MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE BUILDUP OF EFFORTS DURING A FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
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? T??.... 1975
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Buildup of Efforts During
a Front Offensive Operation
50X1-HUM
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The Buildup of Efforts During a Front
Offensive Operation
by
General of the Army G. Khetagurov
The timely buildup of efforts in operations has always
been one of the most important factors in achieving victory
over the enemy. Its purpose is to ensure continuity of an
offensive at high speeds and to a great depth, maintain the
initiative throughout the operation, and fulfil tasks
successfully in the course of the operation. In this
connection, the problems of the buildup of efforts occupy an
important place in the theory and practice of operational
art.
In operations during World War II, the buildup of
efforts was accomplished primarily by the commitment to an
engagement (battle) of second echelons, mobile groups of
various composition, and reserves, that is, by a continuous
increase in the number of troops, the use of large masses of
tanks, and the establishment on the decisive axes of
absolute superiority over the enemy in both forces and
means. In view of the fact that the tasks of the operations
were fulfilled by formations consecutively, and the troops
suffered casualties and lost their offensive capability
relatively gradually, the process of the buildup of efforts
itself was accomplished methodically.
During the breaching of the enemy defense, the second
echelons of regiments, then divisions and corps, entered the
battle successively. The breakthrough was exploited by the
commitment of tank (mechanizes:) corps and tank armies, which
constitute the second echelon, or of mobile groups of
operational formations. Their swift actions led relati5oxi-HUM
quickly to the achievement of significant operational-
strategic goals. Army and even front mobile groups were
brought in fairly often to complete the breakthrough of the
enemy tactical zone of defense, although they were intended
to exploit the successes in the operational depth. As a
result, their commitment was essentially a continuation of
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the successive buildup of efforts begun at the tactical
level.
The buildup of efforts during offensive operations was
also accomplished by a movement of troops from the secondary
sectors to the decisive axes, and also by the massive use of
air and artillery strikes. As aviation and artillery combat
capabilities have grown, the importance of these strikes in
the buildup of efforts during a war has steadily risen.
However, the basic method has remained the commitment of I u
second echelons, reserves, and mobile groups. These
principles and methods of the buildup of efforts
corresponded to the level of development of the means of
armed combat and to the nature of combat operations, and, on
the whole, they ensured the successful development of the
offensive to a great depth.
New weapons and equipment, and their widespread
introduction into all the branches of the armed forces, have
radically changed the form and content of the buildup of
efforts and the conditions under which the buildup is
carried out. Now these questions are decided on a new
material basis -- on the basis of missile/nuclear weapons in
accordance with a changed organization of troops and changed
methods of conducting operations.
An analysis of the possible ways that an aggressor
could unleash a war leads us to judge that front operations
will be extraordinarily complex in nature.* During a war
abrupt changes in the situation and in the nature of combat
operations are possible, as are changes in the spatial scope
of the operations and the tasks being fulfilled. This will
undoubtedly lead to a change in the methods of the buildup
of efforts.
* A front operation can include periods of non-nuclear and
limited nuclear operations, the decisive nuclear period and
the period of concluding operations. 50X1-HUM
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The buildup of efforts in operations begun with the
unlimited use of nuclear wea ons and other means of-
mass destruction will be achieved primarily by the delivery
of massive nuclear and chemical strikes. This will enable
us to inflict a decisive defeat on enemy groupings, not
successively in depth and in time, as was the case in
operations in the last war, but all at once. Thus, the
buildup of efforts of front troops will also have to be
carried out in such a way as to achieve the parallel and
equally successful fulfilment of both the immediate and
follow-up tasks of the front. It should be noted that the
buildup of efforts in an offensive operation will be not
only a function of the front, but also one of the most
important measures of the Supreme High Command carried out
within the framework of a strategic operation.
In addition, nuclear weapons enable us to significantly
weaken and even disable an entire opposing grouping of enemy
troops in a short space of time. Under these conditions,
all that may be expected of front formations is the skilful
and timely exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes
and the completion of the destruction of the opposing enemy
forces. To achieve this it will hardly be necessary to
achieve a threefold or fivefold superiority in forces and
means, as was done in the past, since an abrupt change in
the balance of forces will be achieved as a result of the
casualties inflicted on the enemy.
