MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): COMBAT ACTIONS OF A TANK ARMY SEPARATED FROM OTHER FRONT FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201270001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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THIS DOCIRIOT BE REPRODUCED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
12 September 1975
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Actions of a Tank
rniy eparaMn Other Front Forces
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought". This
article presents comments on a 1965 book with the same title prepared by
the 7th Tank Army. The first section of the article criticizes the book's
treatment of tank army combat capabilities and such specific problems as
meeting engagements and assault crossings of water obstacles. Two other
sections provide general comments on the value of the book to military
science. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (7g) for 1966.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. F erence, cation have been
assigned the Codeword 50X1-HUM
iham E. Nel on
Deputy Director for
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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COUNTRY USSR
Y NOT BE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
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DATE OF DATE 12 September 1975
INFO. Mid-1966
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Actions of a Tank Army
Separated from Other Front Forces
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military
Thought". This article presents the comments of four authors on a 1965 book
with the same title prepared by the 7th Tank Army and edited by
General-Mayor of Tank Troops N. I. Batalov. In the first section of the
article, General-Mayor of Tank Troops G. Zavizion and Colonel L. Kurkov
criticize the book's treatment of tank army combat capabilities and such
specific problems as meeting engagements and assault crossings of water
obstacles. Colonel General G. Ariko and General-Leytenant P. Stepshin
provide, in separate sections, general comments on the value of the book to
military science.
End of Summary
Headquarters Comment:
Colonel General Grigoriy Ivanovich Ariko and General-Levtenant P. V.
Stepshin have held the position of Chief of Staff in the Belorussian and
North Caucasus Military Districts, respectively. There is no information
in available reference materials which can be firmly associated with the
other authors. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three
times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander.
It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. IS #207945
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Combat Actions of a Tank Army Separated from
Other Front Forces*-
by
General-Mayor of Tank Troops G. Zavizion, Colonel L. Kurkov,
Coloneleneral G. Ariko and General-Leytenant P. Stepshin
A work published under this title was written by the generals and
officers of the headquarters of the 7th Tank Army. When a work written by
generals and officers from troop units is brought to its logical conclusion
-- publication in a mass edition -- this is an important event in the
conduct of research in military science. The fact itself is indicative of
the broadening of the front of military science work and of its efficacy
and usefulness.
The publication of theoretical science works written by authors from
troop units attests to the creative growth of our military personnel, who
are capable not only of skilfully commanding troops but also of
theoretically synthesizing the experience of their combat and operational
training and analyzing new, difficult problems.
In the work under review the authors examine a problem which is very
important in present-day operations: the conduct of combat actions by a
tank army separated from other front forces.
This problem is important because, after the delivery of missile/
nuclear strikes, a deep penetration by advancing strike groupings of troops
into the enemy disposition, in cooperation with large airborne landing
forces, will be required in order to exploit the results of these strikes
as quickly as possible and to carry out a rapid offensive into the entire
depth of the theater of military operations. This in itself will reduce
the capabilities of the enemy to deliver massed missile/nuclear strikes and
to unite the efforts of his approaching reserves.
*Combat Actions of a Tank Army Separated from Other Front Forces, edited by
General-Mayor of Tank Troops N.I. Batalov, Military Publishing House, 1965,
104 pages and five inserts.
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At the same time, advancing ground forces groupings of our troops must
complete the destruction of opposing enemy forces, seize and hold
territory, and conduct other combat actions not connected with the
separation and the offensive in the depth of the enemy disposition.
Tasks varying in content and methods of fulfilment can be accomplished
by ground forces large units and formations which differ in composition and
function. The authors indicate quite correctly that it is primarily tank
armies that must be used to conduct highly maneuverable and mobile combat
actions and to deliver a deep strike to the entire depth of a theater of
military operations.
However, a combined-arms army also possesses superior combat qualities
and capabilities for accomplishing important combat tasks both in
cooperation with front main forces and independently. Moreover, because of
its composition, 5-5Fibined-arms army is more capable of fulfilling the
tasks of completing the destruction of an opposing enemy and of seizing
territory.
