MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ORGANIZATION OF CONTROL OF OPERATIONAL AIRBORNE LANDING FORCES IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF A WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/10/03 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Trlo - rDCT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
27 October 1976
NEIORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Theodore C. Shackley
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USM: Organization of
Control of Operational Airborne Landing
Forces in the Initial Period of a War
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thou:he. This
article presents a diagram of the control of airborne landing orces when a
landing operation is undertaken from the interior following the initial
nuclear strike. Whereas the front commander normally controlled landing
forces in training exercises, the authors contend that a preferable
organization of control would include a command-post for the commanders of
the airborne troops and military transport aviation and a forward command
post using an operations group to provide communications with the landing
force commander and assist in control and support. The article also
examines the sequence for the transfer of control of the landing force from
its preparation to the time it joins the advancing troops, and touches upon
the assignment of tasks, cooperation with the front, communications, and
combat and logistical support to the landing force. This article appeared
in Issue No. 2 (63) for 1962.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agenciesFore_,-,-,s4, _caf_reference_renort_s_f_r_nm i
_ths1?4ve been
assigned
50X1 -HUM
Iheodore G. 1-lac1cley _
Page 1 of 12 Pages
:JRPSetTIET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
TOP SP6ET
Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 2 of 1 Pages
TOP CRET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
TOPECRET
COUNTRY(JSSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1962
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 12 Pages
50X1-HUM
SUBJECT
DATE
27 October 1976
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Organization of Control of Operational
Airborne Landing Forces in the Initial Period of a War
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (63) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Miuitary
Thought". The authors of this article are General-Mayor P. Pavlen o and
Colonel V. Bulatnikov. This article presents a diagram of the control of
airborne landing forces when a landing operation is undertaken from the
interior following the initial nuclear strike. Whereas the front commander
normally controlled landing forces in training exercises, the authors
contend that a preferable organization of control would include a command
post for the commanders of the airborne troops and military transport
aviation and a forward command post using an operations group to provide
communications with the landing force commander and assist in control and
support. The article also examines the sequence for the transfer of
control of the landing force from its preparation to the time it joins the
advancing troops, and touches upon the assignment of tasks, cooperation
with the front, communications, and combat and logistical support to the
landing force. End of Summary
Comment:
General-Leytenant P. Pavlenko was identified in May 1976 as Chief OO
X1
Staff of the Airborne Troops. After 1962 the SECRET version of
Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed
down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication
at the end of 1970.
TOP CRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
50X1 -HUM
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
TnP SFAFT
Page 4 of 12 Pages
Organization of Control of Operational Airborne Landing
Forces in the Initial Period of a War
by
General-Mayor P. Pavlenko
Colonel V. tulatnikov
Efficient control has always been the guarantee of the successful
employment of operational airborne landing forces. rnder present-day
conditions it has acquired even greater importance. This is explained by
the fact that, first, the landing of troops has become an organic necessity
in operations, and second, the massed employment of missile/nuclear weapons
in the course of armed combat makes very high demands on troop control in
general.
In recent years in operational games, command-staff exercises and
troop exercises, control of operational airborne landing forces has been
fully organized and implemented by the front commander. Airborne large
units (one or two airborne divisions) and the necessary number of military
transport aircraft which have been concentrated in the zone of the front by
a specified time have usually been transferred to the front. The front
commander has determined the departure area for the laRIFT operation,
carried out the necessary measures to prepare for it, assigned tasks to the
landing force, and organized its all-round support. Such a procedure for
the preparation and employment of operational airborne landing forces under
certain conditions will take place in the future as well. However, it
entails the preliminary concentration in the zone of the front of troops
making the landing and the prolonged preparation of the departure area. It
is just these circumstances which make it not very acceptable for the
conditions of the initial period of war.
