MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE COMBAT READINESS OF RECONNAISSANCE IN A BORDER MILITARY DISTRICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Intelligence Information Special Report' OX1-HUM
Page 3 of 15 Pages
50X1-HUM
DATE 6 April 1976
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Combat Readiness of Reconnaissance
in a Border Military District
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 4 of 15 Pages
The Combat Readiness of Reconnaissance
in a Border Military District
by
Colonel A. Pranovich, Candidate of Military Sciences
Reconnaissance by border military districts and armies can
successfully cope with its tasks if its organs, forces and means are at a
high level of combat readiness.
At the present time three levels of combat readiness have been
established for the troops of border military districts: constant,
increased and full. They differ from each other in definition and in the
specific indicators characteristic of one or another stage of combat
readiness of each branch arm and service including reconnaissance,
depending on their role and location in combat and operations, their tasks,
the time required to accomplish them, the conditions of the theater of
military operations and others. Ensuring a high level of combat readiness
depends on many factors, the most important being that of working out a
unified opinion on the definition and basic characteristics of levels of
readiness of reconnaissance. In the final analysis these factors determine
the number of measures that must be taken in a military district and army
in advance, while it is still peacetime. The need for a more thorough
examination of the problem of combat readiness of reconnaissance arises out
of a number of other circumstances as well.
In the first place, there is the concept of operational reconnaissance
as a constantly "ongoing battle" and, accordingly, supposedly always in
full readiness. We know, of course, that in peacetime reconnaissance is
conducted with only partial forces and means and that the volume of tasks,
the nature of its activity and the conditions for its conduct differ
radically from those which exist on the eve of and at the outbreak of war.
Secondly, in troop practice commanders and staffs sometimes oversimplify
combat readiness, considering it mainly from the point of view of the level
of training of units and subunits in assembling during combat alert and
leaving the military cantonments
In the third place, in preparing reconnaissance forces and means for
war, the major requirements made of them under present-day conditions are
not always taken into consideration. Specifically, the fact that
reconnaissance forces and means must be of such composition, quantity and
quality as to ensure the detection of that number of enemy targets,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 5 of 1 1--
primarily of his nuclear weapons, the destruction of which will enable the
troops to conduct successful combat actions in a nuclear or non-nuclear
war. They must be able to bring themselves up to full combat readiness in
sufficient time to detect the major enemy targets before the enemy brings
his principal grouping of troops to full combat readiness. Reconnaissance
must be capable of committing the bulk of its main forces and means to
action before the combat actions begin, within the first 24 hours, or at
the most three or four days, of the operation. A ligh level of
reconnaissance readiness in peacetime is one of the main factors in the
combat readiness of troops, since the timely bringing of troops to full
combat readiness, the adoption of a decision for the initial operation, and
the effective use of nuclear weapons and troops in the operation, depend to
a considerable degree on the ability of reconnaissance to be informed on a
day-to-day basis regarding the military-political situation in the
corresponding part of the theater of military operations, and on its
ability to react quickly to any change in that situation and to obtain
information needed by the commander in time.
It must also be noted that sufficient allowance is not always made for
the conditions and nature of reconnaissance activities in peacetime, on the
eve of, and at the outset of war. These conditions are extremely variable.
Increased tension in the international situation and frequent provocations
by hostile forces close to our national border require high vigilance,
efficiency, and flexibility on the part of reconnaissance. The more
imminent the threat of immediate enemy attack, the steeper the increase in
the volume of tasks, the more complex the situation in the enemy rear, the
more intense the border and counterintelligence procedures, camouflage and
deception measures, and the more rapid the changes in the location of
targets.
Finally, the fact is not always considered that reconnaissance
readiness is determined not only by the readiness of reconnaissance units
and subunits, but mainly by the readiness of the reconnaissance organs
being sent out by them, the amount and time of training of these organs
being significantly greater than that of combat subunits of troops.
