MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE AIR FORCES IN OPERATIONS WITH THE EMPLOYMENT OF CONVENTIONAL MEANS OF DESTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201620001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 17, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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T EGRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
17 February 1976
1~010RANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : The air Forces in
Operaticns with the Employment of
Conventional Means of Destruction
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the journal ""1[ilitarv Thought". This
article examines aviation capabilities and the pro ems of allocating air
forces in conventional operations in which escalation to nuclear actions is
threatened. The author defines the tasks of long range and front aviation,
which exceed their capabilities, and recommends changing the re' tine
proportion of t.rpes of aviation and determining the relative mportance of
the tasks they are assigned. The problems of control are examined briefly
from the standpoint of maintaining readiness for nuclear actions during a
conventional operation. Thi S arri r-1 P nnnanrarl in Tcci \T z r^r,", 1965.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this rnhi;r-ation have been
William E. Nels
Deputy Director for Opdrations
rage 1 of 15 Pages
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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50X1-HUM
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1965
17 February 1976
MILITARY THOU( -1T (USSR).: The Air Forces in Operations
with the Employment of
Conventional Means of
Destruction
SOURCE Documentary
Summary :
following report is a translation from Pussian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal ?"Tilita
Thought". The author of this article is Marshal of Aviation rasovskiv.
This article examines aviation capabilities and the problems of allocating
air forces in conventional operations in which escalation to nuclear
actions is threatened. The author defines the tasks of long range and
front aviation, which exceed their capabilities, and recommends changing
tie relative proportion c4- types of aviation and determining the relative
importance of the tasks they are assigned. The problems of control are
examined briefly from the standpoint of maintaining readiness for nuclear
actions during a conventional operation.
End of Summary
Comment:
Marshal ttephan Akanovich Krasovskiy was Commandant of the Red Banner
Air Forces Academy i/n Zhukovskiy from 1956 to 1968. The SECRET version of
Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed
down to the level of division ticn
at the end 19770,
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The Air Forces in Operations with the Employment of
Conventional eans o s ruction
by
Marshal of Aviation S. Krasovskiy
Analysis of the character of the exercises of the armed forces of the
US and of their aggressive actions in various areas of the world bears
witness to the fact that our probable enemies, along with preparation for
nuclear war, are also actively preparing to conduct military actions with
the employment of conventional means of destruction. This circumstance
requires us to study the nature and methods of conducting such military
actions, to determine the role and special features of employing the
branches of the armed forces in them, and, naturally, to work out practical
measures for the training of the troops.
In this article, the intention is to examine certain basic positions
about the use of the air forces in operations employing conventional means
of destruction under the constant threat of the non-nuclear war escalating
into a nuclear one.
Depending on the conditions of unleashing and conducting war with the
employment of conventional means of destruction in various theaters of
military operations, the role of each branch of the armed forces, including
the air forces, will be different.
Obviously, the strategic rocket forces under these conditions will be
in constant readiness to fulfil those tasks which are assigned to them in a
nuclear war, and they will not be able to deliver strikes against the major
groupings of ground troops, the aviation, and the rear installations of the
enemy in a theater of military operations.
The ground forces, under conditions of employment of cenventional
means of destruction, will be the basic force for destroying enemy
groupings in offensive operations. An especially important role,
obviously, will belong to the tank troops. As regards operational-tactical
missiles, they will basically be in readiness to employ nuclear weapons
and, as a consequence of their low effectiveness with conventional
warheads, they will not be able to offer substantial support to the troops
of the front. The main role in fire neutralization and destruction of the
important enemy targets in the conditions under consideration will
obviously belong to the artillery.
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The air forces, having the main part of the forces of long range
aviation in readiness for employing nuclear weapons, will develop --
employing front aviation and part of the forces of long range aviation --
aggressive a is ons, jointly with the ground forces and the navy, to defeat
the groupings of means of nuclear attack, aviation, and troops in land and
sea theaters of military operations. Military transport aviation, as in a
nuclear war, will carry out the landing and shipment of troops, cargo, and
combat equipment in support of all the branches of the armed forces.
