MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RAISING TROOP CONTROL TO THE LEVEL OF MODERN REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201580001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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COUNTRY USSR
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
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DATE
29 December 1975
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Raising Troop Control to
the Level of Y!.crn Requirements
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Raising Troop Control to the
Level of Modern Requirements
by
Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov
The experience of many centuries of wars conclusively shows that the
success of the battle, the operation, and the war is directly dependent on
the level, form and methods of troop control. History presents many
examples where military large units, formations and even the entire armed
forces of a country suffered serious destruction as a result of a low level
of troop leadership and unskilled troop control. Therefore, questions of
troop control have always been at the center of attention of military
leaders, formation commanders, and commanders.
It is impossible to isolate problems of leadership of the armed forces
and troop control from the general problems of control in the national
economy of the entire country. V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to the
question of control. He pointed out that it is possible and necessary to
learn to control the national economy, and that a high level of control is
a matter of ability and skill. In the Program of the CPSU, adopted by the
22nd Party Congress, the necessity of constantly improving control is
emphasized.
Recently the Central Committee of the CPSU has spent much the
studying problems of improving control over the national economy. The
Central Committee of the CPSU has carried out a truly revolutionary
reorganization of control over industry, construction, and agricultural
production. The November Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU
adopted important decisions for the reorganization of party leadership of
the national economy, and also for the reorganization of leadership of
scientific research and design organizations. All these decisions of the
Central Committee of the CPSU provide more defined leadership for the
national economy, allow for a fuller use of available reserves, and
separate Party and Soviet cadres correctly and organize their work better.
The instructions of the Central Committee of our Party concerning the
problems of reorganizing control over the national economy are a specific
program for the creative solution of the urgent problems of troop control
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It is necessary to note that in the matter of troop control we have
still advanced only slightly compared to that which was achieved during the
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final stage of the Great Patriotic War, although in the postwar period the
means for armed combat took a giant leap forward in their development.
Concerning the problems of control, we have many old habits ingrained in us
which today do not satisfy modern requirements for control. New problems
of control are solved diffidently and the theoretical foundations of
control are not developed.
The task, then, is to overcome this lag in control, to decisively
improve it, and to raise it to the level of development of combat means. A
further increase in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces depends, to a
significant degree, on solving the urgent problem of the fundamental
improvement of methods and means of troop control.
It is the intention of this article to summarize recent experience
gained in working out problems of control in exercises, to draw preliminary
conclusions from the discussion of these problems in the press, to try to
determine the most important problems of control, and to express the
author's opinion about ways of solving them.
In our press and at military science conferences, debates often arise
about what control is, and about whether or not there is a difference
between control and command and between control and leadership. These
scholastic debates have no practical significance. To control troops means
to command them, to lead them. This is the essence of all work by
formation commanders, commanders, and staffs of all levels.
Control is basically the correct distribution and placement of forces
and means, the assigning of tasks to them, the organization and support of
their combat employment, leadership of them in action, calculation of the
results of the actions, and monitoring of the accomplishment of the tasks
assigned. The formation commander, commander and staff control all forces
and means, units and subunits; they control missiles, aircraft, tanks,
warships and other combat means. However, leadership of personnel is the
main element of control. Only the proper leadership of personnel can
ensure the effective employment of the numerous and complex military
equipment in a battle, operation, or a war as a whole. To control
personnel means to unite their common interests, views and actions, to
coordinate their efforts, and to direct their actions toward the 50X1-HUM
unconditional fulfilment of assigned combat tasks regardless of the
complexity of the situation.
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Lenin's principles of leadership should form the basis for control:
knowledge of the job, firm adherence to principles, concreteness, an
uncompromising attitude toward shortcomings, subordination of personal and
departmental interests to general interests and to the interests of the
job, and concern for people.
In order to control troops successfully, it is necessary to be
completely familiar with military affairs, military equipment, combat
capabilities and combat effectiveness of the troops and forces and means,
and the methods for their employment in combat. But, this is still
insufficient. Troop control is a specific activity of people, and has its
own principles, methods, procedures, and equipment. Formation commanders,
commanders, staff officers, generals and admirals must know not only the
means and methods of armed combat, but also the methods and equipment of
control; they must possess the skills for troop leadership. Without firm
knowledge of the methods of control, and without knowledge of control
equipment and the ability to use it, it is impossible to expect qualified
leadership of troops, forces and means.
Methods and equipment do not stand still; they are constantly being
developed and improved. During the Great Patriotic War we accumulated
extremely valuable experience in troop control. We generalized the
experience, reflected it in regulations, manuals and scientific works, and
gave it practical application in operational and combat training. In the
postwar period this experience underwent significant changes; it was
enriched and improved under the influence of a wide variety of factors.
The main factors which decisively influence the development of troop
control methods are the development of armament and combat equipment and a
Change in the nature and methods of conducting combat actions. A factor
such as the development of the means of control and equipment of control,
and the improvement of the structure of control organs likewise plays an
important role.
The main features of the present stage of development of means of
armed combat are the development and introduction into the armed forces of
qualitatively new types of weapons and military equipment; this sharply
increased the combat capabilities of the armed forces and led to a
fundamental revision of organizational forms and of methods of conducting
military actions on all scales.
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The ground forces, which consisted mainly of non-motorized infantry,
armored troops and special troops, played the main role in the Great
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Patriotic War. The main means for firing at the enemy at that time were
tube and rocket artillery, tanks, and aviation, the depth and power of
whose strikes were relatively little. The main events in this war took
place in land theaters of military operations, and the results of armed
combat in these theaters in the end determined the outcome of the entire
war. The means of destruction did not permit the achievement of a rapid
change in the balance of forces of the combatant sides, which resulted in
the relatively slow development of military actions. On account of the
lack of necessary means of destruction, action against the deep rear of the
enemy was insignificant and did not substantially influence the outcome of
the war.
In the postwar period an unprecedented leap in the development of
means of armed combat occurred. The decisive event was the development of
nuclear weapons, which possess truly fantastic destructive and
casualty-producing properties.
Nuclear weapons became the main means of destruction in a war, and
they will exert the principal influence on all aspects of the organization
and conduct of combat actions in a future war. This powerful means can
almost instantaneously change the situation not only on the tactical and
operational scales, but also on the strategic scale.
The means for delivering nuclear weapons to the target were developed
at the same time as the nuclear weapons. In view of the exceptionally
great destructive force of nuclear weapons, the development of long-range
strategic means for delivering them to the target rose to primary
importance. At first, long range (strategic) aviation underwent rapid
development. However, in connection with the appearance of surface-to-air
missiles and fighter-interceptors, aircraft soon ceased to be an effective
delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons. In our country measures were taken
to develop and produce strategic and operational-tactical missiles, and
also missiles of other classes. Missiles became the most effective means
of delivering nuclear weapons, and quickly became the main means of
warfare.
Missiles possess an unlimited range of action, immense speed and
flight altitude, great precision in hitting the target and high
maneuverability of fire, and the capability to carry a nuclear warhead of
any size and yield. All this ensures the delivery of sudden strikes and
the swift and reliable destruction of a great quantity of targets 50X1-HUM
simultaneously in the deep rear and at the front.
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The level of development attained by nuclear weapons, their power, and
the availability of such improved means for delivery to the target as
missiles of various types, attest to the fact that nuclear weapons are a
means of achieving the goals of an operation and of armed combat as a whole
in short periods of time. Strategic nuclear weapons make possible not only
the destruction of the enemy's means for conducting war, but also the
undermining of his military-economic potential, and the disruption of the
vital activity of enemy governments to the point of the destruction of
entire countries. Operational-tactical nuclear weapons make possible the
destruction of the nuclear means of the enemy and his troop groupings.
Along with nuclear weapons and missiles, there appeared still another
very important military technical factor -- radioelectronics. Electronic
computer equipment and means of automation and mechanization are being
introduced into the Armed Forces in large quantities. This equipment
supports the combat employment of missiles and other means of combat as
well as troop control. It forms the basis for solving the problem or
integrated automation of the processes of troop control.
On the basis of the most recent achievements of science and technology
great changes have occurred in conventional ccmbat means. The widespread
and complete mctorization and mechanization of units and large units of
various branches of the armed forces immeasurably increased their a'eilities
to maneuver rapidly and to conduct combat actions at high speeds. The
introduction of nuclear power plants occupies a special place in the
technical equipping of our Armed Forces. At present this applies mainly to
the Navy, but in the near future these power plants evidently will find
practical use in other branches of the armed forces. Likewise, the
development of rocket technology, motor engineering, aviation technology,
and armored technology is of great importance
As a result of all of this, the Armed Forces have acquired completely
new combat characteristics in the postwar period. Their fire power has
increased, and their structure has changed. A new branch of the armed
forces has appeared -- the Strategic Rocket Forces; and the other branches
of the armed forces have undergone qualitative changes.
