MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE ARTILLERY OFFENSIVE THE PRINCIPAL METHOD FOR THE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION CONDUCTED WITH CONVENTIONAL MEANS OF DESTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201610001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 13, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
13 February 1976
IMMRANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Artillery Offensive -
The incipal Method for the Combat Employment
of Artillery in an Offensive Operation Conducted
with Conventional Means of Destruction
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thought". This
article reviews the employment of artillery beginning with World War II in
establishing the position that the artillery offensive is the method which
provides the best fire support for a ground forces operation. An artillery
offensive is subdivided into the phases of artillery preparation, artillery
support, and support for the advance of other ground elements into the
depth of the enemy defense. The author provides detail on the tactics
employed in these phases, underscoring the need for good reconnaissance,
planning and control, and citing combat with enemy tactical nuclear weapons
as the most important task. A table illustrates the required density of
artillery in relation to the volume of tasks in a breakthrough sector.
This article a ear d
in Issue No- I rRAI fnr 1060 F-
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a stric need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ation have been
assigned
William a on
Deputy Director for O erations
Page 1 of 15 Pages
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 2 of 15 Pa es
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1969
Intelligence Information Special Report
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50X1-HUM
DATE
13 February 1976
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Artillery Offensive - The Principal Method
for the Combat Employment of Artillery in an Offensive Operation Conducted
with Conventional Means of Destruction
SOURCE Documentary
Summa :
e following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita
Thought . The author or this article article s Marshal of Artillery zakov.
is article reviews the employment of artillery beginning with World War
II in establishing the position that the artillery offensive is the method
which provides the best fire support for a ground forces operation. An
artillery offensive is subdivided into the phases of artillery preparation,
artillery support, and support for the advance of other ground elements
into the depth of the enemy defense. The author provides detail on the
tactics employed in these phases, underscoring the need for good
reconnaissance, planning and control, and citing combat with enemy tactical
nuclear weapons as the most important task. A table illustrates the
required density of artillery in relation to the volume of tasks in a
breakthrough sector. ;sox,=HU~i
Cament :
Marshal of Artillery Konstantin Petrovich Kazakov,a Hero of the Soviet
Union, also contributed an article entitled "The Rocket Troops of the
Ground Forces in Combat with Naval Targets" to Issue No. 2 (84) for 1968
He was replaced as Chief of the Rocket Troops and
Artillery and became an Inspector-General of the Ministry of Defense in
1969. The SECRET version of Military Thou ht was published three times
annually and was distributed down tote level of division commander. It
rennrtedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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The Artillery Offensive - The Principal Method for the Combat
Employment of Artillery in an Offensive Operation conducted
with Conventional Means of Destruction
by
Marshal of Artillery K. Kazakov
Experience gained in exercises and war games we have conducted in
recent years, and also an analysis of the operational-strategic concepts of
probable enemies, demonstrate that in a future war ground forces may be
given the task of breaking through a defense employing only conventional
means of destruction.
It should be emphasized that an enemy using engineer equipment and
prefabricated structures is able in a short period of time to prepare
positions for all types of weapons and control posts, and set up a strong
defense. At the same time, a modern defense will be equipped with a large
number of armored means of fire (tanks, armored personnel carriers,
self-propelled guns).
The lines of defense, in engineer preparation and numbers of fire
means, will be equal to those which our troops had to break through in
offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War.
To break through a prepared defense under conditions of non-nuclear
war requires reliable and sustained firepower from artillery and aviation.
Experience has established that aviation is capable of carrying out no more
than 20 to 25 percent of its assigned tasks. Thus, most of them fall to
artillery.
To successfully break through a defense, artillery must reliably
neutralize strong points to the depth of the brigades of the enemy first
echelon; this includes disrupting his system of antitank defense,
destroying tactical nuclear means of attack (to the depth of the range of
fire), neutralizing artillery and mortar batteries and disrupting the
control system. At the beginning of the offensive,artillery is charged
with the task of supporting the attack of motorized rifle and tank subunits
and units, and then of providing continuous accompanying fire for their
advance during a battle in the depth of the enemy defense.
