MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PROBLEMS OF ENGINEER SUPPORT FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF WATER OBSTACLES AT HIGH SPEEDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOP/ECRFT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
50X1 -HUM
16 June 1976
William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Problems of Engineer
Support for the Negotiation of Water Obstacles
at High Speeds
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought". This
article examines engineer support to river crossing operations in Western
European theaters under nuclear war conditions in which water obstacles are
to be negotiated from the march. The engineer measures emphasized by the
author include forming an appropriate grouping of engineer troops and the
equipment required for various conditions, and maneuvering crossing
equipment throughout the depth of an operation while maintaining its
survivability in the face of enemy strikes. The author feels more use
should be made of helicopters to transport materials and perform envi7eer
operations. This article at:neared in Tgcnfl Mn 1 (All 10A/
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies For ease of reference. reports from this nAllirntion have been
assigned
Willithn W. Wells
Page 1 of 19 Pages
TOP 'RET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOP SICRET
50X1 -HUM
Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 2 of 19 Pages
TOP RET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Tr)
COPT
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 19 Pages
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1962
DATE
16 June 1976
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR):
Problems of Engineer Support for
the Negotiation of Water Obstacles
at High Speeds
SOURCE
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military
Thought". The author of this article is Colonel General of Engineer Troops
A. Tsirlin. This article examines engineer support to river crossing
operations in Western European theaters under nuclear war conditions in
which water obstacles are to be negotiated from the march. The engineer
measures emphasized by the author include forming an appropriate grouping
of engineer troops and the equipment required for various conditions, and
maneuvering crossing equipment throughout the depth of an operation while
maintaining its survivability in the face of enemy strikes. The author
feels more use should be made of helicopters to transport materials and
perform engineer operations. Engineer reconnaissance utilizing aerial
photography and television, the advantages of the PMP pontoon bridge se
1-0X1-HUM
and the need for effective traffic control also are touched upon.
End of Summary
'the author, who was Chief of the Military Engineering Academy of the Ground
Forces from 1961 to 1969, also wrote 'Tngineer Support for the Movement 6I1HUM
Strategic Reserves from the Interior of the Country to a Theater of
Military Operations and Their Commitment to an Enanaempnt" in TCC110A M^
(76) for 1965
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOP ;ZRET
Page 4 of 19 Pages
Problems of Engineer Support for the Negotiation of
Water Obstacles at High Speeds
by
Colonel General of Engineer Troops A. Tsirlin
Without touching upon the whole diversity of problems connected with
engineer support for high rates of advance, the need for achieving which
has already been shown in a series of articles, we will dwell only on
engineer support for the negotiation of water obstacles by troops.
Under conditions of missile/nuclear war, water obstacles will have a
great influence on the conduct of operations and especially on the rate of
advance of troops.
Our probable enemies attach great importance in operations of the
initial period of a war to utilizing natural obstacles and to setting up in
conjunction with them engineer obstacles, areas of destruction, and zones
of radioactive contamination. They think that in this way it will be
possible to disorganize the advancing troops, bring them to a stop, or
force them to move slowly through those areas against which it will be
advantageous to deliver strikes with nuclear weapons. According to the
views of our probable enemies, the main preparatory work for setting up a
system of obstacles and areas of destruction on these water obstacles and
the approaches to them must be carried out in peacetime. They consider
that carrying out this work in advance and stockpiling minelaying means
will permit establishing in the course of operations high densities of mine
fields and large areas of destruction on axes which are accessible to
tanks.
According to available data, armies of the aggressive NATO bloc, in
accordance with the plans of the infrastructure, are carrying out an entire
system of measures to prepare for the reinforcement of water obstacles and
the demolition of important installations on them. Therefore, it is
necessary not only to systematically and thoroughly study the nature of the
enemy preparation of theaters of military operations as a whole, the
enemy's planned system of obstacles and especially his system of
demolitions on bridge crossings on medium-width and wide rivers, but also
to be prepared to prevent the setting up of these obstacles and to
negotiate the obstacles at high speeds.