The development of new powerful and long-range means for armed combat
led to a fundamental change in military art. The nature of war changed;
new methods and forms for conducting war and combat actions of the branches
of the armed forces, and a new military art appeared. Along with the
defeat of troop groupings, aviation, and naval forces in theaters of 50X1 HUM
military operations, the destruction of strategic nuclear means located deep
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in the enemy's territory, the undermining of his military-economic
potential, and the disruption of the vital activity of enemy countries
became important in attaining the goals of a war. A future war will
involve unprecedented destruction and extermination. Military actions will
be distinguished by mobility, short duration, and frequent and abrupt
Changes in the situation.
The changes which have occurred in the postwar period in means of
armed combat, in the technical equipping of the Armed Forces, and in
methods of armed combat are placing totally new requirements on control.
Today it is already difficult to control troops and forces and means using
those methods and that equipment for control which were employed in the
last war. There have appeared new weapons, the power of which in combat
can in no way be compared with previous weapons. Furthermore, the Armed
Forces have acquired qualitatively new combat characteristics. Also new,
better educated and more active personnel, for whom the carrying out of an
order becomes creative work, have entered the Armed Forces. Control is now
acquiring a new content; the means and methods of control are changing. In
other words, the same revolution is necessary in the means and methods of
control as occurred in the means and methods of armed combat. All
generals, admirals and officers must realize this and not cling to the old
and the obsolete, but must in every pcssible way aid the development of the
new in matters of control.
Control of the Rocket Forces is a totally new field. What does
control of these troops entail? It entails: selecting targets for nuclear
strikes; accurately determining their coordinates; making complex
calculations for launching missiles; ensuring timely preparation of
missiles and nuclear warheads; giving the signals for launching the
missiles; ensuring the missile is on target and that it reliably destroys
the target; and setting up monitoring and recording of the results of the
destruction. It was not necessary in previous wars to accomplish anything
similar to this. This is a new phenomenon in control; furthermore, it is
an extremely complex phenomenon and requires a high level of scientific
training on the part of all personnel, especially command and engineer
personnel.
The commanders and staffs of fronts, armies and large units must now
solve extremely complex problems oT77Femployment of operational-tactical
missile/nuclear weapons. With the skilful emplcyment of these weapons it
is possible to achieve exceptional results in armed combat in a short
period of time. In combat activity by troops during a nuclear war, troop
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movements, marches and maneuvers, which have now become a component,
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integral part of combat actions, will be of primary significance, and in
many instances they will comprise the essence of these actions. Military
actions will develop along axes at great speeds, and the maintenance of
cooperation among forces and means will become more complicated. Great
skill in troop control is now required of commanders and staffs.
The following have acquired great importance in controlling the Air
Defense Forces of the Country: timely detection of air targets by technical
means; automatic guidance of surface-to-air missiles to the targets and
semi-automatic guidance of fighter-interceptors; quick analysis of a
complex air situation; timely concentration of air defense forces and means
to destroy the majority of attacking enemy missiles and aircraft; and the
employment of nuclear warheads for these purposes.
In controlling the Air Forces, the following have become very complex:
preparation of aircraft, missiles and nuclear warheads for a combat sortie;
control of flights over great distances; organization of navigation, of
support for the navigators and of support in negotiating the enemy's air
defense and in reliably destroying targets with missiles and bombs; and the
conduct of maneuvering by aviation.
Problems of preparing missiles, nuclear warheads, submarines and
aircraft for combat employment and for their employment in operations will
also be solved in the Navy. Control of nuclear submarines during actions
in remote areas presents special difficulty for the Navy.
Even a brief and far from complete listing of the new problems of
control which command cadres in all branches of the armed forces must
confront shows that it is impossible to deal with these problems using old
standards.
It was formerly said that to control meant to foresee, This formula
remains valid today, but it already is not enough. Under modern
conditions, control of troops, forces, and means is primarily concerned
with computing and making all possible calculations. Without precise
calculations, all foresight is impossible. Calculations were made in the
past, but they were mainly limited to determining the quantity of forces
and means necessary for conducting an operation, to calculating the balance
of forces and means, to making calculations involved in troop movement,
transport of materiel, etc. Such calculations will also be necessary under
modern conditions. But, to these are added a significant number of more
complex calculations in the area of the employment of the Rocket Forces: 50X1 -HUM
navigational and navigator calculations; calculations for the interception
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of a moving target by means of destruction (for the air defense forces);
calculations connected with determining the radiation situation and with.
recording radiation doses of personnel; and many other calculations. A
significant portion of these calculatiens have to be rade very quickly.
This is practically impossible to do without complex computer equipment. A
great knowledge of mathematics and computer equipment is now required of
command cadres.
Now, as never before, control must be efficient, mobile, and specific.
Rapid and frequent abrupt changes in the situation will require that the
command and staffs solve problems of the preparation, planning, and support
of combat actions and troop leadership in the shortest possible time, as
well as accurately in all details. Former prolonged reflection,
conferences with subordinates, coordinations and agreements, and the
compilation of voluminous orders, directives and planning documents have to
be decisively eliminated from the work of commanders and staffs. A
repetition of such control methods under modern conditions could cause
irreparable damage when the troops are fulfilling their combat tasks. It
should be kept in mind that there will also be a heavy flow of all possible
types of information (such as orders, instructions, reports, summaries
reconnaissance data, etc.) from the top down and from the bottom up under
modern conditions. All this information must be quickly transmitted to the
appropriate addressees and, in a short time, be processed, summarized,
prepared and reviewed by personnel empowered to make a decision. It would
be impossible to complete all this work without mechanization and
automation.
An important feature of modern control is the sharp growth of the role
of centralized leadership of the Armed Forces from the top to the bottom.
That level of centralization of control which existed during the Great
Patriotic War does not now meet modern requirements. Let us take a problem
such as working out the crucial decision for the conduct of an operation.
During the Great Patriotic War, the General Headquarters of the Supreme
High Command usually briefed front commanders about an impending
operation. Front commanders presented their opinions on conducting
operations. The General Headquarters reviewed them, made the final
decision, and set tasks for the fronts; the fronts planned and prepared the
operation. SimiIar methods were employed in7rEiiTs, armies and large 50X1-HUM
units. Here the following method was often u: aftera briefing
concerning the task received, the staff of the operational formations, and
the commanders and chiefs of the branch arms compiled information, prepared
their proposals, and reported to the formation commander, after which a
decision was reached. On the whole it took a great deal of time to work
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out a decision and to plan and prepare an operation. The circumstances of
a future war will hardly allow such slow preparation for an operation.
Every formation commander and commander will constantly have to be
knowledgeable about the entire situation. Without outside advice, or after
a short exchange of opinions with a limited circle of subordinates
(primarily with the chief of staff), he will have to personally make the
crucial decision, assign tasks to the troops, organize combat actions and
monitor their course.
At the same time, the role of initiative and creativity on the part of
subordinate formation commanders and commanders will increase
significantly. Knowing the general situation and the goal of the combat
actions, the formation commander and commander must be ready to make a
crucial decision without waiting for instructions from above, especially in
those instances where the situation requires immediate action. Any delay
or hesitation can often be greatly detrimental to the course of combat
actions. Therefore, in a nuclear war it is necessary to judiciously
combine the centralization of control with development of the initiative
and creativity of formation commanders and commanders at all levels
These, in our opinion, are the most important requirements made upon
control under modern conditions.
In order to ensure steady, continuous, and efficient control of
troops, forces and means in a future war, it is necessary to provide
formation commanders and staffs with appropriate new control equipment to
revise the structure of control organs, and to work out new methods of
leadership in the Armed Forces.
Recently a large amount of work was carried out on the development and
introduction into the Armed Forces of new control equipment. Radar
equipment and radio-relay communications means have been extensively
developed. New radios and automatic secure communications equipment for
telegraph transmissions and conversations have entered into service; the
first models of automatic secure communications equipment for telephone and
radio have appeared. Facsimile equipment and loudspeaker communications
and equipment have been introduced as an integral part of combat weapons
(at missile launch sites, in deployment areas of surface-to-air missiles,
on aircraft, submarines, etc.). High-speed communications equipment has been
developed. In the work of staffs several models of keyboard calculators
and punchcard calculators have begun to be used. Higher-level staffs h'1 HUMbegun to use electronic computers such as the M-20, STRELA-6, URAL-2,
TRANZISTOR, and FAKEL.
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All this, however, is only the beginning. The control equipment
already in service is far from perfected, and there is still extremely
little of it. Automatic secure communications equipment for telephone and
radio conversations is unstable in operation, and much time is needed to
adjust it. The range of operation of many radios is no longer
satisfactory. Radio communications means have low transmission capacity
and low resistance to interference, and their operation can be disrupted as
a result of nuclear bursts. (This is especially true of shortwave radios.)
Radio-relay means are still bulky and vulnerable, and it takes a great
amount of time to adjust them. Computers are so cumbersome, and so
dependent on stationary operating conditions, that their use in the Armed
Forces is made extremely difficult.