All this requires early, thorough and constant preparation for the
conduct of active reconnaissance under conditions of a period of threat.
and then at the outset of war, on the part of all forces and means 5OX1-HUM
operating in peacetime as well as those committed subsequently. This
preparation must be directed toward precise execution, in terms of target,
time and place, of all reconnaissance and special measures, as well as
toward the protection of reconnaissance forces and means from the action of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 6 of 15 Pages
50X1-HUM
enemy weapons of mass destruction, his counterintelligence organs,
sabotage-reconnaissance groups, and means of radioelectronic warfare.
How should we define the combat readiness of the reconnaissance of a
border military district and armies? In our view, combat readiness of
reconnaissance is the status which determines the degree o preparedness of
forces and means, and the existence of the necessary conditions for the
successful accomplishment of reconnaissance and special tasks in peacetime,
as well as at the outset of war. It includes two inseparably linked
elements: the first -- the reconnaissance capabilities of the troops of a
border military district, which depend on the number and composition of the
forces and means, their corresponding organization, the degree of training
of the reconnaissance troops, their knowledge, experience, and morale, as
well as on the availability and status of combat, reconnaissance and
special equipment, and armament, all of which possess the necessary
tactical-technical specifications, and other materiel-technical means.
The second element is the ability of reconnaissance forces and means
to proceed to their tasks in a timely and organized manner, on the basis of
all the steps taken earlier and systematically and which were designed to
ensure timely reporting of the information on the enemy needed by the
command in making a definitive decision for the operation; and also to
quickly switch the intelligence organs, units and subunits from a peacetime
to a war footing.
The combat readiness of reconnaissance is characterized by definite
indicators. In the practical activity of staffs of border military
districts and armies it is extremely important to distinguish such
indicators for a separate intelligence unit and subunit on the one hand,
and for district and army reconnaissance as a whole.
For an intelligence unit or subunit these factors are basically the
following: full manning and equipping in terms of personnel, weapons,
reconnaissance, special, and other military equipment; the condition of
weapons and military equipment, their conformity with the present level of
science and technology, and with the conditions in the given theater of
military operations; the availability of the necessary materiel-technical
means; the state of political and special training of personnel and the
degree of operational-reconnaissance skill of officers; the ability to
bring itself up to readiness in an organized manner to accomplish comba5OX1-HUM
tasks or complete mobilization within a set period of time; the
effectiveness of reconnaisssance in peacetime (if it is conducted) and the
readiness for immediate actions of forces and means on alert; the number of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page rirn-l
7 05OX1-HUM:eS
reconnaissance organs (groups, teams, posts and others) which a unit or
subunit may send out; the quality of their training and materiel-technical
support for accomplishing tasks in the initial operation; and the state of
military discipline and everyday facilities and services for the troops.
The combat readiness of reconnaissance of a border military district
and army as a whole depends on the combat readiness of its composite units
and subunits. However, it would be quite erroneous to consider it only as
the total of the readiness of the various reconnaissance units, subunits
and organs. Under modern conditions reconnaissance will be able to
successfully accomplish its tasks if the activities of reconnaissance
organs, units and subunits are coordinated in advance by a common goal,
concept, and overall plan of operations, and if all the conditions are
created in advance for the organized deployment and effective activity of
reconnaissance units on the eve of and at the start of war. Further, the
success of reconnaissance in an initial operation and in a war as a whole
will depend on measures of an organizational and mobilization nature, which
must be taken on the scale of an operational formation, likewise according
to a unified plan. Among the most important of these measures are the
organization and planning of reconnaissance in peacetime for the conduct of
an initial operation, preparation of control organs and of conditions for
the creation of a grouping of forces and means, the coordination of
different reconnaissance units for the conduct of reconnaissance in a
system on the scale of an operational formation, the preparation for war of
versatile reconnaissance cadres from the reserve, their registration, the
planning of reconnaissance mobilization measures in a military district and
an army, and the organization of a system of materiel-technical support for
reconnaissance units under conditions of nuclear war.
Our research enables us to conclude that the combat readiness of the
reconnaissance of a border military district and army is characterized by
four basic factors.