50X1 -HUM
TOP ECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
.TOP
CRET
Page 5 of 19 Pages
The nature of the water obstacles which must be negotiated by the
troops during an offensive is determined by a series of indices, above all
by the width of the obstacle and nature of the bottom. Depending on their
width, water obstacles (rivers and their tributaries, canals, straits,
flooded areas, and the like) can arbitrarily be divided into narrow -- up
to 60 meters, medium-width -- up to 200 meters, and wide -- over 200
meters. In the Western European theaters of military operations narrow
water obstacles comprise approximately 68 percent of the total number.
During an offensive the troops will encounter them every 30 to 40
kilometers; they will encounter medium-width and wide water obstacles of
operational importance every 200 to 250 kilometers. Therefore, in a modern
offensive operation conducted to a great depth, it will be necessary to
negotiate two or three water obstacles daily. With the ever greater
development of tank crossings along the bottom, the contour and firmness of
the river bed also are becoming very important.
It is apparent from the data cited that during an offensive operation
in the initial period of a war the negotiation of water obstacles will be
just as certain and regular an occurrence as the negotiation of zones of
radioactive contamination, obstacles, and areas of destruction.
Not long ago, the assault crossing of water obstacles meant only a
troop crossing with a battle. Under modern conditions this concept has
changed substantially. At present, the negotiation of water obstacles
includes the movement of the troops right up to the water obstacle along a
wide front, the delivery of nuclear strikes against the most important
targets, the landing of airborne landing forces in a number of cases to
facilitate and accelerate the crossing of the troops, the crossing by units
and large units, and their rapid advance on the opposite shore.
Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Minister of Defense and Marshal of the
Soviet Union, demands that the troops master the methods of negotiating
water obstacles at high speeds, and learn to rapidly develop the offensive
into the depth after having negotiated the water obstacle, without alluding
any delay at the bridgehead.
The main condition for the successful negotiation of water obstacles
is the purposeful employment of nuclear warheads to deliver strikes,
primarily against large enemy reserves assigned to counteract our offensive
and, in conjunction with conventional means of destruction, also against
troops on the defensive right at the water obstacle. At the beginning of
and during the negotiation of water obstacles, tanks and artillery will
continuously conduct massed fire against enemy ground targets from both the
50X1 -HUM
TOP ECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
ouAl-num
TOP S
ET
Page 6 of 19 Pages
near and opposite shores. Accordingly, the ability of the troops to quickly
exploit the results of nuclear strikes and the effects of conventional
means of destruction against the enemy, and to rapidly negotiate a water
obstacle without substantially changing the battle formations of large
units or the operational disposition of formations, is of great importance.
At the same time, one of the decisive conditions for the success of an
offensive including the negotiation of water obstacles at high speeds is
engineer support. Its main task should be considered the conduct of
measures directed toward creating conditions for the rapid movement of the
troops up to the water obstacle along a wide front on separate axes, direct
support of the troop crossing, including crossing via bridges which have
been captured or cleared of mines, as well as support of an advance at a
high rate on the opposite shore.
The capabilities for the employment of missile/nuclear weapons by both
sides, the quality of modern combat equipment, the mobile nature of troop
actions to a great depth in an operation -- all this has sharply changed
former ideas concerning the organization of engineer support for an
offensive including the negotiation of water obstacles and concerning the
combat employment of engineer troops, and has introduced much that is new
into them.
Under modern conditions, in order that high rates of advance of troops
reaching 100 kilometers per day, not be decreased, all the water obstacles
encountered must be negotiated from the march. Since missile/nuclear
weapons will be employed in the interests of successfully negotiating
medium-width and wide water obstacles, all calculations and the
organization of engineer support should be carried out in peacetime,
proceeding from the basic method of negotiating water obstacles from the
march when an offensive is being conducted at high speeds. The design and
improvement of combat equipment and transport and crossing means, as well
as the combat training and operational training of troops and staffs, must
be subjected to this requirement.
Of course, the negotiation of water obstacles after a short period of
preparation, which could take place, for example, at the beginning of an
offensive operation if the operation is conducted without employing nuclear
weapons, as well as during an operation on several axes where for some
reason the water obstacle could not be negotiated from the march, cannot be
totally rejected. However, troops equipped with amphibious combat and
transport equipment and improved self-propelled (on land and in the water)
crossing means, as well as trained for the rapid negotiation of water
50X1 -HUM
TOP SE ET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Page 7 of 19 Pages
obstacles from the march, obviously will carry out the crossing completely
even when the preparation period is short.