From this it follows that the essence of the buildup of
efforts in nuclear warfare operations lies not so much in
establishing overwhelming superiority over the enemy, as in
achieving and maintaining an advantage in forces and means
that will ensure the successful fulfilment by the attacking
troops of those tasks that arise during the operation.
The desire on both sides to achieve decisive results
with nuclear weapons, and the great mobility of troops, make
combat operations extraordinarily diverse and dynamic. On
some axes front troops may conduct a successful offensive,
on others they might repulse strong enemy counterstrikes,
and on still others they could conduct meeting battles or
engagements in the event of radioactive contamination of an
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area or a great amount of destruction. Under these
conditions it will probably be impossible to build up
efforts gradually, as was done in the last war; rather, we
shall have to foresee sudden and drastic changes in the
situation in a short space of time, at various depths, and
at all possible moments during the operation. In contrast
to the past, when forces and means intended for a buildup of
efforts were used mainly on previously planned axes, in
nuclear warfare operations it will often be necessary to
redirect them to new, previously unforeseen axes. And this
means that rocket troops, aviation, and large units of the
second echelon and of the reserve must be in constant
readiness during the operation to fulfil tasks that suddenly
arise. Continual reconnaissance of all types and timely
acquisition of data about the enemy, and the presence in the
front of a reserve of nuclear and chemical warheads, also
are indispensible conditions for the successful buildup of
efforts in a front offensive operation.
Let us now examine the question of what methods of
building up efforts for the successful development of an
offensive are possible under modern conditions. We should
note at the outset that they should not be looked upon as a
single type, since in essence they represent a whole complex
of interrelated actions that coalesce into a large and
complex process. Thus, for example, a study of this problem
at a number of exercises attests to the fact that in
operations during the nuclear period of a war, depending on
the circumstances of the situation and the presence of
forces and means, the buildup of efforts can be accomplished
by the delivery of nuclear strikes, the commitment to the
engagement of combined-arms or tank formations (large units)
from the front second echelon (armies), the use of reserves,
a maneuver an regrouping of troops from other axes, and the
broad use of airborne landings.
The buildup of efforts through the use of nuclear
weapons is a new phenomenon in operational art. This is the
principal method, the most decisive and effective. It
enables us almost instantly to bring about radical changes
in the situation and a balance of forces favorable to the
attacking troops. t oeever, in looking upon this N-.capor.5cx1-HUM
powerful means for the buildup of efforts, we are not
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inclined to assess in this aspect all the nuclear strikes
delivered during an operation. The experience of our
operational exercises and war games attests to the fact that
an immediate adjunct of the buildup of efforts are those
nuclear strikes which at critical moments of an operation
cause abrupt changes in the established balance of forces
and means in a certain interval of time on one or another
axis. Thus, the buildup of efforts will obviously include
those nuclear strikes aimed primarily at destroying newly
detected enemy means of nuclear attack, the destruction of
his approaching reserves, and the foiling of counterstrikes
by large groupings.
Along with the delivery of nuclear strikes by front
means in the zone of the front offensive, strikes by
i,iedium-range strategic missiles and long-range aviation will
also be delivered, in order to destroy deeply deployed enemy
nuclear means: aviation at airfields; rocket troops and
nuclear warhead depots; and large groupings of his troops
and other important objectives. During an offensive on
maritime axes nuclear weapons may be used to destroy carrier
strike large units and enemy naval forces in order to carry
out amphibious and airborne landings on the shore. These
nuclear strikes should be considered part of the buildup of
efforts in the operation.
The buildup of efforts with the aid of nuclear weapons
can be accomplished by the delivery by rocket troops and
front aviation of both massive and group strikes, as well as
single strikes. The greatest effect, unquestionably, can be
achieved by a massive nuclear strike in conjunction with the
use of,chemical weapons and conventional means of
destruction, and the subsequent exploitation of the results
by the attacking troops. However, the organization and
delivery of such a strike is a rather complex matter. it
requires careful preparation and the simultaneous commitment
of a considerable quantity of nuclear and other means of
destruction. It is advisable to deliver it in the shortest
possible time against large forces and the most irm:portant
enemy objectives. Therefore, during a front offensive
operation, massive nuclear strikes can obviously be carried
out only at certain crucial moments. Thus, in command-staff
exercises and operational games in the Baltic Military
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District in 1966 to 1968, such strikes were delivered
usually when destroying large advancing enemy reserves,
repulsing his counterstrikes, and committing the front
second echelon to the engagement.
