MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): WAYS OF REDUCING THE TIME FOR BRINGING TROOPS TO FULL COMBAT READINESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302270001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ways of Reducing the Times for Bringing Troops
to Full Combat Readiness
(Based on the experience of the Baltic Military District)
by
General -Leytenant M. Ivanov
The most favorable conditions for bringing troops to full combat
readiness will be during a threat period, even if only of short duration,
during the course of which all necessary measures can be taken in sequence.
However, to count on such a period in all cases is to commit an irreparable
mistake.
In our view the most difficult condition will be the kind when the
troops of the border military districts are being brought to full combat
readiness with the simultaneous onset of war.
In view of the importance of this question, much work is being
conducted among the troops of the district on shortening the time of
fulfilling such basic elements of combat readiness as the warning,
assembly, preparation, and moving out of troops and combat equipment, the
moving out of mobile reserves of supplies from places of permanent
deployment, and the deployment of rocket forces for delivery of the initial
nuclear strike. Naturally all these steps are regarded as an integrated,
inseparable process directed at preservation of the survivability of the
ground forces during possible enemy nuclear strikes and at organized entry
into battle in the initial period of war.
Warning of troops and staffs is effected by means of a semiautomatic
warning system utilizing T/OU and specially developed radiotelegraph and
telephone Coffimunications equipment as well as various types of sound and
light signalling equipment. This system consists of control consoles
mounted in the rooms of the operations duty officers, illuminated indicator
boards in communications centers (with display of signals), equipment for
-collective-call warning of the officer personnel through the city automatic
telephone system, selector devices for warning duty officers in ,
directorates and departments of staffs, and a series of other improved 50X1-HUM
devices, sound and light signalling equipment, etc. Thanks to this,
warning staffs and troops at the military district-division level takes
three to five minutes, and the signal reaches down to subunits, units, and
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installations in eight to ten minutes.
Shortening of the time has also been achieved by the presence in the
military district headquarters of a non-T/0 group of permanent operations
duty officers who know their duties and the warning system to perfection.
Ways of further improving the warning system should, it is evident, be
sought in wider automation of its basic procedures at all tactical and
operational levels, so as to eliminate the multistep process which still
exists in a number of garrisons. The time is ripe to move from prototypes
of automatic warning systems to their centralized mass production and
introduction into service with troops, since a great amount of money is
being spent on the manufacture and further improvement of semiautomatic
systems in military districts, and delayed introduction of automatic
equipment leads to unwarranted expenses.
Industry-manufactured automatic warning systems based on radio and
radioelectronic means should ensure simultaneous warning of all command
levels for two or three levels down, automatic confirmation of the
reception of the signal received, warning of the officer personnel in their
quarters and of the troops located outside military posts, and general -
(military district, army) warning and autonomous (garrison) warning.
It is absolutely necessary to connect into this system the control
posts deployed under field conditions, which will permit operational staffs
to take on the control of troops from the indicated posts more quickly.
We consider that with the introduction of an automatic warning system
it is necessary to have in large staffs T/O groups (sections) of four to
six operations duty officers. Practice shows that the available
semiautomatic system produced by the forces and means of the troops makes
great demands not only on the operational but also on the technical
training of duty officers.
Many years' experience testifies to the fact that operational staffs
are often compelled to stay at points of permanent deployment for lack of
-timely readiness for operation of the communications centers of control
posts, which take much time to set up. If a front communications center is
going to be moved 25-30 kilometers from the permanent deployment point of
the military district staff, its moving out, setting up, and establishment
of communications requires up to seven to eight hours. Obtaining radio
communications is possible within an hour after setting up the
communications center, but the absence of secure communications equipment
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hampers troop control. Another limiting factor is telegraph communications
since they require no less than six or seven hours from the moment of the
sending of a combat alert signal just to obtain plain text channels and one
hour to make them secure.
This situation is explained not only by the imperfection of the means
of communications, but also by the extremely limited quantity of secure
communications equipment, which in addition requires high-quality
communications channels. Practically speaking, only the main links from
stationary communications centers and a portion of the main links from
field communications centers can be provided for by the available secure
communications equipment.
