MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): REPELLING AN ENEMY TANK AND ARMORED INFANTRY ATTACK IN A DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 10
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DATE 27 May 1975
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : Repelling an Enemy Tank and Armored Infantry
Attack in a Defense
N
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Repelling an Enemy Tank and Armored Infantry
Attack in a Defense
by
Colonel V. Yerofeyev
The repelling of massive enemy tank attacks following nuclear strikes
delivere against defending troops is the high point of a defense. The main
burden in repelling these attacks rests on the shoulders of the tactical
level. What, then, are the antitank capabilities of our combined-arms
large units, and what are the methods of determining them?
This question may be answered only after appropriate calculations of
the relative strength of the forces and means of each side are made, taking
into account the results of nuclear strikes and the combat characteristics
of each antitank weapon.
Research conducted at the Military Artillery Engineer Academy i/n F.F.
Dzerzhinskiy testifies to the fact that when determining the combat
capabilities of antitank means, one must proceed from the intended
magnitude of damage to be inflicted upon attacking tanks as a result of
which the enemy would be forced to break off the attack, and also from the
coefficient of the required initial ratio of the number of antitank means
to the number of attacking tanks which would ensure infliction of the
intended magnitude of damage upon the enemy.
Analysis of the experience of defensive engagements and battles during
World War II shows that, as a rule, the attacking enemy, upon losing 30 to
40 percent of his tanks, broke off the offensive on a given axis. On this
basis, one can assume that under present-day conditions the destruction of
up to half the total number of tanks would also be sufficient to repel an
enemy attack. We accept such a loss level as the necessary magnitude of
damage to be inflicted.
At the same time, combat experience and calculations show that the
number of tanks which may be destroyed by one or another antitank means is
not a constant value. With all other conditions being equal, it depends on
the initially established ratio of the number of attacking tanks to the
antitank means of defense. It has been established, for example, that a
group of 100rim antitank guns, when engaged in a battle against enemy tanks,
outnumbering it two to one, is capable of destroying an average of 1.7
tanks with each of its guns. However, if the enemy advantage is four to 50X1-HUM
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one, the same gun can destroy an average of only 1.1 tanks. In the former
case, one gun actually can handle two tanks, while in the latter case, only
one.
As a result, it became necessary to introduce a coefficient of the
necessary initial relative strengths. By this is meant that ratio of the
number of attacking enemy tanks to the number of antitank means which will
ensure the destruction of no less than 50 percent of the tanks. According
to data of the Military Artillery Engineer Academy i/n F.E. Dzerzhinskiy,
the value of such a coefficient for the conduct of fire under the most
favorable conditions equals: for an antitank guided missile combat vehicle,
2.3; for a portable antitank guided missile launcher and an SPG-9
recoilless gun, 2.9; for a 100mm antitank gun, 2.6; and for a T-55 medium
tank, 2.0. For example, a battery of 100mm antitank guns (six guns) is
capable of repelling an attack by 15 or 16 tanks while destroying seven or
eight of them.
It is easy, on the basis of these data, to calculate that a motorized
rifle division having the authorized amount of combat equipment and
armament is capable of successfully withstanding a strike by an enemy tank
grouping numbering up to 700 tanks while destroying up to 350 of them. If
we assume that at the time of changing over to the defensive, the division
is 30 percent understrength due to combat losses, these figures will be 500
to 250 respectively, i.e., it may be said that a motorized rifle division
is capable of repelling an attack of up to one and a half divisions
(including one armored or tank division) of our probable enemies. These
calculations were made without taking into account the large number of
hand-held antitank grenade launchers which, in close combat, are capable of
destroying individual tanks which have broken through. The same is more or
less true of tank division capabilities.
In our view, the very capabilities of a large unit to destroy
attacking enemy tanks should be used as the basis for determining
operational-tactical norms in defense. Of course, in each specific case
one must proceed from the actual condition of the large units and allow for
special terrain features, troop morale, their combat experience, and other
factors of the combat situation.