Unfortunately, the book does not devote sufficient attention to
analyzing and comparing the content of the tasks and the operating methods
of combined-arms and tank armies.
The authors demonstrate the necessity of the delivery of a deep strike
by a tank army and, based mainly on its operational-tactical
characteristics, they explain the function of a tank army. For example,
they state: "The special operational-tactical characteristics of a tank
army have predetermined its function and leading role in a modern offensive
operation...". And they continue: "...the unique function of a tank army
has also resulted in its being assigned an immediate task different from
the tasks of combined-arms armies" (Page 6). No explanation or analysis of
the tasks and operating methods of combined-arms armies is given in the
book.
In our opinion, it would be methodologically more correct to begin
with a short study of the general nature of present-day operations and the
need to fulfil tasks which vary in content and operating methods; then, on
the basis of this and also with regard for their diverse combat
characteristics and capabilities, to explain the functions of tank and
combined-arms armies. Thus, it would have been advisable not to compare
their operational-tactical characteristics, but to demonstrate more
conclusively the importance in present-day operations of the delivery of
deep and rapid strikes by the ground forces. Precisely for this reason it
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is advisable for fronts on the axis of the main strike to be composed of
the most mobile and highly maneuverable large units and formations,
primarily of tank armies.
In examining the combat capabilities of a tank army to deliver a deep
strike, the authors have on the whole correctly analyzed its fire power,
maneuverability and mobility, and formed entirely valid conclusions and
proposals. But in doing so more attention should have been given to
analyzing the capabilities of a tank army to accomplish independent
operational, and in a number of cases also operational-strategic, tasks
during actions when separated from other front forces. For example, it
would have been very useful to determine: for how long and at what distance
from the other front forces can a tank army conduct combat actions
independently, ---Tr?_ngu only its awn forces and means; and what would be the
results of the movement by troops of an army to certain
operational-strategic areas and installations.
Furthermore, it would have been more appropriate to regard the
separation itself not as something that increases gradually, but rather as
all-out drives in which, in certain cases, beginning with the first day of
an operation a tank army can advance more than 100 kilometers. During the
operation this separation sometimes can decrease (When an army is delayed
at contaminated zones and other obstacles, or when it conducts meeting
battles and engagements), and then increase again.
The separation of the troops of a tank army from other front forces is
one method of quickly achieving the goals of an operation. Therefore, this
separation is already envisaged in the concept of the front troop commander
and is supported by an entire system of measures for its achievement.
The separation is inseparably linked with a high rate of advance,
which must always be greater for a tank army than for combined-arms armies.
While making great demands on the headquarters of a front and the
General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to create the conditions
necessary for a tank army to operate when separated from other front
forces, at the same time the authors have not fully set forth all of the
capabilities of a tank army for conducting rapid and continuous actions in
order to deeply penetrate the enemy disposition and to accomplish
independent tasks.
Specifically, the book does not mention which enemy grouping a tank
army can operate against with its own forces and means and what damage it
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The reinforcement and support means assigned to a tank army for
conducting an operation are accepted by the authors without sufficient
basis. For the most part they are only taking into consideration the
experience of exercises of the 7th Tank Army. In research in military
science it is also necessary to make more extensive use of the experience
of other large units and formations, and also to produce more detailed
calculations and substantiations.
Problems of the conduct of a meeting engagement by a tank army should
have been analyzed anew in the book from the standpoint of the meeting
engagement being primarily a tank engagement, since, after the reciprocal
delivery of missile/nuclear strikes, it is the tank troops who will survive
to a large degree and retain their combat effectiveness, and it is they who
will play the principal role in meeting battles and engagements on both
sides.
It would also have been advisable to examine the various methods of
destroying advancing enemy reserves, not limiting these methods to meeting
battles and engagements alone. In a number of cases it will be more
advantageous for a tank army delivering a deep strike to destroy advancing
enemy reserves with missile/nuclear and chemical weapons, to delay their
advance and, by utilizing its own maneuvering capabilities, bypass the main
enemy groupings after leaving behind the minimum required quantity of
forces and means to complete the destruction of the enemy. The primary
attention of a tank army must in all cases be directed toward a rapid
advance without getting involved in protracted battles against opposing
forces.