In our opinion, new features in the organization and implementation of
engineer support for the negotiation of water obstacles at high speeds
include the totality of such measures as: the support of the approach of
the troops on a wide front and on the distant approaches, which eliminates
the formation of "traffic jams", and enables movement at increased speeds
even over swampy floodplains; the timely support of operations by forward
detachments and airborne landing forces, which are being more widely
employed for the specific purpose of seizing bridges and clearing mines
from them; the simultaneous setting up and maintenance of crossings on a
number of water obstacles, under conditions in which a deep operation is
being conducted; the maneuvering of engineer forces and means within a
limited time period; and, finally, the integrated employment of several
types of crossings and the utilization of various crossing means.
Engineer reconnaissance of water obstacles within short time limits,
operational camouflage, provost and traffic control service, and also troop
control at the moment the water obstacles are being negotiated, are
different under modern conditions. Let us examine some of the enumerated
theses in greater detail.
It seems to us that the new concept in the combat employment of
engineer troops in an operation is above all the formation of an
appropriate grouping of them which would be capable of ensuring the advance
of the troops to the water obstacle along a wide front on separate axes,
their immediate crossing, even in unsuitable sectors, following nuclear
strikes, and the continuous development of the offensive on the opposite
shore. In forming a grouping of engineer troops which meets these
requirements, it is necessary to thoroughly reason out the distribution of
engineer forces and crossing means along the axes of troop actions so as to
ensure the independence not only of divisions, but also of regiments of the
first echelon, and establish appropriate reserves of crossing means in the
armies and in the front with the goal of maneuvering them while negotiating
the water obstacles.
The independence of regiments, divisions, and armies in negotiating
water obstacles can be ensured by including in them organic crossing means
and by allocating such an amount of engineer forces and means, in a timely
manner, as would allow a troop crossing to be organized on the most
important axes without decreasing the rate of advance and, in addition,
would allow minimum reserves to be established in order to reconstruct
TGP SECRET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Page 8 of 19 Pages
crossings which have been put out of service.
It is known that deep operational tasks and the necessity to fulfil
them within short periods of time require that the entire large unit or
operational formation, including their rear services units, cross rapidly
to the opposite shore. Since the amount of non-amphibious combat equipment
and transport in a motorized rifle division is 1,850 pieces of equipment,
and in a tank division 1,905 pieces, moving them across on amphibious and
ferry means takes a great deal of time.
Calculations show that the organic crossing means of a present-day
motorized rifle (tank) division ensure the fulfilment of these requirements
only during an assault crossing of narrow (up to 60 meters) water
obstacles. During an assault crossing of wider rivers, the first-echelon
divisions of an army need to be reinforced with crossing means. Naturally,
there is a limit to the number of crossing means which can be concentrated
in the divisions.
If we consider that 800 to 1,000 trips of pieces of amphibious and
ferry means are necessary for moving across an entire division, and that in
the course of an hour three or four turn-arounds of these means can be
provided for, then it will be necessary to utilize an average of 300 pieces
of crossing means per hour. In order that a division cross within three
hours, it must be allocated up to 100 amphibious vehicles and ferries.
Obviously, even the maximum number of means which the division will receive
will be about one third of this figure, and the crossing by the division by
the amphibious-ferry method will take eight to nine hours.
As calculations show, when an adequate number of forces and crossing
means are allocated, the routes for driving tanks under water are skilfully
utilized, and the approach of the troops to the water obstacle is correctly
organized, the negotiation of this obstacle by a motorized rifle (tank)
division within five hours becomes possible. It is true that even such
time limits do not completely correspond to high rates of advance. It is
necessary as quickly as possible to revise the equipping of divisions and
regiments with crossing means and to improve the methods for using them.
This must be done in order to ensure a swift crossing by not only forward
detachments, but also regiments of the first echelon on amphibious and
ferry means, in conjunction with the immediate selection and preparation of
fords for tanks, the laying of routes for driving tanks under water, as
well as the laying of bridges for moving the main forces of the arm)soxi-Hum
across.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOPSECRET
Page 9 of 19 Pages
Among combined-arms commanders and engineer chiefs, existing views on
tank crossings, in accordance with which driving them along the bottom is
either recognized as the only method or completely ignored, could be
harmful to the development of the entire theory and practice of negotiating
water obstacles.