As a whole, existing control equipment does not ensure the timely
transmission and processing of the flow of information or the making of
necessary calculations. It is bulky, operates slowly, is not mobile
enough, has poor security, and is vulnerable to interference (including
that from the flux of radiation during nuclear bursts). It does not ensure
reliable control of troops, forces and means during mobile actions and
under rapidly changing conditions. One must note such a shortcoming as the
diversity of equipment and extremely insufficient standardization, which
impedes the manufacture and introduction of equipment into the Armed
Forces. This situation requires the carrying out of a firm and unified
technical policy. We have been slow to develop technical. means which
facilitate the work of the commander and staff worker. In essence, we have
no such equipment. As a result of this, the productivity of the work of
generals, admirals and officers in troop control is very low, which results'
in inflated tables of organization.
All this is becoming a serious hindrance to the further development of
military affairs, and is beginning to adversely affect the combat readiness
and combat effectiveness of the troops.
Existing control equipment can and must be improved. But this does
not provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of control. The
fundamental reorganization of the entire technical system of control and
the extensive mechanization and automation of all control processes,
including the work of the corrander and staff officer, with. a gradual
transition to integrated automation of the entire control system, are
necessary. Mobile electronic computers, the communications means
corresponding to them, and other technical means of control, shouid be the
foundation of an integrated automated control system. But, the
estahlishaent of such control systems is a complex and long preme 50X1-HUM
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is, therefore, necessary to establish it gradually, stage by stage.
First, new means of minor automation and mechanization must be
introduced into the system of control. The introduction of automatic
secure communications equipment for telephone and telegraph transmissions
and conversations over shortwave and ultra-shortwave radios, and over
radio-relay and wire communications links will be of the greatest
importance in improving the effectiveness of control. Attaining automatic
secure communications for all communications would greatly speed up the
assignment of tasks to the troops and the collection of information, would
increase the effectiveness of troop leadership and would strengthen the
personal influence of the commander on the course of combat actions. At
the same time, it is necessary to introduce cipher and coding equipment,
signal-coding devices, ultra-high speed communications means, and sound
recording and loudspeaker communications equipment at control posts. To
mechanize the computational and other work of the staffs, it is necessary
to introduce keyboard calculators and punchcard calculators, means for
duplicating maps and graphic and textual documents, means for mechanizing
drawing and clerical work, and others. Finally, it is necessary to be
persistent in mastering the use of electronic computers and the working out
of algorithms, and, at the same time, to prepare staffs for the transition
to integrated automation.
As the equipment mentioned is introduced and mastered, experience is
gained, and more complex equipment -- primarily mobile electronic computers
-- is developed, it will be possible to switch to the integrated automation
of all control processes. The automation of interconnected control systems
for all the Armed Forces is the next task.
An automated control system will consist of a complex of various
technical means. The nucleus of this system will be electronic computers
and new communications means -- telecode communications means with
automatic secure conmmnications equipment. An integral part of this system
will be various devices to facilitate the work of the commander and staff
worker: devices for representing the situation, high-speed printing, and
the automatic input and output of information; means for technical 50X1-HUM:
reconnaissance and navigation; and other equipment.
This system must provide for: automatically collecting, processing,
recordinc, and outputting information about the situation; making
computations concerned with planning and controlling military actions;
relaying directives, instructions, and other documents to those who are to
execute them; and monitoring the fulfilment of combat tasks.
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The use of electronic computers in combination with other means of
automation must ultimately cause a fundamental change in control methods,
sharply increase the effectiveness of control and, most importantly,
increase the speed with which various control levels react to the combat
situation. The method of gathering and processing information will be
changed. Primary data will be immediately coded and input into the
computer, which will collate the data and automatically find the optimal
variant for the decision. All stages of planning, including the evaluation
of the situation and collation of different variants, can be executed by
the computer.
The introduction of new control equipment and the automation of
control are closely connected with improvement of the structure of control
organs. It is impossible to imagine a situation where new control
equipment would enter into service with the currently existing control
organs. Views were expressed in our press to the effect that each
higher-level staff and its primary directorates should be provided with the
whole range of technical means, including computers. If we were to follow
such a path, then the whole idea of automation would be discredited. A
serious reorganization of the entire structure of control organs is needed.
It is necessary to sharply reduce their size, simplify them, and decrease
the multiplicity of steps in procedure. It is necessary to attain a
situation in which control organs with a small number of personnel and a
minimum amount of computers, equipment and devices operating at full
capacity could ensure steady and continuous troop control. This task also
cannot be accomplished immediately; rather, it must be done gradually, as
experience is gained. We must begin, clearly, with the establishment of
experimental sectors and centers.
When speaking of the existing structure of control organs, one must
note that it is far from meeting those requirements which are made upon it
under modern conditions. It is complex, has many steps in rrocedure, too
many personnel and, as a whole, is too expensive and insufficiently
efficient.
The existing structure of control organs at the strategic and
operational levels has developed gradually as the Armed Forces developed
and as new branches of the armed forces, branch arms, and operational
formations were formed. The organization of the headquarters of fronts and
armies during the last part of the Great Patriotic War formed the basis for
the structure of control organs. When a new branch of the armed forces and
its control organs were established (main staffs, staffs of the operationa7
formations) they were organized in the same way as the headquarters of a 50X1-HUM
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front or an army. If we compare the headquarters of a front with the
headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, it appeFFF that their
organization is approximately the same -- the same overall staffs, staffs
of the branch arms, and directorates of the rear -- although their
functions in troop control and their methods of control differ. Even in
such a distinctive branch of the armed forces as the Strategic Rocket
Forces, the structure of control organs was initially based, to a
significant degree, on that of the ground forces; it was later necessary tc
rectify this.
The primary task in improving the structure of control organs is to
establish as constantly combat ready -- that is, with a small number of
personnel and not requiring the carrying out of full mobilization -- all
central organs directly connected with troop control, and headquarters of
air defense districts, fleets, and formations and large units of all
branches of the Armed Forces. It is necessary to decisively eliminate all
excesses in the control apparatus, reduce the table of organization, and
seek a way to decrease the multiplicity of steps in procedure. Of course,
this work must be accomplished gradually, as experience is gained and means
of mechanization and automation are introduced into service; however, it
should also be done without any special delay.
Such are the general problems of control which concern all branches of
the armed forces. We will now examine control of the troops of a front in
more detail.
II
Recently, problems of improving troop control in the front and army
have been given considerable attention.
The theoretical and practical solution of this important problem was
carried out in the following main directions: finding new tables of
organization for the field headquarters of fronts and armies, as well as of
large units and units; and developing and introducing into the staffs new
methods of working and ways of controlling troops which meet the demands of
modern technology and the nature of war.
In order to more deeply study and resolve all these problems, a
significant amount of research work has been conducted, and a large number
of different conferences and meetings have been held among the troops and
at academies. Working out problems of troop control was one of the main
training goals in all war games and command-staff and troop exercises. A 50X1-HUM
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number of exhibitions displaying both civilian and military models and
serial-production and experimental models of control means, have been
organized to study means of minor automation and mechanization of the
processes of troop control and to select the best models of these means.
In order to achieve more effective results, the Minister of Defense
decided to conduct a series of special research command-staff exercises, at
which primary attention would be devoted to the in-depth study of problems
of the tables of organization of staffs and the use of new technical means
of control and new methods of carrying out staff work. These exercises were
conducted in the complex operational-strategic setting of the initial
period of a war, which promoted the proper study of the assigned problems
in a complex situation.
The most important research command-staff exercises were conducted in
1962 in the Kiev, Leningrad, and Belorussian Military Districts. Formation
commanders, generals, and officers of the staffs and of the research and
umpire organizations did much work at these exercises; this made it
possible to gain valuable experience, which laid the foundation for solving
a number of specific problems aimed at increasing the efficiency of troop
control.
First of all we will examine the organizational structure of the field
headquarters of the front and armies. The structure or thei-e-Teadquarters,
which has existed until recently, was worked out and put into effect in
1957. It was based on experience gained over a long period in the
organizational development of our Armed Forces. In essence, the basis of
the organization of field headquarters of the front and armies in 1957 was
the organization of these headquarters as it existed during the last year
of the Great Patriotic War with allowance made for those changes in
equipping troops with new combat equipment which took place during the
postwar period. At that time, this was a good organization for field
headquarters, fully ensuring control over the troops of the front and
armies in the event of war. However, at the present time, tHrg--
organization has already become considerably obsolete and needs
improvement.
When the organization of field headquarters of the frcnt and armies
was adopted, the Strategic Rocket Forces did not yet exi7Z?IE the Armed
Forces; the quantity and yield of nuclear warheads that we have available
today did not exist. Individual models of operational-tactical missil(50X1-HUM
had only beglui to be put in service with the fronts. Now, fronts have
tactical and operational-tactical missiles in?TETW quantitiFg7--issiles
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with a range of fire of SOO to 700 kilometers have begun to appear. New
tanks, antitank guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, new v/
fighter-bombers, bombers and fighters, new means of control, etc., are
entering into service. Naturally, it was impossible to foresee all this in
1957. Therefore, the existing organization of field headquarters does not
fully ensure control of the troops, in particular control of rocket troops
and other new combat means existing in the front and army.
