MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE NEED FOR SELF-PROPELLED MORTARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302190001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 26, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Need for Self-Propelled Mortars
by
Colonel G. Yefimov
The highly important question of the need for self-propelled artillery
already has been raised in periodical military publications.* In the
interests of increasing the combat effectiveness of our Ground Forces we
believe it necessary, along with developing self-propelled artillery, to
develop self-propelled mortars as well. Without them, in the near future
the artillery of motorized rifle, and especially tank, large units will
not, in our opinion, be able to fully meet the requirements of a
combined-arms battle and perform all its fire tasks to the full extent in
the shortest possible time with the minimum expenditure of ammunition and
by the most economical methods.
The attention given to artillery, and especially mortars, has
decreased in recent years as the troops have been equipped with tactical
nuclear weapons. In the postwar period the number of mortars in Ground
Forces large units already has been sharply reduced. Thus, according to
1942 tables of organization and equipment, a rifle division had 104 mortars
(not counting 50-mm mortars), which assured it superiority over a German
infantry division by a factor of 1.5 in 82-iiia mortars, and absolute
superiority in 120-mm mortars. At the present time there are 15 mortars in
a tank division, and 45 in a motorized rifle division. This is one-half to
one-third the number of mortars in large units of the armies of the US and
the Federal Republic of Germany. Even if mortars are considered obsolete
weapons, such a significant enemy superiority cannot be tolerated, if only
because mortars are the sole weapon able to fully combat other mortars.
It is known that mortars were first used in 1904 in defense of Port
Arthur. Then they were forgotten, and by 1914 there were virtually none in
the Russian Army. In the World I period mortars again demonstrated their
right to existence as close combat weapons. It is sufficient to recall
that in the offensive against Riga in September 1917, the Germans
concentrated 550 mortars on a 4.5 kilometer front; and that the French
during the Aisne River offensive in April 1917 had 1,650 mortars, which at
that time represented considerable strength.
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Despite the obvious need to develop this type of weapon, mortars were
not adopted into service in the Red Army until 1937-1938, and by February
1940 the troops had received only about 6,800 in all. Only the experience
of the war with the White Finns revealed this serious shortcoming and
necessitated the acceleration of the equipping of the army with mortars.
As a result, by April 1940 there already were 10,800 mortars with the
troops (not counting 50-Inin mortars). However, even this number proved to
be clearly insufficient. On the basis of the experience of the first
months of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made to increase the
production of mortars. In September 1941 industry produced three times as
many of them as in July, and by November 1942 the production of mortars had
increased 10.2 times. Of the total number of guns in the Ground Forces
(including antiaircraft, self-propelled and rocket artillery), mortars
comprised 46.6 percent in 1943, and 37 percent in 1945. The Great
Patriotic War ended in victory, and again the number of mortars with the
troops began to he reduced; the above-cited figures provide a convincing
illustration of this.
At present the majority of the armies of the capitalist states have
self-propelled mortars in service. For example, the US Allay has the M257E1
81-mm self-propelled mortars on M113 armored personnel carrier chassis, and
the M48, xm06 and M106E1 106.7-mm (107-mm) self?propelled mortars. In the
army of the Federal Republic of Germany, 81-mm and 120-mm self-propelled
mortars have been adopted into service. The Japanese army has 61-mm and
106-mm self-propelled mortars developed from American models but
manufactured in Japan. At the same time mortar rounds also are being
improved. Thus, in the US Army the new M374 81-mm round has been developed
with a more powerful explosive charge and a perlite wrought iron casing,
which doubles its effectiveness. The range of fire using this round has
been increased considerably by improving the obturation and aerodynamic
characteristics of the round. Work also is being done to increase the
power and range of fire of mortars using 107-mm rounds. The great
attention to mortar armament is explained by the advantages inherent in
mortars in comparison to other fire means.
At the present time there are no self-propelled mortars in our Ground
Forces. It often is written in the military press that the insufficient
amount of artillery and mortars in Ground Forces large units is compensated
for by the large number of tanks, the gun armament of which can
successfully substitute for artillery and mortars. However, it must not be
forgotten that tanks are primarily intended for combat against enemy
armored targets. Tank armament and instrumentation are being improved for
that very purpose. The unit of fire of tank guns basically consists of
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armor-piercing and sabot rounds, which are not sufficiently effective when
fired at non-armored targets.
But mortars, unlike howitzers and especially tank guns, are capable of
striking targets behind shelters and in ravines, folds in the ground and
wooded areas. When one 82,-mm to 120-mm mortar round bursts, enemy
personnel located in the open are killed within a 1,000 to 1,570 square
meter area; whereas the shell of a 100-mm tank gun kills personnel within
an area of no more than 400 square meters. That being the case, a 100-mm
tank round costs two to three times as much as a mortar round.
