MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL DEFENSE IN A MISSILE/NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201990001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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COUNTRY USSR
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Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
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DATE
11 Jur,.a 1Q76
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : Cooperation Between the Armed Form_Hum
and Civil Defense in a Missile/Nuclear War
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Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense
in a Missile/Nuclear War
by
Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov
A number of articles on civil defense were published in 1965
in the journals Military Thought and Civil Defense of the USSR.
They analyzed the changes in the means of conducting a modern war
and the nature of this war and, in connection with this, both the
role and place of civil defense in the overall system of the
defensive measures of the state, its main tasks, and methods for
accomplishing them. These articles unquestionably helped the
leaders and all workers in civil defense, as well as the generals
and officers of the armed forces, to more fully picture the vast
range of problems to be solved in protecting the population and
economy of the country.
Among the large number of diverse and complex problems,
which are of interest both to civil defense and the armed forces,
a special place is afforded to cooperation between them in a
nuclear war.
Sufficient attention was not devoted to researching this
problem in previous articles. However, the achievement of
victory in a nuclear war will depend largely on the proper
solution of this problem.
We will mention right away that the problem of organizing
cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces is a new
one, and, perhaps for this reason, some of our military workers
underestimate its importance. The fact that not everyone has
formed a clear idea of the purpose of civil defense, its nature,
main tasks, and the methods of fulfilling those tasks in a
nuclear war, also undoubtedly has an effect. There are even
frequent instances where modern civil defense is regarded as
being the same as the local air defense which existed earlier.
This, of course, is not the case.
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In speaking about cooperation, it is necessary to state some
theses which form the basis for its organization. Thus, we are
firmly convinced that it is impossible to separate the training
and employment of the armed forces in a modern war from the
remaining defensive measures of the state, including civil
defense, since the active protection of the country (actions by
the armed forces) is inseparably linked with so-called passive
protection (civil defense). After all, the victorious side will
be the one that will be able not only to deliver nuclear strikes
and aggressively conduct large-scale offensive actions at the
front, but also to protect its economic potential and, most
important, its population, from nuclear strikes and other means
of destruction. And, it is impossible to accomplish the task of
ensuring the survival of the state in a nuclear war without very
close cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense.
This is why all the defensive measures of the country must
comprise a unified system and be directed from a single center.
Other military researchers object to allocating the armed
forces to help civil defense, believing that this will divert
them from fulfilling their own basic tasks and, as a result, will
be detrimental to the accomplishment of the main tasks of the
armed forces.
We cannot share such a view. In examining this question, we
must assume that, in a nuclear war, each warring side will
persistently strive to destroy the military-economic potential of
the enemy. First, enemies will attempt to destroy the industry
which produces nuclear weapons and other highly improved means of
armed combat. And, inasmuch as enterprises of virtually all
branches of the national economy take part in this production to
some extent, it is inevitable that high-yield nuclear strikes
will be delivered against the most important industrial,
political and administrative centers where a large part of the
country's population lives. A considerable part of the
conscripted manpower pool, equipment and supplies enter the armed
forces from these centers; numerous military units, staffs,
military educational institutions and various facilities of the
armed forces are located in them. Therefore, protection of the
major industrial centers is inseparably linked with protection of
the entire population, and, consequently, is important for 50X1-HUM
ensuring the survival of the state during a nuclear war.
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How can the protection of armed forces personnel against
bacteriological weapons be carried out separately from the
protection of the entire population of the country? We would
like especially to consider this question. The spontaneous
outbreak of cholera, which occurred in Iran and Afghanistan in
the summer of 1965 and was comparatively limited in scale,
illustrated how difficult it is to combat an epidemic even in a
quiet, peaceful situation.
Consequently, protection against bacterial means must be
carried out with close cooperation between civil defense and the
armed forces.
The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of
Ministers of the USSR determined the basic principle of
protecting the population against nuclear strikes to be the
dispersal of the population beforehand. When this measure is
carried out, as calculations show, losses of population from
nuclear strikes of the same yield can be decreased 35 to 40
times.
