MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): FIELD AIR DEFENSE IN COMBAT WITH LOW-ALTITUDE TARGETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Intelligence Information Special Reporr50X1-HUM
Page 3 of 9 pares
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
" M-- 1976
50X1-HUM
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Field Air Defense in Combat
with Low-Altitude Targets 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
 5(1X1 -HT TM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Page 4 of 9 Pages
Field Air Defense in Combat
with Low-Altitude Target
s
by
General-Mayor of Artillery S. Prosvirkin
In our periodical publications* and in operational training
the problem of combat with low-altitude targets is given a rather
large amount of attention. This is quite natural, considering
the difficulty of solving it.
The surface-to-air missile systems we have in service permit
us to combat aviation and cruise missiles at low, medium and high
altitudes. At the same time, combat at low and maximally low
(under 100 meters) altitudes is the most difficult for our
present-day air defense, and the least effective (Figure 1).
Judging from the experience of the Vietnam war, the latest
modifications of existing surface-to-air missile systems, made to
improve firing at low-flying targets, have not produced
significant results. Fighter aviation interception of air
targets also is not very effective at altitudes less than 1,000
meters, and hardly practicable at altitudes less than 300 meters.
The complexity of solving the problem is aggravated by the lack
of effective radar means among the troops to detect and track
low-altitude targets. The lower range of existing radars, as we
know, is for practical purposes limited to altitudes of 300 to
500 meters. Thus, the low-altitude target detection range is so
limited that in rugged terrain conditions it is insufficient for
fighter aviation as well as surface-to-air missile means. Front
radiotechnical units essentially are not now capable of setting
up a continuous radar field at low altitudes. In essence, a
large amount of front territory which should be closely covered
is left without radar support.
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1
(83), 1968; No. 2 (81) and No. 3 (82), 1967; No. 2 (78), 1966.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
 5(1X1 -HT TM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Page 5 of 9 Pages
Research as well as the experience of operational training
and combat actions in Vietnam and the Near East show that, for
the time being, light antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft
machineguns remain the most realistic force for combating enemy
aviation at low and maximally low altitudes. Specifically,
experimental firings have shown that the probability of-one
ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun, firing from position
and in motion, destroying a MIG-17-type aircraft flying at an
altitude of 25 to 200 meters, is 0.42 to 0.67.
What are the actual requirements for these means in order to
set up close cover for the troops and installations in a front
(army) ?
Front zone installations having the greatest need of close
cover number about 40 to 50. These installations will be: home
airfields of the air army's aviation, launch sites and deployment
areas of missile brigades and bases, command posts and control
posts, crossings, special armament depots and others. Front and
army surface-to-air missile units also require close cover.
On the basis of combat experience and the capabilities of
existing and prospective low-altitude antiaircraft means, it has
been established that to provide cover for an airfield requires a
minimum of two batteries; cover for a front (army) missile
brigade -- at least six batteries; close cover for a front
command post -- six to eight batteries; and for one
surface-to-air missile battalion -- one or two batteries. In
Vietnam, for example, two or three batteries of 37-mm (57-mm)
automatic weapons and two or three ZPU-4 (ZPU-2) antiaircraft
machinegun platoons are allocated to cover one surface-to-air
missile battalion.
As a whole, to provide close cover for particularly
important front and army installations will require up to 10 to
15 additional antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft machinegun
regiments (battalions). These antiaircraft units (subunits) must
be highly mobile and air-transportable (the latter quality is
particularly important for antiaircraft artillery subunits
covering an airfield). Organizationally, front (army) 50X1-HUM
antiaircraft means for close cover may be combined into
battalion-sized antiaircraft artillery groups, but mixed
(antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft machinegun) battalions
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Page 6 of 9 Pages
The close cover capabilities of tank and motorized rifle
divisions, which have the organic means to provide only 25 to 40
percent of their own cover, also must be increased. We
specifically share the opinions expressed earlier on mounting
antiaircraft machineguns on tanks, and also concerning the
necessity for front units and subunits to organize and fire
salvos against air targets using all types of small arms.
But a numerical increase in the existing models of
antiaircraft artillery and machineguns in units and subunits
alone still does not solve the problem as a whole.