The air defense forces of the country, employing mainly the forces of
front-area large units and formations, will carry on combat with tactical
and carrier-based aviation, inasmuch as the enemy obviously will not start
to employ strategic aviation and strategic and operational-tactical
missiles with conventional warheads. Destruction of tactical aviation in
the air will be carried out in close cooperation with front fighter
aviation.
The navy, having its main forces in readiness to employ nuclear
weapons, will, with part of its forces, carry out aggressive combat actions
on the seas employing conventional means of destruction to destroy chiefly
the aircraft carrier and missile-carrying forces of the enemy navy.
The scope of armed conflict with conventional means and, consequently,
the degree of participation in it by the air forces will, obviously, be
determined by the political and strategic situation which has taken shape
by the beginning of and during the course of military actions in this or
that theater.
It must be expected that, in the Western theater of war, where the
groupings of the ground forces, the navy, and aviation are already formed,
armed combat may acquire the greatest scope. It is precisely here that
front aviation, long range aviation, and military transport aviation will
find widespread employment. By virtue of the decisive goals which the
warring sides will be pursuing, the switch to employment of nuclear weapons
in this theater may be implemented considerably earlier than in other
theaters of military operations.
Combat actions without the employment of nuclear weapons in secondary
theaters, because of the limited goals, probably will involve separate
areas and strategic axes and can be conducted with relatively small forces
over a longer time. As a result of the fact that the necessary groupings
of troops will be formed during the course of armed conflict, it can be
assumed that with the beginning of combat actions long range aviation and
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military transport aviation will find wider employment in these theaters.
Thus, from an analysis of the character of armed combat, it follows
that, with the employment of only conventional means of destruction, the
air forces will conduct aggressive combat actions on a large scale to
destroy and neutralize the land, sea, and air enemy. In case of
simultaneous initiation of such actions in several theaters, the main
efforts of the air forces will be concentrated on the main one, the Western
Theater of Military Operations.
Here, in view of the fact that the operational-tactical missiles of
the ground forces basically will be in readiness to employ nuclear weapons
and the range of artillery fire is limited, front aviation will find the
widest employment. Under such conditions, it a one will be capable of
delivering effective strikes to the full depth of the operational
disposition of the enemy troops.
The actions of aviation employing only conventional means of
destruction will have much in common with what theory and combat practice
in the Great Patriotic War produced. At the same time, one must not
mechanically transfer the experience of that war to the conduct of combat
actions by aviation under modern conditions.
This position is explained, first of all, by the change in the
qualitative status and the quantitative strength of the air forces;
secondly, by the availability of nuclear weapons in the armed forces, the
possibility of employment of which must be taken into consideration every
moment in the conduct of war with conventional means; and, finally, by the
increased strength of the enemy air defense system.
Let us briefly examine the factors mentioned.
The aviation equipment which is in service with the air forces
generally meets the requirements for conducting combat actions employing
both nuclear and conventional weapons.
The range and duration of flight of the aircraft of front aviation and
long range aviation ensure actions against distant targets and permit
increasing the duration of remaining over a target or in an airborne alert
zone. It is becoming possible to base aviation at a great distance from
the front line and to concentrate the efforts of air units and air large
units on the necessary areas and axes without preliminary airfield
maneuvering.
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Subunits of fighter-bombers and front aviation bombers flying at low
altitudes are capable of delivering strikes at a depth of up to 200 to 400
kilometers. At high altitudes, the depth of actions increases by 200 to
300 kilometers. Such ranges of the aircraft of front aviation fully ensure
hitting the main groupings of missiles and ground troops of the enemy in
the Western Theater of Military Operations. However, it is not capable of
action against a grouping of enemy tactical aviation at the full depth of
its basing, especially when flying at low altitudes. This shortcoming can
be successfully compensated for by long range aviation, whose capabilities
in range permit delivering strikes on any enemy target situated in this
theater of military operations.
