MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ASSURING CONTINUITY IN MILITARY SHIPMENTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF WIDESPEAD DESTRUCTION ON THE TRANSPORTATION LINES OF A FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
23 June 1975
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Assuring Continuity in Military Shipments
Under Conditions of Widespread Destruction
on the Transportation Lines of a Front
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N
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Assuring Continuity in Military Shipments Under
Conditions of Widespread Destruction on the
Transportation Lines of a Front
Y
Colonel L. Sukholinin
Colonel D. Kazhiloti
In examining questions of materiel support to front troops in an
offensive operation under conditions in which rail deliveries have been
suspended, General-Mayor V. Yuryev touched upon a number of pressing issues
in his artic
Although basically agreeing with the author's conclusions and
proposals, we would like to express some opinions on the questions of the
organization of temporary transshipment areas.
As the experience of a number of front command-staff exercises
conducted in the military district shows,--the thhe advance preparation of
separate temporary transshipment areas (two or three per military district)
in the most "congested" areas of a road network, and the implementation of
general measures for increasing the viability of transportation lines do
not assure the continuity of transport.
As is known, in some border military districts there are railroads
with an operating length of thousands of kilometers. Along these railroads
are several thousand man-made structures, including bridges more than 100
meters long and a large number of tunnels.
If to these man-made structures are added hydrotechnical structures
which represent a potential threat to transportation lines (the widespread
destruction of dams causes catastrophic flooding of large areas and the
wash-out of transportation lines), then the answer to both questions raised
becomes quite apparent: the temporary transshipment areas prepared in
peacetime will probably not be able to fulfil the tasks assigned to them
with sufficient comprehensiveness; and concerning the number of these
structures, it is considerably less than the number of possible "barriers".
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*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thoueht" 1966, No 2 (78).
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Furthermore, these temporary transshipment areas are intended for use
only on the railroads at the same time that "barrier areas" can also appear
on the transportation lines of other types of transport.
The number of "barrier areas" will also not decrease in territories
seized from the enemy during an offensive by our troops.
The question arises: how can we assure the continuity of transport not
only in our territory, but also in the territory formerly occupied by the
enemy? It appears to us that the primary resolution of this question can
be achieved by establishing complexes of mobile temporary transshipment
areas in the military districts.
In suggesting that the temporary transshipment areas now in existence
on the railroads be supplemented with a system of mobile temporary
transshipment areas, we are specifically basing our suggestion on the fact
that mobile temporary transshipment areas will not be tied to a particular
territory and, for this reason, will be able to "serve" not only the
railroads but also other "barrier areas" of the front transport network.
As an example, we will examine a mountain-maritime theater of military
operations.
Here, railroads and roads are hemmed in by mountain chains and, as a
rule, pass through gorges and mountain passes in parallel lines,
intersecting on the way a great number of mountain rivers; there are a
considerable number of tunnels, bridges, viaducts, retaining walls, and
other man-made structures. Under these conditions "barrier areas" can be
formed to the same extent on both railroads and roads.
In connection with the possible destruction of ports and moorings on
coastal axes, loading operations must often be transferred to roadsteads
and unprepared coasts. Under these conditions, mobile temporary
transshipment areas can facilitate, and often even completely resolve, the
problem of assuring the continuity of transport.
It should be mentioned that, in our opinion, with the availability of
temporary transshipment areas in combination with mobile temporary
transshipment areas, railroads will not be an "auxiliary type of
transport", as General-Mayor V. Yuryev describes them, but will be one of
the principal types in the complex of transport means employed to supply 50X1-HUM
the needs of a front.
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The experience of recent command-staff exercises conducted in our
military district demonstrated that the establishment of mobile temporary
transshipment areas is completely possible and advisable. The areas were
formed from rear front bases, reinforced with the forces and means of the
Directorate of Rocket mops and Artillery, of air defense, of the air
army, and of the special rear services units and subunits.
A similar task, although on a somewhat smaller scale, was also
repeatedly accomplished at front command-staff exercises, for example,
during the transport of rocket troops, missiles, and missile propellant.
Before the beginning of the operation a special plan was formed for
the organization of the transport of missiles and missile propellant
through "barrier areas". This plan was developed by the chief of the
Military Transportation Service of the front in coordination with the chief
of rocket troops and artillery, the fuel supply department, and the
commander of the air army; it was signed by the deputy troop commander for
the rear, and was approved by the front troop commander.
In accordance with the plan, on both sides of the "barrier areas" the
necessary forces and means were concentrated in advance for the
organization of the work of the temporary transshipment areas for the
transport of missiles and special propellants around areas of destruction.
As the experience of exercises has shown, such a method greatly
facilitates the resolution of problems of the organization of continuity in
the transport of missiles and missile propellant when there is widespread
destruction on transportation lines. The most important fact is that the
proposed system of mobile temporary transshipment areas is not tied to a
particular "barrier area" and can quickly deploy in a required area when
necessary.
The mobile temporary transshipment area complex must correspond to the
physical-geographic conditions and to the development of transportation
lines in the area being covered.
In our view, the most desirable, general-purpose complex will be one
containing forces and means for: the preparation and maintenance of the
road network and water obstacle crossings; assuring the transport of
missiles, warheads and missile propellant; the transfer of fuel; the
implementation of transshipping and engineer work; and the organization of
communications. For this reason it can be assumed that a mobile tempor50X1-HUM
transshipment area must have up to one separate road-traffic control
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battalion, up to two batteries from a separate missile park battalion, one
special propellant supply platoon, motor transport and pipeline units, and
servicing and communications units.
Helicopters and trailers should be allocated according to need.
As calculations and the experience of exercises show, when one or two
organic temporary transshipment areas are available in a front during an
offensive operation, it is advisable to form from two to uor mobile
temporary transshipment areas.
With an optimal radius of operation of 100 to 150 kilometers, such a
number of mobile temporary transshipment areas in combination with
stationary temporary transshipment areas set up in peacetime at very
elaborate man-made structures on the railroads, will be able to cover the
transportation lines of an entire front area and assure the continuity of
materiel deliveries, troop movements, and casualty evacuations.
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