MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RECONNAISSANCE DURING THE ADVANCE OF A COMBINED-ARMS (TANK) ARMY FROM THE DEPTH AND ITS COMMITMENT TO AN ENGAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 14 Pages
DATE 25 Anoiict 1975
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance During the Advance
of a Combined-Arms (Tank) Army from
the Depth and Its Commitment to an 0X1 HUM
Engagement
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 4 of 14 Pages
Reconnaissance During the Advance of a Combined-Arms
(Tank) Army from the Depth and Its Commitment to an Engagement
by
Colonel N. Krivopustov
As a result of operational training, staffs and troops have acquired
experience in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance during an
advance covering great distances and during the commitment of the troops to
an engagement; our military press is also giving considerable prominence to
an analysis of this problem. Unfortunately, however, the discussion of
these questions most often pertains to the conditions that prevail when all
army troops are in a state of constant readiness or of simultaneously
completed mobilization.
However, in practice a more complex situation more often arises when
the troops are in different stages of combat readiness to carry out their
combat tasks. Thus, a combined-arms (tank) army of a border military
district may have in a state of constant readiness one or two motorized
rifle (tank) divisions, missile large units, air defense units, and also
the first echelon of the field headquarters and certain support forces,
including reconnaissance forces. Different periods of time may be required
to bring to readiness the remaining large units and units, the organs of
the rear services, and the second echelon of the army field headquarters.
When combat actions begin, the large units and units that are in a
state of constant readiness, and the first echelon of the army field
headquarters, will immediately begin to advance to the area of forthcoming
operations, while the second echelons, including a portion of the
reconnaissance forces and means, will only be starting to deploy and fully
mobilize. Thus, the army forces under these circumstances will move
forward by echelon at two to three day intervals. This means that the
commander and staff of the army will find it considerably more difficult to
command the troops and give them operational support.
During this period, reconnaissance measures may be carried out while
the enemy is making massive use of nuclear weapons against the deployment
and full mobilization areas of the large units and units, as well as
against targets in the zone of forthcoming troop advances. Reconnaissance
will immediately be confronted with additional tasks, since, as a result of
the employment of the means of mass destruction, extensive zones of
radioactive contamination will be formed, and main transportation centers,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 5(1X1 -HT TM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 5 of 14 Pages
bridges, and other important transportation installations may be destroyed.
A portion of the reconnaissance forces and means that were in a state of
constant readiness obviously will suffer losses.
In a situation such as this, the first echelon of the field
headquarters and the staffs of the large units and units in a state of
constant readiness should immediately begin to carry out reconnaissance
measures in support of the planned advance, primarily radiation, chemical,
and engineer reconnaissance measures, and also take steps to restore the
combat effectiveness of the reconnaissance units and subunits. At the same
time, large units and units with reduced complement (second echelon) should
form radiation, chemical, and engineer reconnaissance subunits and begin
performing actual tasks in the area of complete mobilization.
It is not difficult to deduce that under these conditions the army and
division staffs will have an extremely limited amount of time to plan
reconnaissance. For this reason we believe it advisable that each
formation (large unit) staff have a previously prepared reconnaissance plan
outlining the entire range of reconnaissance measures to be carried out by
the available forces and means and providing for a subsequent buildup of
these forces and means. Of course, upon the receipt of specific tasks, it
will be necessary to clarify or revise several parts of the plan (to
redistribute the forces and means, to review the sequence of their advance
and the types of activities in which they are to engage in the indicated
areas or on the routes), but the principal measures will still retain their
importance. During the DNEPR exercise, for example, the staff of one of
the armies refined the reconnaissance tasks in support of the advance of
the troops to the designated combat area, after it received a directive on
regrouping from the district (front staff.
It will also become necessary to refine the reconnaissance plan after
changes in the situation during the troop advance. Based on the experience
of exercises, it is advisable to make these refinements immediately if the
changes in the situation are of a severe and critical nature. In the
remaining cases, the plan is usually refined at the end of each day.
Simultaneously, the intelligence department of the army draws up combat
orders and conveys them to the large units and the reconnaissance units,
and helps the subordinate commanders to prepare for the timely advance of
the appropriate reconnaissance organs to carry out their combat tasks.
Since the amount of time available for organizing reconnaissance is
extremely limited, the reconnaissance plan, as has been demonstrated by the
experience of exercises, should be prepared in visual form on a map with
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0 Jo uM
Page 6 of 14 Pages
brief explanatory notes attached.