In working out methods for negotiating water obstacles, it is very
important to provide for the efficient combination of the driving of tanks
along the bottom with other types of crossings, and for the utilization of
all modern amphibious, ferry, and bridge means. Only the integrated
employment of amphibious combat and transport equipment, engineer crossing
means, and equipment for driving tanks under water and for swimming
crossings, as well as the development of devices to increase the
cross-country capability of transport means (non-amphibious armored
personnel carriers, prime movers, trucks) through deep fords, can ensure
high rates of advance of troops during the successive negotiation of a
series of water obstacles in an offensive operation.
Engineer support for the negotiation of water obstacles using the
entire arsenal of modern means is the duty of the engineer troops,
regardless of who has designed and manufactured these means and which
branch arm they are in. For example, in a number of cases, after the
obstacle is negotiated by amphibious tanks, as well as after conventional
tanks cross on tracked self-propelled ferries or under water, it will be
possible, rather than deploying pontoon bridge sets to assemble ferries, to
set about laying bridges immediately. Motorized rifle subunits and
artillery in this case will be able, as they come to the water obstacle, to
carry out a crossing on amphibious armored personnel carriers and
self-propelled amphibious means. The slight decrease in the rate of
advance, which might take place in the first hours after the beginning of
the crossing, will be compensated for by the subsequent accelerated troop
crossing over the bridges which have been laid.
When bridges are laid soon after the division arrives at the water
obstacle, the higher traffic capacity of the bridges can ensure that the
division crosses within a short time. Until recently, floating bridges
could be built at best within three hours from the moment the forward units
arrived at the water obstacle. This circumstance compelled the utilization
of pontoon bridge means initially for ferry crossings, since it was known
beforehand that the capacity of the latter would not permit adequate forces
to be rapidly concentrated on the opposite shore for the immediate
organization of the offensive. As a result of this, in a number of cases
it was necessary to secure small bridgeheads even when the enemy forces in
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
50X1-HUM
Page 10 of 19 Pages
the sector of the assault crossing were insignificant.
In disengaging the pontoon means deployed to lay floating bridges, as
rapidly as possible, the construction of bridges on narrow water obstacles,
as well as trestles or submerged bridges on fixed supports on medium-width
and wide rivers, will play an important role. The construction of the
latter should begin at the same time as the laying of floating bridges. A
trestle of any length built at such a distance from the bridge that it
cannot be destroyed at the same time as the bridge with one burst of a
medium-yield nuclear warhead, will be a sort of reserve for bridge crossing
means already deployed on the water.
Under all conditions a submerged bridge will have greater
survivability against the effect of nuclear strikes than a low-level
bridge. However, in the initial period of a war it is not likely that
there will be a large number of component parts for the construction of
such bridges among the troops. Apparently, in this situation in order to
construct bridges on narrow rivers and trestles on medium-width and wide
rivers, it will be necessary to utilize in full measure treadway bridge
layers of the vehicle-mounted treadway bridge and the vehicle-mounted heavy
bridge models, as well as non-bulky organic means enabling submerged
bridges to be erected quickly. At the present time, the speed with which
such bridges can be constructed is still one fourth to one fifth that with
which low-level bridges are built.
We must also take into consideration the fact that in the initial
period of a war the employment of missile/nuclear weapons and swift actions
both by specially allocated forward detachments when the troops approach
the water obstacles and by airborne landing forces dropped in advance, will
enable, to a greater extent than in the last war, bridge crossings to be
seized before they are destroyed. In this case, purposeful actions by
engineer troops to clear, as rapidly as possible, mines from the bridges
which have been seized will be very important.
We can safely say that the successive negotiation of a series of water
obstacles will not affect the rate of advance if crossing means are
correctly distributed in the army to the large units, and in the large
units to the units, and most important, if they are maneuvered at the
proper time. This acquires especially important, decisive significance in
the planned support of the negotiation of water obstacles under all
conditions of the situation. 50X1-HUM
TOP ECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOP
ET
Page 11 of 19 Pages
The maneuvering of crossing means depends on the skilful leadership of
the engineer troops equipped with these means, and will be complicated by
the absence of a continuous and straight front line. In order to ensure
high speeds for a troop crossing on the main axes, it is necessary in
conducting a maneuver to concentrate other bridging means, in addition to
the means moved up to the troops in advance, from those sectors where a
crossing was unsuccessful, as well as means from the second echelons and
reserves of the army and, in a number of cases, from the front. Military
transport aviation has a great future in the maneuvering of Eossing means.