The insufficient quantity of secure communications equipment can to
some degree be compensated for by using available coding machines by
setting up coding posts, but the tables of organization do not provide for
the personnel and corresponding specialists to work in them, therefore
these machines are not, as a rule, fully utilized.
Much time goes into linking up the operating rooms of communications
centers, especially into adjusting and tuning the complex equipment, and
the secure communications equipment, because of the low personnel strength
of the special T/0 teams. Obviously it is necessary-to bring the tables of
organization of communications units into conformity with the requirements
of existing equipment.
It is impossible not to notice that many of the indicated inadequacies
result from the technical capabilities of existing means of communications.
They require further improvement and the establishment of more effective,
small-size, simple to handle models. What ways do we see to solve this
problem? First of all, in the rapid equipping of the troops with radio and
radio-relay channel secure communications equipment capable of ensuring
live conversation under any conditions. Secondly, in simplifying the
passing of correspondence in communications centers (by introducing
duplicating equipment) and the registering of documents in receiving points
and dispatching centers. Third, in working out the linking of the
operating rooms of communications centers with command-staff vehicles.
And finally, it is advisable to reexamine the T/O structure of
communications units with the object of building up their
engineer-technical personnel and specialists in secure communications
equipment. In other words, it is essential to bring the organization of
communications troops into conformity with the existing and planned
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communications equipment. Communications equipment has changed
significantly, but the organization of communications troops has basically
remained at the level where it was at the end of World War II.
Upon placing the troops of a border military district on combat alert
the main attention should be concentrated first of all on bringing the
rocket forces, aviation, air defense means and ground forces to full combat
Te-a=
":gr?'1his will permit timely delivery of the initfinuclear strike
and maximum exploitation of its results to complete the destruction of the
enemy in a short time.
Deployment of rocket troops. We fully support the proposals made on
this question in the article of Colonel General of Artillery G.
Kariofilli.* In addition to them we would like to dwell on the following.
Experience of exercises shows that even with indirect indications of
enemy preparation to deliver strikes, missile and missile technical units
should be brought to a state of increased combat readiness. When bringing
the ground forces to this state of readiness, it is necessary to bring the
missile units and, above all, the missile technical units to full combat
readiness. This will allow us to gain five to six hours in the preparation
of missiles and warheads.
At the present time, in practical work the timetable for technological
preparation of missiles is being thoroughly examined. In accordance with
it, the sequence of preparation of the booster missiles and warheads has
been changed, the functional duties within crews and assembly brigades have
been reallocated, and the intensity of labor has been somewhat increased.
Introduction of this timetable into practice in the work of mobile missile
technical bases allows, as experience has shown, reducing the check-out and
preparation time of missiles by 1.5 to two times. This significantly
reduces the time for bringing the rocket troops to full combat readiness.
Another very important means of destroying the enemy is
front aviation. Practice shows that shortening the time of bringing it to
full combat readiness depends above all on its speedy movement out from
under possible enemy strikes, since its basing will already be known to him
in peacetime, and consequently airfields will be under constant threat of a
strike. Naturally, aviation is the most vulnerable target of all the means
for employing nuclear weapons which a military district (front) has at its
disposal.
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From the onset of war the success of the combat operations of aviation
and the preservation of its forces will be determined by its timely and
concealed movement to alternate airfields. Hence, the most effective way
to achieve high combat readiness and security for aviation is maximun_
dispersal of its basing (two to three airfields per air regiment) and the
establishment of a sufficient number of concealed alternate airfields in
peacetime.
Inasmuch as the reception of aviation during rebasing or after a
combat sortie at unprepared airfields is impossible or extremely difficult,
it is advisable, especially in wintertime, to maintain the dispersal
airfields in constant readiness. It is necessary to establish at them in
advance reserves of materiel as well as the appropriate engineer-technical
equipment to support the combat operations of the aviation.
In the interests of further development of an airfield network, there
should be prepared in peacetime widened sections on existing highways
(suitable for combat operations of jet aviation), and airstrip sections
should be provided for on all newly constructed highways as well.