A substantial shortcoming in the structure of the field headquarters
of 1957 is that it differs significantly from the headquarters of military ,
districts, groups of forces and armies which we have now. In order to make
the transition to a wartime table of organization, the reorganization of
control organs, and even the carrying out of their full mobilization, are
necessary. In connection with this, the constant readiness of control
organs to control the troops in the event of the sudden outbreak of a war
is not ensured.
Finally, the structure of organs of the field headquarters of the
front and armies which was adopted in 1957 is too unwieldly and awkward. It
suffices to say that in a front field headquarters there are 1,300
personnel and in an army frerrheadquarters -- SOO. The field headquarters
of a front amounts to almost a regiment, and the field headquarters of an
army -- a battalion. In the same way as the front and armies, the tables
of organization of corps, divisions, regiments, etc. are inflated. This
does not help to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops; rather,
it lowers it. Popular wisdom says that large staffs are a sign of the
army's weakness, not its strength.
Extremely diverse proposals have been made concerning the question of
the organization of the field headquarters of the front and army. Some
comrades consider the 1957 structure of control organs to be completely
suitable for present-day conditions, and that no basic changes should be
introduced into it. This, to be sure, is an unacceptable point of view.
Those shortcomings which were discussed above indicate that the time has
come to make substantial corrections in the organization of the field
headquarters of the front and armies.
Other comrades, on the other hand, believe that this organization for
the field headquarters of the front and army has become completely
outdated, does not meet modern requirements and needs a drastic and
fundamental change; in conjunction with this, they have introduced
extremely varied reconnendations for its reorganization.
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The staff of the Belorussian Military District has worked out a
fundamentally new structure for the field headquarters of the front and
army. Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya Ivalinovskiy
permitted the commander of the troops of the Belorussian Military District
to test this structure in a command-staff exercise. Such a test was made in
1962.
The proposal of the staff of the Belorussian Military District
amounted to the following. The directorates and departments of the branch
arms and services (rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops,
engineer and chemical troops, and others) should be removed from the field
headquarters. Based on the directorates and departments of the branch arms
and services, headquarters should be established for the missile corps and
the corps of air defense troops in a front and, correspondingly, for the
divisions or brigades in an army, as well as for the groups of engineer and
chemical troops. Then, all large units and units of the corresponding
branch arms should be subordinated to the headquarters of these corps,
divisions, and groups.
The functions of the abolished staffs and directorates of the branch
arms and services were transferred: matters of combat employment -- to the
operations directorate or department; matters of supply, maintenance and
repair -- to the deputy commander of the troops for armament and combat o
equipment. Under the deputy commander of the troops for armament and
combat equipment, a staff was established. All directorates and
departments concerned with matters of the maintenance, repair and supply of
missile and artillery equipment, armored equipment, motor vehicle and
tractor equipment, engineer equipment, chemical equipment, and
communications equipment were subordinated to it. In the operations
directorate were established: a planning department; a department for the
protection of troops against means of mass destruction, with a radiological
center; a department of the operational rear; a department of information;
and other departments and sections.
According to the view of the staff of the Belorussian Military
District, such an organization of field headquarters provided a reduction
in the number of control organs directly subordinate to the commander, a
closer contact with the troops in the matter of control by chiefs of the
branch arms and services, an easing of the work load of control posts, and,
ultimately, an increase in the efficiency of control. However, the
exercise did not confirm such prognoses. 50X1-HUM
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In spite of the fact that representatives of the branch arms and
services were included in the operations directorate, the directorate, in
essence, could not cope with all the problems involved in the combat
employment of formations, large units, and units of all the branch arms,
The commanders of the troops of the front and army obviously missed the
qualified assistants in the person o??The commanders of the branch arms and
their directorates for solving a wide variety of problems concerning the
combat employment of the branch arms which neither the operations
directorate nor the operations department was able to solve. A significant
increase in the volume of work and numerical strength of the operations
directorate made it unwieldly and awkward, and able to cope with its direct
responsibilities only with difficulty.
The establishment of a missile corps, a corps of air defense troops,
and groups of engineer and chemical troops did not prove to be justified.
In fact, these organs became intermediate levels of transmission of control
between the front staff and the troops. They did not simplify troop
control; ratrler, they complicated it and made the front staff more remote
from the troops. Besides this, they required the expenditure of additional
means of communications. Also, the number of personnel in. the control
organs increased, since the headquarters of the corps, divisions and groups
were larger than the directorates of the chiefs of the branch arms and
services in the front and army.
It could be said that it is not possible on the basis of one exercise
to arrive at a final conclusion of the unsuitability of the structure of
control organs which was proposed by the Belorussian Military District.
This view, of course, is valid to a certain degree. The author does not
intend to completely dismiss the proposal of the Belorussian Military
District; in it is raised an idea of simplifying control organs, which
deserves attention. However, a drastic and fundamental change in the
structure of the field headquarters of the front and army is premature.
Staffs and formation commanders are not vet re7Y for this, and control
organs are still poorly supplied with control equipment.
There are many discussions about the necessity of increasing the role
of the staff, and about freeing the formation commander from solving 50X1-HUK
problems of supposedly secondary importance. Basically all these
suggestions are intended to provide staffs with greater authority: to plan,
organize, and control everything, leaving overall control and the signing
of documents prepared by the staff to the formation commander. Therefore,
they say, the chief of staff must be a competent, trained general or
officer, while the conmiander only has to possess strength of will. This is
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clearly a mistaken point of view. The formation commander or the commander
is the central figure in troop control. He must be capable of solving all
problems concerning preparation for combat actions and troop control
independently. For this, it is not enough to possess the quality of strong
will; it is also necessary to have the very highest military training. Of
course, the chief of staff must also be trained and strong-willed, but, all
the same, he is not the central figure in troop control.
We have worked out a model for a new organization for field
headquarters which was specially tested in experimental exercises in the
Kiev and Leningrad Military Districts in 1962, as well as in other
exercises. This model provided for the reinforcement of combined-arms
staffs and the establishment of organs which would be qualified to solve
problems of the combat employment of missile/nuclear weapons and other new
combat means. The field headquarters of a front was reduced by 342 people,
and the field headquarters of an army by 207?
The basic changes in the organization of the field headquarters
amounted to the following.
Apart from the command, there are three staffs in a field
headquarters: the combined-arms staff, the rocket troops and artillery
staff, and the rear staff. The remaining staffs were abolished, and in
place of them directorates and departments were established within the
field headquarters. In the operations directorate, a combat operations
planning department was set up; the operatlons department of the
directorate was charged with the task of troop control (in this department
elements -- one for each axis -- were established in accordance with the
number of armies and separate large units); and the information department
of the directorate was reinforced with specialists on radiation conditions.
In the intelligence directorate, a reconnaissance planning department, a
department fcr air reconnaissance, and a reconnaissance center was
established. In the combined-arms staff, an independent department for
radioelectronic countermeasures was established. All communicationa
(except air defense communications and rear coplaunications) were
concentrated in the hands of the chief of communications, who was
subordinated to the chief of staff. The surface-to-air missile departr,-me
was removed from the directorate of the chief of rocket troops and 50X1-HUM
artillery and transferred to the directorate of the chief of air defense.
The directorate of tank armament and the directorate of the motor vehicle
and tractor service were combined. In the directorate of the rear, the post
of quartermaster was abolished, and the military transportation service and
the road service were subordinated to the chief of the rear. Analogous
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50X1-HUM
changes occurred in the field headquarters of the army.
The exercises in the Kiev and Leningrad Military Districts
demonstrated that the structure for the field headquarters of a front and
army envisaged by this model, basically meets modern requirement77-7t is
less unwieldly, improves the planning of operations, increases the role of
the combined-arms staff, ensures great efficiency in troop control, and
establishes better conditions for the use of new control means. Also,
several shortcomings of this structure were exposed. Primarily, the
experience of the exercises showed the impracticality of the operations
planning department (and, in the army, the operations planning section) in
the operations directorate. This is fully understandable, It is
impossible to separate the functions ef planning, transmitting tasks, and
monitoring troop actions. These are obvious tasks of the operations
department and it must accomplish them. It is impossible to consider as
correct the assignment of permanent axis officers in the operations
department. Such a measure leads to the narrow specialization of
operations officers and to their poor knowledge of the overall situation.
Axis officers are a contribution which belongs to the past. The operations
directorate is the brain of the staff. It must be completely manned with
highly trained officers and generals qualified to resolve all questions of
planning and controlling troop combat actions. There is no need to
establish an air reconnaissance department within the intelligence
directorate of the staff of the front. It is sufficient to have several
specialists in air reconnaissancF7E-the directorate. It is advisable to
leave the control of air reconnaissance to the air army. Other
shortcomings of the model were also detected.
On the whole, the structure for the field headquarters of a front and
army, which was tested in exercises last year, became the basis for the
preparation of new tables of organization for these headquarters.
