MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF TROOP CONTROL WHEN CONDUCTING AN ARMY COUNTERSTRIKE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100950001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Increasing the Efficiency of Troop Control
When Conducting an Army Counterstrike
by
Colonel P. Ushakov
High efficiency in troop control has acquired a great deal of
importance in modern operations. The saving of literally each minute spent
collecting and collating data on the enemy, adopting a plan, and allocating
tasks to the troops, may radically affect the attainment of success in
highly mobile actions in a sharply changing situation. These conditions
are particularly characteristic of the preparations to conduct a
counterstrike, which is an example of the highest level of defense
activity.
The experience of exercises and research has shown that we have
considerable reserves at our disposal for increasing the efficiency of
control, first of all, by changing the methods of adopting a counterstrike
plan, by the speed in conveying tasks to subordinate troops and, finally,
by creating a single, continuously operating combat control center.
Under modern conditions, the most acceptable operating method by which
a plan is adopted and developed and tasks conveyed to troops is a single,
logically and technically integrated process. The commander, the staffs,
and the chiefs of the arms of troops and services of the army participate
in it simultaneously, and commanding officers and staffs of subordinate
echelons are included in the parallel preparation of the counterstrike.
Thus, the time expended is essentially reduced and the efficiency of
control increased.
During an army defensive operation the plan to defeat an invading
enemy grouping is adopted on a map withou econna~ssance, and in a limited
time frame (according to the experience of command-staff exercises and
troop exercises, in no more than an hour), on the basis of continuous and
complete knowledge of the situation, in order to immediately influence the
development of combat actions. 50X1-HUM
In the interest of increasing the efficiency of control, and because
of a lack of time, in our view there is no need to formulate a separate
counterstrike plan. The basic starting conditions are taken into account
in the plan developed in detail for the defensive operation itself, but it
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50X1-HUM
obviously is not possible to provide for all the specific changes in the
situation and reflect them in the counterstrike plan.
The seed in conveying tasks to subordinate troops becomes especially
important in achieving high efficiency o troop control for the delivery of
a counterstrike. We feel that a positive effect is derived from allocating
tasks to the troops immediately after they are determined by the army
commander in the process of adopting the plan. By this method the troops
are included in the preparation for combat actions in parallel, without
waiting for the plan to be made official and the written documents to be
received. Written confirmation of verbally allocated tasks and detailed
planning, if required, may be completed a little later.
Not disputing the decisive role of precise and uninterrupted
communications in the timely transmission of combat instructions to the
troops, we must find other ways to accelerate as much as possible the
process of allocating combat tasks to the executors. In the first place, a
proffer procedure should be established for the passage of combat documents
through the information organs and communications centers. We think it is
necessary not only to establish a single, strict system of document traffic
but frequently to execute documents on paper of various colors. For
instance, print combat orders and instructions of the "Vozdukh" series on
pink paper, documents of the "Vneocherednyye" series on blue, "Srochnyye"
on yellow and all the rest on white. In our view, this will facilitate the
passage of combat orders, instructions, and reports, and it will save time.
Practice justifies executing combat instructions in three carbon
copies. One of these is sent to the cipher office, another is delivered to
the communications officer,( and the axis officer, on the basis of the third
copy, communicates the caritent of the document to his subordinate staff by
secret coding device or radio communications. This kind of parallel
transmission ensures the reliable conveyance of combat tasks toe troops.
A large reserve for saving time and increasing the efficiency of
control lies in the very method of processing operational and combat
documents. The first step in this direction is for officers to develop
skills in preparing short and clear documents; the second is to use
standard document forms, which constantly have to be improved and
persistently used by commanding officers and staffs.
The basic method of troop control during a counterstrike will be
signal-commands, short combat instructions, and direct communication of the
50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
army commander, the chief of staff, and other persons responsible for field
control with division and even regiment commanders by technical
communications means. For this purpose (according to the experience of
exercises) we used a coded control chart, the signal-commands of which may
be transmitted even via open communications channels. Subordinates use
previously established signal-messages to report the fulfilment of combat
tasks.