Group nuclear strikes during an operation can, as
experience from exercises shows, be delivered against enemy
nuclear means, his operational reserves in-concentration
areas and during their advance and deployment, and against
other important objectives that cannot be destroyed by a
single nuclear warhead. Should it become necessary
immediately to destroy newly detected enemy means of nuclear
attack and other important objectives, single nuclear
strikes can be delivered in the area in front of the
offensive of the first-echelon large units.
The buildup of efforts by the commitment to the
engagement._ofsecond-echelon troops_._axnd__reserves has
retained its significance in opera.ti.o.ns-in---a---nuc-l- r- war,
but it cannot be considered __the__.p-r_i.mary_method, as was the
case in operations of the last war. Now the commitment to
-an engagement of forces from the depth in effect completes
-the buildup of efforts that was begun with nuclear strikes.
The prompt exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes by
fresh forces drastically alters the situation and creates
favorable conditions for the successful development of the
offensive.
The second echelon of the front is committed to an
engagement at the most critical and complex moment in the
development of the operation, and in particular when, as a
result of enemy nuclear strikes or other actions by him, the
striking power of the armies of the first operational
-'echelon is considerably reduced and there is a danger that
the pace of the offensive may be slowed down. The second
echelon may by committed to destroy defending enemy
groupings or enemy reserves advancing from the depth; when
shifting the main efforts from one axis to another; and for
the fulfilment of other tasks. The need to commit the
second echelon to an engagement can arise both after the
front fulfils its immediate task, or while it is in the
process of doing so.
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The methods of committing an army of a front first
echelon to an engagement depend on the conditions of the
situation as it has developed, and primarily on the
capabilities of the front to deliver nuclear strikes, and on
the conditions and nature of the actions of our first
echelon and of the enemy. Practice gained from exercises
shows that under conditions of nuclear war the most
acceptable method is the sequential commitment to an
engagement of the second echelon, although in certain
theoretical works and individual articles the opinion is
still forcefully expressed as to the possibility and
advisability of committing to an engagement operational
formations, such as modern combined-arms and tank armies and
even fronts at full strength.
Of course, the simultaneous commitment to an engagement
of all the large units of the second-echelon armies produces
a sharp change in our favor in the balance of forces; but to
achieve this in practice is hardly possible, since the first
consideration under these conditions is the need to protect
the reserves from, enemy nuclear destruction, both before
their commitment to an engagement and at the moment of
commitment. I1-oreover, it is necessary to commit to an
engagement a __.gu a ti_ty__of __f.o .c_es ..sufficient _to ensure _the
development of the operation. It _is _this factor, and not
the desire to commit to an engagement as many fresh forces
as possible, that should be our--pr-ii+a-r -co-nsideration. At
present not only the coromiitment to the engagement, but even
the approach to the area of commitment by such a large
grouping as an army, entail_s__c.t,__x.isk. It is difficult to
impunity.
conceal it from the enemy or to carry s it b out with forward
As a result, the
in individuallargecunits second-echelon
and, in rordertomaintain their
combat effectiveness, they mu st.__e_ commi tted . to...the
engagement on. the-spot. Furthermore, in order to commit the
second-echelon army into the engagement at full strength, it
will be necessary to carve out a strip up to 100 kilometers
wide. But to do this in practice is difficult, and to
create similar gaps in the operational disposition of front
troops deliberately, as is sometimes recommended, is very
dangerous, and not a single front commander would, be willing
,,to do it. Therefore, we are firmly convinced that the most
correct method is to commit operational formations to an
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engagement piecemeal, with temporary resubordination to the
first-echelon army of those large units located in its zone.
The buildup of efforts during a front offensive
operation by the incorporation into the first-echelon armies
of individual combined-arms large units and units of special
troops may result from various causes, and chiefly from a
sudden drop in the combat capabilities of first-echelon
troops.
According to the experience of exercises, reserve
divisions may be transferred to attacking armies in order to
establish superiority over the enemy on a selected axis, to
repulse his counterstrikes, to secure a captured area, or to
destroy a grouping or airborne landing force that has been
cut off (or surrounded). In contrast to operations in the
last war, when reserve large units transferred to
first-echelon armies and corps were used for their overall
reinforcement, now they can also be used to replace troops
who have lost their combat effectiveness, including those
large units whose personnel have received maximum doses of
radiation. For this purpose, divisions from the front
reserve, or large units regrouped from other axes, are
brought in and, in an extreme emergency, large units of the
front second echelon also.
