MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): URGENT PROBLEMS OF LOCAL AND CIVIL DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000202050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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COUNTRY USSR
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
DATE 17 June 1976
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Urgent Problems of Local Defense
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Urgent Problems of Local Defense
by
General-Leytenant I. Katyshkin
Troop combat operations to a large extent depend on the
normal functioning of numerous rear installations that are not
immediately affiliated with the area adjacent to the front, such
as permanent supply and repair bases, military depots, hospital
bases, military garrisons, and other facilities. The
organization of reliable protection of them under the conditions
of a nuclear war is an extremely complex problem that so far has
not been adequately explored. The guides, instructions, and
different manuals on this subject mainly enumerate protective
measures against weapons of mass destruction and almost never
contain recommendations on the organization of this work and
procedures for carrying it out during wartime.
In the past the protection of all the above installations
was the responsibility of the local air defense system, the
organizational structure of which was based on requirements of a
limited nature since an installation, using its own forces, could
to a considerable extent eliminate the aftereffects of an air
strike. Now, however, with the employment of nuclear means an
enormous territory (a large city with all the military-industrial
installations located within its limits) can be turned into a
continuous center of destruction. Then, of course, it will be
impossible to carry out rescue operations without joint,
coordinated efforts of military units and of the local and civil
defense contingents of different types operating in the grouping
of forces of the given operational axis.
An examination of the structure of the local defense of
important installations of the military district from this
standpoint leads one to conclude that it requires some revivina
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In our opinion, its main shortcoming is that local defense
contingents and their system of control are formed without regard
for the shift system either in the production process or in the
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conduct of rescue operations in a contaminated area. As a
result, when personnel are dispersed, subunits appear to split
into two parts and virtually lose their combat effectiveness.
The control of contingents becomes impossible since the combat
crews of the control posts can provide immediate guidance from
only one post. The situation is aggravated still further by the
fact that the numbers of people at some installations do not
always permit the establishment of reserve contingents even
though many workers and employees are not included in the local
defense teams.
We believe that the way out of this situation is to
establish more flexible, organizationally complete contingents
that conform to the actual conditions of the installation.
As the experience of the work of the Transcaucasus Military
District demonstrates, when organizing the civil defense of rear
installations, it is essential to enlist in the contingents
everyone who is working other than those registered for
mobilization, the elderly, and women with young children. The
authorization of the contingents should conform to the number of
persons enlisted in them. Installations that convert to
two-shift work during the "Special Period" should have
contingents established for each shift.
In small installations, specialized teams and groups capable
of removing obstructions, creating passages for vehicles and
persons, evacuating casualties, and carrying out other work may
be appointed. The advisability of establishing such teams has
been borne out by the experience of the work of a number of
installations in the military district.
The proposed procedure for contingents also requires a
partial reorganization of the system of control.
It seems advisable to us that each working shift have an
independent group for the control of local defense, which should
include among its personnel shift supervisors of production,
shift chiefs, foremen, brigade leaders, and other senior 50X1-HUM
specialists.
During the working shift, control group personnel can
simultaneously attend to their immediate duties of supervising
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production. However, in the dispersal area and when engaged in
rescue work, the control group has to carry out its functional
duties, like the combat crew of a control post.
The chief of local defense of an installation, his deputy,
the chief engineer, and the chief of the staff must direct the
local defense of both shifts. The place where they are situated
will depend on the specific situation.
This control structure ensures flexible and efficient
direction both of the production process and of the conduct of
local defense, and has already been adopted by the civil defense
organizations of installations located within our military
district.
In small garrisons and in installations with limited
personnel, and where there is one working shift, backup control
organs have proven of value. In the military district, the
best-prepared local defense staffs of individual installations
that are less likely to suffer strikes are designated the backup
local defense staffs of the garrisons.