The special feature of organizing control in_a defensive operation to
defeat an invading large enemy grouping, if the opposing sides use only
conventional means of destruction, lies in the fact that the formation
commander and staff have to simultaneously direct the defensive combat
actions of_the_troops and take measures to create strike groupings on the
counterstrike axis-for the purpose o going over to a ec ssive offensive;
and the formation commander and staff must also take into consideration the
special features of organizing control in the event nuclear weapons are
employed.
In response to the difficulty involved in increasing the efficiency of
this kind of control, our army created a single combat control center (as
is done in many military districts) for all exercises. This center
includes the army commander, a member of the military council, the army
chief of staff, the chief of the operations department with a planning
group and axis officers, the chief of rocket troops and artillery with one
or two officers, and the chief of army air defense troops. During the
period the plan is being adopted other chiefs of the arms of troops and 50X1 HUM
services also are called to the center on orders of the commander.
We think creating a unified, continuously operating combat control
center in an army satisfies modem requirements, increases efficiency, and
can Willy ensure the control of troops during an operation and while
conducting a counterstrike, using the available technical means of
communication and having a proper structure of the control organs.
One of the basic measures for ensuring stable and efficient troop
control is, as is known, a well thought-out organization of control posts
and communications. When conducting an army counterstrike, troop control
will be effected from the control posts which were organized during the 50X1-HUM
preparation of the defensive operation. But for a more purposeful
direction of troops delivering the counterstrike it is desirable to
reorganize an alternate command
it out onto the axis of main st
post into a forward command post and move
rike, on to create a mobile control group
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from personnel of the main command post, headed by the army commander and
provided with the necessary means of communication and conveyance (a total
of 10-12 vehicles).
Practical exercises show that it is desirable to position all control
post personnel by groups (elements) of a certain function in the interests
of increasing viability. At the army command post these groups might be:
the combat control center headed by the commander; staff groups; and groups
of chiefs of the arms of troops and representatives of coordinating arms 5O&1-HUM
troops and branches of the armed forces, as well as support and servicing
groups. At relocation time, there should be available highly mobile
vehicles_equipped with communications means anwor spaces already
prepared. This is particularly necessary during a counterstrike. F
We would like to recommend the following approximate composition of
regiment, division, and army mobile control posts (see diagram). While
positioning and relocating control posts the vehicles serving their
personnel must be separated from the control vehicles and located 1.5 to 2
kilometers away.
Reliable, continuous, and efficient troop control during a
counterstrike (according to the experience of exercises) may be ensured by
the combined use of radio, radio-relay, tropospheric, line, and mobile
means of communication on the basis of a previously created, single
communications system. The methods of organizing communications by axes,
and the wide use of radio-relay points and auxiliary communications
centers, have proved their value.
The experience of command-staff exercises indicates that the
collection of situation data is greatly hindered by a lack of efficiency in
the passage of the flow of information being sent to the army staff. The
same information is transmitted on the lines of the combined-arms staffs
and of the chiefs of the arms of troops and services. This results in
loading the communications channels and creates unnecessary parallel of information. Often important data are lost or get_to -the army commander
an Fstaff -3-1--hours late and more. All this is impermissible when
delivering a counterstrike in the fast-moving conditions of the situatio5oxl-HUM
The increasing volume of situation data and the rg owing frequency of
in formation require that new methods be sought for obtaining and processing
them. For these purposes, in our view, it is desirable: for divisions to
have a permanent briefing group (2 to 3 men), and an army staff to have a
group of axis officers for each division (2 men each) and an information
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group (no less than 3 men); to accelerate the passage of combat
instructions and reports by reducing their volume and strictly regulating
transmissions at the communications centers; to train field control
officers and division staffs to appraise situation data and independently
make valid conclusions on the situation in a report for the commander or
commanding officer.
Comprehensive, high-level training of operations officers, the other
field control officers, and staffs as a whole, likewise is one of the
conditions which ensures stability and a continuous increase in the
efficiency of controlling army troops while delivering a counterstrike.
50X1-HUM
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