An additional allocation of nuclear and chemical
warheads to first-echelon armies is usually undertaken in a
case where, during an operation, they have lost these means
as a result of enemy strikes, or where new unforeseen tasks
arise whose fulfilment requires an expenditure of forces and
means not previously anticipated. This becomes necessary
particularly when destroying enemy counterstrike groupings
that have broken into the zone of an army from adjacent
friendly troops, and in an offensive on a maritime axis when
conducting operations against large amphibious landing
forces. Along with the allocation from the front reserve of
nuclear warheads to first-echelon armies, the re nforcement
may also involve the transfer of artillery, antiaircraft,
rocket, and engineer and chemical units and subunits, as
well as other forces and means.
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A maneuver of forces and means in order to achieve a
buildup of efforts allows the fullest possible exploitation
of the results of nuclear strikes, the timely concentration
of efforts, and the creation at the decisive moment of an
advantageous balance of forces on decisive axes. It is
carried out in order to quickly destroy enemy nuclear means
and important groupings, to transfer the efforts of troops
to other axes, to create the necessary groupings of troops
for the development of the offensive, or to replace large
units that have lost their combat effectiveness.
During an operation the maneuver can be one of nuclear
weapons, front aviation, large units or even formations. In
this context the term "maneuver" refers first of all to the
shifting of strikes by nuclear and chemical weapons and
conventional means of destruction from certain objectives to
others, and also the rapid shifting of combined-arms large
units (formations) in order to create an advantageous
grouping of troops on one axis or another.
The maneuver of nuclear means is of decisive
importance. Thus, the maneuver of front rocket troops by
trajectories enables us to deliver strikes against the enemy
to a depth of up to 250 kilometers. Along with the delivery
of nuclear strikes, the maneuver of nuclear warheads and
missiles with chemical warheads is also of great importance;
this maneuver is accomplished by rocket large units and
units, and also by using supplies of missiles held in
reserve.
A powerful and effective means of carrying out a
maneuver and a buildup of efforts during an offensive
operation is front and long-range aviation. Its
maneuverability, speed and great range enable front aviation
in a short span of time to carry out a maneuver and
concentrate its forces on any axis, and to quickly and
suddenly reach strike objectives and destroy them with
nuclear, chemical, and conventional warheads to a depth of
up to 500 kilometers from the line of troop combat contact.
Although long-range aviation primarily fulfils tasks in
accordance with the plan of the Supreme High Command, it is
also an important means in the buildup of efforts in support
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of advancing front troops. Its operations may consist of
delivering fo low-up strikes in order to neutralize the deep
reserves; and to destroy airfields and newly detected
control posts of operational-strategic significance, nuclear
missile-carrying submarines, carrier strike groupings that
have just appeared, and important naval bases and ports on
the seacoast.
The maneuver of front formations and large units also
acquires great significance during the buildup of efforts in
an operation. Possessing great striking power and
maneuverability, they are able to quickly transfer efforts
from axes to axes, and to outflank enemy groupings and
deliver strikes against both his flanks and his rear. This
applies primarily to tank large units and formations and to
helicopter and airborne landing forces.
In carrying out a quick maneuver, especially when
transferring efforts to a new axis, helicopter_units acquire
great importance. They make it possible to transport
individual units and even large units by air in a short span
of time. This will be necessary during a landing conducted
into the enemy rear, or when crossing zones with strong
radioactive contamination, broad areas of destruction, or
forest fires. Helicopters will be used particularly V
extensively, in our view, when carrying out a maneuver in
the so-called forward edge of the battle area. They can be
used successfully to transport missiles, warheads, and
missile propellant, and also to move reserves of various
types and control posts.
The buildup of efforts during a front offensive
operation will be greatly facilitated by airborne landings
of various compositions and purposes, the use of which will
make it possible to quickly shift combat operations deep
into the enemy rear. This creates favorable conditions for
the rapid development of the offensive by tank and
mechanized forces.