We are implying here that, as a result of combat against his nuclear
means, the enemy has not succeeded in delivering massive nuclear strikes
against the defending forces. Otherwise, extremely unfavorable conditions
would be created for the defense to accomplish its combat task. 50X1-HUM
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ii
If, in order to simplify the discussion, we eliminate other factors
and proceed from only a 70 percent troop strength, then we may assume that
a combined-arms army having three divisions in the first echelon of the
operational disposition is capable of withstanding an attack by an enemy
grouping consisting of up to five or six divisions, i.e., up to two army
corps, along a 100- to 120-kilometer front. To parry enemy attempts at
increasing his efforts from the depth, the army must have one or two
divisions in the second echelon or in reserve.
The above-mentioned method of calculating antitank capabilities also
dictates specific principles for the use of antitank means in a defense.
The latter must be committed to battle at each line of defense or firing
line, not piecemeal, but simultaneously, in order to ensure powerful fire
action against the enemy along his entire front of attack. When different
types of antitank means with different ranges of fire are deployed at the
firing line or in the defense area, it is advisable to create "pockets of
fire" by placing long-range weapons (antitank guided missiles) in a deeper
position at the base of the "pocket" and those having a shorter range
(tanks, SPG recoilless guns) -- on its flanks.
In combined-arms large units at the present time, tanks themselves
possess strong capabilities for combatting enemy tanks. In a defense,
however, tank units and subunits are, as a rule, withdrawn to second
echelons. Because of this, the first echelons of motorized rifle divisions
often lack the necessary forces for repelling massive enemy tank attacks.
This may lead to undesirable consequences.
Calculations indicate that even if all three motorized rifle regiments
are in the first echelon and if each of them, likewise, has two motorized
rifle battalions reinforced with a tank company, then in the first position
(at 70 percent of unit strength) there will be 45 to SO units of antitank
means: 20 to 22 tanks, eight to ten SPG-9 recoilless guns, and 17 to 18
portable antitank guided missile launchers. In the very first echelon of
an attacking grouping there may be deployed, within the limits of the
division defensive zone, up to five tank and four motorized rifle
battalions of the enemy (an armored tank division and one or two brigades
of a US Army mechanized division). And this means that 200 to 250 tanks
and 100 to 120 armored personnel carriers will take part in the attack. To
repel them with the indicated number of antitank means will be difficult
even with the help of artillery fire and obstacles. 50X1-HUM
Consequently, such a distribution of forces and means among the
elements of a battle disposition in a defense does not, in our opinion,
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meet the specific conditions for carrying out the tasks confronting the
troops. Apparently, until motorized rifle subunits are equipped with a
large number of highly effective antitank means, the tank battalions of
motorized rifle regiments must be used more extensively for reinforcing the
strong points in the first position.
There also is a need for an efficient solution to the problem of
combatting enemy infantry, in armored personnel carriers and combat
vehicles, which is attacking jointly with tanks. Such combat is made
difficult by the fact that the small arms of the subunits of motorized
rifle regiments are ineffective against armored vehicles. The basic
antitank means, as is obvious from the calculations cited, will be totally
committed to the destruction of enemy tanks. It turns out that, until
combat vehicles are introduced into the troops, the entire burden of
combatting the numerous enemy infantry combat vehicles and armored
personnel carriers falls upon the hand-held antitank grenade launchers.
But they, in our opinion, will not be able to fully handle this task, and
here is why.
Hand-held antitank grenade launchers have a short effective range of
fire (300 meters), while the combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers
in service in the armies of our probable enemy are equipped with long-range
automatic cannon and machinegun armament. For example, the SPW armored
personnel carrier (Federal Republic of Germany) has armor of up to 30mm
thickness and is armed with a 20mm automatic cannon which has a range of
over four kilometers. The MICV-65 combat vehicle, which is being developed
in the US, also will be equipped with an automatic cannon and machinegun
armament. Consequently, combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers,
moving 300 to 400 meters behind attacking tanks, have the capability, with
only slight threat to themselves, of destroying our antitank means and
defending infantry with cannon and machinegun fire. In order to prevent
this, more automatic cannons or long-range large-caliber machine s,
possessing sufficiently high armor-piercing capabilities, must be employed.
This problem will be resolved favorably when our combined-arms large units
and units are equipped with infantry combat vehicles.
The decisive destruction of enemy tank o ins which have penetrated
into the depth o a de tense is the prerogative o operational detense.