The first factor is the composition of reconnaissance forces and means
and their status. by this is meant the forces and means operating in
peacetime and intended for deployment on the eve of, at the beginning of,
and during a war. They must be able to accomplish the tasks assigned to
the reconnaissance of large units and formations located in the given
theater of military operations, over the entire period planned for combat
actions, but especially during the initial operation. Of great importance
here is the organizational structure of reconnaissance units and of the
reconnaissance of the military district as a whole. It must ensure an
advantageous combination of the types of reconnaissance, great independence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
es
Page 8 o 50X1-HUM
and functioning ability of each unit and subunit, efficient control. of
reconnaissance organs, constant readiness for actions in any situation, the
bes capabilities for combat training, as well as the rapid conversion of
units and subunits from a peacetime to a war footing. The organizational
structure of reconnaissance forces and means must enable reconnaissance to
successfully accomplish its tasks in a modern operation without any major
reorganization of it.
Combat readiness requires a high manning level of reconnaissance units
and subunits, relative to the wartime tables of organization, with
well-trained personnel, as well as full equipping with weapons, combat,
reconnaissance and special equipment, transport, supplies, rations, and
other materiel-technical resources. The condition of these resources must
be appropriate to the methods of armed combat and the conditions under
which reconnaissance is conducted in the given theater of military
operations. The political-morale state and the discipline of the
personnel, and the field training and teamwork of the units also must be
maintained at a high level.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War and postwar exercises shows
that it is extremely important for the maintenance of the combat readiness
of reconnaissance to quickly replace losses in personnel and equipment and
to activate new units and subunits during combat actions. The latter
depends on the availability of a reserve of reconnaissance personnel
created from among eligible reservists and a system adopted for training
them, constant maintenance of skills, and regular registration of them. It
also is important in advance to establish in the district reserves of
combat, reconnaissance, and special equipment, weapons, and all necessary
materiel-technical means.
The second factor on which the combat readiness of reconnaissance
depenis t e vo ume and type of measures carried out in advance, which
ensure an organized commitment to action of military district
reconnaissance forces and means and their effective use in support of the
initial o eration. ~_EREF measures include timely warning of the troop
command of a military district or of the front formed on the basis of it
regarding possible aggression, and preparation of the data needed in making
a definitive decision for the operation; concealed and rapid expansion of
reconnaissance efforts in the event of a deteriorating situation in the
theater of military operations or a sudden enemy attack; and creation of
favorable conditions for the organization and conduct of reconnaissance in
an initial operation in order to considerably shorten the time reg15oxi'' -
-HUM
accomplish important reconnaissance and special tasks.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 1 Pcr
9 50X1-HUM
Reconnaissance must at any given moment have information on the
activity of opposing enemy groupings and on targets marked for destruction
in the initial nuclear strike. This is achieved through a high level of
organization and a continuous increase in the effectiveness of
reconnaissance in peacetime, and efficient recording of the information
obtained. Also important is careful monitoring of the key points, sectors
and targets where reconnaissance indications of immediate preparation of
aggression may appear. Data about the situation in a theater of military
operations are required for the successful activity of each type of
operational reconnaissance. Under conditions of fluid and highly mobile
combat actions none of them will be able to accomplish its tasks in a short
space of time if all the information required on the areas in which it is
to operate, and on important targets, is not accumulated in peacetime.
The proper organization and effective conduct of reconnaissance in the
initial operation of a front and army, require in advance the most
practical planning possible of reconnaissance at all levels. Thus planning
for an initial operation must include all questions of the organization and
conduct of reconnaissance, including working out documents on the
organization of control, communications, and the assignment of tasks to
executors; cooperation with the border troops and reconnaissance of
adjacent military districts, branches of the armed forces (Air Defense
Forces of the Country, long range aviation, navy) and other reconnaissance
organs operating in the zone of the front and army; as well as
materiel-technical and all-round combat support of reconnaissance activity.
Important and complex reconnaissance and special measures should be planned
and prepared most thoroughly -- for example the first sortie by
reconnaissance aviation, dropping intelligence groups into the enemy rear,
disrupting enemy counterintelligence activities, and increasing the
resistance to jamming of communications equipment and the survivability of
reconnaissance organs, units and subunits.