The fact is that the S-60 57-mm antiaircraft systems,
ZSU-57-2 self-propelled antiaircraft guns, 37-mm antiaircraft
guns, ZPU-4 and ZPU-2 antiaircraft machineguns, and
radar-equipped ZSU-23-4 SHILKA systems still have a number of
shortcomings, which lower their combat effectiveness or
performance. Even the recently developed rocket-type
low-altitude means are not secure against jamming. Reliable
close cover for troops and installations evidently will be
possible only when a mass-supplied, specialized weapons system,
which embodies all the best features of existing systems and is
the result of further technical improvement of them, is
available.
New armament must ensure the destruction of air targets
throughout the whole range of low and maximally low altitudes, be
highly mobile, easy to master, reliable in operation, relatively
inexpensive and, particularly important, it must permit firing
under conditions of any unforeseen jamming by the enemy.
It may be possible to base the prospective system on the
antiaircraft component of the SHILKA. A wheeled chassis with
cross-country capability (such as the BTR-60P armored personnel
carrier) could be used as a base, thus reducing the cost of the
undercarriage. we should avoid a turret which obstructs the
direct field of view (necessary for firing on suddenly-appearing
low-altitude targets), and should develop an automatic device for
direct aiming at the target, improve the telescopic sight arr,
retain a radar of very simple design in order to determine LX1-HUM
direction to the target. Since maximally low altitudes, as a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Page 7 of 9 Pages
50X1-HUM
rule, require tracer fire, the muzzle velocity of the shell
should be increased as much as possible.
Some reduction in firing effectiveness, due to simplifying
the radar direction system, will be compensated for by the
capability to fire on targets throughout the low and maximally
low altitude range, and by the high reliability and simplicity of
operation of the system as a whole. Simplifying the design and
lowering its cost will make it possible to equip troops with
these systems in a short time and, in conjunction with
surface-to-air missile means, to create a fire barrier over front
installations and troops against the attacks of aviation
operating at all altitudes.
Speaking of the need for developing a simple antiaircraft
tube artillery system and widely introducing it into our troops,
we propose to supplement the development of new surface-to-air
missile armament with an improved, reliable, and easily operated
weapon which can make up for the shortage of low-altitude combat
means which has developed among the troops, in a short time.
Heavily concentrating antiaircraft tube artillery in the
troops will be a good way to supplement surface-to-air missile
troops combating low-altitude targets. we know that in Vietnam,
for example, the enemy created definite difficulties for
surface-to-air missile units by jamming missile guidance radars
and striking the launch sites of surface-to-air missile troops
from low and maximally low altitudes.
Radar support of close cover in a front, in our opinion, has
required establishing a system of low-altitude radar posts.
These posts should be provided with high-speed, multichannel
communications in order to send warning signals directly to the
active means of combating low-flying targets.
The system of low-altitude posts will require reinforcement
with a network of visual observation posts which have been
provided with modern signal equipment. Experience shows that
where visual observation is well organized and a reliable warning
system is set up using all signal means, even the simplest ones,
losses are always significantly less. Helicopter-mounted rac5oX1-HUM
and patrolling airborne visual observation posts can be very
effective in detecting low-altitude targets, and should be widely
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Page 8 of 9 Pages
introduced into our troops.
Timely reconnaissance of low-altitude air targets is
possible only when planning is centralized on a front (army)
scale, and effective combat with them (timely commitment of
active air defense means to battle) is possible only when warning
and fire control are decentralized.
The level of readiness of close cover means to repel enemy
air strikes will depend primarily on the ability of personnel to
combat low-altitude targets under all conditions of the air and
ground situation. In this connection, inculcation in personnel
of solid skills in the timely detection and destruction of
targets flying at low and maximally low altitudes is now
acquiring especially great importance.
Training troops to fire tank antiaircraft machineguns and
small arms deserves a great deal of attention. It would seem
desirable for tank units, whose tanks have antiaircraft
machineguns, to not only master single firing against air
targets, but also widely put into practice group firings of
antiaircraft machineguns by companies and battalions.
Warning troops and close cover means of the threat of attack
by low-altitude targets requires further improvement.
NOTE:
The full text of this report and of others in this series is
stored on magnetic tape for computer text searching in
CIA/CRS/DSB. For access call Extension 5434 and ask for File No.
C 303 U.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9
Page 9 of 9 Pages
-Per-experience-of-combat actions
b) Per experience of actions by Israeli aviation
1000
--- --_\
500
--------
~~
300
60 M
I !~
Figure 1. Aviation flight profiles
a - per experience of combat actions in Vietnam;
b - per experience of actions by Israeli aviation
300
Zone of
low and
maximally
low
altitudes
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/12 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201950001-9