This plan usually contains: the goal, principal tasks, and targets of
reconnaissance during the period of the march, and, separately, of
reconnaissance against the enemy during the approach to the area of combat
actions and the commitment of the army to the engagement; an estimate of
the forces and means to be assigned to carry out each task, indicating
specific time periods; the routes of advance of the troops and of
reconnaissance organs that are to be sent out during the march, indicating
the time of their actions by lines and by targets; the time they are to
pass the departure line and the phase lines; the daily halt areas for the
army reconnaissance units; the sites where the technical means for
reconnaissance are to be deployed; the composition of the reconnaissance
reserves and their location in the march formation; a list of information
on the enemy and the terrain which must be obtained from the higher staff,
adjacent units, and forward operating troops; and the procedure for
organizing communications with reconnaissance units (subunits) and other
sources of reconnaissance data (information).
In the explanatory attachment those organizational measures are set
forth that cannot be displayed on a map, as, for example: the organization
of the rapid conversion of reconnaissance forces and means from peacetime
status to combat status; the place and procedure for receiving
reconnaissance units coming into the army from units which are in the
process of being formed; certain problems relating to coordination and
materiel and technical support; and the handling of information in the
field headquarters, large units, and units.
When organizing the work of the intelligence department, the officers
should first direct their main efforts toward carrying out those measures
that would ensure the timely initiation of activities by reconnaissance
forces and means in support of the advancing troops in a state of constant
readiness, in order to reduce to a minimum the interval between the time
the army receives the combat task and the time its reconnaissance organs
begin their activities.
During the advance of the army first echelon, it is advisable that
reconnaissance in support of the troops on the march be organized and
conducted to a depth of a two- to three-day march of an army, and to a
depth of a one-day march of a division.
The formation, large unit, and unit reconnaissance organs assigned to
reconnoiter the zone of advance of the army troops must obtain and promptly
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 7 of 14 Pages
transmit to the command data on: the condition of roads, bridges and
crossings on the routes; the most favorable troop rest and concentration
areas; and the devastated areas and zones of radioactive and chemical
contamination, and the possibilities for bypassing them and laying
cross-country roads.
The reconnaissance of the routes of march is conducted by
reconnaissance groups from the motorized rifle (tank) divisions and
regiments, and their composition includes combat engineers and chemical
warfare reconnaissance troops. The distance of these groups fibm` It-H
security line of friendly troops will essentially depend upon their
composition, their tasks, and the nature of the terrain. The distance may
be as much as 50 to 80 kilometers in the case of reconnaissance groups sent
out by divisions, and 30 to 50 kilometers for those sent out by regiments.
Under these conditions officer reconnaissance patrols may be widely
employed. They may be sent out in tanks, armored personnel carriers
(armored reconnaissance vehicles, infantry combat vehicles) and by
helicopter to determine the exact position of friendly troops, to check out
contradictory information on the situation, or to assess the situation in
areas that have undergone nuclear strikes. Reconnaissance should also be
conducted by the following: chemical reconnaissance patrols, chemical
observation posts, engineer reconnaissance patrols, and special
reconnaissance groups, sent out ahead of time on the routes of advance of
the army large units (units) and to the areas where there are to be halts
of several hours duration and one-day halts.
An air radiation reconnaissance group using helicopters from the army
level and equipped with special dosimetric devices should be sent out for
the purpose of quickly determining the overall radiation situation in the
zone of the advance, in an area subjected to nuclear strikes, and in
sectors of terrain that are difficult of access. It should be noted that
if a complex radiation situation in the zone of the army advance and in the
full mobilization areas of the large units and units of the army second
echelon is to be assessed within a short period of time, it is of the
utmost importance that we now develop and adopt special instruments to be
dropped from aircraft (helicopters) on the routes of march and in areas
where there are extensive zones of radioactive contamination, or to be
placed ahead of time on the routes of forthcoming troop advances, to
constitute part of the overall system for gathering and processing
reconnaissance information. This will make it possible to quickly
determine the nature of the contamination of the terrain without sending a
large number of reconnaissance organs into these areas.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 8 of 14 Pages
When carrying out these tasks in support of the troop advance, the
intelligence department of the army will concentrate its efforts primarily
on obtaining the information required by the commander to ensure the
successful commitment of the army, and particularly of its first echelon,
to the engagement.
As is known, a border district combined-arms (tank) army that is
located at a considerable distance from a possible area of combat actions
will not conduct reconnaissance of the enemy with its own forces and means.