The correct, well maintenance of combat eauipment has
great significance in shortening the time to ring large units and units to
combat readiness.
On the basis of work conducted with the troops of the military
district, a series of technical improvements was introduced that permitted
significant reduction of the completion time of certain operations for
bringing equipment to readiness and obtained good results in shortening the
overall time of bringing troops to combat readiness.
It is known that delivering storage batteries to tanks and installing
them is a very laborious process that requires the expenditure of a large
amount of time. This has an especially adverse effect in large units with
reduced personnel strength. Therefore, in units_in constant readiness but
with reduced personnel strength, we maintain the entire tank park (except
for tanks in long-term "Cocoon" storage) with installed batteries,
switching them to continuous battery charging with low currents. This
makes it possible to sharply reduce the_tirW for starting up the vehicles
from five or six hours to half an hour. Besides this, the method indicated
permits a significantly smaller expenditure of time and effort on the
servicing of storage batteries, lightens the physical labor of crews, and
above all establishes conditions for maintaining tanks in a high degree of
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combat readiness at any time of year. Also contributing to this is the
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introduction in units with reduced personnel strength ofjpecial_evipment
for quick filling of the tanks with liquidccolant and oil, as well as the
permanent mounting on the tankcof the removable part of the equipment for
underwater driving (OPVT).
It should be said that the implementation of the above-mentioned
measures, plus well-thought-out equipping of parking areas with
battery-powered emergency lighting, gas exhaust venting attachments, and
light signalling to permit giving commands to mechanic-drivers during the
moving of tanks out of the park, as well as the represerving of armament
and equipment of the emergency reserves with the application of inhibiting
paper, synthetic sheeting, and multipurpose lubricants, all make it
possible to bring armament and combat equipment to combat readiness
significantly faster.
Solution of the technical problems enumerated is only one aspect
facilitating bringing troops rapidly to combat readiness. Another very
important aspect is the loading up and moving out of mobile reserves of
materiel and technical means. Although the jobs are to some degree
mechanized with the use of roller conveyers, conveyors, dollies, overhead
rails, and narrow gauge railways, which allow shortening the time twofold
or threefold and significantly reducing the number of personnel allotted to
carry them out, this still has not solved the problem of moving out mobile
reserves at the same time as the moving out of combat units from places of
permanent deployment. Obviously, given the present organizational
structure and technical equipping of troops,:ffie.best way of solving this
problem is to keep mobile reserves of ammunition and POL permanently on
organic combat and transport vehicles. As concerns rations, clothing, and
medical supplies, they should also be stored in vehicles or in special
packaging (containers) in prepackaged form.
Such a system of storing mobile reserves has been implemented in
practice among the troops of our military district since it ensures their
moving out rapidly, excludes the involvement of large numbers of men in
loading and the necessity of allotting means to the mechanization of
loading operations, and in the final analysis sharply reduces the time for
bringing troops to full combat readiness.
A few words about monitoriu. A check of the combat readiness of
units and large units is, as is mown, most often timed to coincide with
the conduct of various exercises. However, experience shows that such
checks do not give a complete picture of the true state of combat
readiness. Troops preparing for exercises know to some degree or another
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in advance, to what they should pay attention in order to register good
time. Under such conditions results achieved when an alert is signalled
are significantly higher than the performances troops give during a
surprise check. Besides that, during surprise checks it is possible to
discover more accurately the true state of combat readiness of any
particular large unit or unit and correctly determine ways to shorten the
time.
All the above ways of shortening the time are unthinkable without a
good level of training and a high state of political consciousness and
morale of troops and staff personnel. Not one undertaking, even a well
planned one, will come out successfully if those who carry it out do not
treat its fulfilment with a sense of high responsibility and diligence.
High military discipline, a spirit of collectivism, and industry take on
enormous significance in this.
The several ways stated to reduce the time periods for bringing the
troops of a military district to full combat readiness are not exhaustive.
For this reason, we are carrying on with the work of further research on
this important matter.
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