At the present time it is in order to examine the following ways of
maneuvering crossing means: from the depth to the water obstacle, along the
water obstacle, by leap-frogging or shifting the crossing means during the
successive negotiation of a series of water obstacles, and finally, from
the water obstacle into the depth. In connection with this, problems of
maneuvering crossing means, not only on a division and army scale but also
within a front, using ground transport and especially military transport
aviation, as well as problems of controlling engineer troops when
negotiating a series of water obstacles at high speeds, should be worked
out carefully and in advance. In developing means for the integrated
mechanization and automation of troop control, we must also take into
consideration the need of the engineer troops for these means in order to
carry out control and maneuvering while supporting an offensive which
includes the negotiation of a series of water obstacles at a high speed.
We should also take into consideration the circumstance that the
enemy, utilizing water obstacles to conduct combat operations, will strive
to hamper the deployment of crossing means on the water, to exert maximum
influence on them with his nuclear and conventional weapons and aviation
before and after they are put into operation, and prevent the maneuvering
of crossing means. It is sufficient to note that the crossings and bridges
on a water obstacle within a radius of 1.5 kilometers from ground zero of a
burst can be destroyed by a low-yield nuclear warhead. And, when nuclear
ground bursts are employed, zones of radioactive contamination many
kilometers in area and having high levels of radiation will be created on
the approaches to the water obstacle and at the crossings.
The vulnerability of crossing means to such strikes requires that
engineer chiefs take part in organizing surface-to-air missile and air
cover for the crossing areas, coordinate actions by the engineer troops
with actions by tanks and ground artillery, as well as take effectivr,
.J0X1-HUM
measures to directly ensure the survivability of the crossings.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
5nyi-uum
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Page 12 of 19 Pages
From the engineer point of view, the survivability of crossings can be
ensured by distributing crossing means along a broad front, by building
dummy crossings and especially bridges, by rapidly changing over from
bridge to ferry crossings and back, by systematically transferring floating
and composite bridge crossings to new places (an anti-nuclear maneuver), as
well as by freeing crossing means in a timely manner, especially pontoon
bridge sets, and replacing them with submerged and low-level bridges on
fixed supports.
In conjunction with the problem of the survivability of crossings,
there arises the urgent necessity of maintaining all crossing means in a
state of readiness to support the negotiation of water obstacles by the
troops at any time of day and in any sector, including those with
unsuitable approaches. In connection with this, all crossing means should
be equipped beforehand with all that is necessary for laying crossings or
utilizing them at night.
The width of the present-day offensive zone of large units and
formations has changed significantly in comparison with the past war.
Combined with the post-war development of crossing equipment, which in its
tactical characteristics and specifications cannot be compared to previous
means in any way, this width also has strongly influenced the organization
of the negotiation of water obstacles and, in particular, the increase in
the length of the assault crossing sectors of divisions and the assault
crossing zones of armies. Thus, in 1943 six armies of the Steppe Front
advanced across the Dnepr River in the Kremenchug-Dneprodzerzhinsk sector,
while during the operational-strategic exercise in the autumn of 1956 (?),
the water obstacle in this same sector was negotiated from the march by two
armies, in support of which a significantly larger number of the best
quality crossing means were utilized than were possessed by the entire
Steppe Front.
When an army is advancing in a zone 100 to 150 kilometers wide, its
divisions will actually be advancing on separate axes with gaps between
them reaching 20 to 30 kilometers at times. In this case the army will
approach the water obstacle along a broad front, and to negotiate the
obstacle, divisions could obtain a sector up to 20 to 30 kilometers wide.
For the successful negotiation of a water obstacle along a broad front by
all the first-echelon divisions of an army, it is necessary to reinforce
them beforehand with amphibious and pontoon bridge means.