The increase in the flying speed of aircraft, especially at low
altitudes, guarantees rapidity of action against newly detected important
enemy targets and facilitates successful negotiation of the enemy air
defense not neutralized by nuclear weapons. At the same time, with the
increase in speed, the search for and detection of small-size targets and
their destruction by conventional means of destruction are becoming
complicated.
The armament of aircraft has become more powerful and diversified. It
is capable of hitting any of the land, sea, and air targets of the enemy.
The effectiveness of the armament of aircraft, especially of front
aviation, it appears to us, can be substantially increased by installing on
aircraft rapid-firing aerial cannon, including in the unit of fire guided
missiles of the air-to-ground type, adopting standardized containers that
allow for employment of diversified means of destruction, and also by
further improving aiming and navigational equipment.
On the whole, the qualitative change in the aircraft inventory of the
air forces has led to an increase in the capabilities of the units and
large units of the different types of aviation to fulfil tasks using
conventional means of destruction.
In determining the quantitative strength of the air forces that can be
allocated for actions with conventional means of destruction, it is
necessary, in our opinion, to take into consideration the following two
circumstances.
The threat of employment of nuclear weapons makes it mandatory to
reserve part of the forces of front aviation and long range aviation on a
constant alert status in.readiness for delivering nuclear strikes. For
this purpose, as calculations show, there may be allocated, from front
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aviation, up to 30 percent of the front fighter-bombers and bombers, and up
to 50 percent of the front cruise missile launchers, and from long range
aviation, about two-t is of its forces. Consequently, combat actions
with conventional means of destruction could be conducted by about 70
percent of the strength of front aviation and 30 percent of long range
aviation.
The other important factor is the strong enemy air defense, not
previously neutralized by nuclear strikes, in which substantial changes
have taken place since the Great Patriotic War. The increased
effectiveness of the modern air defense of the enemy will lead to an
increase in aircraft losses and, consequently, will require the allocation
of larger forces both for the destruction of each individual target and for
combat with the forces and means of air defense.
Calculations performed in conformity with the conditions of a front
offensive operation conducted with only conventional means of destruction
show that the most favorable conditions for conduct of the combat actions
of aviation are brought about with probabilities of 0.8 to 0.9 of
negotiating the enemy air defense. However, such probabilities can be
attained only with the simultaneous action of a considerable number of
aircraft groups and with 60 to 80 percent neutralization of the fire system
of enemy surface-to-air missiles, for which, as calculations show, it is
necessary to allocate about 30 percent of the forces and means being
planned for the operation.
It is evident from this that all those measures to combat air defense
which are carried out in nuclear war take on even greater significance with
the employment of only conventional means of destruction. At the same
time, the allocation of considerable forces to neutralize it will lead to a
corresponding reduction of the number of aircraft of front aviation and
long range aviation that can be allocated to conduct con at actions with
conventional .;leans of destruction in support of the operations of the
ground forces and the navy.
Consequently, given the relatively low strength of front aviation and
long range aviation designated for the accomplishment of tasks in war with
the employment mainly of nuclear weapons, a relatively small quantity of
aviation, obviously, can be allocated for actions under conditions of
conducting war with only conventional means.
What tasks can the air forces accomplish under the conditions being
examined?
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Analysis of the possible nature of the actions of the ground forces
and naval forces shows that such tasks can be:
-- for front aviation: destruction of detected operational-tactical
means missile/nuclear attack and part of the forces of
tactical aviation on the closest airfields; participation
in preparatory fire and air support of troops on the offensive;
destruction and neutralization of enemy reserves in their
concentration areas and on the move; cover of troops and
installations of the rear of the front against aviation
strikes and aerial reconnaissance; conduct of aerial
reconnaissance;
-- for long range aviation: destruction, at the depth of the
main forces, of tactical aviation on basing airfields and
of Mace cruise missiles in launching areas. Besides this,
long range aviation can be allocated for actions against
enemy reserves in areas of concentration and unloading from
various types of transport, and also against man-made
structures on land transportation routes.
