MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PROBLEMS OF MANNING THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100960001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
DAT 0 February 1975
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Problems of Manning the Soviet Armed Forces
50X1-HUM
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Problems of Manning the Soviet Armed Forces
by
General-Leytenant A. Kuleshov
0 onel V. Gradoselskiy
Manning the Soviet Armed Forces in all stages of their development has
constituted one of the very major problems of paramount national
importance. It has been, and continues to be at the center of Communist
Party and Soviet Government attention.
Inevitably, with the developments in military affairs and the
introduction of new weapons and military equipment into the troops,
personnel requirements have grown and the forms and methods of manning the
armed forces have changed.
The diversity and highly technical basis of new weapons and the
complexity of their combat and operational use have drastically complicated
the tasks of manning the armed forces. In contrast to the past, the
current stage of military development has required a thoroughly thought-out
and scientifically based process of supplying personnel to the-forces which
takes into account the numerous characteristics of the branches of service
and arms of troops.
At present, the development of massed regular armed forces in
peacetime not only raises the problem of the qualitative training of young
people for military service, but also greatly complicates the problems of
manning the armed forces from the quantitative standpoint. This became
particularly evident at the beginning of the 1950's, when statistical data
on pre-conscription and conscription ages were studied, and the prospects
of providing replacements to the army and navy with youths born during
World War II became evident. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate
the serious situation which had developed. Assuming the number of boys
born in 1937 was 100, then in 1943, in relation to 1937, only 28, or 3.5
times fewer, were born. Wartime difficulties adversely affected not only
the birth rate, but the health of young people as well.
The consequences of the war also affected the general education of
young people: in 1950, more than 77 percent of those called up for
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military service did not have a 7-year education. In this connection it is
appropriate to recall the statement of the distinguished military
theoretician and leader M. V. Frunze: "Unless a soldier has a considerable
degree of intellectual development, the conduct of modern, complex, and at
the same time extremely specialized warfare is a hopeless cause."* If
Soviet military leaders appraised the problem this way in the middle of the
1920's, it is even more urgent in the current period of military
development. Successful mastery of modern weapons, equipment and the
fundamentals of combat requires that our soldiers and sailors have a
secondary school education for the leading branches of the armed forces and
arras of troops, and incomplete secondary school education for the rest.
At the beginning of the 1950's, then, the status of conscript
contingents in the country hardly satisfied the new requirements.
Solving the problem of manning the armed forces at the time they were
being equipped with missile/nuclear weapons required taking a number of
nation-wide measures directed toward increasing the general educational
schooling and sharply improving the physical condition of pre-conscription
and conscription-aged citizens.
We can include among these measures the resolutions of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR**, adopted in accordance with Defense Ministry
recommendations, which established the system of training youths beginning
at 15 years of age, i.e., four years before induction into the army. This
training of conscripts in the country has become the responsibility not
only of the Ministry of Defense and its local military control organs, but
also of public health service and public education organs, and of Party,
Soviet, Komsomol, sports and trade union organizations.
* M. V. Frunze. Selected works, Volume 2, Military Press, 1967, page 69.
**Resolution of the Council o inisters of the USSR of 10 September 1953,
"Improving medical-sanitation work among pre-conscription and
conscription-aged youth"; Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the
USSR of 10 September 1953, "Eliminating illiteracy and low literacy among
young people of pre-conscription and conscription ages"; Resolution of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR, "Measures for improving the physical
training of young people of pre-conscription and conscription age".
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We should emphasize that the question of training conscripts in
advance and in an organized manner on a nation-wide scale has been raised
for the first time in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces. The problem
of fully supplying the army and navy with literate and physically healthy
personnel has become the subject of great attention and constant concern to
the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Special resolutions
on these questions were adopted in 1960 and 1964 by the Central Committee
of our Party.
However, the development of the work of training conscript contingents
for manning the armed forces was hampered by several obsolete statutes.
For example, under the Law of Universal P.iilitary Duty adopted in 1939,
conscription districts annually registered 18-year-old youths, who until
induction were on military commissariat rolls for 8 to 10. months.
Obviously this was insufficient time to complete the training of
conscripts for service in the armed forces. Therefore, on 1 June 1962 the
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, "Changing
Article 17 of the Law of Universal Military Duty" was adopted, and in
conformity with it, conscription districts began to register annually the
citizens who had reached 17 years of age prior to 1 January. This
increased the conscript training period from 8-10 months to 20-22 months,
and military commissariats jointly with corresponding local organs were
given the opportunity of fully accomplishing the measures connected with
the medical treatment, schooling, and physical training of young people.
In this period more favorable conditions were created for training
conscripts in various military-technical specialties by DOSAAF training
organizations and professional-technical education schools.
The results of the entire system of work on training pre-conscription
and conscription-aged citizens for military service are shown in Table 1.