It is known that in the past war the delay of mechanized troops on
swampy sectors of river floodplains was caused, as a rule, by the slow
TOV SECRET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
ouAl-num
Page 13 of 19 Pages
building of treadway road surfaces. Thus, when the troops of the 36th Army
of the Transbaykal Front were negotiating the swampy floodplain of the
Argun river in August 1945, the rate at which work proceeded on the laying
of plank wheel tracks on each of the approaches to this river was dependent
on the speed at which the vehicles hauling the wooden wheel tracks moved
over the floodplain.
Now it is completely realistic to count on the utilization of
helicopters for the transport and laying of wheel treadways, along which
the troops will be able to advance to the crossings, in sectors with routes
which have a low load carrying capacity. The employment of helicopters to
carry out such tasks is desirable, since a helicopter is capable of flying
in a straight line at a speed of 200 kilometers per hour even above sectors
of terrain which are inaccessible to vehicle transport, while a truck can
move no faster than 40 to 50 kilometers per hour.
The exercises conducted in 1959 in the Baltic Military District showed
that by using helicopters it is possible to quickly select places for
crossing the swampy sectors of river floodplains which would require the
minimum artificial increase in the load carrying capacity, and to transport
by air and lay road surfaces of plank wheel tracks and duralumin in these
places within a very short time without decreasing the rate of approach by
the troops to the water obstacle.
In our opinion, we should continue to work out theoretically and
experiment widely in troop exercises with ways to rapidly reconnoiter
passages across swampy sectors of terrain and methods to increase the load
carrying capacity of river floodplain sectors.
However, even a substantial acceleration in the completion of engineer
operations by utilizing helicopters will not be able to fully solve the
problem of ensuring the timely approach of the troops to water obstacles
across wide swampy floodplains along impassable roads, especially during
the flood season and rainy periods. In connection with this, we must raise
a question concerning the significant increase in the cross-country
capability of the combat and transport vehicles of all the branch arms, as
well as the vehicle chassis for engineer equipment allotted to support an
offensive at high speeds which includes the negotiation of water obstacles.
Moving crossing means, and the troops and cargo to be put across, to the
water obstacle without using the roads already in existence or those laid
in the course of the offensive will enable crossings to be set up in
sectors to which access is difficult, and the location of crossings to be
easily shifted on the water obstacle, thus ensuring the greatest safety for
TOP CRET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOP
RET
Page 14 of 19 Pages
crossings from strikes by enemy nuclear weapons.
However, even if the problem of sharply increasing the cross-country
capability of ground transport is solved, engineer support for the movement
of troops to a water obstacle will remain, as before, one of the most
difficult measures directly affecting the achievement of high rates of
advance. This support will consist primarily of reconnoitering routes and
eliminating enemy obstacles which it is disadvantageous or impossible to
bypass. To achieve high rates of advance there are movement support
detachments on each of the routes of the first-echelon regiments and within
forward detachments on the routes of the battalions. Also, engineer units
within the march columns must lay short sections of column routes, clear
the roads of tree barriers and combat equipment which has been abandoned,
damaged, or burned, and eliminate damage to the road beds in an extremely
short time.
The movement support detachments should always be supplied with
engineer equipment mounted on tank chassis, which would enable the above
operations to be carried out in zones of radioactive contamination having
radiation levels of up to 50 roentgens. But when such engineer equipment is
available the radiation dose received by the crews will be one tenth of
that received by personnel during exposed movement and work on contaminated
terrain.
At the present time it is becoming vitally necessary for engineer
units to have equipment that would protect the personnel working in it
against radioactive contamination when the level of radiation is from 150
to 200 roentgens. The placing of a special protective layer (liner) in the
cabs of existing engineer vehicles using tank and heavy artillery prime
mover chassis is entirely practicable. There is no doubt that the time has
come to supply the engineer troops with remote-controlled equipment for
operations in zones having high levels of radiation which are either
impossible or inadvisable to bypass.