Therefore, during the advance, the principal source of information on the
enemy will be the front (district) staff and the forward operating
formations. In view of this, the army staff, and particularly the chief of
intelligence, must maintain reliable communications and coordination with
the staffs of the forward operating troops; for this purpose the
composition of the army operations group should include two or three
intelligence officers headed by the deputy chief of intelligence. Their
principal task will be to familiarize themselves in detail with the
situation at the staff of the formation that is in direct contact with the
enemy, and to keep the command continuously informed on the status and
nature of enemy actions in the zone and on the flanks of the commitment of
the army to the engagement. They will also organize coordination with the
reconnaissance of the forward operating formation that is carrying out a
portion of the tasks in support of the advancing army, and coordinate
matters related to the deployment of their own forces and means and their
commitment to action prior to the approach of the first echelon of troops.
Before the first echelon of the army field headquarters reaches the area of
forthcoming operations, control of the army reconnaissance units that are
approaching the area of combat actions is usually turned over to these
intelligence officers.
It must be pointed out that to regularly receive complete information
from an operations group is a very complex matter. The difficulty in
effecting the timely delivery of information on the enemy during an army
advance lies in the fact that the sources obtaining it are located a great
distance from the army staff; and during most of the time it is regrouping,
the army staff is on the move. Consequently, in a number of instances it
is extremely difficult to organize and maintain reliable liaison with the
staffs of the forward operating troops through an operations group that has
been sent out to them. In addition, at the present time the procedure
charts and the methods of employing them still have not been perfected.
The processing and transmission of necessary information requires a great
amount of time and work. It therefore becomes necessary to use the
conin uiications channels of the General Staff, front (district), our
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 9 of 14 Pages
civilian ministries, and of the member states of the Warsaw Pact; to deploy
auxiliary army comnmications centers in the zone of the advance; and to
exchange secure troop control of documents.
In the concluding stage of the regrouping, the principal role in
carrying out the main reconnaissance tasks will be played by the forces and
means of the advancing formation. It is therefore essential that at the
very beginning of the march all measures be undertaken to ensure the rapid
and organized advance of units of radio, radiotechnical, artillery, and
special reconnaissance to the area of the commitment of the army to the
engagement, where after selecting advantageous positions in advance, they
must quickly deploy in battle formation and begin carrying out their
reconnaissance tasks.
The experience of exercises suggests that they can move out ahead of
the first echelon of the army troops, together with the road units of the
engineer troops and the first echelon of units of air defense and the
provost and traffic control service. When there is information that enemy
sabotage-reconnaissance groups and airborne landing forces have been
dropped in the path of the advance or that large gaps have been formed in
the battle formations of the forward operating troops, it is advisable that
the reconnaissance units move out immediately behind the forward
detachments or the advance guards. Such a procedure for the advance and
the coordination of the forces and means of reconnaissance ensures that
damaged sections of roads, water obstacles, and zones of radioactive and
chemical contamination are more quickly negotiated; and it also makes it
possible to more successfully combat sabotage-reconnaissance groups and
small subunits of enemy airborne landing forces during the march.
It is advisable that separate radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance
battalions and the artillery reconnaissance regiment proceed along one or
two army routes; and that the length of their daily marches, and the speed
and order of march, be planned so that during the end of the march they
move by company (by battery) in approach march formation along several
routes and along the entire zone of the army. It is important that these
units reach the designated areas and begin carrying out their assigned
tasks one to two days prior to the commitment of the main forces of the
army to the engagement.
It is advisable that a special purpose company move out together with
OSNAZ reconnaissance units,.or with the army forward command post. The
decision as to the time of dispatching reconnaissance groups from the
special purpose company, the procedure for sending them, and the number to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 10 of 14 Pages
be sent, will each time depend on the prevailing situation and the presence
and nature of reconnaissance objectives (targets), and will conform to the
requirement that up to one-third of the special purpose reconnaissance
groups always remain in the reserves of the army chief of intelligence.
In our opinion,.it is hardly advisable to drop special purpose
reconnaissance groups of the advancing combined-arms (tank) army ahead of
time (by two to three days) since doing so could reveal to the enemy the
beginning, and the axis, of the commitment of the army to the engagement.
Therefore, under the conditions being examined, it is desirable that at the
order of the front staff a portion of the special purpose reconnaissance
groups be detai a from the forward operating formation. The operations
group of the advancing army should assume command over it and direct it to
carry out reconnaissance tasks for its own support.