In this connection we feel it is necessary to make one
comment. At theipresent time front formations for all / /"
practical purposes do not as yet possess the necessary means
for airlifting troops. Airborne end helms co~ter landings
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arge tanorces i
during an operation are, as before, c rigid out only from
time to time. Meanwhile, the practice from exercises and
war games convinces us more and more each year that ground
forces, for all their mobility, maneuve bilityl___and growing
striking powers are no__.e nn~; t; ~? ~~__ fastest kind
of offensive, to make timely and-full-use _ of the resultsof--
nuclear strikes, even when fulfilling their immediate task.
Advancing at an average pace of 50 to 70 kilometers a day,
front troops reach the area of maximum range of friendly
nuclear means in six to eight days,"when the enemy already
has had time to restore the combat effectiveness of his
troops and bring up reserves from the depth. The situation
is even worse when it comes to exploiting the results of
nuclear strikes of strategic means, delivered to support the
fulfilment of the follow-up task. It is evident that under
conditions of nuclear- warms airborne and be l ic ter 1 a ni i ngs
will become as commonplace as, let us say, the commitment of
A-,
1-1
ar. Therefore, in our view, we must create for the ground
forces special independent groupings ___f_or---tr- nspor- -hy--a-ir_,
and include them in the composition of fronts as a permanent
element of the operational disposition of the troops. It is
extremely important also to have more powerful and numerous
The buildup of efforts in operations conducted with
-,conventional t es of weapons will have much in common with-
'the methods of building u a forts in the last war. As in
the past, an important role in the destruction of the enemy
under these conditions will be played by operational
'formations of ground forces, and the basic means of
'destruction will be artillery, tanks, and aviation. The
chief method of achieving the goals of a front operation
will be the s!ccessive destruction of enemy groupings;
-,therefore, the buildup of efforts will also have to be
accomplished successively. It will take the form of
decisive massing of forces and means and the creation of the
necessary superiority over the enemy on the decisive axes,
primarily by the commitment of the second echelons and
reserves. However, this in no way means that the methosoXl-HUM
accomplishing these measures remain the same as before.
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airborne landing forces, of which we spoke earlier.
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The constant threat of the enemy use of nuclear weapons
requires that the troops operate in dispersed deployment on
separate disconnected axes, in broader zones, without a
solid front, and that they constantly execute all measures
of protection against weapons of mass destruction.
Therefore, the buildup of efforts will now be carried out by
a rapid concentration of forces and the delivery of
-coordinated strikes from various axes after intense
preparatory fire by conventional means. As the task is
being fulfilled, the troops must again disperse.
The particular features of conducting combat operations
without the use of nuclear weapons naturally will also exert
an influence on the methods of building up efforts under
these conditions. The most effective methods, in our view,
will be the commitment to an engagement (battle) of second
echelons and reserves, the massing of artillery fire,
strikes by aviation and rocket troops, and a broad maneuver
of forces and means.
The commitment to an engagement (battle) of the second
echelons and reserves of the armies and of the front will be
the basic method in the buildup of efforts, since under
these conditions it is the only method by which it is
possible, during an operation, to bring about a sudden
change in our favor in the balance of'forces, and to create
the conditions for a sustained attack at a fast pace. In
contrast to operations in which nuclear weapons are used, an
army of a front second echelon, as in the last war, will
most often awe committed at the same time and at full
strength. In connection with the threat of nuclear attack,
the advance and deployment of troops will have to be carried
out on a broader front, while large units will be committed.
to breaches and gaps that have formed in the operational
disposition of troops. Here the commitment of second
echelons and reserves will require dependable fire cover in
the form of short but intense preparatory fire and fire
support. 50X1-HUM
In operations of a non-nuclear war, tank armies remain
a powerful means in the buildup of efforts. They are
capable of decisively penetrating any gaps in the enemy
disposition and into his depth, and of delivering strikes
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from the march against the most vulnerable places. Their
commitment to the engagement should be carried out after
breaking through the tactical zone of defense.
The basic principle in the use of tank forces, in our
view, must be their massive use not only as part of the
front, but also within the framework of a strategic
operation, when at the most critical moments the efforts of
several tank armies of adjacent fronts are concentrated
simultaneously on the most important axis.
The buildup of efforts by massive fire of all types and
massive air strikes will be accomplished by the
concentration of artillery on the most important axes and
the use of large forces of front aviation at the most
critical moments of the operation. The role of the latter
has become especially important. The ability of aviation
quickly to shift and concentrate efforts, as well as its
great range of action, raises the question of a possible
independent air operation with several air armies of fronts
and of long-range aviation taking part at the same time.