Turning to engineer equipment which directly supports a crossing, we
should say that the PMP model pontoon bridge set which was adopted into
service at the beginning of 1960 possesses the best indices in comparison
with earlier pontoon bridge sets. This set permits high rates of advance
to be ensured while negotiating water obstacles. Bridges built from the
PMP pontoon bridge set are laid not within 1.5 to two hours, as is the case
with bridges made from TPP heavy pontoon bridge sets, but within 20 to 30
minutes; that is, three to four times faster. The speed which is permitted
on them is two times greater (20 to 25 kilometers per hour), and the number
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOP
CRET
Page 15 of 19 Pages
of vehicles required to transport the bridge assembly and personnel needed
to lay the bridge is one half as many. However, the inadequate
cross-country capability of the transporting vehicles of the PMP pontoon
bridge set off the roads necessitates further improvement of the design
with the goal of developing self-propelled bridge sets.
The reduced time used by crews in laying the bridges and the increased
speed of troop movement over such bridges are very important in the event
of high levels of radioactive contamination at the water obstacle. It
would only be necessary to relieve the personnel maintaining the bridges
more frequently.
Since the PMP pontoon bridge set possesses such good indices, there
arises the urgent necessity to equip the troops with these sets as rapidly
as possible. The presence in an army pontoon bridge regiment of two PMP
sets would enable divisions to be reinforced while negotiating water
obstacles of medium width and, under the conditions of the Western European
theaters of military operations, allow such water obstacles to be
negotiated by an army within 10 to 12 hours, without reinforcement with the
crossing means of the front.
Returning to the question of the utilization of helicopters, we should
point out that at the present time there is not one task for the engineer
support of a troop offensive which includes the negotiation of a series of
water obstacles, in the accomplishment of which helicopters could not play
a great role. The capability of landing engineer subunits with obstacle
clearing means in order to negotiate obstacles and areas of destruction on
the approaches to water obstacles will assist tank groupings in quickly
approaching them. Unfortunately, in exercises the decision to utilize
helicopters for this purpose, which for some reason is considered a passive
task for them, is often not approved. On the other hand, at times the
totally unjustified setting down of landing forces by helicopters on the
opposite shore in areas which were subjected to nuclear strikes and where
the tasks of these landing forces certainly were not always active, has
become almost commonplace.
Helicopters can also be widely utilized for the carrying out of a
whole series of other important military-engineer operations. Let us
mention that the helicopter is not only a transport means, but also an
ideal hoisting means, in which the engineer troops are very interested.
Using helicopters, one- and two-span bridges can be assembled in a very
short time across small obstacles on the approach routes to the main water
obstacles. Thus, the MI-1 helicopter is capable of airlifting structural
50X1 -HUM
TOP CRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Page 16 of 19 Pages
components for bridges weighing up to 1,150 kilograms at speeds of up to
100 kilometers per hour and erecting them at the obstacle.
In connection with this, the demand for the development of basic means
of engineer equipment, primarily crossing means, which could be transported
by air, is fully justified. They should have higher technical
specifications than the existing models.
In relation to the organization of engineer reconnaissance, it should
be emphasized above all that the engineer reconnaissance subunits in the
divisions must be prepared to find axes for the laying of routes to the
water obstacle, as well as to reconnoiter places for tank crossings along
the bottom, and for amphibious, ferry, and bridge crossings, and to detect
obstacles within the water obstacle. As the experience of a series of
exercises shows, engineer reconnaissance subunits acting jointly with
regimental reconnaissance 20 to 25 kilometers in front of the forward
detachments were able to reconnoiter and mark approach routes and places
for crossings, as well as sectors on the shore and in the water which had
been mined, by the time the forward detachments approached the water
obstacle.
In all circumstances, before a decision can be made to negotiate water
obstacles, data about the water obstacles gathered from maps and
military-geographical descriptions, and obtained by agent reconnaissance
and from other sources, will have to be refined on the basis of an
interpretation of aerial photographs of the sectors of the water obstacles
in the offensive zone of army (front) troops. Using aerial photographs it
is now possible to determine: the width(with an accuracy of plus or minus
four meters) and the depth of water obstacles, the speed of the current,
the presence of obstacles in the water and on the shores, the steepness of
descents and ascents (with accuracy within one or two degrees), the nature
of the bottom, the condition of the approaches to the water obstacle and
the exits onto the opposite shore, and the height of the banks (with an
accuracy of plus or minus a half meter).
In addition to this, the methods for obtaining aerial photographs of
objects in the water obstacle and on the approaches to it must be improved
by using television systems installed on helicopters and aircraft.