Naturally, this principle of dispersal also extends to
military units and facilities located in cities.
It is fitting to pose the question: what will military
units and facilities located in garrisons do in the event the
aggressor delivers a nuclear strike, or employs other means of
mass destruction against the political, administrative and
economic centers of the country? Will they participate in rescue
and emergency restoration work? Of course, we do take into
account that troops, based on their function, will fulfil the
tasks assigned to them. However, even in this case, in our
opinion, some of these troops should be allocated to do rescue
and emergency restoration work. This pertains especially to
those troops who are not directly conducting combat actions
(academies, military schools, construction units, etc.).
For troops moving to the front from interior military
districts, an exceptionally serious problem can arise in
connection with the destruction of transportation centers.
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movement through these centers is restored, or bypasses are
built, the troops will not be able to advance. Therefore, in
order to resume movement, they will also have to take part in a
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number of restoration operations.
In this way, troops must help the stricken population, take
part in restoring the industry of cities and the transportation
lines, and thus assist civil defense which, in turn, will also
greatly help the armed forces to fulfil their tasks by
eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes and the
employment of other types of weapons. This is what cooperation
consists of.
What, then, are the tasks which the armed forces will have
to fulfil in support of civil defense during the special and
initial periods of a war?
Among the tasks which the armed forces will fulfil in order
to protect the population, warning the population about the
threat of an enemy attack occupies a special place. It is
necessary to take into account that civil defense does not and
cannot have its own system of long-range reconnaissance and
observation. Therefore, it will receive data about the threat of
an enemy attack most quickly only from staffs and the Air Defense
Forces of the Country. Further transmission of information can
be done either via the independent civil defense warning and
communications net, or via the net of the Air Defense Forces of
the Country. In our opinion, it is advisable to have a unified
warning and communications system in the country. This will
ensure more rapid transmission of signals to installations of the
national economy and the entire population, and it is more
advantageous for economic reasons.
The exercise conducted in the Ukranian SSR in 1965 was
instructive in this regard. For the first time during this
exercise the "Air Alert" signal was transmitted not from the
civil defense command post, but from the command posts of an army
of the Air Defense Forces of the Country and its units. The
results were good. The very first warning signal reached the
oblast civil defense command posts within two minutes. Thi50X1 -HUM
means that, after conducting the necessary training for
personnel, the speed at which oblasts are warned can be reduced
to one minute. This result is achieved without any additional
expense, but only with proper organization and the maintenance of
continuous cooperation. Precisely this method is used in many
foreign countries. As is stated in the annual report of the US
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Civil Defense Headquarters for the 1964 fiscal year, which was
presented to President Johnson, the Joint North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD) supports civil defense warning centers
and provides them with necessary information, and a joint armed
forces communications agency controls the civil defense
communications systems and the national warning system.
One of the most important tasks of the armed forces, when
cooperating with civil defense and militia organs during a
nuclear war, should be considered to be ensuring good
organization and order in economic and administrative centers, on
transportation lines, etc. This should surprise no one: the
last war showed conclusively that a high degree of discipline
within the population as a whole is very important. Since then
the importance of this has increased many times over.
In case of an immediate threat of the employment of weapons
of great destructive power by the enemy and, moreover, if they
have already been employed, individual persons can cause serious
panic.
Let us take an incident which occurred in the Chinese city
of Chung-hsien at the beginning of 1941. During one of the air
raids by Japanese aviation, approximately 12,000 people were in a
large bomb shelter, which was well protected against the very
largest bombs. During the bombing of the city, someone in the
shelter shouted: "Gas!". Chaos resulted: everyone pushed
toward the exit, the strong ones knocked down and trampled the
weak and then fell along with the others; they blocked the exits,
shutting off the air supply. The majority of the people in the
shelter died as a result of a panic which began with one word,
said possibly by accident or as a joke.