A maneuver for the purposes of a buildup of efforts
will be executed first of all by combined-arms large units,
artillery units, and also by air and missile strikes with
conventional warheads. It will take the form of a bold
penetration by advancing large units and units, through
poorly protected sectors, breaches, and gaps, into the depth
of the enemy defense, and by breaking out onto the flanks
and into the rear of his groupings of troops and to the
centers of resistance. In a number of cases the maneuver
can be executed for the purpose of shifting efforts from one
axis to another. However, it should be borne in mind that
whereas in a nuclear war the shifting of efforts can be
carried out relatively quickly by a maneuver of nuclear
means, in conducting an operation with conventional weapons
of destruction a regrouping of troops will first be 50X1-HUM
necessary, and this entails great effort in organizing
dependable security and will require a great deal of time
Airborne and amphibious landings will play an important
role in the buildup of efforts under the conditions being
discussed here. They can be used to help the troops achieve
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50X1-HUM
high rates of advance, negotiate large water obstacles,
encircle and destroy enemy groupings, interdict his
withdrawal, and also to fight his reserves and disrupt troop
control and the work of the rear. Raids by small landing
detachments against the enemy rear can be especially
effective; in conjunction with the extensive use of
special-purpose groups they will make possible heavier
strikes against the control system, enemy combat means, and
his reserves.
A few remarks on the essence of the buildup of efforts
when both sides switch from combat operations with
conventional means of destruction to limited use of nuclear
weapons, for example only operational=strategic ones.
As experience from exercises shows, in examining this
question we proceed first of all from the assumption that
the switch to nuclear weapons is generally made_at_the...mo.st.
critical moment of an operation in order to bring about a
radical change in the course of events. For this purpose
all available means are brought in along with nuclear
weapons, and literally all the reserves are put into action.
The changeover itself is accomplished by the nearly
simultaneous delivery by both sides of a massive nuclear
strike. Consequently, at this turning point in the
operation, all methods in the buildup of efforts that have
been examined above will be more closely combined. The
decisive role here will continue to be played by nuclear
weapons, and the beginning of this process will be the first
nuclear strike, which should establish the necessary
prerequisites for the successful use of all other forces and
means of the front.
The carrying out of all measures connected with the
buildup of efforts in an operation, when switching over to
the use of only operational-tactical nuclear weapons, on the
whole, in our view, will differ little from actions under
conditions of general nuclear war. However, it should 50X1-HUM
borne in mind that the use of only operational-tactical
nuclear means will not enable us to brincr effective actions
to bear on the enemy simultaneously throughout the entire
depth of the front operation. Their use will permit us to
inflict damage only on individual enemy groupings of troops
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and objectives in the operational depth. Thus, in this
case, as in the period of non-nuclear actions, it will b
necessary to build up efforts and fulfil tasks consecutive y L
piecemeal, but in a shorter span of time. 5OX1-HUM
With the beginning of the use of operational-tactical
nuclear means, casualties among the troops will increase
sharply, and therefore the reserves will becoi:,e important in
the buildup of efforts during this period. It is not
impossible that even in the beginning it will be necessary
to commit not only the second echelons of armies, but also
the second echelon of the front. A major role will also-Le
allotted to airborne landings. To achieve maximum
exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes, the front
command will have to refine previous plans, and possibly
change the axis of the main strike and create new strike
groupings of troops. The changeover from limited. to
unlimited use of nuclear weapons will signify the entry of
the belligerent sides into general nuclear war. Under these
conditions the buildup of efforts will be based on the
massive use of nuclear weapons of all types and in
accordance with the principles which we examined at the
beginning of this article.
In conclusion it should be noted that questions
concerning the buildup of efforts in a modern front
offensive operation occupy a most important place in the
work of a formation commander and his staff in the direction
of troops. The bases of a buildup of efforts must be laid
during preparation of the operation, and perhaps even
earlier, in peacetime, in the process of combat and
operational training of troops and staffs. During an
operation it is carried out with due consideration for the
nature of the combat operations, the developing situation,
and the plan for destroying the enemy. The timely buildup
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of efforts enables us to influence the course of the
operation and achieve superiority over the enemy on decisive
axes, and it helps us to maintain the initiative.
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