We will speak next about the new organizational structure for the
field headquarters of a front and armies which recently was approved by the
Minister of Defense,
In the first place, the differences between peacetime and wartime
tables of organization were, in the main, eliminated. We should not have
carry out the full mobilization of the field headquarters of fronts (in ;
peacetime, military districts and groups of forces) and armieTT?ITTY must
be basically the same in peacetime and wartime. Only in this way
can
provide constant high combat readiness of control organs; under modern
' 50X1-HUM
conditions, this is of decisive significance in ensuring the successful
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conduct of military actions in the event of the sudden outbreak of war.
In the new tables of organization, the number of personnel in control
organs has been reduced significantly, particularly at the expense of all
types of excesses, an inflated servicing organization, etc. Overall, the
front headquarters has been reduced by 45 percent, the headquarters of the
TEMErned-aims army -- by 50 percent, and the headquarters of the tank army
-- by 34 percent. The quantity of transport means and technical means of
control has been correspondingly reduced.
As a result of these changes the new organizational structure of field
headquarters became more efficient, and better adapted for troop control in
a nuclear war, than the former structure. Now, it is important to
completely ran the headquarters with well-trained generals and officers
capable of creatively resolving the questions of troop control. In the
final analysis, people, and their level of training and practical
experience in controlling troops, decide everything.
However, we must not stop here, but must seriously look into the
future. The structure of control organs will also change as new equipment
and means of automation and mechanization are introduced into the
headquarters and as the transition to an integrated automated control
system progresses. Sooner or later, we will arrive at that structure for
control organs about which larshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. 70alinovskiy
wrote in an article published in the Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal 17dlitarv Thought", in the siRtF-75.17e 67-7-071. subordinate to the
commander 57.?Ege?EFont and the army will be: one staff, consisting of a
group of generals, operations officers and specialists on all the branch
arms; and a directorate directing rear support for the troops. The control
organs will be small in personnel strength, mobile, efficient, and equipped
with control equipment; the multiplicity of steps in the procedure of
control will be reduced. However, this is as yet a task of the future.
One of the main trends in resolving the problem of improving troop
control is the widespread introduction into staffs of various means of
automation and mechanization. The importance and necessity of equipping
staffs with these means is now understood by the overwhelming majority of
our generals and officers, but the practical solution of this problem is a
very complex ratter.
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The introduction of automated and mechanized means should ensure the
accomplishment of such important tasks as increasing the productivity of
the work of control organs, ensuring a quicker response to the situation
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and, on this basis, sharply reducing the number of personnel of the staffs.
However, no type of automation or mechanization can replace the mental
capabilities of the commander and staff officer. It will only promote more
effective work in troop control.
Means of automation and mechanization of the processes of troop
control include a significant amount of extremely diverse equipment, from
the simplest devices for facilitating work with a map to the integrated
automated systems of the future based on the use of computers and automated
means of communications.
As a result of a series of research and development works carried out
over the past three to four years, the conclusion was reached -- which was
correct in principle -- that fundamental changes in the troop control
system can be achieved only after the introduction of integrated automated
systems into service with the troops. Work on the development of technical
means for an automated system of control of front troop is already being
conducted by our industry. However, a great amount of time will be needed
for their introduction into service with the troops.
As we have already mentioned above, we consider the very rapid
development and introduction into the staffs of means of minor automation
and mechanization, and new means of communications, to be the immediate
technical task in solving the problem of increasing the efficiency of troop
control. This task must be accomplished in a feasible manner in a.
relatively short time; the introduction of this equipment will quickly show
results in the improvement of troop control.
In exercises conducted in the staffs several tens of models of various
means of automation and mechanization were used. The experience of the
exercises definitely confirmed that the use of means of automation and
mechanization by the staffs makes it possible to significantly increase the
efficiency and security of troop control. With these means the staffs
worked successfully at reduced strength.
Let us look more closely at how the control equipment performed during
the exercises, and what conclusions can be drawn from it.
Automatic secure communications means, used in the exercises in 50X1-HUM:
significant numbers, made it possible to make the main front and army
communications, including radio, completely secure, and first time
to establish a unified field system of secure telephone communications from
the front to the division and missile brigade. This reduced to a minimum
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labor-consuming manual coding in the staffs, and thus sharply increased the
efficiency of troop control. Moreover, it significantly decreased the
extent to which the reliability of control depended on the operation of
wire communications and government high-frequency communications.
The equipment for security of telegraph transmissions (r-204) operated
stably, on the whole. It is now the main type of equipment having
guaranteed stability of security. The T-204 is included in small
quantities in the tables of equipment of the communications units of
military districts and armies.
The T-205 equipment is included in the tables of equipment to provide
secure telegraph communications of the front and army with the staffs of
large units, but it still dces not have sufficient reliability of
operation. Therefore, it is necessary to take measures for improving the
quality of this equipment and also for mastering as quickly as possible the
new model of equipment for secure telegraph transmissions (F-206), which
has entered into service and which in the near future should replace T-204
and T-205 equipment.
The new equipment for secure telephone conversations on radio-relay
and wire lines, the T-216 (LIAW, was especially readily used by staffs
for troop control; however, it requires good comiunications channels.
Models of the new ELBRUS automatic secure comirmnications equipment
performed quite favorably when telephone conversations were transmitted via
shortwave and ultra-shortwave radio links. The equipment provided stable
secure telephone communications via radio between the staffs of the front
and army to a range of up to 60 kilometers when moving and up to 100
kilometers when stationary. The ELBRUS secure coLurunications equipment is
the best means for the future; we should devote special attention to its
introduction. It is advisable to have ELBRUS at the control posts of the
front and army, as well as at the control posts of large units and units.
For the first time under field conditions staffs used experimental
models of the VYNPEL military facsimile equipment with START secure
communications equipment. They were tested on the front-army link for
transmitting situation diagrams, charts, and textual cfocuments. The
transmission of a standard-size sheet took no more than five minutes. The
great effectiveness of using graphic documents must be emphasized. Thus,
for example, transmitting combat instructions in the form of a diagram is
five times faster than transmitting textual documents. This saves time
also in preparing the document. 50X1-HUM
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After some modification, MIPEL with START will go into serial
production and begin tc enter service with staffs.
A subsequent task consists of completing the development of
large-format facsimile equipment (with secure communications equipment).
The use of cipher and coding machines, according to the experience of
exercises, speeds up the enciphering and encoding processes fivefold to
sevenfold. Cipher machines should be introduced into all cipher organs of
the staffs of fronts and armies for enciphering especially important
documents. It isto develop a more portable cipher machine for
the cipher organs of the staffs of large units.
The new FIALKA coding machine, which can be used not only by cipher
clerks, but also directly by operations officers, performed very favorably
in the exercises. This machine may be most widely used in the absence of
secure comiumications equipment.
Along with the introduction of already available coding machines, it
is necessary to speed up the development and equipping of the troops with a
new type of equipment which provides for both preliminary encoding and
immediate on-line operation; and this will significantly increase the speed
of passage of information among staffs.
In the air armies of a number of military districts, signal-coding
devices of the TFPESTOK type with and without VETKA secure copultunications
equipment, and another device of this type which has been developed, were
used most successfully for transmitting signals, commands, short
instructions and reports. They ensure rapid transmission and immediate
reverification. In transmitting short instructions, this device has a
noticeable advantage over other means. With this, the VETKA secure
communications equipment provides guaranteed security of transmissions.
The necessity of having high-speed signal-coding devices was once
again confirmed in an exercise of the Leningrad Military District by the
experience of transmitting signals for alerting staffs, signals for putting
the Rocket Forces in a state of increased combat readiness, and signals for
their delivery of nuclear strikes. Transmitting signals by conventional
means is intolerably slow, whereas only seconds are required with 50X1-HUM
signal-coding devices.
In spite of certain shortcomings in the signal-coding devices
available, they must be introduced into the staffs of the Rocket Forces
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the air defense troops of the front (imilitary district) and armies, of the
air armies, and of aviation large units.
At the same time scientific research organizations must be seriously
concerned with the development of a common standardized signal-coding
system for all branches of the armed forces which would ensure the rapid
and reliable transmission of signals, commands and short instructions, and
the receiving of reports.
The experience of the exercises fully confirms the advisability of
using field-type sound recording equipment in the staffs, making it
possible to record conversations -- including those via communications
means -- and instructions from the command and reports, and to subsequently
process the magnetic recording or listen to it again. The sending of tapes
with recorded instructions to subordinate staffs also was employed.
The P-130 dictaphone which has entered service needs to have several
technical defects eliminated. However, it must be introduced into the
tables of equipment of the primary directorates and departments in the
field headquarters of the front and armies and be more widely used in their
work.
The imported =VATIC dictaphone, which records onto a recording
disc (instead of a tape), is used in staffs and is suitable for recording
short conversations, instructions and reports, and, when necessary, for
sending or filing them. It would be advisable to have a similar dictaphone
under production in our own industry.
Regarding commercial tape recorders, it is desirable to have them in
the communications centers of command posts to monitor conversations. The
future task of our communications specialists is the development of a
portable dictaphone, that is, a 'pocket" dictaphone for the troops.