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According to the plan of the civil defense leadership, there
will be large-scale movements of people from residences and
industrial enterprises to shelters or a non-urban zone during the
"special period". At this time nothing can guarantee against the
appearance of panic-causing rumors and panicky conduct on th50x1 -Hum
part of not only isolated individuals but whole groups,
especially since the enemy also will be actively trying to cause
such panic through its agents. The rise of general confusion is
not ruled out. Troops, especially cadets of military schools and
units from local garrisons, are best able to instil confidence in
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the people and establish a calmer atmosphere.
By no means are we skeptical of the ability of the militia
to bring about and maintain order, but the forces of the militia
will obviously be insufficient when masses of the population
consisting of many millions of people are moved. Besides this,
organized, highly disciplined troops instil calmness and
confidence in masses of people by their very presence and
fearless conduct.
The next task, which will require the allocation of troops
along with civil defense organs for its fulfilment, is that of
assisting the population which has been subjected to weapons of
mass destruction. Troops (mechanized, artillery, engineer or
special units) possess high mobility and are equipped with
everything necessary for rescue work. They can accurately
determine the coordinates of centers of destruction, the scales
of areas of destruction resulting from the shock wave, the
results of the effect of thermal radiation and the aftereffects
of radiation contamination; they can quickly arrive at centers of
destruction and immediately begin the rescue and prompt
evacuation of people to uncontaminated areas and medical
facilities.
And, finally, there is one more task, which civil defense
forces and military units must fulfil jointly -- carrying out
emergency restoration work. This work must be performed in the
interests of both the entire country and the troops in action.
It is completely obvious that restoration operations will be
large in scope, diverse and urgent. It will be necessary to
restore control and communications, bridges, roads and other
lines of transportation, industrial enterprises, the power
supply, agricultural production, etc.
It is even difficult to foresee what kinds of destruction
are possible and how many forces and means will be necessary for
carrying out the restoration work. However, it can be correctly
stated that there will be no one, and no technical means, that
will not be needed in this work. Therefore, there is no doubt
that military units and facilities must take a very active part
in emergency restoration operations.
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These, then, are only the most basic tasks which could be
fulfilled by the armed forces in cooperation with civil defense
organs. The limited scope of this article, unfortunately, does
not allow us to dwell at length on other less vital, though
nevertheless very important, tasks. Among these we should
include: rendering assistance in the area of scientific research
work, providing means of radiation, chemical and bacteriological
reconnaissance, rendering medical assistance, etc.
It is very important that firm bases for cooperation between
the armed forces and civil defense be laid in peacetime so that
this cooperation is reinforced with actual means, and developed
and refined in the course of joint command-staff and troop
exercises.
Naturally, for the organization and implementation of
cooperation, corresponding organizational forms are also
necessary.
For the protection of our population against weapons of mass
destruction, it is advisable to have a unified plan for
cooperation between all civil defense forces and means and the
units, military educational institutions and facilities of the
armed forces allocated for this purpose.
At present civil defense has its own special staffs and
units being made ready to organize, direct and actually carry out
rescue operations in centers of destruction. In the "special
period" and with the beginning of war, there will be more of such
staffs and units. They will be reinforced with personnel,
special equipment, transport, etc.
We are convinced that, besides civil defense staffs and
units which, with the onset of war, are assigned to set up
direction of rescue operations, it is highly essential to
allocate some of the armed forces staffs and units which are
garrisoned in cities and industrial centers. After all, in major
cities, especially those such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, 50X1-HUM
there are many military academies, institutes, schools, and
various units and facilities which will not be sent to the front.
Will the Academy i/n M. V. Frunze, the Academy of Armored Troops,
the Military Engineer Academy, or the School i/n Supreme Soviet
with their control organs, having highly qualified officers and
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generals at their disposal, really not be able to head the
organization and conduct of rescue and emergency restoration
operations, or to render substantial assistance in evacuating and
dispersing the population on the most crucial operational axes of
the City of Moscow and of Moscow Oblast? Especially, since in
and around Moscow, together they have a sufficiently powerful
materiel-technical base.