The combat readiness of reconnaissance requires the creation in
peacetime of a desirable grouping of its forces and means in the theater of
military operations which would permit secure and rapid deployment of
forces and means and an expansion of their efforts during the period of
threat and at the beginning of combat actions. The determination and early
accomplishment of the volume and type of measures required to prepare the
theater of military operations is highly important in creating favorable
conditions for distributing reconnaissance forces and means, ensuring their
rapid deployment, camouflage and concealment, as well as for shortening the
time required to accomplish reconnaissance and special tasks. 50X1-HUM
Specifically, such measures include preparing the airfields of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 10 of 15 Pages
50X1-HUM
reconnaissance aviation and the operational deployment areas of
reconnaissance units and the routes of approach to them, and concealing
equipment and materiel-technical means.
The third factor determining the combat readiness of reconnaissance is
the volume and type of measures taken in advance, which ensure the
organized and rapid transition of operating and reserve reconnaissance
forces and means from peacetime to wartime conditions. Reducing the time
required to bring reconnaissance units and organs operating in peacetime up
to the highest level of readiness in order to successfully accomplish the
tasks entrusted to them acquires special importance, as does their timely
removal from the area of anticipated enemy nuclear strikes. Both of these
are achieved by detailed planning, preparation, and comprehensive
materiel-technical support of such measures as: warning, the assembly of
personnel on the basis of a combat alert, the removal of military equipment
from storage, the movement of reconnaissance subunits and units from points
of permanent deployment into areas of operational assignment, and the
transport there of the necessary materiel-technical means; the deployment
within a set period of time of reconnaissance units and the activation of
new ones; and the conversion of all forces and means operating in peacetime
to a wartime working routine.
In carrying out these measures a correct definition of the levels of
combat readiness (constant, increased, and l1 of reconnaissance forces
and means and the sequence of their transition from one level to another
acquires exceptionally great importance.
Since reconnaissance, in contrast to other forms of combat support,
not only accompanies, but also precedes the combat actions of the troops,
its forces and means always must proceed ahead of the troops, and at any
given moment must be a minimum of one degree of readiness higher. Thus
when the troops are shifted to an increased level of readiness, the
reconnaissance forces and means must already be at full combat readiness.
However, such a head start may be achieved not only by shifting
reconnaissance units and subunits to a higher level of readiness before the
troops are brought up to that level of readiness, but also by establishing
and maintaining higher indicators of constant readiness.
In our view, the constant combat readiness of the reconnaissance of a
border military district and army should signify a status in which part of
its forces and means conduct continuous and active reconnaissance, allowing
it to follow the everyday activities of the armed forces of a probable
enemy, obtain at any time the data needed by the command on the location of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 11 of 15 Pa?es
50X1-HUM
vitally important targets and troops, and on the nature of their actions.
In the process other reconnaissance forces and means engage in combat
training and remain in a state which ensures transition to full combat
readiness in a set period of time and the accomplishment of reconnaissance
tasks in support of the employment of nuclear weapons and troops in the
operation.
Ensuring the high, constant combat readiness of reconnaissance, in our
opinion, requires the following basic conditions (indicators). A front and
army must maintain a full complement of reconnaissance units and suits,
with the permanent manning level brought up to at least 95 percent, and the
basic specialists to 100 percent, of the wartime table of organization.
Each reconnaissance aircraft requires atJleast- .5 trained crews. The
total equipping with weapons, combat and special equipment must be at 100
percent, with at least 85 percent in good technical repair (the remainder
may be out for repair, preventive maintenance, etc.). The training of
officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men and the level of their
field training must ensure the accomplishment of reconnaissance and special
tasks under the conditions of modern operations and battles.