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Artillery accomplishes all these tasks by various ways and methods;
and the nature of its cooperation with combined-arms large units and units
and the procedure for this cooperation change, depending on the phases of
the combat actions.
The variety of methods for accomplishing fire tasks and the complexity
of carrying out cooperation during an offensive requires such an
organization of the employment of artillery as would promote continuous and
effective fire support for the offensive operation.
The most desirable form of artillery combat actions, one having a
well-balanced system is, in our view, the artillery offensive, which fully
proved itself in operations during the Great Patriotic War. - Its
fundamentals were set forth in Supreme High Command Headquarters Directive
No. 03 of 10 January 1942.
An artillery offensive consisted of neutralizing the enemy defense, as
well as of continuously supporting infantry and tanks with massed,
effective artillery (mortar) fire throughout the offensive, and was
subdivided into the phases of preparation for the attack, support for the
attack and support of infantry and tank actions in the depth of the enemy
defense.
It was most completely carried out first at Stalingrad on 19 November
1942. The artillery offensive subsequently was the deciding factor in all
offensive operations of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.
Methods for the artillery offensive were continuously improved and were
distinguished by an absence of stereotypes. Large groupings of artillery
were established to carry out the offensive. In the most important
offensive operations in the years 1944-1945 the density of artillery in
breakthrough sectors reached 250 to 300 guns and mortars per kilometer of
front.*
*In the Lvov-Sandomir operation (July-August 1944) - 250 guns, mortars and
rocket launcher vehicles per kilometer of front; in the Iasi-Kishinev 50X1-HUM
operation (August 1944) - 250 to 290 guns, mortars and rocket launcher
vehicles per kilometer of front; in the East Prussian operation (January
1945) - 200 to 300 guns, mortars and rocket launcher vehicles per kilometer
of front; in the Berlin operation (April 1945) - up to 314 guns, mortars
and rocket launcher vehicles per kilometer of front.
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Massed artillery strikes against the entire tactical depth of the
enemy defense were the basic method of conducting artille preparation.
However, in this method each battalion and battery fire at accurate y
reconnoitered targets (strong point, artillery battery, observation post,
L. etc.).
The duration of the artillery preparation, as a rule, was one to two
hours, but sometimes longer. Toward the end of the war (because of the
increased quantity of artillery allocated), it had been shortened to 20 to
40 minutes. During artillery preparations, direct-firing guns were widely
employed to demolish and destroy individual targets.
SMoortt for an infantry and tank attack was carried out by various
method -- successive concentration of fire, single or parallel barrage.
Artillery simultaneously neutralized the most important enemy strong
points, and also artillery and mortar batteries, by concentrated fire. The
depth of attack support reached three to five kilometers. Great precision
and efficient control of artillery fire (in which combined-arms commanders
directly participated) and close cooperation with the troops being
,-supported ensured accomplishment of the main task; artillery fire literally
;"led" tanks and infantry, which followed at a distance of 200 to 400 meters
L behind the bursts of the artillery shells.
Accompanying fire for infantry and tanks during a battle in the depth
was accomplished by combining fire with maneuver by the individual guns
(self-propelled artillery), platoons and batteries in the battle formations
of forward subunits. Strong points in the immediate depth of the enemy
defense, artillery and mortar batteries, and approaching reserves were
destroyed by the concentrated fire of artillery groups and battalions.
Artillery control was decentralized. However, it permitted the army
commander (division commander) at any point in the operation (battle) to
mass fire to inflict decisive destruction on the most important enemy
targets (groupings) in the shortest possible time.
After the Great Patriotic War the organization of the artillery
offensive was continuously improved, and toward the end of the 1950's more
effective methods of accomplishing fire tasks, as well as fire control
methods at all levels from army down to battery, were worked out and
mastered.
However in subsequent years, in connection with the inclusion of
missile/nuclear weapons in the ground forces and also due to some reasons
of a subjective nature, the concept of the "artillery offensive" as a
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method for the combat employment of artillery in an offensive operation
was, in our view, groundlessly eliminated from the regulations, as well as
from the operational and combat training of the troops. And although the
basic elements of the artillery offensive remained, the whole well-balanced
system of fire support for the breakthrough of the enemy defense was
disrupted to a significant degree.