Long range aviation will accomplish the indicated tasks employing both
the forces which are allocated for actions directly in support of the
troops of the front and the forces operating in support of armed combat in
the theater as a- w ole.
The actions of the warring sides with only conventional means of
destruction leave their imprint on the nature of the tasks and the scale of
employment of military transport aviation. As a consequence of less
disruption of ground lines of transportation, the need for its mass
employment for delivery of materiel to troops is reduced. The necessity of
using transport aircraft for mass transportation of the sick and wounded
also disappears. However, as a consequence of constant enemy actions
against our means of nuclear attack, one of the important tasks of
transport aviation continues to be delivery of missiles, nuclear warheads,
and missile propellant from the interior of the country. Reducing the
expenditure of forces on shipments and also on support of the maneuvering
of troops will allow concentrating the main efforts of transport aviation
on accomplishment of such a task as the landing of airborne forces.
The volume of tasks of front aviation and long range aviation is
characterized by that quantity targets against which they have to act in
the course of an operation.
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Analysis of a front offensive operation shows that if, during
preparatory fire in-776-breakthrough sectors, the fire means of the troops
of the front can neutralize up to 40 to 45 percent of the important and
especially '-important enemy targets, in the course of the operation during
fire support their capabilities fall to neutralizing 20 to 25 percent of
such targets, and the number of targets not hit correspondingly rises from
55 to 60 percent to 75 to 80 percent.
Thus, 55 to 80 percent of those enemy targets which must, to some
degree or the other, be subjected to fire action in the course of the
operation may become the responsibility of the front aviation and 'Long
range aviation allocated for actions in support off"-the troops of the front.
And what are the capabilities of front aviation and long range
aviation for hitting the indicated num enof enemy targets?
If one proceeds from the composition of an air army in the Western
Theater of Military Operations accepted as standard in the practice of the
operational training of the troops (two fighter air divisions, one
fighter-bomber air division, two to three bomber air regiments, one cruise
missile air regiment), then it can, in the course of three to five days of
an offensive operation, considering losses and without replacements,
destroy and neutralize about 30 to 40 percent of those important and
especially important enemy targets which are not hit by the fire means of
the ground forces.
Allocating long range aviation (not more than one air division) for
actions in the zone of the front will, on the whole, permit inflicting
substantial hits on about hat of those enemy targets which may be assigned
to front aviation and long range aviation.
So, the same difficulty confronts aviation as in nuclear war: the
volume of tasks exceeds its combat capabilities.
Increasing the combat capabilities of front aviation, considering that
allocating larger forces of long range aviatio on bvzously will not be
possible, can be achieved both by increasing the strength of the air army
of the front (in comparison to that indicated above, but within reasonable
limits)-and by changing the relative proportion of the different types of
aviation in it.
Turning to the question of the strength of the air army and the
relative proportion of the types of aviation, it is not without interest to
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recall the experience of history. In the Great Patriotic War, with the
poorer state of aviation means of destruction, we had a considerably larger
air army, and the proportion of strike forces of front aviation (bombers
and ground-attack aircraft) exceeded the proportions fighter aviation (by
mid-1944 its proportion came to about 47 percent). In the enemy air
defense means at that time, fighter aviation predominated, and the
effectiveness of conventional antiaircraft artillery was not high.
With the existence of air supremacy (1943) and superiority over the
enemy in aviation strike forces, front aviation was capable of successfully
accomplishing the overwhelming number of tasks in front operations,
supporting the ground forces in destroying hostile enemy groupings.
A different situation, it appears to us, may develop under modern
conditions in conducting combat actions with only conventional means.
Calculations show that, in quality and quantity of strike forces (bomber
and fighter-bomber aviation), our ont aviation is inferior to the
tactical aviation of the enemy, but at the same time superior to it in
fighter aviation. If one considers that the basis of the enemy air defense
consists not of fighters but of highly effective surface-to-air missile
means, then it becomes clear that the front aviation is not capable of
fully satisfying the increased requirements of the ground forces for its
actions in operations conducted with the employment of conventional means
of destruction.