Thus, from an economic point of view, it is six to nine times more
profitable to destroy enemy personnel located in the open by mortar fire
than by tank gunfire. In addition, a self-propelled mortar can carry up to
120 to 200 rounds in its fighting compartment, while a tank carries only 20
high-explosive fragmentation shells. Consequently, when striking persmnel
in shelters, the firepower of the expendable reserve of ammunition carried
in the fighting compartment of a self-propelled mortar is 23 to 25 times
that of a tank.
This suggests the conclusion that it is not advisable to destroy by
tank gunfire those targets which may be more successfully destroyed by
mortar fire. The number of such targets in the various types of battles
fluctuates between 20 and 60 percent. Consequently, tank units and large
units in the first echelon should have at least one self-propelled MB-i-tar
for every five tanks. These mortars will perform tasks which are
impossible for tank guns to perform: destroying the enemy with chemical
weapons, blanketing individual targets with smoke, setting up smoke screens
and light markers, and illuminating the terrain.
In comparing self-propelled mortars and self-propelled artillery, it
is easily observed that mortar rounds, when fired against personnel located
in the open, are capable of destroying targets over a considerably greater
area than artillery shells of corresponding caliber, and are not inferior
to such shells in killing personnel in shelters. The size (in square
meters) of this zone in which personnel are killed by fragments and the
shock wave is shown in the following table.
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Nature of target
120-ma
mortar
round
122-mm
shell
160-mm
mortar
round
152-mm
shell
Personnel standing up in
the open
Personnel lying down
Personnel in foxholes
1,570
740
30
800
310
30
2,270
860
65
950
360
50
For personnel of the attacking troops who are in the open, the safe
distance from the targets to be hit by mortar fire is approximately half
that required when these targets are to be hit by artillery. When there is
accompanying fire from tanks and infantry combat vehicles, mortars in fact
can destroy the enemy personnel and antitank means immediately in front of
those attacking tanks and infantry combat vehicles located on the flanks
and between subunits. This is of great importance in close combat and
especially during combat actions conducted without the employment of
nuclear weapons.
Mortar rounds are much lighter in weight than tank and artillery
rounds. Thus, 960 82-mm mortar rounds, or only 144 100-mm artillery shells
can be supplied to the troops by two three-ton trucks or one MI-6
helicopter. This makes it possible to have much larger mobile reserves
without increasing the number of transport means and facilitates the
delivery of ammunition during an operation, which is especially important
for troops separated from the main forces and supply bases.
The production and operation of self-propelled mortars is much
simpler, and the cost significantly less, than that of self-propelled
artillery. The cost of manufacturing mortar rounds is two to 2.5 times less
than the cost of artillery shells of comparable calibers.
Thus, using tanks, as some authors propose, to perform fire tasks
usually performed by mortars, is unprofitable and inadvisable in terms of
firepower, tactical features and economic considerations.
On the basis of the foregoing we again efflphasize that, along with
self-propelled artillery, motorized rifle and especially tank divisions
should also have self-propelled mortars.
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It is organizationally more advantageous, in our opinion, for
self-propelled mortars to be formed into regiments of armies and
separate battalions of tank and motorized rifie-divisions. That being the
case, the mortars will not be held in reserve in second-echelon units and
subunits; they may easily be transferred to the axes requiring them.
In an army self-propelled mortar regiment there may be two battalions
of three six-mortar batteries each (36 mortars in a regiment). It is most
desirable for them to have 120-mm and 160-mm mortars. The mortar battalion
of a division may consist of three batteries with six 120-mm or 82-mm
mortars each. With this number of mortars, divisions advancing along the
main axis of the army will be able to reinforce first-echelon battalions
with self-propelled mortar batteries, which will greatly increase their
firepower.
Self-propelled mortars, when relocated immediately behind
first-echelon subunits, will destroy with their fire the enemy antitank and
other fire means in front of the attacking troops. Self-propelled
artillery in this instance, by using its maximum range, will be able to
concentrate fire against artillery and other targets in the depth, while
tanks will concentrate their fire against armored targets. As a result, in
the course of the battle all the fire means will be aimed just at those
targets they were built to destroy with maximum effectiveness, economically
and reliably.
In destroying antitank means, self-propelled mortars sharply reduce
tank losses, and the tank crews, attacking right after the rounds explode,
will operate more confidently and decisively while saving their limited
unit of fire for the most important targets. The capabilities of motorized
infantry also will increase due to the inclusion of self-propelled mortars
with their high-trajectory fire, which aids in killing enemy personnel. All
this will result in a considerable increase in the rates of advance of the
Ground Forces, and will ensure that their tasks are carried out in a
shorter time and with fewer losses.
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