Artillery combat actions. in essence disintegrated into a series of
sporadic tasks which were not interconnected by a unified concept of fire
support for the offensive operation. This applies particularly to the
phase of fire support for the offensive.
This phase lasts from the beginning of the attack by motorized rifle
and tank units until the completion of assigned combat tasks by divisions
and armies. The term "fire support for an offensive" (as it exists in the
regulations) is too general and does not fully correspond to the actions of
advancing troops, nor to the tasks of artillery in providing fire support
for them. Nevertheless, our regulations do not cover such an important
phase as artillery support for the attack, although it is the most complex
from the 'point 0 view of organizing cooperation and fire control. In this
phase artillery uses such types of fire as rolling barrage and successive
concentration of fire, in which the opening and cessation of fire.against
sectors and lines are carried out on signals from the commanders of
motorized rifle (tank) regiments and battalions. At the same time as the
rolling barrage (successive concentration of fire) is carried out,
artillery neutralizes artillery batteries and other important targets in
the enemy defense.
arillery. We think the artillery offensive should be recognized as the
Exercises conducted in recent years (including those with field
firing) show that combined-arms and artillery commanders do not take this
,,into account, and do not give sufficient attention to organizing
cooperation in the attack phase. As a result a smooth transition from
preparatory fire to support is not ensured, and the motorized rifle and
tank subunits do not try to advance behind the bursts of their shells at
minimum distances. The depreciation which has occurred in the role of
artillery in modem warfare was also the reason for.-the-lag in the
development of reconnaissance means and means for controlling artillery
units and subunits, as well as in the development of self-propelled
-oymethod for the combat o nt of artillery in an o ensive
operation which es it possible to provide the best fire support for the
operation. The artillery offensive must undoubtedly reflect the tasks and
conditions for the combat employment of artillery, which have changed in
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comparison with the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
In the present article are set forth only basic theses regarding the
artillery offensive as they appear to us to apply to a modern offensive
operation.
An artille offensive consists of the decisive and rapid destruction
of enemy tactical nuclear means of attack and the neutralization of his
defense to the depth of divisions of the first echelon, and of the
continuous support of motorized rifle and tank large units and units with
massed effective artillery fire from the beginning of the attack until the
task of the day is fulfilled.
Artillery accomplishes its tasks in cooperation with aviation, which
primarily strikes targets located beyond the range of artillery fire
(division reserves, division command post, aviation control posts), as well
as moving targets, nuclear means of attack (detected at the beginning of
artillery preparation) and other large targets.
We will examine how much the tasks of artillery and the methods of
fulfilling them have changed. A new task has become the main one -- the
i.e., c" ers aril"?.iS y
emploing
gun nuclear warheads. All -ery
must be ready at any moment to switch over to carrying out this task.
Hence flow the basic requirements made of artillery fire control --
flexibility, reliability, multichannel communi
ti
ca
ons, and constant
readiness for centralization for the purpose of concentrating fire on newly
detected nuclear means of attack. The most important task is thus the
neutralization of enemy artillery and antitank means (especially antitank
guided missile launchers) which are situated in the depth of the defense of
v?-'a brigade of the first echelon. Therefore., the_ depth to which the defense
is hit simultaneously during artillery preparation cannnot be less than the
,,maxpimum4,range-of modern enemy antitank guided missiles, that is six to
The task of combating enemy artillery is accomplished differently.
Until now batteries of towed guns were neutralized by two or three short
artillery strikes; between the strikes, fire spotting was conducted by
deliberate fire or by intensively concentrated rapid fire of batteries.
One of our batteries could accomplish the task of neutralizing such a
battery (located in emplacements) during preparatory fire.
50X1-HUM
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At the present time the artillery of the armies of the NATO countries
is equipped with armored self-propelled guns. A self-propelled artillery
baatt is capable of occupying and abandoning positions in a ew m-nu es.
-Therefore, such batteries can be neutralized only by one or two short, but
powerful, artillery strikes with a significant expenditure of ammunition.