Also to be reckoned with is the fact that, for a number of reasons, by
the moment military actions are begun we will not have in our air forces
that quantity of aviation which would ensure fulfilment of all the possible
tasks confronting aviation in operations with the employment of
conventional means.
In such a situation, in order to achieve decisive success of the
actions of the front aviation and long range aviation in supporting the
ground forces and the navy in the operations being carried out by them, in
our opinion, it is necessary first to assign to aviation the most important
tasks, the fulfilment of which would, to the greatest degree, support
successful conduct of the operations;second, to determine in fulfilling
each task the main targets, those which by being hit would cause the
greatest harm to the enemy; and third, to determine those axes in the
operation where it is necessary to concentrate the main forces of both
front aviation and long range aviation.
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In determining the degree of importance of tasks for the aviation, it
is absolutely necessary to consider the effect of their fulfilment on the
course of the operation not only in the period of conducting it with
conventional means of destruction but also mainly in the time when it has
to be conducted with the employment of nuclear weapons.
Hence, the first and most important task of front aviation and long
range aviation should be considered to be destructio on f the enemy means of
nuclear attack so as to maximally reduce his capabilities to employ nuclear
weapons. In connection with the limited strength of aviation forces, their
main efforts are advisably directed toward hitting the enemy tactical
aviation on basing airfields and the Mace cruise missiles as the primary
means of the enemy for employment of nuclear weapons, and also the
operational missiles (Pershing, Sergeant).
This task retains its paramount importance for the duration of the
entire operation. In order to fulfil it, as calculations show, it is
advisable to plan to allocate up to 25 percent of the flight resources of
the fighter-bombers and up to 60 percent of the flight resources of the
front bombers, taking into consideration that enemy means of nuclear attack
will The destroyed during the conduct of air support. As regards long range
aviation, it will probably allocate not less than 60 to 70 percent of its
flight resources to fulfilling the task of destroying means of nuclear
attack.
Considering the capabilities for negotiating the system of air
defense, the tactical flight radiuses of the aircraft, and also the
grouping of enemy means of nuclear attack in the Western Theater of
Military Operations, the efforts of the aviation may be distributed in the
following manner.
Long range aviation destroys the delivery aircraft of the tactical
aviation on the airfields to the full depth of its basing and the Mace
cruise missiles in launching areas; front aviation, with part of its
forces, destroys the tactical fighters on the airfields closest to the
front line, and, with its main forces, destroys the operational missile
units in concentration areas, waiting areas, and on the move.
The degree of importance of the other tasks will be determined by the
situation in the course of combat actions. However, analysis of the fire
capabilities of the artillery and rocket troops of the front shows that in
operations with the employment of only conventional means of destruction,
such a task as air support of the ground forces takes on especially great
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significance.
Insufficient fire action against the enemy in the period of
preparatory fire because of the limited strength of artillery means
probably will cause an increased requirement for air support of the first
echelons of the divisions right away when they go over to the attack. In
order to carry it out, the air army must have the appropriate forces and
means at its disposal.
In carrying out air support, in view of the relatively short range of
artillery fire and the decrease in its intensity as the troops move
forward, the actions of aviation, unlike in nuclear war, must be brought
nearer to the advancing troops. This, in turn, increases the
responsibility of both combined-arms and aviation commanders for organizing
and implementing cooperation, especially in distributing the targets of
actions between artillery and aviation, identification marking of troops,
and mutual target indication.
Besides the means of nuclear attack, first-priority targets for
destruction during air support will be those which can offer or are
offering the greatest opposition to our advancing troops and which cannot
be neutralized successfully by artillery means. For fulfilment of this
task, considering its importance, it is advisable to allocate not less than
50 to 60 percent of the flight resources of the fighter-bombers.