Regarding this, until the 1960's, when there was still local
air defense, these educational institutions were assigned to
actively participate in protecting the population. They worked
out plans and organized cooperation in the sectors of Moscow
assigned to them. According to plans for cooperation which were
drawn up and put into practice, the Moscow Military District, for
example, allocated 65,000 men and 4,000 vehicles, including
41,000 men and 1,800 vehicles for Moscow alone, to help civil
defense. This same situation existed in other military districts
also.
The necessary organizational work and the training of
control organs, command cadres and all personnel were done on the
basis of plans for cooperation.
But this system, which had been of unquestionable benefit,
was subsequently disrupted. At first, aid to civil defense from
military districts was sharply curtailed; for example, the Moscow
Military District began to allocate a very insignificant number
of forces to help Moscow, and then ceased even this assistance.
In our opinion, such a situation will not promote the
strengthening of the country's defensive capability to the
necessary degree.
Also, much must be done in the area of developing methods
for joint exercises of the armed forces and civil defense, since
it is impossible to count on good cooperation during wartime if
it has not been practically studied and worked out in peacetime.
In the past, many operational front command-staff exercises,
for example in the Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Leningrad, Baltic
and other military districts, were conducted together with the
civil defense exercises of the corresponding republics, krais,
and oblasts. In these exercises a situation was created which as
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closely as possible resembled that which could arise at the
beginning of a war. Experience has shown that joint exercises of
the staffs of the armed forces and civil defense were very
interesting, instructive and helpful from the standpoint of the
development of cooperation and the actual accomplishment of
common tasks.
Other joint tasks should be fulfilled on the basis of
cooperation. Let us take as an example research and development
work. In this area the sensible coordination of efforts and the
mutual exchange of information are also exceptionally important.
Therefore, the great economic and practical effect which can
result from close creative contact between scientific research
institutions and the educational institutions conducting
scientific research work on matters which are of mutual interest
to the armed forces and civil defense, is fully obvious.
As is known, the successful fulfilment of any task depends
primarily on the availability of well-trained cadres. Therefore,
it is impossible to speak about cooperation without having
touched upon the problems of training cadres.
Unfortunately, we must admit that there are quite a few
workers who have little idea of the nature of civil defense tasks
and the methods for carrying them out. One reason for such a
situation is that our military educational institutions do not
provide even elementary knowledge about civil defense matters.
In our opinion, military cadres should also be trained in how to
protect the population, industry and agriculture against weapons
of mass destruction. For this, there should be special
departments for civil defense in military educational
institutions, and especially in the leading academies.
The most fundamental questions of cooperation between the
armed forces and civil defense in a missile/nuclear war have been
examined in this article. It should be emphasized that a number
of them require resolution on a state-wide basis. We have
already dwelt on the urgent need to have a unified state system of
warning and communications. It is also necessary to have a
unified state-wide system for radiation observation and
laboratory monitoring. In order to protect the population it is
very important to detect radiation, chemical and bacteriological
contamination early, to accurately determine the boundaries of
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centers of contamination, and to forecast possible future
spreading of them. After all, we know that radiation
contamination can be spread along the paths of the movement of
radioactive clouds over a very large area. Bacteriological
contamination can also be spread very quickly. Therefore, it is
impossible to fulfil such a task with the uncoordinated efforts
of the forces and means of various agencies. A unified state-wide
system is needed for the observation and laboratory monitoring of
radiation, chemical and bacteriological contamination in the
atmosphere, in water, and on land. Such a system should be
established during peacetime. Organs of the Ministry of Defense
should also participate in this system.
There is now a department for the local defense of
installations of the armed forces. It could head up this work
also, as well as solve all other problems connected with
organizing and implementing the civil defense of these
installations. Apparently, it is generally more suitable to call
this the department for the civil defense of installations of the
armed forces.
The article "Civil Defense in a Missile/Nuclear War"* has
already discussed the need for centralized control over the
accomplishment of all defensive measures (of the economy, armed
forces and civil defense). An examination of specific problems
of cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense
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reaffirms this conclusion.
Unified control will ensure more effective cooperation of
all the forces and means of the country's defense, both at the
center and locally. The separation of the defense of the state
into several independent systems greatly complicates cooperation,
and could lead to very serious consequences
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