Loudspeaker communications equimEIL is being used successfully by
staffs in exercises and in everyday work. However, the commercial models
DGU-20 and DW-10 are poorly suited to field conditions. During an
exercise in the Leningrad Military District equipment manufactured by their
own personnel was used. It was considerably better and more economical
than commercial models.
50X1-HUM
Keeping this experience in mind we should expedite the development and
acquisition from industry of field loudspeaker equipment. 50X1-HUM
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Keyboard calculators were used to great effect during exercises. They
were used in the air army -- within the nonorganic computation-computer
post, and in the combined-arms staffs and rear organs -- in a decentralized
manner. They were used with the greatest success in the directorates and
departments of the rear, missile and artillery armament, engineer troops,
and air defense troops, and in the organization and mobilization
directorate. The time it takes to make calculations with keyboard
calculators is, at the minimum, two to three times less than the time
required for calculations done manually. This enables officers to be freed
for other important duties, and, where there are calculating personnel, to
reduce their number.
Punchcard calculators. In a Leningrad Military District exercise, a
reduc-e777a7Tricarchcard calculators, set up in a vehicle, was used for the
first time in exercises by personnel of the intelligence directorate of the
Leningrad Military District staff. The equipment was used for storing
actual intelligence data arriving from OSNAL: units and for automatically
collating information about US strategic aviation, earth reconnaissance
satellites and other targets. The time needed to automatically collate
various information about the enemy was 10 to 15 minutes, which was a gain
of many hours. In the future, the Leningrad Military District intends to
use this set for other types of front reconnaissance, in particular combat
reconnaissance. This interesting iET important experience must be
thoroughly studied and, after being generalized, relayed to the staffs of
all branches of the aimed forces.
Experience shows that, for mechanized calculating and planning and for
carrying out the more labor-consuming computational tasks under stationary
conditions in groups of forces and military districts, it is advisable to
set up machine calculation stations equipped with one or two sets of
punchcard calculators and several keyboard calculators. Such a machine
calculation station has already been set up and is operating in the Moscow
Military TJ strict In 1963 machine calculation stations will be set up in
the Leningrad and Kiev Military Districts and in the Group of Soviet
Forces, Germany. Experience gained in operating similar stations in
civilian organizations shows that their introduction significantly
increases work efficiency and leads to reduction in the number of recording
and calculating personnel. 50X1-HUM
In the exercises, an experimental model of a staff printing device for
printing a situation on a map in three colors was tested in the staff of
the front. The productivity of this device is twice that of the means
prov7757?by the table of equipment. Clearly, it would be advisable to adopt
50X1-HUM
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this device into service.
The TPA-1 topographic printing device, a table-of-equipment means
of division staffs, was fairly widely used for reproducing graphic and
textual documents in front and army staffs. It was concluded from the
exercises that this device should be given to the staffs of the front
(military district) and armies.
The imported THERMCTAX copy machine, intended for rapid reproduction
of textual and graphic documents (20 x 30 centimeters) in one color, was
used successfully in a Leningrad Military District exercise. When our own
industry masters the production of an analogous device, T=CCOPIER, it
will be advisable to use it in the primary directorates and departments of
the staffs of the front (military district) and armies.
During the exercises several devices for obtaining data and making
calculations about the radiation situation were tested. The LOGARIFM
remote-controlled radiation monitoring installation, consisting of 15 to 20
automatic sensors and one central control panel, provided automatic
observation of the levels of radiation on terrain covering an area of up to
150 square kilometers and automatic transmission of the results of these
measurements to the central control panel. The use of this installation
makes it possible to decrease the number of personnel assigned for
conducting radiation observation, and also to sharply reduce the time
needed for conducting reconnaissance (down to five to ten minutes).
The EV-1 electronic computer allowed the staffs to quickly solve
problems connected with evaluating the radiation situation. This is a
small, uncomplicated, desk-size device.
Both the LOGARIFM and EV-1 devices still require some modification,
after which measures should be taken for the serial production of them.
The communications center installed in MI-4 helicopters, which was
tested in various exercises, ensured troop control in flight and on the
ground. It can be used as a mobile means for relocating the operations
group of a staff. This means will be of special importance in providing
troop control on the march and during an offensive at high speeds.
In general, it is considered that the use of means of minor automation
and mechanization by staffs substantially increases the efficiency of troop
control and makes it possible to have smaller staffs while not
significantly increasing the number of specialists in communications
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
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centers. Therefore, introducing these means into staffs must be regarded
as an immediate task.
However, we must not stop here, but must solve the problem of the
automation of control, the most reliable basis for the fundamental
improvement of troop control.
The most important means of ensuring automated control in the future
control system for front troops will be mobile, small, multipurpose
electronic computers being specially developed in accordance with a decree
of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of the ussa.
They will be capable of storing a great amount of data (information) in
their memory about our own troops, the enemy and the terrain. They will be
able to solve information-logic and computational problems, and ensure the
rapid selection, processing and output of information, and the immediate
transmission of tasks to the troops.
It must be emphasized that these electronic computers are intended for
serving staffs and solving problems of troop control not only during the
preparation for an operation, but also in the course of the operation.
Therefore, these computers, installed in vehicles and trailers, will always
be moved along with the staff. The use of stationary multipurpose
computers to automate the processes of control of the troops of the front.
and, moreover, of the army and the large unit, as has been suggested
some comrades, comrades, is clearly unacceptable. It is another natter to use
stationary electronic computers during command-staff exercises and war
games. They find the most extensive use in these instances. More than 70
such exercises and games were conducted in all branches of the armed forces
during 1D61-1962. In a number of exercises, each staff used eight or nine
multipurpose stationary electronic computers, with communications set up
over hundreds of kilometers.
Conducting exercises and games with the use of stationary electronic
computers is extremely important. It allows us to determine and clarify
which troop control processes can be assigned to mobile electronic
computers in the future and which should remain with the staff and
commander. It also allows us to study possible organizational changes in
the staffs and their working methods as a result of the introduction of
electronic computers, During these exercises we familiarized our coevoald
personnel with the capabilities of electronic computers, checked the
usefulness of the problems which were worked out in making
operaticnal-tactical, engineer-technical and rear services calculations and
ways for improving them, and studied a variety of other problems.
50X1 -HUM
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In some exercises the number of tasks which staffs accomplished using
electronic computers reached SO and more. These tasks are grouped according
to the following basic problems: calculations on planning the employment of
nuclear weapons and determining the effectiveness of nuclear strikes;
evaluating and forecasting the dose of radiation received by the troops;
evaluating the effectiveness of means and groupings of air defense;
calculations for planning the regrouping of troops; calculations connected
with planning and supporting combat actions of the air army; and
calculations concerning various rear services.
From the experience gathered by tho staffs in solving problems on
electronic computers during exercises, these main conclusions can be drawn.
First, the use of electronic computers to make complex, labor-consuming
operational and other calculations frees officers for creative work in
troop control. Second, the staffs of military districts and groups of
forces must gradually make the transition to solving problems with the help
of electronic computers in direct support of their practical work, in
particular for verifying basic operational calculations, including those on
the concepts for exercises and war games. Third, the number of problems
worked out by academies and institutes still is insufficient and their
quality does not always satisfy the requirements of the staffs; therefore,
further extending the range of problems to be solved with computers and
improving their quality must be considered one of our primary tasks.
Let us dwell briefly on communications. In recent years radio,
radio-relay and wire communications meTiTS?Have been developed
significantly.
Radio communications have become especially important in ensuring
reliable troop control in modern, highly mobile operations. Ever since
telegraph and telephone transmissions over radio have been made secure by
means of secure comiltunications equipment, the radio has become a basic and
indispensable means of troop control.
Radio communications, however, have substantial shortcomings. In the
first place, they have a low-capacity multichannel capability and cannot
fully satisfy the requirements for commnications channels. In the second
place, unless special protective and radio camouflage measures are taken,
radio comarnications can be easily blocked and disrupted by jamming by the
enemy at the most critical moment of an operation. We have encounterod a
new, previously unforeseen difficulty: nuclear bursts at great altitudes in
the ionosphere disrupt shortwave radio communications for a period ef -c---
50X1
several minutes to several hours. -HUM
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In spite of existing shortcomings, radio communications should be used
extensively, and staffs should be taught to use them for troop control in
any type of operation and under any conditions, while employing effective
radio camcuflage measures. Staffs should also be taught not to limit their
use cf radio communications out of fear that the enemy will locate the
control posts by direction finding. Ultra-shortwave radio communications,
which are considerably less susceptible to the effect of nuclear bursts,
should be used particularly extensively.
Modern multichannel radio-relay communications means have great speed
in establishing communications and high mobility. They can be used
successfully for augmenting wire comunications which lag behind the
troops; for setting up lateral communications lines, which increase the
reliability of connunications and ensure the cooperation of troops along
the front and with adjacent troops; and also for establishing
communications with rocket troops, aviation and other branch arms.
