centimeters, wood of 10 centimeters, dirt of 9
centimeters, concrete of 8 centimeters, and polyethylene of 2.5
centimeters.
In order to increase the combat readiness of communications means and
armament with electronic components under conditions in which nuclear
weapons may be employed, it is necessary to improve methods for protecting
personnel and radioelectronic equipment in units and large units, taking
into account the actual conditions o5 their combat utilization.
We must work toward the creation of equipment with greater resistance
to the effects of radiation, taking as a guide the parameters set forth
above, and we must work out protective methods and the most effective ways
of applying them.
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