The most acceptable time for dropping the special purpose
reconnaissance groups of the advancing army is the night before the
commitment of the army to the engagement. However, it should be kept in
mind that the special purpose groups will be able to obtain the initial
reconnaissance information no sooner than five to six hours after being
dropped in the rear. of the enemy. This amount of time is necessary for
assembling, camouflaging, reaching the area of their activities, and
organizing and actually conducting reconnaissance. If the special purpose
reconnaissance groups are to carry out their tasks thoroughly and in good
time, they must be sent first of all to those areas where they will be able
to most quickly detect the advance or concentration of enemy
missile/nuclear weapons and his strike grouping and transmit reconnaissance
information to the staff three to four hours prior to the cc mitment of the
army to the engagement.
After carefully analyzing the volume of tasks confronting the special
reconnaissance of the army and the capabilities of a special purpose
company, we conclude that a maximum of four to five special purpose
reconnaissance groups can be sent out from the special purpose company at
one time, keeping up to one-third of its forces in reserve. As is obvious,
its capabilities are not great, especially if one considers that the
activities of special reconnaissance personnel in a number of instances
will involve not only reconnaissance, but also the organization of
sabotage, i.e., aggressively combatting the means of nuclear attack and
control posts, severing communications, and destroying stores of nuclear
weapons throughout the entire zone of forthcoming arm actions to a depth
of 100 to 500 kilometers. Since a group can be assigned to reconnoiter only
one probable area where an objective might be located, it is obvious that
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 11 of 14 Pages
if a combined-arms (tank) army is to reconnoiter several important
objectives, the above number of groups, which is that now authorized for the
organization of a special purpose company, is insufficient.
An urgent need has obviously developed to increase the capabilities of
army special reconnaissance and to somewhat alter its organizational
structure. This need has been further accentuated by the fact that in
recent years a trend has been observed in a number of exercises toward
including reconnaissance specialists in the special purpose reconnaissance
groups and in the deep reconnaissance groups to carry out specific tasks
(such as the reconnoitering of nuclear mine obstacles and the means of
chemical. attack). It is not always advisable to send independent engineer
eii chemical reconnaissance groups deep into the rear of the enemy.
In view of the foregoing, we believe that it is advisable that a
combined-arms (tank) army have a special reconnaissance battalion, rather
than a special reconnaissance company. It could be composed of two
reconnaissance companies, each with three platoons (and four squads per
platoon); a training company composed of three platoons (for training group
commanders, reconnaissance personnel, and radio operators); an
administration and service company; an engineer reconnaissance platoon; and
a chemical reconnaissance platoon. This would increase the capabilities of
army special purpose reconnaissance by a factor of two to three in
comparison with its existing capabilities. It would be possible to form
composite reconnaissance groups without drawing on other units for
reconnaissance specialists from the branch arms and services. The presence
of a training company in the battalion would make it possible to train on a
continuing basis highly qualified reconnaissance personnel to reinforce
special purpose reconnaissance groups during the course of combat actions.
The. experience of troop, experimental, and command-staff exercises
conducted in recent years demonstrates that aerial reconnaissance is the
most effective means of obtaining essential reconnaissance information on
the enemy and on the terrain. Under the complex conditions that exist at
the beginning of a march, it is capable within a short period of time of
determining the condition of the road network, bridges, and crossings, of
ascertaining the radiation situation, and of detecting changes in the
nature of the terrain resulting from the use of nuclear weapons by the
enemy.
Aerial reconnaissance of the zone of advance of the army is usually
carried out in conformity with the reconnaissance plan of the front
(military district), and draws upon combat aviation during the pe it od the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 12 of 14 Pages
latter is rebasing to the forward airfields in the designated area of
operations. In a number of instances, a tactical aerial reconnaissance
squadron may be placed under the operational command of the army for the
purpose of conducting tactical aerial reconnaissance both during the
advance and during the commitment to the engagement.
As the army troops draw closer to the area of combat actions, besides
performing tasks related to the study of the terrain and the routes in the
zone of the advance, aerial reconnaissance is assigned additional tasks
relating to the acquisition of information on the position and nature of
the actions of the enemy ground grouping and missile/nuclear means on the
axis of the probable commitment of the army to the engagement. During this
period it must determine the position of, and keep under observation, 80 to
100 enemy targets, approximately half of which will constantly be moving or
changing position. The immediate task of reconnaissance aviation is to
find and select from the large number of enemy targets those targets of
special importance to be earmarked for immediate destruction by the nuclear
means of the army.