An analysis of the capabilities of the means and forces of
comunications leads to the only correct conclusion: that it is necessary
to concentrate comamications forces and means and centralize their control
under a single authority, that is, that it Is necessary to set up a unified
communications system common to all branch arms participating in the
operations. Setting up autonomous communications systems for the rocket
troops, the air defense troops of a front (army) and other branch arms
leads to a dissipation of conmunications forces and means, to a
considerable decrease in the effectiveness of their employment and to an
excessive, unwarranted increase in communications troops.
A unified conmunications system of a front (army and corps) having a
multichannel net of radio, radio-relay and 0'.re comunications lines with
auxiliary communications centers on them, makes it possible, with fewer
forces and means, to provide direct channels for any branch arm
participating in the operation. If necessary, these forces and means can
be used to establish separate special communications links to a large unit
or unit of any branch arm or branch of the armed forces, should the
situation require it.
In the near future new multichannel radio-relay stations and radios
with a greater range of operation will enter service with the troops.
Field tropospheric radios, which provide reliable multichannel
communications to significantly greater distances than radio-relay
stations, are being de'oeloped. All this will make possible more reliable
conmunications in a front and army, 50X1-HUM
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Problems involved in setting up control posts and determining a system
for them deserve serious attention.
The basic requirement made of these control posts is that they be
capable of fully ensuring stable, continuous troop control in any
situation, however complex it may be. This requirement can be satisfied by
means of the achievement of maximum survivability for control posts, the
proper organization for them and the appropriate technical equipment.
In the past the survivability of control posts was ensured by the
secrecy of their movement, location and operation -- especially the
operation of radio communications means -- and by the organization of the
appropriate guarding and defense, by advance preparation of alternate areas
for their location, etc. Of course, all these measures have fully retained
their importance even under modern conditions, but now they are no longer
sufficient to achieve continuous and stable troop control. If earlier
there was the fear that the enemy would put individual elements of a
control post out of action, now there is the constant threat of complete
and instantaneous destruction.
Some comrades propose establishing several fully equipped control.
posts ready at any moment to assume troop control; that is, along with the
basic command posts and rear control posts, establishing 41ternate or
reserve command posts and rear control posts. It is thought that all these
posts should be established during peacetime and be allotted for in the
corresponding table of organization of field headquarters and staffs.
At first glance such a system of control posts seems attractive.
However, if we examine it more closely, we must inevitably conclude that it
is unacceptable. Primarily, it is unwieldy and uneconomical, and requires
a great outlay of communications means, personnel and transport. A
considerable number of people and numerous communications means do not
actively participate in providing control; they are, in fact, placed in
reserve, and it is not known whether they will be put into operation at
all.
It seems to us that the system of control posts adopted by us --
command post, forward command post, and rear control post -- meets modern
requirements and is able to provide troop control to the fullest degree.
Such a system is economical. The work at these posts can be provided for
by the available complement of staffs and commmications means of our
existing organization. 50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
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The command post is the main post from which the formation commander
(commander) controls the troops. The post must be small in its number of
personnel. It contains the main complement of operations officers of the
combined-arms staff and the staffs (departments) of the branch arms and
special troops, a small operations group of the rear, and also the main
portion of the communications means. All the rest, which are not involved
in providing direct control over troop combat actions, should be located at
the rear control post. Otherwise, the command post would be unwieldy and
sluggish, and its vulnerability would be increased.
Recently in the military press there have been proposals to organize
the work at command posts according to the principle of so-called control
centers: to establish an operations-reconnaissance information center, a
missile/nuclear center, an air defense center, etc.; and to include them in
the table of organization of staffs. The essence of these proposals
amounts to concentrating work which is similar in nature in separate
elements, which, in the opinion of their authors, supposedly will increase
the efficiency and skill of control.
However, study, as well as practical testing of a system of control
centers in command-staff exercises, demonstrated their ineffectiveness.
This is fully understandable since an attempt is being made here to
artificially divide the unified process of control into isolated elements.
A splitting up into centers can in no way increase the efficiency of
control. It will more likely bring about the opposite result inasmuch as
the very idea of centers predetermines their isolation, requires additional
coordination and the organization of cooperation among the centers, and, in
the final analysis, leads to the loss of valuable time.
There must be only one control center. This center is the command
group, at the head of which is the formation cohuonder himself who has been
given the authority to personally make decisions, assign combat tasks to
the troops, and direct their efforts for achieving the assigned goals. The
task of the combined-arms staff and the staffs and departments of the
chiefs of the branch arms and special troops is to ensure the precise
fulfilment of decisions of the formation commander.
The forward command post is established when it is necessary, because
of the situation, For the formation commander to be closer to the troops,
and also when the main command post is being moved to a new location. In
all cases, the formation commander moves to the forward command post only
after a decision has been made and all basic instructions have been 50X1-HUM
transmitted to the troops.
50X1-HUM
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The forward command post is also used as a reserve or alternate post ,
to which troop control can be transferred at any moment in the event the
main command post is put out of operation.
By virtue of its purpose, the forward command post must be in constant
readiness for operation and must be capable of providing steady troop
control. Consequently, it must contain the same elements as the command
post, but be considerably smaller in the number of personnel; that is, it
must be a command post in miniature.
We are striving to free the command post and forward command post as
much as possible from those organs which are not directly concerned with
providing control over the combat actions of troops, and to locate these
organs at the rear control post. This naturally entails an increase in the
complement of the rear control post. Very likely, it will have the most
personnel and be the most diversified in composition. To ensure secrecy of
operation and increase the survivability of this post a considerable
dispersal of its elements will be necessary.
The presence of three deployed control posts fully ensures the
survivability of the entire control system. In the event that the enemy
puts the command post out of action, troop control will be exercised from
the forward command post by the deputy formation commander, who usually
heads this post. It is true that the group of operations officers at the
forward command post is not as large as that at the main command post, but
it will subsequently acquire competent officers taken from lower-level
staffs and other staffs. In the final analysis, it is not a matter of the
quantity of personnel but rather of their capabilities and skill in
accomplishing the tasks confronting them.
Under certain circumstances control over the combat actions of the
troops can also be transferred to the rear contrel post. This, of course,
does not mean that the chief of the rear must command the formation or
large unit, although even such a variant is not excluded. We do not lack
chiefs of the rear who are capable and well-trained in operations and can
successfully cope with the new role. We are talking primarily about the
use of the rear control post simultaneously to control not only the rear
but also combat actions of the troops. 50X1-HUM
The survivabiTity of the control system can also be increased by 5OX1HUM
designating in advance in an order one or two lower-level commanders as
deputies. The experience of the last war regarding this is sometimes
forgotten, and we must fully reinstate .1t. We must learn to control troops
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from a lower-level staff in the event that control from the main command
post is disrupted; for example, we must learn to control the troops of a
front from the command post of one of the armies, the army from the command
post of a division, and the division from the command post of a regiment.
In order to do this it is necessary to prepare staffs in advance and to
provide them with the appropriate documentation and communications. As the
experience of exercises has demonstrated, it is impossible to control
troops from the command post of a subordinate level without such advance
preparation. For example, in an exercise in the Kiev Military District the
front commander, who was at the command post of an army, in accordance with
the situationwhich was created, was supposed to assume control of the
troops of the front. However, this was impossible since the corresponding
preparation had not been carried out in advance.
Thus, the existing system of control posts at its present stage of
development can ensure stability of control as a whole. The task consists
of fully mastering this system, and most important, achieving effective
activity by control posts under the most difficult situational conditions,
and achieving their complete interchangeability.
Another important problem is increasing the mobility of control posts
in every possible way, which can be achieved by equipping them with
command-staff vehicles having a cross-country capability and means of
communications which ensure control while on the march. Such a command cost
will be mobile in the full sense of the word, and will not require
additional time for setting it up or dismantling it.
Improving control of the rear continues to be a big problem. There
are now several types of supply and repair of combat equipment concentrated
in the hands of the chiefs of the branch arms and special troops, as though
control of rear units and facilities were decentralized. in connection
with this, opinions are being expressed about the necessity of
concentrating control of all rear organs in the hands of the chief of the
rear.
The idea of the centralization of control of the rear is correct on
the whole, but at the present stage of development it is difficult to
implement in practice. Centralization would make control of the rear
cumbersome and laborious, exceeding the physical. capabilities cf the chief
of the rear it is not ruled out that in the future we will come to such
centralization, but it will be possible only on the basis of widespread 50X1-HUM
employment of means of mechanization and automation La the processes of
control of rear organs.
50X1-HUM
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The improvement of working methods of formation commanders and staffs
in troop control has the greatestruntance in decisively increasing the
efficiency of control. The basic requirement for their work -- to react
quickly to the situation and to immediately influence the course of events
-- stems entirely from the nature of modern operations. The time factor,
which had great importance in the past, has now become decisive in gaining
victory over the enemy.
Do the working methods which we have adopted for formation commanders
and staffs meet these requirements? We can answer this question in the
affirmative. They have been worked out over the years and, on the whole,
are acceptable. It is another natter that they have as yet been
insufficiently mastered, or that they require further improvement.