When we speak of backup staffs, we have in mind not merely
their formal designation, but, principally, their systematic
training. In the military district garrisons, the backup staffs
train by studying combat documents prepared by the local defense
staffs of the garrisons and installations that are to have
backups; by having backup personnel participate as players in all
staff training practices and exercises; and by taking part in
training exercises at main and temporary control posts. It must
be emphasized that backup control organs are able to carry out
their functions successfully only if they are supplied with radio
communications means. During garrison exercises, we tested a
radio communications scheme that included all control posts,
including backup control posts. It was again confirmed that
unless the backup posts are included in a unified radio
communications net, it is almost impossible to quickly switch
control over to them. Therefore each main and backup control
post of the installations should have two radio sets operating on
the garrison and installation radio nets, respectively. For
control based on the two-shift principle, it will be necessary to
allocate two more radio sets to each installation so that the
local defense chief of the off-duty (non-urban) shift can keep in
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contact with the garrison chief and with the civil defense chief
of the appropriate city sector, whose staff will also be located
in the non-urban zone.
We base the planning of the action of local and civil
defense forces and means on the assumption that it will be
possible to essentially complete personnel dispersal before the
war begins. In this case, efforts will be directed mainly toward
rescuing working shifts sheltered on the grounds of an
installation. With a surprise attack the picture changes -- both
the working and the off-duty shifts will be exposed to the
strike. Even if some forces remain at the installations, it will
hardly be possible to count on their aid since they themselves
will have to be rescued. Under these conditions, the main burden
of rescue operations will fall on the contingents of rural raions
and cities not affiliated with civil defense groups. The forces
of local military garrisons that are located within the raion or
the oblast will also be involved in these tasks.
In the given case, actions involving civil defense organs
must be coordinated with exceptional precision. We have
presented such a variant of actions in the appropriate plans for
the cooperation of civil defense organizations and the garrisons.
Specifically, shift civil defense contingents have been
designated for each military installation, and departure areas
within the appropriate operational axes, as well as contact
points, have been assigned them. Military units have been
assigned to help local and civil defense organizations to
eliminate the aftereffects of an enemy attack.
However, the practical aspect of this effort involves the
training of all these forces, and especially of military units,
for joint operations to eliminate the aftereffects of an enemy
attack.
Of course, this work should not affect the combat readiness
of the units or their performance of basic tasks during either
peacetime or wartime. Nevertheless, each military unit should be
prepared to carry out a certain amount of rescue work to protect
the population.
We already have some experience in the training of units and
institutions allocated to aid civil and local defense
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organizations. They are trained within the system of regular
training, using the combined method and in conformity with a
specially developed program. For example, a company will work
out its special program during a tactical exercise.
Simultaneously, against the same background, operations will be
conducted to rescue persons from obstructions, shelters, and
burning homes; passages will be made in obstructions; etc. In
order that staffs of military units may acquire practical skills,
they are periodically required to participate in joint local and
civil defense exercises. A specific example of this is provided
by the command-staff civil defense exercise of the city of
Tbilisi, in which the local defense staff of the garrison,
operations groups from a motorized rifle division, from an
artillery school, from a military construction detachment, and
from a military hospital, participated. The following problems
were worked out during the exercise: the organization of the
maintenance of civil order, the preparation and use of roads and
areas where units are to be accommodated, the support of
mobilization measures, and the mutual use of civil defense units
and contingents when eliminating the aftereffects of an enemy
attack.
We would like to point out, however, that at the present
time the training of military units, joint exercises, and other
civil defense measures are planned mainly at the initiative of
the staffs of the military districts. It appears that the time
has come to include in troop combat training programs a minimum
number of problems pertaining to the conduct of rescue and urgent
emergency restoration operations in the city and the factory
(enterprise), particularly since this work differs from similar
troop activities in a center of destruction under wartime
conditions.
As is known, the problems of evacuation and dispersal occupy
an important place in the protection of installations. How did
we solve them under the conditions in the military district?