As for the problems of an assault crossing of water obstacles by the
troops of a tank army, it would have been advisable to discuss first of all
the destruction of the enemy capable of delaying a tank army on the
approaches to a water obstacle or immediately at the obstacle. The
continuous development of the offensive on the opposite shore must remain
the main goal even during the assault crossing. In this connection, one
would have wished a more detailed analysis of the exercise experience which
was cited as an example. Without it, the example does not fully support
the theoretical conclusions of the authors on the assault crossing of water
obstacles from the march.
In examining the actions of the troops of a tank army during the
delivery of a deep strike, it would have been very useful to indicate the
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various methods of combat against the numerous antitank means of the enemy,
particularly antitank guided missiles.
A commendable aspect of the work is that the authors give considerable
attention to the control of army troops, to support, and to protection of
the troops against weapons of mass destruction. The book convincingly
presents the problems of cooperation with airborne forces and aviation and
describes party-political work during actions by a tank army separated from
other front forces.
It should be stated that on the whole, in spite of certain failings,
the work produced by the officers and generals of the 7th Tank Army is a
valuable theoretical study, which substantiates one of the most important
principles of operational art concerning the actions of a tank army
separated from other front forces.
The authors also are to be commended for having made a serious attempt
to synthesize the experience of combat and operational training of troops
and staffs and also materials from military science conferences held at the
field headquarters of the 7th Tank Army and in its large units. Therefore,
the proposals put forth also take on practical significance.
* * *
At the present time problems of the organization and conduct of combat
actions by a tank army separated from other front forces have still not
been worked out with sufficient thoroughness7--rEr the 1966/67 academic
year the Minister of Defense assigned the task: "Learn to use tank armies
in close cooperation with airborne troops for a rapid advance into the
depth in order to seize vital political-administrative centers and military
installations." Therefore, the work Combat Actions of a Tank Army Separated
from Other Front Forces, produced by the headquarters of the 7th Tank Army
and prepared for publication by the Military Science Directorate of the
General Staff, is of timely importance.
The authors have succeeded in making a fairly complete analysis of the
following problems: the function of a tank army in an offensive operation;
the operating methods and methods of use of a tank army separated from
other front forces; the organization and maintenance of steady cooperation
with the rocket troops, airborne landing forces and aviation; and also the
problems of supporting combat actions.
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The conclusions and recommendations contained in the work are
substantiated by the necessary calculations and experience of staff
exercises.
To be sure, the authors did not exhaust all problems connected with
the use of a tank army separated from other front forces for rapid actions
into the operational depth. However, their work will considerably aid
generals and officers in their theoretical training and practical
activities.
It should also be noted that the publication of theoretical works
written in troop units according to plans for military science work will
help in all possible ways to further develop military science thinking
among the troops and staffs.
It is advisable to more extensively and actively apply the experience
of the Military Science Directorate in publishing similar works, written in
troop units, in the course of future military science work.
* * *
We have received and studied with interest the work Combat Actions of
a Tank Army Separated From Other Front Forces, written by a collective of
authors from the 7th Tank Army and preparenbr publication by the Military
Science Directorate of the General Staff.
We believe that this form of publishing military science research
conducted among the troops is highly desirable. It helps to draw wide
circles of generals and officers into serious research in military science;
increases their personal interest in research results; and assures the
introduction into use in the science of a large quantity of factual
material accumulated among the troops, its thorough theoretical
interpretation, and the efficiency of transmitting research results to the
military reader.
The content of the work corroborates these observations. The book is
favorably noteworthy for a wealth of factual material drawn from the
experience of combat and operational training, for its originality of
presentation of a number of problems arising out of real situations, and
for the obvious practical value of certain recommendations.
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The publication of works produced in troop units and prepared for
publication by the Military Science Directorate, in our opinion, is
something we would be well advised to practice in the future.
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