Let us take as an example the making of a decision by the formation
commander. One could say that the main shortcoming, our scourge, in this
matter is the extravagant expenditure of time in making a decision. Very
often this time amounts to eight to ten hours and more at one command
level. For example, in the exercise of the Kiev Military District, the
commander of troops of the front needed about nine hours to make the
decision to move the troops?MT-Ward. Of course, making a decision is an
exceptionally complex and most crucial matter, and here the personal
qualities of the formation commander play a very great role. But, much
depends not only on the personal qualities of the formation commander. The
method which a formation commander uses in making a decision is likewise
important.
As is well-known, after the Great Patriotic War, we adopted a method
by which the formation commander listened to detailed information reports
of the chief of staff and chiefs of the branch arms and services, before
making a decision. This ,.as done exclusively for training purposes; it
helped to bring operational thinking into a defined system, and at one time
played a positive role in training formation commanders and staffs. But
later on this method was improperly interpreted, here and there
legitimatized in practice, and in a number of instances used deliberately
when the formation commander did not have a decision of his own and sought
one in the proposals of his closest assistants. That is why this method
was decisively condemned in orders, directives and statements of the
Minister of Defense as not conforming to modern requirements and causing
great harm to the training of command cadres.
Decision-making is, in the highest degree, a creative process. The
formation coranander arrives at a decision on the basis of the entire course
50X1 -HUM
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of preceding events; if he knows the situation well, constantly analyzes
it, and foresees all changes, then it is unnecessary for him to again
listen to lengthy information reports and waste time on this. It will be
sufficient for the formation commander to clarify certain details with the
chief of staff and the chiefs of the branch arms and services in order to
finally formulate his decision.
In content the decision should be as concise and clear as possible,
not allowing any other kind of interpretation of the concept, and
especially of the combat tasks of the troops.
The next necessary condition for achieving high efficiency in control
is the rapid formulation of the decision and transmission of it to those
who are to execute it. We must accept as a principle that making the
decision, its formulation, and the transmission of the tasks to the troops
is a single inseparable process, which will not allow any delays.
The tasks can be assigned to the troops verbally, by technical means
of communications using cipher telegrams and secure communications
equipment, or via messenger means of communications. The selection of these
methods in each specific case will depend on the situation and mainly on
the availability of the means of communications.
Recently a view has emerged that today combat tasks do not have to be
presented in the form of a written combat order, that a verbal order or an
order drawn on a map will be sufficient, and that a written order will be
drawn up only when time is available, etc. This is an incorrect view. A
written combat order or operational directive is the basic document which
records in writing the combat tasks of the troops. It is intended for
confirming a combat task assigned verbally or by technical means and for
the correct understanding of that task. Besides this, the combat order
instills discipline in those who are to execute it and compels them to
carry out the assigned task precisely.
To be sure, additional time is needed to prepare the combat order
(operational directive) and to transmit it to those who are to execute it,
but this circumstance cannot greatly reduce the efficiency of control.
Some delay in delivering the written combat order should not be the basis
for inactivity and temporizing on the part of the executor, inasmuch as
the task has already been formulated for him verbally or in the form of a
corresponding telegram.
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
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Combat tasks which are assigned in order to develop a previously made
decision can be transmitted to the troops in the form of combat
instructions. However, in cases where the situation demands a fundamental
change in the previous decision, it is advisable to assign the new tasks
for the troops again in the form of a combat order or operational
directive.
As for the compilation of the plan of the operation or combat actions,
we ought to strive to complete it primarily on maps, and then to formulate
certain calculation data in text form.
We should deal separately with work with a map. The experience of
exercises shows that many generals and officers have a poor knowledge of
the method of working with a map, and do not know how to represent the true
operational situation on a map. Under conditions of highly mobile actions,
as a rule, the troops are moved in vehicles, mainly in columns; using the
old method, their position on maps is shown by solid frontlines and lines,
and consequently the true position of the battle formations of the
regiments and divisions is distorted. Frequently, the maps do not reflect
the results of nuclear strikes and especially the radiation situation,
which, as is well known, is now the most important element of the
operational situation. Of course, on the basis of such a map, it is
impossible to make a correct decision.
In spite of the requirement of the Minister of Defense that commanders
should learn to do their working maps personally, many generals and
officers do not like to, and often do not know how to, do it; so draftsmen
or operations officers do the work for them. It is not surprising,
therefore, that these commanders often know the situation only
superficially and are not capable of making a precise report.
In many staffs there is noted a passion for ostentatious maps and
poster maps, on which much time is spent in preparation and which are
needed only for showing to the superior commander. Such maps are not
suitable for troop control; it is necessary to refrain from making them and
thus free the staff from unnecessary work. Under modern conditions a map
is a means of troop control; it should be a basic working and planning
document, and requirements for doing it and formulating it must be
resolutely raised.
50X1-HUM
The greatest in volume and most poorly worked out aspect of the work
of the staffs continues to be the process of collecting and processing data
about the operational situation. A major shortcoming is lateness in the
1-HUM
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passage of information. It is no secret that in some exercises the
situation which was being dealt with in the staff of the front was three to
four hours behind the actual situation. Consequently, the 717-Mation
commander is late in making his decision by the same length of time, if not
longer. During this time, the troops can advance or withdraw 25 to 30
kilometers and, on the march, move 100 to 130 kilometers, and the decision
will no longer correspond to the new situation. In such a situation the
formation commander will lag behind events and not influence them, which is
intolerable under modern conditions.
There are many reasons for the slow passage of operational
information. One such reason is often the loss of communications and the
inability to quickly switch from one type of communications to another.
Often discipline is violated and prescribed deadlines are not met in
sending in reports, as a result of which higher level staffs are forced to
"wring out" situational data from subordinate levels. A strict order of
procedure in passage of information is not always established, as a result
of which important data about the operational situation, which is urgently
needed for making a decision, is lost in the flow of other information
which is not of top priority. Finally, much time still is spent on
compiling, editing and reviewing at various staff levels, and then on
enciphering, transmitting over means of communications and deciphering a
mass of information, in which the essence of the matter is buried among
minor details.
While not disputing the decisive role of accurate and continuous
operation of the means of communications in carrying out the timely passage
of information, we must also seek other ways to speed up the process of
collecting and processing data on the operational situation to the greatest
possible extent.
First, it is necessary to introduce proper order in the passage of
information. For this purpose, it is advisable to divide the entire
information flow into categories of precedence, according to its
importance, and hence, its urgency. These categories could be:
an above-precedence category -- combat orders and combat.
instructions which must be sent to the executors immediately,
without the slightest delay;
information of first precedence -- combat reports, operations
summaries, reconnaissance information on the enemy's nuclear
means of attack and on the radiation situation;
information of second precedence -- reports and sunmaries on
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the combat activities of the branch arms and the special
troops, and also reports and summaries of the rear;
-- information of third precedence -- all additional information.
In order to graphically show to which precedence a document belongs,
it is necessary to establish a common and strict system of letter
designations, or to draw up documents on paper of the appropriate color.
For example, all combat orders and combat instructions would be drawn up on
pink paper, documents of first precedence -- on blue, of second precedence
-- on yellow, and all the rest -- on white. Then, each telegrapher and
each cipher clerk will separate out without difficulty the information
which must be transmitted first from amcng the large amount of information
entering the cipher organ and communications center, and it will be easier
for the chief of the communications center to determine the appropriate
means of communications for each precedence. In our view, this should
shorten the time for passage of combat orders and operations reports.
There is a great potential time saving to be had by shortening the
time for working out operations documents. It is necessary to foster among
generals and officers skills in composing concise, and at the same time
sufficiently clear, documents, deleting from them everything that is minor
and unnecessary. So-called standard documents, or document forms, which
are blank forms prepared in advance and which are to be filled in with a
specific content, should be widely introduced.
Time can be saved by moving the cipher organs close to the operations
departments of the staffs, where operations officers and cipher clerks will
work together in one working area.
Thus, the possibilities for sharply increasing the efficiency of
control even with the existing technical resources are still significant,
and OUT task consists of searching for them every day and improving in
every possible way the working style and methods of formation connanders
and staffs in control of troops.
* * *
In this article the most important, from our point of view, problems
of troop control under modern conditions have been examined. Increasing
the combat readiness of the Armed Forces depends to a considerable degree.
H
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very complex problems must be solved on a scientific basis, be discussed
actively in the press and at military science conferences and, meetings, and
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be thought over carefully in everyday work.
The main task in the matter of improving troop control is the
development, introduction into the Armed Forces and mastering of control
equipment, means of minor automation and mechanization, and means of
communications. At the same time, it is necessary to work on solving the
problem of the integrated automation of control.
Also an important and pressing task is improving the organizational
structure of control organs and the methods of troop control, and
increasing the combat readiness of control organs.
Scientific military cadres, scientists, designers and all the
generals, admirals and officers who actually control troops must take the
most active part in accomplishing all these tasks.
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