T ralize one battP, as a rule, abation_nf rnir art;
be a n order simult~a?
mint Y s ver._a consi1 ]e, area with
shell bursts and to attain a high density of fire.
Since self-propelled artillery has dependable protection and will be
maneuvering continuously, to combat newly detected batteries the chief of
\, the rocket troops and artillery of an army (division) must have a reserve
of artillery subunits (one or two battalions) available during both
artillery preparation and support for the attack.
The approach to flank protection of the breakthrough sector now has
changed. In view of the increased range of antitank means, strong points
on the flanks must be neutralized in the artillery preparation phase at the
same time as other targets (at a distance of up to two kilometers from the
flanks). During artillery support for the attack these strong points also
should be held under fire until troops seize the areas defended by the
battalions of the first echelon.
Under modern conditions an attack by motorized rifle (tank) units and
particularly an advance during a battle in the depth of the defense will be
conducted at a higher rate. This circumstance requires greater mobility on
,,the part of fire subunits and artillery control means. High enemy mobility
requires that artillery concentrate and mass fire in the shortest possible
/length of time (a few minutes).
Although the tasks of artillery and the conditions and methods of
their accomplishment have changed under modern conditions, when breaking
through the enemy defense employing conventional means of destruction,
artillery will continue to prepare an attack by motorized rifle (tank)
vunits and lead them with its fire from one target of the attack to another.
,That is why we propose to return to such a tested form as the artillery
offensive.
Under modern conditions it is more desirable to subdivide an artillery
offensive into three phases: artillery prepA-ratjQB artillery support for the attack, and artillery support for the advance of
motorized rifle and tank subunits during a battle in the depth of the enemy
defense.
50X1-HUM
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T OP CCCRET
t~i C~rLT
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Thus, the question of setting up support for the attack by parallel
barrage or successive concentration of fire on two lines simultaneously
must be raised. One artillery group will fire upon a line immediately in
front of the attacking subunits; and another will fire on a line 1,500 to
2,000 meters from the first, and on the main deployment areas of antitank
.guided missiles and other enemy long-range antitank means. 50X1-HUM
It may be shown that in the absence of continuous trenches in the
enemy defense, attack support need not be carried out by rolling barrage.
However, it must be understood that a rolling barrage is employed when
there are no accurate reconnaissance data available about the location of
platoon strong points and all the fire means they possess. Precisely such
conditions as these will be most characteristic in modern warfare. Only by
setting up a solid wall of fire is it possible to reliably paralyze the
actions of enemy antitank means.
With the opening of a rolling barrage (successive concentration of
fire), artillery (mortar) batteries as well as strong points located on the
flanks and between the lines of the rolling barrage (successive
concentration of fire) are neutralized. Finally, artillery must be
prepared for rapid massing (concentration) of fire against those defensive
sectors which are presenting the most stubborn resistance.
The objective of artillery s impart for an
d
a
vance during a battle in
the depth of the enemy defense is to ensure t e continuous a vance o
motorized rifle (tank) units large units) and to prevent an enemy
counterattack by massed (concentrated) and barrage fire.
During support for an attack and for a battle in the depth of the
enemy defense a large role is played by accompanying guns and antitank
guided missile launchers, moving within the battle formations of motorized
rifle (tank) battalions of the first echelon. The presence of infantry
combat vehicles within the battle formations of the advancing troops does
not ensure reliable destruction of enemy fire means since the tins
on them are, hQrt-ran$e _v(up_to one lc lometerl.._anQ not use fra~nentation
e S. Close simnn,-r -,..-
-
O elled artillim
fy into S rVl e w
erv.
Stable artillery fire control during these phases can be carried out
i only from mobile armored command posts and command-staff vehicles- Thimse
problems are now being solved successfully. 50X1-HUM
lop-secm
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Carrying out an artillery offensive in breakthrough sectors requires
the establishment of powerful artillery groupings. The amount of artillery
necessary for the breakthrough is determined on the basis of the volume of
tasks being accomplished simultaneously during artillery preparation.