Continuous and active reconnaissance against a probable enemy by all
available peacetime means and methods, in accordance with the tasks set by
the General Staff and the troop commander of the military district, for
timely warning of impending aggression and support of the initial nuclear
strike are the basic indicators of its constant readiness. Thus, it is
important to have forces and means on alert for continuous control and
timely reinforcement of reconnaissance on the main axes and targets in the
event of an abrupt change in the situation or receipt of the first
indications of immediate preparation of aggression, as well as for assembly
and continuous processing of reconnaissance data and the reporting of it to
interested staffs. The status of the rest of the reconnaissance forces and
means must enable them to be brought up to full readiness in no more than
five to six hours (considering the fact that the main grouping of NATO
forces brings itself to full readiness in 10 to 12 hours) and, if required,
to be included in the combat assignment right after the forces on alert.
One of the indicators of constant combat readiness is the precise
cooperation of the reconnaissance forces and means, both within an
operational formation and with other reconnaissance forces and means 50X1-HUM
operating in a given theater of military operations, as well as the
availability of continuous, stable, efficient, and secure communications
with subordinate units, the General Staff, the staff of the border troops
and other reconnaissance organs. The most important prerequisite of this
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 12 of 15 Pages
50X1-HUM
level of readiness is the availability of an advance reconnaissance plan,
carefully worked out in every detail, for the initial operation with a
firmly established procedure for transmitting to the executors each combat
task and the steps for carrying it out.
Thus, it is important for the reconnaissance plan for the initial
operation to be closely coordinated with the mobilization plan and the plan
for bringing the reconnaissance units, subunits and organs up to increased
and full combat readiness. A necessary indicator of constant readiness is
also the availability of previously established reserves of
materiel-technical means, and their proper storage and timely issue.
Increased combat readiness of the reconnaissance of a border military
district and army is that status from which they can be brought on signal
up to full combat readiness in the minimum amount of time, and move from
their deployment points to carry out combat tasks or move into areas of
concentration and full mobilization. This level of readiness is most often
put into effect during a worsening not only of the general international
situation, but also of the situation in a given theater of military
operations, as well as during major military exercises of the aggressive
imperialistic blocs. This level of reconnaissance readiness may be put
into effect even if the district troops are on a peacetime footing.
In our view, the increased combat readiness of reconnaissance must
mean: maximum strengthening of reconnaissance against the enemy by all
forms and methods available under the conditions of a period of threat;
increasing the number of forces and means on alert and their readiness by
switching a large number, and for certain types of reconnaissance all
available forces and means, to combat alert status; increasing the alert at
the control posts of the chiefs of intelligence of the military district
and armies, and at the command posts of radio and radiotechnical
reconnaissance units and subunits; partially deploying the means of control
and communications in accordance with the reconnaissance plan, as well as
fully amplifying all planning documentation for the initial operation.
This level of readiness must provide for secure full mobilization of all
reconnaissance units and subunits.
When this level of readiness is announced, reconnaissance units and
subunits prepare for immediate abandonment of deployment areas and the
removal of materiel-technical means; personnel return from leave and 50X1 HUM
assigned trips, officers are switched to barracks status, weapons and
combat equipment are drawn from long-term storage and are brought up to
combat readiness; mobile reserves of materiel are loaded onto motor
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 13 of 15 Pages
50X1-HUM
transport; routes of advance and areas of operational assignment or
concentration are refined; security is strengthened, and antinuclear and
antichemical protection measures also are taken.
Full combat readiness of reconnaissance is introduced in the event of
an immediate threat of enemy attack. It means that reconnaissance units
and subunits must be capable of immediately accomplishing their combat
tasks. This is a state in which active and purposeful reconnaissance
against the enemy is conducted in support of and according to the plan of
the initial operation of the front and army by switching to wartime
operating routine the greatest possible number of types of forces and means
available under the conditions of a period of threat. The remaining
reconnaissance forces and means (reconnaissance units and subunits,
particularly air, long-range reconnaissance groups, and the reconnaissance
groups of divisions and regiments) are ready immediately on signal to begin
carrying out combat tasks from deployment or basing points and from areas
of operational deployment. The reconnaissance of a military district may
be brought up to a state of full combat readiness from both peacetime
status and the status of increased combat readiness. In our view,
reconnaissance units and subunits must be trained in bringing themselves up
to full readiness directly from peacetime status.