Technically, it is already possible to transmit an image of the terrain
from an altitude of ten kilometers and for a distance of 250 to 300
kilometers, and at the reception point the objects in which we are
interested (bridges, approaches to the water obstacle, hydraulic
engineering works, and others) can be photographed from the television
TO8ECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
50X1-HUM7----
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
nnp SFOFT
Page 17 of 19 Pages
screen.
For the conduct of engineer reconnaissance it is very important to
develop technical means which would enable the initial data necessary to
immediately organize a troop crossing of a water obstacle to be determined
in a most rapid manner. It has become necessary to equip engineer
reconnaissance subunits with special vehicles having a cross-country
capability in order for these subunits to rapidly and directly reconnoiter
water obstacles, especially the contour and quality of the bottom, and the
approaches to them. Such vehicles should ensure the selection and marking
of deep fords and routes for the negotiation of water obstacles along the
bottom by tanks. It is possible that one of the vehicles will swim at
various depths and move along the bottom of the water obstacle to gather
the necessary data.
The increased importance of seizing bridge crossings in the course oE
a high-speed offensive brings up the need to equip engineer reconnaissance
subunits with improved instruments enabling the mining of bridges to be
detected, and with means for the removal of mixed minefields which have
been detected.
While approaching a water obstacle the troops should be dispersed in
order to decrease losses from enemy nuclear strikes, since the rate of the
troop crossing in a number of cases might be less than their rate of march.
In connection with this, operational camouflage acquires an important role:
the basic measures of this camouflage, when preparing for an offensive with
the negotiation of water obstacles, must be worked out in peacetime. These
measures should have a dynamic nature corresponding to the rapid actions of
the troops when negotiating a water obstacle. We should note that while we
have enormous experience in displaying dummy stationary targets, the
simulation of moving targets (marches, crossings, mobile operations) still
requires a large number of forces and means. This problem urgently needs
to be worked out further.
In order to reduce losses from nuclear weapons and to negotiate water
obstacles at high speeds and in a well organized manner, the provost and
traffic control service organized by the combined-arms staffs on the
approaches to the water obstacle and at the crossings will have enormous
importance. It is advisable to assign engineer troops to perform the
provost and traffic control service only at the crossings themselves and on
the closest approaches to them. In each specific case, depending on the
contours of the terrain on the close approaches to the water obstacle and
on the nature of the floodplain, a boundary line between the posts of the
TOP CRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TO
ECRET
Page 18 of 19 Pages
provost and traffic control service of the engineer troops and those of the
combined-arms provost and traffic control service should be set up in
advance.
As the experience of exercises shows, it is advisable to organize the
provost and traffic control service at the crossings after the forward
detachments have come to the water obstacle. Under these conditions, as
forward subunits cross, the commandants of the crossings will be able to
have their own assistants, provost and traffic control posts and rescue
teams on the opposite shore. Officers and engineer subunits assigned to
perform provost and traffic control service at the crossings will be able
to fulfil their duties in a timely manner only if they move with the
leading battalions of the forward detachments.
From all that has been said, this conclusion can be drawn: for the
engineer support of high rates of advance including the negotiation of
water obstacles, it is necessary to equip the engineer troops with improved
means for the reconnaissance of water obstacles, with modern water crossing
means, and with means for the erection of submerged bridges.
At the present time, the most complex problem in organizing engineer
support for the negotiation of water obstacles very likely is not so much
to immediately move the troops across, as to ensure their rapid and
organized approach to the water obstacle along a broad front on separate
axes, and the continuous development of the offensive on the opposite
shore. In our opinion, this is linked to the slight lag in the development
of the road-building vehicles and bridge-building means in service with the
engineer troops, as well as to the low cross-country capability of organic
combat and transport vehicles. However, it would be incorrect to attribute
all the shortcomings to equipment alone. Further improvement in the
organization of the utilization of the existing road network, its
restoration, development and maintenance, and control of troop movement
along it, will affect the solution of this problem considerably. The
development of a new type of operational support, that is, road support,
apparently would also eliminate such shortcomings.
In our opinion, such are the urgent problems of engineer support for
the negotiation of water obstacles which, in the interests of such support,
require solution as quickly as possible.
TOP RET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
TOP 5EdET
Page 19 of 19 Pages
TQP?CRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-00105R000202040001-8