The basic method of conducting aerial reconnaissance is to seek out
enemy targets and make a visual determination of the nature of their
activities and their coordinates. This information should be transmitted
by radio from the reconnaissance aircraft to the command posts of the
formations, large units, and units. Experimental aerial reconnaissance
exercises in our district have shown that the receipt of reconnaissance
information from an aircraft entails certain difficulties resulting from
the fact that staff officers are poorly trained in the receipt, processing,
and analysis of such information. Also, the low sensitivity of the R-313
radio receiver adversely affects the reception of signals.
The time interval between the detection of the target by the crews and
the receipt of the reconnaissance information from onboard the aircraft by
the staffs of the armies (divisions) amounted to tens of minutes.
Since we attach great importance to increasing the practical skills of
staff officers in the receipt of aerial reconnaissance information from an
aircraft, in our district we regularly (once or twice per month) conduct
special training sessions lasting three to four hours with intelligence
officers of the staffs of units, large units, and formations. This helps
the officers to achieve accuracy in the reception of aerial reconnaissance
information, speed in processing it, and promptness in reporting to the
command. The positive results of the above measure were evident during the
DNEPR exercise.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 13 of 14 Pages
This exercise also confirmed the need for an efficient system of
organizing the collection, processing, and transmittal of aerial
reconnaissance information to interested staffs. A post for the receipt
and processing of aerial reconnaissance information was set up in the
intelligence department of one of the armies. Its personnel consisted of
two officers, three sergeants, and a soldier. The receiver center was
located in a motor vehicle on which was mounted the radio equipment with
rigidly fixed (by crystals) tuning to frequencies in various bands, and
with the necessary communications means. This greatly helped to increase
efficiency in collecting aerial reconnaissance information.
The circumstances under which the army will enter the engagement, and
the need for effective employment of nuclear weapons against targets, make
it necessary to periodically observe particularly important enemy targets
during the preparation of a strike against them. Calculations show that in
the tactical zone these observations should be made at a rate of every 30
minutes to every 1.5 hours, and no more than every two to three hours in
the operational depth. It is very difficult to carry out this rate of
observation, reconnaissance, and final reconnaissance using only attached
reconnaissance aviation and supporting combat aviation. The experience of
exercises indicates the advisability of a combined-arms (tank) army having
its own organic tactical reconnaissance aviation and multi-purpose
helicopters. At the same time, they also can be used to drop reconnaissance
groups in the rear.
Reconnaissance of the air enemy during the advance of the army is
carried out by the means of the Air Defense of the Country and by the air
defense means of the socialist countries, and, in the area of combat
actions, by the means of the front and of the forward operating troops. To
obtain radar reconnaissance innformation, air defense posts are deployed at
army command posts; and these air defense posts give warning to the troops
of possible enemy air strikes. In addition, in the areas of a day's halt,
and also when the army forces are negotiating large water obstacles,
mountain passes, and places that are difficult of access, there should be
deployed some extra radar reconnaissance means from the complement of the
radiotechnical battalion of the army air defense.
In conclusion, we would like to say a few words about improving the
control of reconnaissance organs. As is clear from the results of
exercises, especially the DNEPR exercise, it is necessary to set up a
control post for the chief of intelligence. Setting up such a post would
make it possible to substantially increase the efficiency and continuity of
control of the forces and means of all types of army reconnaissance, to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
 ~. nv II _SSTTT\,r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0
Page 14 of 14 Pages
sharply reduce the amount of time it takes reconnaissance organs and means
to pass reconnaissance information, and also to ensure the timely
dissemination of necessary data on the enemy as reports to the army command
and as information to all interested echelons. The control post of the
chief of intelligence should be an independent, organic entity consisting
of an array of staff, receiver, transmitter, and specially-equipped
vehicles with a cross-country capability. These vehicles must have
multichannel communications, using secure communications equipment, with
all organs and chiefs of intelligence of subordinate large units (units)
that receive reconnaissance data from reconnaissance aircraft; the vehicles
also must have selective circuit communications with the army command and
the principal chiefs of the staff departments and of the branch arms and
services of the field headquarters. The tactical equipment of a.
reconnaissance control post should provide the documentation, and visual
display on an electron-optical screen, of all incoming reconnaissance
information, the position of operating reconnaissance forces and means, and
the availability and condition of reconnaissance reserves.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201210001-0