Calculations show that the breakthrough of a prepared enemy defense in the
European theaters of military operations requires 80 to 110 guns and
mortars per kilometer of breakthrough sector front see a
What are the possibilities of setting up the required artillery
densities?
50X1-HUM
In a combined-arms army in the breakthrough sector, up to 408 guns and
mortars can be allocated to fire from indirect fire positions (the organic
artillery of two motorized rifle divisions of the first echelon, army
artillery and the divisional artillery of a division of the second
echelon); in a tank army, only 252 guns and mortars can be allocated.
7
If each army in the first echelon were rei
f
d b
n
orce
y an artillery
division of present-day strength (252 guns and mortars), then its
requirements
ld be
wou
only 75 to 80 percent satisfied. 50X1-HUM
Consequently, even with such reinforcement
d
, army an
divisional
artillery of an army from the second echelon of the front (in all, up to
300 guns) still must be allocated to artillery preparation and support.
However, this involves extremely great difficulties and there is the danger
that this artill
ery may not return to its own large units in time50X1-HUM
The establishment of large artillery groupings in the breakthrough
sectors gives rise to the urgent problem of their protection against enemy
nuclear strikes. To resolve it, artillery should be concentrated at the
breakthrough sectors for a strictly limited (minimum) time. After
accomplishing its tasks, attached artillery must be moved forward, and
allocated artillery withdrawn to the flanks
A
til
.
r
lery placed in
deployment areas must be dispersed, making optimum use of the maximum range
of the guns and the capability to maneuver fire.
Planning an artillery offensive in a modern operation is complex in
that it must ensure the transition rom non-nu
l
c
ear actions to actions
employing nuclear weapons without significant reorganization of the system
of cooperation and without excessive loss of time.
An artillery offensive is inconceivable without stable control of the
artillery and its fire. Setting up continuous artillery reconnaissance
nor-sEGUz
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(especially of enemy nuclear means of attack) and a reliable communications
system ensuring the rapid report of reconnaissance results to staffs and
the passage of fire control commands, have particular significance in
matters of control.
Experience shows that artillery preparation and attack support have
been successful only when the enemy defense has been carefully
reconnoitered by all available means. Therefore, in preparing offensive
operations repeated aerial photography of enemy lines of defense was
conducted without fail; and besides the various means of artillery
reconnaissance, combined-arms and engineer reconnaissance data were widely
used.
Extremely significant in this respect was the experience of organizing
preparatory fire and support during the breakthrough of the enemy defense
by the 349th Armored Regiment in the DNEPR exercise. As our troops
approached the prepared line of defense, aerial photography of the line --
which provided artillery staffs with photographs of the defense -- was
carried out twice. Artillery reconnaissance subunits arrived at the line
of defense at the same time as the reconnaissance organs of the motorized
rifle subunits.
This organization of reconnaissance made it possible to determine
precise contours of strong points and the coordinates of batteries, fire
positions and other targets. Seventy-five to eighty percent of the enemy
defense had been detected; this enabled artillery to reliably neutralize 79
percent of the detected targets during preparatory fire and support.
Combating enemy tactical nuclear means of attack remains the most
important task of artillery even when an operation begins without the
employment of nuclear weapons. It becomes particularly urgent during a
battle or operation, when the enemy at any moment may turn to the
employment of nuclear weapons. It is well known that the 155mm and 203.2mm
self-propelled howitzers of armies of the NATO countries which have nuclear
warheads'in service spend only five to seven minutes setting up and
re
arin
f
fi
p
g
or
re. Consequently, it is necessary in that short period of
'iTna to rcnnnnni te?
~- ...__. t _--_ 1.
h
t
e
prepare and transmit the command to the fire position, and carry outcthe'
artillery strike. This is accomplished only when fire control ]50X1-HUM
rganized.
We have reviewed the basic tasks and methods for the
b
t
com
a
employment
of artillery in an offensive operation conducted without the employment of
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nuclear weapons.
From an organizational point of view the artillery offensive does not
cause, in our view, special difficulties, since its basic elements actually
exist and in one way or another are used in fire support. The methods used
by artillery to accomplish fire tasks, which were tested in battles of the
Great Patriotic War and in postwar troop experience, are basically suitable
even for modern conditions. Only some of them require improvement.
