MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY ROCKET TROOPS IN AN OPERATION OF THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201350002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 3, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Tar-SECRET
THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
3 October 1975
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Deployment of Army
Rocket Troops in an Operation of the Initial
Period of War
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article cites measures to ensure readiness of missile units for operation
upon alert and when there is a period of threat. Provision should be made
for appropriate siting areas, deployment of missile-technical bases and
meteorological stations, and for the secure communications means required
for control. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966. The
Russian-language version was disseminated as FIRDB-312/03886-74.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, re orts from this publication have been
assigned the Codeword 50X1-HUM
FIRDB-312/03190-75
Deputy Director for Ope ations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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FIPDB-312/03190-75
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR HRDB- 312/03190-75
DATE OF DATE 3 October 1975
INFO. Mid-1966
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Deployment of Army Rocket
Troops in an Operation of the
Initial Period of War
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor of Artillery M.
a aryc ev. This article cites measures to ensure readiness of missile
units for operation upon alert and when there is a period of threat.
Provision should be made for appropriate siting areas, deployment of
missile-technical bases and meteorological stations, and for the secure
communications means required for control.
Comment:
End of Summary
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Mikhail Ivanovich Makarychev, a Hero of the Soviet Union, took charge of
the Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Moscow Military District on 31
August 1969, and was promoted to General-Leytenant in the latter part of
1971. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times
annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The Russian-language
version of this article was disseminated as FIRDB-312/03886-74.
TS #208400
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The Deployment of Army Rocket Troops
in an Operation of the Initial Period of War
by
General-Mayor of Artillery M. Makarychev
In the first operation of the initial period of a war, a timely first
nuclear strike will have decisive importance for the destruction of the
opposing enemy grouping. Therefore, the movement of rocket troops from
permanent areas and their deployment must be carried out in a manner which
will ensure their readiness for carrying out their assigned tasks in
accordance with the plan of the front commander.
The results of exercises show that, under conditions when an army
begins an operation by moving from alert assembly areas, and its missile
brigade is called upon for the first massed nuclear strike and is deployed
near its permanent deployment areas, the following points are extremely
important in ensuring that the brigade is ready to launch missiles:
-- the advance preparation of alert assembly areas as siting areas,
separated by a distance of 10 to 20 kilometers from the permanent
deployment areas;
-- the creation of the necessary reserve of missiles and warheads at
mobile missile-technical bases, as well as missiles and propellant
components in the missile units. In order to save a great deal of time on
the preparation and delivery of missiles to the battalions, it is desirable
to maintain the warheads in the mobile missile-technical bases at Special
Readiness S with an allotment of one for each launcher;
-- the timely allocation of tasks on the preparation of the required
number of missiles, warheads, or ready missiles, and their delivery to the
missile units;
-- the establishment of reliable communications within the brigade and
stable communications and precise cooperation between the missile brigade
and the separate_mobile missile-technical base, and the missile battalions
of large units and the army mobile missile-technical bases. This can be
accomplished if the c ie o roc e roops an ar 1 ery has direct command
over the mobile missile-technical bases;
-- timely and precisely organized meteorological support.
If there is a threatening period prior to the time that an army goes
on an offensive, the movement of missile and missile-technical units to
their siting areas (deployment areas) and preparations for carrying out
TS # 208409
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their tasks can be made over a period of one to two nights. One battalion
of a missile brigade can be deployed in its combat alert assembly area and
remain on alert while the other battalions are moving and deploying in
their siting areas.
Missile units must have one missile for each launcher when they are
moving from the alert assembly areas. In some cases they may receive ready
missiles in the course of the march or at their siting areas.
Reconnaissance groups are sent out at least two to 2.5 hours before the
start of a march.
Motorized rifle subunits in armored personnel carriers should be
assigned to the commanders of missile and missile-technical units for
security and defense purposes.
The distance between missile deployment areas and the forward edge
(state border) may be 40 to 60 kilometers for a missile brigade and eight
to 12 kilometers for tactical missile battalions.
The siting areas and routes of travel for tactical missile battalions
are set by the commanders of the motorized rifle (tank) divisions, and only
in cases when the battalions are being used to accomplish tasks under an
army plan will the siting areas be assigned by the army headquarters.
The deployment areas of missile-technical bases may be 15 to 40
kilometers from the siting areas of missile large units and units.
A most difficult situation may develop for the rocket troops when
combat operations begin while they are under way and they are forced to
deploy for the fulfilment of tasks from the march in unprepared siting
areas.
Experience gained in exercises shows that it is best to designate
possible siting areas along the routes of travel of rocket troops in the
event that they are forced to deploy. Missile units should have their own
means for the topogeodetic preparation of launching sites and for
meteorological support. Provisions may be made for the leapfrog movement
of meteorological stations and their deployment for operation every 30 to
SO kilometers. The deployment areas and operating procedures of
meteorological stations should be reported to the commanders of the missile
units.
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Permanent wire communications lines and messenger means of
communications are used to control the missile units in the alert assembly
areas (siting areas near the areas of permanent deployment). Radios should
be used only to receive.
When the rocket troops are moving to their siting areas,
communications within the brigades should be maintained with
ultra-shortwave radios and messenger means of communications.
During preparations at the siting areas for the first nuclear strike,
communications with the missile brigade and the battalions should be
carried out over radio-relay and wire telephone and telegraph channels
equipped with secure communications equipment and other ultra-shortwave
radio sets. It is forbidden to transmit over shortwave radio sets during
this period.
On the basis of the results of exercises, we believe that the chief of
rocket troops and artillery of an army should have certain permanently
secure communications means for the control of missile and
missile-technical large units and units.
To increase the reliability of control it would be desirable to have
highly mobile tropospheric radio sets with an operating range of at least
120 kilometers.
Missile-technical units are experiencing an acute need for secure
communications equipment, and shortwave radios should be included in their
table of organization and equipment for the purpose of communicating with
missile transporters.
The results of exercises also show that the armies and divisions must
make detailed plans for the movement of an army missile brigade and
tactical missile battalions, respectively. In the latter case it will be
necessary to take into consideration army orders for the employment of
these battalions in grouped strikes.
In order to ensure maximum participation of missile units in grouped
and massed nuclear strikes, the staff of the rocket troops and artillery of
a front determines the siting area from which the units must be ready to
derlir-TF the strikes. In a number of cases, if plans have been made for the
use of an army missile brigade in a massed strike by a front, the brigade
may be moved in full complement in accordance with the Frairof the front.
TS # 208409
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The movement of mobile missile-technical bases must be planned in a
way that will ensure their maximum productivity in the preparation of
missiles and their rapid delivery to the missile units. Experience has
shown that an army missile-technical base can be moved daily a distance of
70 to 100 kilometers, while a mobile missile-technical base supporting an
army brigade can be moved once every 1.5 to two days in moves of 150 to 180
kilometers. If an army has a mixed mobile missile-technical base, it
should be moved by units (subunits for the preparation of tactical missiles
should be moved separately from subunits for the preparation of
operational-tactical missiles).
It should be pointed out that the presence of a mixed mobile
missile-technical base in an army tends to complicate both control as well
as the organization of cooperation between it and the missile units.
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