MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): DETERMINING THE BALANCE OF FORCES AND MEANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302240001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 17, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Determining the Balance of Forces and Means
by
Colonel I. Shcherbakov
The search for the most acceptable methods of assessing the balance of
forces and means under modern conditions has acquired urgent significance.
Combined-arms commanders, the main organizers of the combined-arms battle
and operation, are especially interested in the solution of this problem.
The methodology proposed by General-Mayor G. Perventsev and Engineer
Mayor D. Sokolov does not give a comprehensive answer to the question
posed, but, without doubt, is a step forward.* Until now, the balance of
forces was determined by branch arms, types of weapons and combat
equipment, and occasionally by their casualty-producing capabilities
Military Academy i/n M. V. Frunze, Armored Academy, Artillery Academy, and
others). The authors of this article are striving to find one coefficient
of commensurability for all branch arms, and to express the balance of
forces simply. They believe that by using a coefficient of
commensurability, it is possible to compare the forces not by branch arms
and types of combat equipment and weapons, but by divisions, taking into
account the capabilities of nuclear weapons, artillery and tanks (included
within large units and attached to them).
We would point out that in itself the idea of using coefficients of
commensurability in assessing the balance of forces is very progressive,
but we are not able to agree with the opinions expressed on this by the
authors of the article under review for a number of reasons.
To begin with, in such a coefficient the capabilities of different
branch arms, operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons, and
conventional types of weapons are equated. And indeed, the authors
themselves explain that the larger coefficient of commensurability for a
West German motorized infantry division is due not only to the presence of
six Honest John launchers, but also to its having a large concentration of
antitank means (2,904). This applies to a Belgian mechanized division, as
well. Furthermore, in such a single coefficient, the probable actions of
fire means against the depth of the enemy are not considered; i.e., the
capabilities of weapons acting against the operational (tactical) depth and
weapons for close combat and self-defense are equated. When comparing the
forces of the two sides in terms of the capabilities of a division together
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with its means of reinforcement, the significance of nuclear weapons and
artillery not only within the division but also in the army and front is
lost to a certain extent.
The methodology proposed by the authors for assessing the balance of
forces does not supply the command with enough data to make a decision.
Using the methodology, for example, it is impossible to ascertain the weak
and strong points of troop groupings, to find ways of eliminating enemy
superiority, and to establish which branch arms and types of weapons make
it possible to achieve superiority in forces and to decide the outcome of
the fighting. The most efficient ways of determining a desirable
composition of forces and means when accomplishing tasks in various
complicated situations (repulsing counterattacks, etc.) are not examined.
Obviously, depending on the conditions under which combat actions are
conducted, the capabilities of the different branch arms will be of primary
importance in calculating the balance of forces. Thus, when a nuclear war
is being conducted, calculations will be centered around nuclear weapons;
during a non-nuclear war, combined-arms large units, artillery, and
aviation will figure centrally in calculations; when repulsing
counterattacks and counterthrusts by enemy tank units and enemy formations,
antitank means will be central to calculations. In assessing the
qualitative balance of forces and means, casualty-producing capabilities
will, naturally, occupy a central position.
The results of actions by the two sides using nuclear weapons and fire
means will have an effect on the composition and combat effectiveness of
groupings, including the division. Only by taking this into consideration
will a division be able to become an equivalent unit for making comparisons
and calculations. In order to assess losses, it is necessary to know the
capabilities of the branch arms and to be able to take them into account.
Thus, the command of our troops will have to take our and the enemy's
capabilities to inflict losses (damage) into consideration, and based on
this, find ways and methods of keeping our troops intact, of sharply
reducing enemy capabilities and, in the end, of changing the balance of
forces in our favor.
In connection with this, qualitative distinctions in combat means must
be accounted for using a combined method. Although the authors are correct
on the whole in maintaining that a calculation comparing weapon to weapon
and tank to tank does not give the required result, all the same, under
certain conditions this method is advisable. Thus, when repulsing 50X1-HUM
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counterattacks in a meeting engagement such calculations must be made
taking into account presumed losses which had been inflicted (suffered)
earlier. In this case, capabilities cannot be expressed simply.
Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between situations where only
the branch arms or types of combat equipment and weapons are compared among
themselves against the background of the effect of more powerful means of
destruction, and situations where all the power of each side and the
possible results of its employment are taken into account.
In the first case, coefficients of commensurability are applicable for
those forces and means among which a relationship exists. Such
coefficients have been established for antitank means, artillery, and
combined-arms subunits (perhaps only as a first approximation) by the
appropriate academies, and the majority of them have been published in the
periodical press.
In the second case, the matter is much more complicated. Here,
obviously, it is most advisable in the first place to: compare the
composition and capabilities of the forces and means of the two sides;.
clarify the balance of forces in a zone as a whole, by axes and tasks;
ascertain the strong and weak points of one's own troops and the enemy;
determine mutual damages (losses) inflicted by nuclear weapons and other
means of mass destruction, by artillery, and by aviation; and in
conclusion, compare the capabilites of combined-arms forces and means in
accomplishing various tasks and select variants for their employment.
In so doing, the capabilities of the branch arms, particularly the
rocket troops and artillery, can be taken into account using different
methods. Thus far there is no common view on this point. They can be
accounted for by areas destroyed or by "standard" targets. Such targets
are battalions, missile or artillery battalions, launchers, and others.
The calculation is made in the following way: knowing (assuming) the
composition of the nuclear weapons of the two sides, their capabilities to
destroy (neutralize) "standard" targets are determined. On the basis of an
account of the probable damage (loss) in terms of battalions, missile or
artillery battalions, and launchers, the comparative capabilities of the
two sides are specified.
The methodology for showing the capabilities of combined-arms large
units (without considering data on launchers and artillery) is analogous to
the one given in the article. In this case, the coefficients of
commensurability include not only original capabilities but also changes
resulting from losses sustained. 50X1-HUM
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Thus, a combined calculation of the balance of forces permits a
comparison of the combat capabilities of the groupings of the two sides
under various conditions and the establishment of the grouping of one's own
troops which is most desirable for the accomplishment of the assigned task.
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