Thus, in the period 1953 to 1966 inclusive, the fitness of conscripts
for military service from the health standpoint increased more than 10
percent, and their general educational schooling changed considerably. The
number of conscripts having a secondary or secondary-technical education
increased almost twice. There were more than twice as many conscripts who
had finished grades 7 to 9. At the same time, in 14 years the number of
youths not having incomplete secondary education decreased by more than a
factor of 9.
Great successes also were achieved in educating the rising young
people, as indicated by the steady increase of Komsomol members among
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conscripts, and also in physical development: at time of conscription,
youths, as a rule, fully passed the standards for the "Ready for Work and
Defense" (GTO) badges.
All of these things created favorable conditions for successfully
solving the problem of manning the Soviet Armed Forces at the time they
were being equipped with missile/nuclear armament. It is fully understood
that the achievements in training conscription-aged citizens are
inseparably linked to the overall progress of our Soviet Motherland, and
the heroic labor of all Soviet people who already in the fifth decade are
increasing their wealth in all spheres of Communist development.
The decisive steps taken by the Central Committee of our Party and by
the Soviet Government to improve the preparation of pre-conscription and
conscription-aged citizens for army service and the perseverance of local
organs of the Party and Soviet government, as well as military
commissariats in putting them into practice, have had a positive influence
on the manning of the Soviet Armed Forces and have created favorable
opportunities for ensuring the forces are fully manned.
It can be seen from Table 2 that in 1966 the Strategic Rocket Troops
received more than twice as many conscripts with higher, secondary and
secondary-technical education, than in 1960. Now six out of ten Rocket
Troop soldiers and sergeants have higher, secondary, or secondary-technical
education. The sharp rise in the educational preparation of young
replacements also has been observed in the other branches of the armed
forces.
It also should be taken into consideration that conscripts who
finished school in the 1960's, unlike those of the 1950's, possess certain
labor and industrial skills, which help them a great deal in mastering
military equipment successfully and in a shorter time. Many youths, as a
rule, have combined studies with work in factories, mines, on construction
jobs, and on collective and State farms, acquiring various kinds of
professional training before their induction into the army. We should not
fail to note, either, that replacements entering the troops from
agriculture have now become better prepared technically. In recent years
more than 40 percent of the replacements have been agricultural
machine-operators. Thanks to the growth of technical and professional
training in 1966 more than 60 percent of the conscripts sent to man the
Strategic Rocket Troops and almost 70 percent of those sent to the Navy had
worked in industry, transportation, and construction. 50X1-HUM
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In this connection it is useful to make a comparison with our
situation after the Civil War. Of the young replacements assigned to the
Red Army in 1924, 16 percent were conscripts who previously worked in
industry, transportation, and construction. %re than 80 percent of the
replacements were conscripted from agriculture, and only a few of these had
technical training. The successes of the selfless struggle of the
Communist Party and the Soviet people for the triumph of Leninist ideas are
reflected quite vividly in this comparison.
The considerable number of technical specialists among conscripts has
permitted us to solve the problem of manning the Soviet Armed Forces in a
new way. Beginning in 1959, manning was based on the principle of
industrial specialty and qualifications, which means that conscripts
working in factories, enterprises, and institutions producing missile,
aviation, and tank equipment and radiotechnical gear, had to be assigned
when conscripted to missile, aviation, tank, radio, and radiotechnical
units correspondingly.
However, despite the fact that seven years already have passed since
this manning principle was introduced, we cannot say this problem has been
completely solved. The reason for this lies in the difficulty of planning
conscription by the industrial principle and in the fact that central
organs and the staffs of military districts do not have the necessary data
available for such planning. Obviously, records on the status of conscript
resources by qualifications and industrial specialties should be expanded.
Therefore, if we are talking of further prospective development in the
manning of the armed forces by the industrial principle, then its
accomplishment is inevitably tied to the receipt and processing of a huge
amount of information on the many hundreds of professions of the
conscripts. In our view, one of the principal ways of solving this problem
is to introduce mechanized information recording and processing from top to
bottom. This is all the more important since improving and developing the
stated principle will further increase troop combat readiness and permit us
to exploit rationally the favorable capabilities for technical growth of
Soviet youth in manning the armed forces with young relacements.
Thus we can say that we have had some success in solving the problem
of manning the armed forces at the time they were being equipped with
missile/nuclear weapons. Accordingly, particular attention was paid to the
qualitative selection of replacements for the Strategic Rocket Troops and
Navy. The most educated, healthy, and physically fit young people are
selected for these branches of service. 50X1-HUM
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At the same time, our experience in manning the armed forces has
convinced us that at the present time the medical examination of conscripts
is still inadequate. The appearance of missile/nuclear weapons and the
wide introduction of radioelectronics and complicated types of combat
equipment have brought about radical changes in the nature of troop combat
actions. In modern warfare troops are required to have, in addition to a
great deal of knowledge and high moral-political attributes, exceptional
endurance and the capability to withstand enormous physical and nervous
strain many times greater than in past wars. In other words,
missile/nuclear weapons which have extraordinarily increased the powers of
troops, have called into being new ordeals of unparalleled difficulty. The
soldier must he prepared not only to control and use these weapons, but
also to withstand the effects of the same enemy weapons. The intense
physical strain for every soldier is amplified by severe psychological
strain.