Only a powerful counterstrike using all fire means can bring about the
destruction of the advancing enemy and attainment of the goals of a
defense. 50X1-HUM
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According to the experience of NATO troop exercises, the commitment to
battle of army corps reserves is usually planned and carried out at a depth
of 30 to 60 kilometers at the end of the first or the beginning of the
second day of the offensive. Therefore, it is advisable to deliver the army
counterstrike with the aim of piecemeal destruction of the groupings which
have penetrated, as early as the first day of the operation, when large
units of the first operational echelon are engaging the enemy in battle,
are inflicting losses by stationary fire and obstacles, and are preventing
him from maneuvering freely. If we assume that during the advance and the
offensive within the first zone of the army defense, large units of the
first echelon of the enemy will sustain up to 50 percent losses of
personnel and equipment, then his main grouping which has penetrated may
number up to 400 tanks and 450 to 600 armored personnel carriers.*
Approximated calculations attest to the fact that complete destruction
of this grouping would require 12 to 16 nuclear warheads, 30 to 40
chemically armed missiles, two or three regimental fighter-bomber flights,
and also the artillery of the large units operating on the counterstrike
axis and in its immediate vicinity. However, for this purpose, the
commander of the army may, as a rule, have at his disposal a limited
quantity of nuclear warheads, which at best would allow him to put out of
action only a small part of the tank or motorized rifle battalions which
make up the grouping which has penetrated. Therefore, it would become
possible to destroy it mainly with front nuclear means. If, however, the
front cannot allocate such means, ten t e troops of the army will have to
carry out the given task by using their own forces and means under more
difficult conditions.
It must be taken into consideration here that the artillery of the
defending forces will be significantly weakened as a result of combat
losses by the time the counterstrike is to be delivered. Artillery fire
from indirect fire positions using conventional ammunition will not have an
appreciable effect on the tank groupings of the enemy. Artillery can
effectively destroy enemy command posts, nuclear means, artillery in place
and also motorized infantry subunits.
*This is based on a calculation that the nine to 12 tank and 12 to 16
motorized rifle battalions making up one armored division, and the one and
a half to two motorized rifle divisions of an army corps, will have
approximately half of the authorized combat vehicles.
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Consequently, in the preparation and conduct of our counterstrike, the
main role in destroying the enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers will
again be played by tank and antitank means conducting direct fire. In this
connection, it seems advisable in a number of instances, before delivering
a counterstrike, to use some of the tank units and subunits of the
second-echelon large units of the army to destroy the enemy from the firing
line on the axis of the upcoming active operations of these large units.
What kind of results may we expect from a counterstrike under these
conditions? Let us imagine the following approximation of a defensive
engagement. An enemy strike grouping which has penetrated the zone of
defense of the army on a 30- to 40- kilometer front to a depth, let us say,
of 20 kilometers, finds itself basically spread out along the perimeter of
the area of penetration, which in this case is 60 to 70 kilometers. The
enemy has an average tank density of six to seven and an armored personnel
carrier density of eight to ten per kilometer of front. In this case, the
grouping will be most dense at the point of the penetration spearhead and
significantly weaker at its base, at which, naturally, the counterstrike
should be aimed.
If, however, nuclear strikes are delivered against the main forces of
the enemy grouping which has penetrated, then it may be advisable for the
defending forces to conduct a frontal counterstrike. This will obviate any
complicated maneuvering and allow the defeat of the enemy to be completed
quickly.
In the event that a tank division of the second echelon of the army
does not sustain substantial losses from enemy nuclear strikes and deploys
to deliver a counterstrike on a front of 15 to 20 kilometers, the average
tank density on one kilometer of front will be 15 to 20; and for a
motorized rifle division, 12 to 15. In other words, troops delivering a
counterstrike will have double and even triple tank superiority on their
main axis, which will ensure successive, piecemeal destruction of the enemy
before his corps reserves and troops can be brought up from other axes.
However, these specific preconditions may become actual possibilities
if, having penetrated the defense, the enemy is cut off from his reserves
and if his freedom to maneuver is restricted by active defensive battles of
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the first-echelon troops of the army, and, chiefly, if he is hindered to
the maximum in exploiting his nuclear superiority over the defending
troops.
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