In organizing an artillery offensive, in our opinion the establishment
of the necessary groupings and the organization of artillery fire control
during the offensive operation will be the most complex.
The first problem can be partially solved by maneuver of the artillery
of the second echelons. However, this is only a temporary solution. The
effective establishment of the required artillery groupings in breakthrough
sectors requires large, highly mobile artillery large units from the
Reserve of the Supreme High Cormnand, specifically artillery divisions of UP
to .4.00 to 450 guns and_,mort s, In regard to the second 'pro`blem-""` ;"f"or i"ire
control and maintenance of continuou
i
s cooperat
on during the offensive,
artillery commanders and staffs must have mobile armored command and
I
command-staff vehicles of the same type as the corresponding combined-arty
commanders. 50X1-HUM
Implementation of the stated measures will ensure successful
organization of an artillery offensive.
In an offensive operation employing nuclear weapons, motorized rifle
and tank large units will not be required to break through prepared lines
of defense. Troops will advance in wider zones and along separate axes.
In connection with this, the volume of artillery tasks will decrease
significantly and control over artillery generally will be decentralized.
Under these conditions, the necessity to consolidate artillery comb-qt
actions into such a form as the artillery offensive obviously will &Am HUM
longer arise.
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VOLUTE OF TASKS AND REQUIRED DENSITY OF ARTILLERY FOR NEHTIW.IZING AN F.NU4.Y
DEFENSE DIURING ARTILLERY PREPARATION IN THE BREAKTHRCE(H SECTORS OF TROOPS OF A FRONT (VARIANT)
5th Army
7th Tank Army
Targets of
Density
Equated
Number of
1'. S. mechanized division is
West German motorized infantry
destruction
of neut-
li
i
area of
guns required
on the defensive
division is on the defensive
ra
zat
on
one target
to destroy one
Width of breakthrough sector on
Width
f b
k
h
h
(hectares)
target
axis of m
i
ik
t
- 2 ki
rea
o
t
roug
sector on
a
n s
r
e
lometers
axis of main strike - 8 kilometers
Number of
Equated area
Required
Number of
Equated area
Required
targets
(hectares)
number of
targets
(hectares)
number of
guns
guns
Honest John batteries*
18
3-4
2-3
3-4
2-3
A. Tar ets t
be destroyed fir
;t
battalions
battalions
203.2mm howitzer batteries
1.0
18
6-9
108-162
4-7
-
72-126
l05mn F, l55mm howitzer,
175m field gun batteries
1.0
12
15
180
9-12
-
108-144
Pocket launcher batteries
1.0 1
12
3
36
2
24
Platoon strong points of
first-echelon companies
01 S. - 6 hectares, West
1.2
7.2 (4.8)
2 guns per
15
108
216
15
72
144
Germany - 4 hectares)
hectare
Platoon strong points of
.first-echelon companies
1.0
6 (4)
2 guns per
6
36,
72
6
24
on the flanks
hectare
48
Platoon strong points of
1.0
6 (4)
2 gums per
6
36
72
6
24
second-echelon companies
hectare
48
Battalion command posts
1.0
4
12
3
12
36
3
12
36
Brigade command posts
1.0
6
12
2
12
24
2
24
24
Mortar platoons (sections)
1.0
6
8-9
48-54
6
36
36
Separate targets
1.0
1 hectare
1 gun
20
20
20
20
20
20
B. Targets to
be destroyed seco
nd
Platoon strong points of
2 guns per
second-echelon battalions
1.0
6 (4)
hectare
9
54
108
9
36
72
Division command post
1.0
8
18
1
8
18
1
8
18
Division reserves
To be destT
yyed by aviati
Total artillery required to
conduct preparatory fire
(taking into account
battalions being held in
reserve)
848-936
596-670
Required density of artillery
per kilometer of breakthrough
sector
106-117
T,
*To be destroyed as detected b
artillery f
the reserve
f the army
50X1-
HUM
Ton CECDCT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201610001-6