In our view, the task of the manning organs and medical commissions of
military commissariats will be one of carefully selecting conscripts,
taking into consideration the psychological characteristics of each of
them. It is absolutely unjustifiable, for example, to send youths who have
had nervous-psychological disorders into military service. Rocket Troop
manning, for example, requires selecting young people who possess
instantaneous reactions and the ability to solve complex problems in a
short time, make numerous calculations, and react quickly to abrupt changes
in the situation. The submarine fleet, where service involves long voyages
under difficult conditions, also demands great psychological tolerance and
endurance from a person. All these characteristics must be carefully
considered by the conscription commissions of military commissariats when
conscripting citizens for active military service.
The experience of manning the armed forces in the postwar period shows
that providing the troops with personnel must constantly correspond to the
level of development of military affairs, which requires anticipating new
manning problems which arise during the development and improvement of the
troops.
The profound economic and social reforms taking place in the life of
our society, the increasing level of political development, the general
educational and technical schooling of Soviet youth, and the basic changes
in equipping troops with the newest combat equipment and modern weapons
have created the prerequisites for solving other, essentially new problems
in the manning of the armed forces.
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In our opinion, the solution of problems arising in connection with
the urgent need to reduce the terms of active military service must now
take center stage. Four-year service in the navy and three-year in the
other branches of military service are very long terms which at present the
other socialist countries (except Communist China) and capitalist countries
do not have. Obviously, it is difficult to serve a fixed term of 3 to 4
years. Meanwhile, we have every reason to reduce the term of service,
primarily because of those qualitative changes in the schooling of young
people which were previously discussed.
Introducing shorter terms of active military service for soldiers,
sailors, sergeants and petty officers will entail restructuring the
conscription and manning system of the armed forces. At present, under the
current Law of Universal Miltary Duty, once a year, in the autumn citizens
are conscripted and servicemen who have served an established term are
released to the reserve. Thus one-third of the soldiers and approximately
50rpercent of the sergeants are aced annuall -1
y. we reduced the term
Zt service to two years and refined the existing one-time callup, we would
have to discharge every autumn not a third, but half of the soldiers. This
situation would complicate the task of maintaining continuous troop combat
readiness. Apparently this problem most probably must be solved by
conducting two callups per year, conscripting 25 percent of the requirement
in both spring and autumn and discharging the same number of'soldiers at
these same times.
The problem of supplying the armed forces with sergeants and petty
officers has become especially acute.
As we know, at present approximately 50 percent of the sergeants of
the troops and 33 percent of the petty officers from navy ships are
released annually to the reserve. Reducing service one year would require
replacing annually 100 percent of the sergeants in units with a 2-year
term, and 50 percent of the petty officers on naval vessels.
Simultaneously replacing this number of sergeants and petty officers
certainly is not in the interests of the armed forces and we cannot concur
with this position on manning the army and navy with sergeants and petty,
officers. Ensuring the combat readiness of units and ships requires
finding the most practical solutions to this problem. In the meantime, it
is difficult to say what specific ways will be found. However, it is clear
that the increasing level of general educational and technical knowledge of
young people provides us the opportunity of training sergeants and petty
officers in a shorter time than now is the case.
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Apparently the need has arisen to significantly increase the scope of
specialist training in DOSAAF training organizations, especially of truck
drivers, tracked artillery prime mover driver-mechanics, parachutists, and
communications specialists. We cannot rule out the requirement that DOSAAF
training organizations develop the preparation of new specialties for tank
troops, artillery, and engineer and chemical troops.
As we know, initial military training for students was abolished in
our country in 1946, and the conscript training established by the Law of
Universal Military Duty was discontinued in 1962.
When reducing the term of active military service, young people must
be given military training before they are inducted into the army and navy
so as to accelerate incorporating young servicemen into the ranks. Since
our youths are educated in schools, technical schools, and other secondary
educational institutions or work in industry, it is advisable to introduce
compulsory military training in these learning institutions and enterprises
once they have been provided with the necessary cadre of military
instructors.
In conclusion we should note that the manning system must be
continuously improved and developed, and should be the subject of constant
concern if we want our armed forces always to maintain a level which safe -
guards the national interests of the USSR and the socialist camp as a
whole. The task consists of constantly focusing on the problems of
training Soviet youth to perform military service and of manning the armed
forces, and of resolving in a timely manner all difficulties arising in
this important national matter.
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