First, with the participation of city civil defense staffs,
installations were assigned dispersal areas. Here the following
details are typical. Installations were assigned dispersal sites
within the limits of the operational axes of the appropriate city
areas to be cleared, where the civil defense contingents assigned
to give aid to these installations were to be concentrated. This
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made it possible to better organize the cooperation of civil and
local defense formations when they were moving out to the center
of destruction and during their subsequent actions. In
determining the distance of the dispersal areas from industrial
centers, we endeavored to ensure that working shifts could go to
and from their place of work with a minimum expenditure of time
and to spare them the direct effects of the casualty-producing
elements of a nuclear burst; this distance amounted to 35 to 50
kilometers. The prevailing wind direction was also taken into
consideration to avoid sending personnel to a site that was
certain to suffer radioactive contamination.
After the installations had been assigned dispersal areas,
the reconnaissance groups carried out their work. They studied
routes, determined the average rates of movement, and identified
bypasses for sectors that were difficult to traverse. At the
accommodation sites, they explored the possibilities of using
public, administrative, and economic structures, power and water
sources, and local communications centers to link the
installation with the dispersal point.
The problems of dispersing people as the basic method of
protecting the population against weapons of mass destruction
must not, in our opinion, be considered in isolation from other
protective measures, and, in particular, from engineer
protection. Only if we have an adequate number of strong
shelters can we quickly shelter the working shift and those
persons who are not able to get out to a non-urban zone or who
are forced by their official duties to stay in the city. It must
be taken into consideration that in the event of a surprise
attack, shelters will constitute the principal means of
protecting the population. Because of this, the search for ways
of using underground structures of the municipal services to
protect the people has acquired grave importance. Some work has
been done to adapt a number of military district facilities for
use as shelters: air vents and shafts equipped with iron
shutters made from scrap have been built, and wiring for
telephone communications, radio broadcasting, and telegraphy has
been installed.
Several garrisons have begun to make experimental models5a-7 -HUM
very simple shelters built of reinforced concrete. Having
carried out all this work, we nevertheless believe that all
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possible measures must be taken in peacetime to increase the
stock of protective structures even if it means only building
them for community and production needs and simultaneously
designating them as shelters for people.
The level of training of command personnel plays an
extremely important role in the basic improvement of local
defense measures and the ensuring of the constant combat
readiness of its forces and means. Unfortunately it does not yet
fully meet modern requirements. Directors of facilities and
chiefs of the local defense of installations have not yet
acquired sufficient knowledge or ability to solve the problems of
organizing and conducting rescue operations creatively, quickly,
and with initiative, and are inadequately prepared to direct
subordinate staffs, services, and contingents. This is why we
believe it necessary that they be trained in local defense
courses (at the time of the central "Vystrel" courses) as are the
chiefs of the local defense staffs of installations, but with a
reduced training period.
Of course, the chiefs of the services also need thorough
special training, since they train subordinate personnel.
After studying and testing several variants of command
personnel training, we came to the conclusion that in the future
the training of this category of personnel should be organized at
military district assemblies, using the resources of training
centers, advanced training courses for doctors, chemical warfare
training centers, and other district facilities and institutions.
The advisability of this academic training method is
confirmed by the positive results of courses of instruction for
chiefs of communications and warning and of the medical,
chemical, engineer, and fire-fighting services. These courses
were conducted under the direction of the chiefs of the
directorates and departments of the military district.
Here we point out that the training of command personnel
cannot, of course, be limited to short-term training in cours5oxi-Hum
and assemblies. They should subsequently deepen and improve
their knowledge and skills both independently and in the command
training system. The value of individual assignments that are
worked out in the district for each quarter and for all
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categories of personnel of local defense staffs and services is
being increasingly demonstrated.
The successful training of contingents would be furthered by
producing as soon as possible a number of valuable training and
visual aids on the work of staffs, services and contingents and
on the theory and actual conduct of local defense. This task can
be accomplished through the joint efforts of the staffs of the
military districts and the central directorates of the Ministry
of Defense.
The above are some ideas that in our opinion will help to
increase even more the readiness of facilities and institutions
for protection against weapons of mass destruction.
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