Thus, the basic element in bringing border military district and army
reconnaissance up to full readiness is the further expansion of its efforts
in order to obtain reliable information on the time of possible initiation
of combat actions by the enemy and to provide the command with information
needed for the initial strike, for a maximum increase in the number of
forces on alert, and for completion of preparation for action by all
reconnaissance forces and means in the shortest amount of time.
Border military district and army reconnaissance may be considered as
having been brought up to full readiness if it has deployed the maximum
number of forces and means possible under conditions of a threatened
attack, and uses them to conduct active reconnaissance in accordance with a
refined plan for the initial operation; if reconnaissance aviation is
dispersed (if this is called for by the situation) to alternate airfields
and not less than two-thirds of its crews brought up to a flight readiness
of three to five minutes (after having been in a state of full combat
readiness over a long period of time, some of these forces will have been
switched to a lower level of readiness); all personnel of the
reconnaissance units and subunits are fully mobilized, equipped, and r5oxi--HUM
to carry out combat tasks, and the units are fully equipped with
reconnaissance and special equipment prepared for combat employment; if the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 14 of 15 Pages
50X1-HUM
reconnaissance groups of units and large units are brought to departure
areas, and agent and special reconnaissance organs are ready to cross to
the enemy rear or engage in immediate actions.
In addition, the radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance units and
subunits of the first-echelon formations and large units are deployed at
battle positions and carry out active work: precise, stable control of
reconnaissance forces and means, and cooperation within front and army
units and subunits and with other reconnaissance organs, as well as with
radioelectronic countermeasures units are organized. When observing the
previous radio communications operating routine, stable, secure, and
efficient communications with all reconnaissance organs, units and
subunits, and with the General Staff, as well as communications with all
concerned command levels are established; all mobile and emergency reserves
of reconnaissance units and subunits, including armed parachute drop
equipment, engineer and special intelligence equipment, ammunition,
rations, personal equipment and other supplies are sent to the area of
operational deployment.
The moment that reconnaissance forces and means are brought up to full
combat readiness, particular attention should be paid to concealing their
actions, and to conducting them under the guise of exercises and other
routine activities, taking measures for air defense and for protection
against weapons of mass destruction, and exercising continuous control of
units and subunits.
Experience shows that the period of time the troops, including
reconnaissance forces and means, remain at increased and full readiness may
be prolonged; therefore, it is particularly important to monitor the
constant maintenance of high vigilance and readiness for immediate actions
in the reconnaissance units, subunits and control organs.
And finally, the fourth factor on which the combat readiness of
reconnaissance depends is the volume and type of measures taken to maintain
the combat readiness level attained and to further improve it. These
include timely reaction to changes in tasks, in the situation and in
conditions for conducting reconnaissance in a theater of military 50X1 HUM
operations; refinement of all documents worked out for the initial
operation, and of activities undertaken to prepare the forces and means;
establishment of a strict procedure determining the training process,
combat duties and everyday routine of reconnaissance units and subunits, as
well as the conduct of regular and surprise checks on the combat readiness
of reconnaissance units and of military district and army reconnaissance as
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1
Page 15 of .l
50X1-HUM'
a whole; the conduct of special research, and the persistent implementation
of everything positive and the elimination of deficiencies that are
discovered.
The combat readiness of reconnaissance thus includes many
interconnected measures, which must be examined both alone and in a whole
complex of individual elements. A border military district and an army
have reconnaissance forces and means which are quite varied in terms of
purpose, organization, armament, technical equipping and operating methods.
Therefore, to achieve rapid, efficient and coordinated actions by these
forces and means in a nuclear war situation is a complex matter requiring
time, systematic training practices, research, and a thoughtful approach to
each measure. In this connection, a high level of combat readiness of the
reconnaissance of a border military district and army may be achieved not
by some one-time act, but by the day-to-day, tedious, persistent work of
the commanders and staffs and all personnel of the reconnaissance units and
subunits.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201750001-1