The actions of the aviation in operations of the ground forces both in
nuclear war and with the employment of only conventional means of
destruction must be concentrated on those main axes where the main tasks
are being accomplished to defeat the opposing enemy groupings. The most
decisive massing of aviation forces and means must, in our opinion, be
carried out on the axis of the main strike. Only in this case, considering
the limited capabilities of the aviation, can the necessary superiority
over the enemy be achieved and the fulfilment of the most important tasks
in the operation be ensured. Obviously, such massed employment of aviation
must be carried out primarily in support of the armies operating in the
first echelon of the front. In order to strengthen the support of
advancing troops in crisis moments of the situation, it is necessary to
have, in the hands of the commander of the front (air army), the
appropriate reserve of forces of fighter-bomber and bomber aviation.
Obviously, in the questions of massing aviation on the axis of the
main strike in an operation, it is necessary to consider the experience of
the Great Patriotic War quite thoroughly.
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In conclusion, let us dwell on the questions of control.
Control of all the branch arms of the air forces (front aviation, long
range aviation, and transport aviation) under the conditions being
considered must be organized and implemented in such a way as to ensure
their constant combat readiness for the employment of nuclear warheads and
to avoid losses of aviation with a sudden enemy employment of means of mass
destruction.
The content and overall tasks of control with the employment of
conventional means of destruction do not differ in principle from its
content and tasks in nuclear war, though they do have certain special
features.
In the period of preparation and during combat actions, the amount of
work of formation commanders (commanders) and their staffs is considerably
increased, inasmuch as they will have to decide the questions of control of
air units and air large units according to two variants of actions. As a
consequence of this, in the process of control of large units and units are
noted, as it were, two closely interconnected, but fairly independent,
directions in the work of the command and staffs. One direction is
connected with controlling that part of the forces of aviation which is
conducting combat actions with the employment of only conventional means of
destruction, and the other with controlling the forces that are in
readiness for actions employing nuclear means of destruction.
In both cases there will be required continual acquisition of data
about the situation, the adoption of new decisions and refinement of
previously adopted ones, getting them to the executors, and all-round
support of combat actions. Therefore, for controlling that part of the
forces of aviation which is in readiness to employ nuclear weapons, it
makes sense to establish special groups of generals and officers in the
staffs of the air armies and of the large units of long range aviation
(heavy bomber air corps). It is desirable to test the advisability of this
measure in exercises.
The system of control of the air formations, air large units, and air
units, in our opinion, should not undergo changes. Along with this, we do
not share the opinion, ostensibly in connection with the considerable
decrease in the rates of advance of the ground forces, that the change of
control posts may be carried out considerably less often than in nuclear
war. This point of view, in fact, extends not only to the change of
control posts, but also to the regrouping of aviation, relocation of rear
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units and facilities, etc.
The weakness of the position of the proponents of this point of view
consists in the fact that they leave out of consideration the possibility
of a non-nuclear war escalating into a nuclear one. The constant threat of
the employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy obliges us not only to
maintain and keep our nuclear weapons in constant readiness for employment
but also to protect from strikes of enemy means of mass destruction all the
other aviation forces and means, including the system of control.
So, changing the control posts of all levels of command, regrouping
air large units and air units, relocating rear units and facilities, and so
forth, must be carried out no less often than under conditions of nuclear
war.
From all that has been said, one may draw the conclusion that the role
of the air forces is considerably increased in operations conducted with
conventional means of destruction but with the constant threat of the
employment of nuclear weapons. They are the only means of neutralizing n.d
destroying various targets and groupings of troops of the enemy beyond the
maximum range of our artillery means. Participating in the operations of
the ground forces, the air forces fulfil a large set of various tasks,
including tasks which under the conditions of nuclear war are assigned to
strategic and operational-tactical missiles. The most important principles
in the employment of the air forces in operations conducted with
conventional means of destruction are the massing of forces and means, the
concentration of efforts of aviation in support of the main grouping of
troops, and, what is especially important, maintenance of part of the
forces of aviation in constant readiness to employ nuclear weapons.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201620001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201620001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201620001-5