As is known, a modern war can be initiated by sudden massed nuclear
strikes. Aggressive imperialist circles count mainly on secrecy of
preparation and suddenness of nuclear attack. Immediately after the
nuclear strikes combat actions will develop on land, sea, and in the air.
Airtgrne larg it,constautJy.a_ t_ate_...01, Increasedit readiness
will undoubtedly be employed at the very beginning ofwarr'itliii)T-7717777--
landed after the nuclear strikes in order to complete the destruction of
the most important targets of the enemy operational rear, and to assist the
ground for= and navy in achieving the objectives of the initial
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-001051000302490001-8
WPRET
Page 5 of 12 Pages
operations.
Under these conditions the airborne divisions must be ready to make a
landing literally a few hours after the signal is transmitted to them.
This can be ensured only if the airfields of the departure area for the
landing operation are located close to the permanent deployment points of
the troops to be landed, since airlifts of the latter to considerable
distances under the conditions of a war which has begun entail great
difficulties and require a very long period of time.
Thus, we are discussing a landing operation from the interior of a
country when the departure area is thousands of kilometers from the front
line.
The considerable distance of the airborne large units from the line of
contact of the belligerents when they are preparing for an airborne landing
occasions substantial modifications of the procedure for controlling the
operational airborne landing forces which is currently accepted and
employed in exercises.
In the diagram is shown what we consider to be the most acceptable
organization of control of an operational airborne landing force (made up
of an airborne division) being landed from the interior of the country
after the initial nuclear strike.
_ _
Let us briefly examine some of the elements of the diagram. The
command post of the commander of the airborne troops and the military
fir.osport-aVratidi is deployed in the departure area for the landing
operation close to the staff of the airborne division. From here
communications are established (primarily by radio) with the General Staff
(General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command), the staff of the front
in whose zone the airborne landing force is being employed, and the landing
force's materiel support area. In addition, direct communications can be
established as well with the commander of the district (army) of the Air
Defense of the Country and with the staff of the interior military district
on whose territory the departure area for the landing operation is located.
The forward command post of the commander of the military transport
avtion and the operations gr-dup from the headquarters of theTaiftWinr-
troops are deployed at the staff of the front. It is desirable that they
set to work 24 hours before the landing operation begins, however, the
situation is not excluded in which their work will begin several hours
before the take-off of the military transport aviation aircraft. The main
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
TOP ET
Page 6 of 12 Pages
task of the forward command post of the military transport aviation is to
provide control of aviation in the course of the landing operation.
Several tasks are entrusted to the operations group from the
headquarters of the airborne troops. The main one of these is to provide
communications between the staff of the front and the commander of the
landing force (after it is landed). The operations group also provides
communications between the commander of the airborne troops and his forward
command post when one is landed in the complement of a large landing force
(two or three airborne divisions), and communications between the commander
of the landing force and the materiel support area. In addition, the
operations group may assist the operations directorate of the staff of the
front somewhat in the control, maintenance, and all-round support of the
TITTOrne landing force. The group will consist of one or two operations
officers and two or three officer specialists. Four or five radio sets,
two or three (of the R-835, R-118, or R-115 type) for communications with
the landing force in the area of its combat actions and one or two (of the
R-102 type) for communications with the command post of the commander of
the airborne troops and with the supply area of the landing force, will he
required by way of communications means.
The control post of the chief of the landing force's supply area is
deployed at one of the materiel support airfields. It can maintain
communications with the landing force through the operations group of the
front staff or through the command post of the commander of the airborne
troops.
Now let us examine the possible procedure for control of a landing
force sequentially from the moment it is prepared for the landing operation
to the time it joins the advancing troops.
During the period of preparation for the landing operation it is best
to concentrate control of the airborne and military transport aviation
large units in the hands of one person. We think this person might be the v
commander of the airborne troops.
The staffs of the airborne troops and the military transport aviation
must coordinate in advance with the main staffs of the air forces and the
air defense, the staff of the rear and the chief of the communications
troops of the Ministry of Defense, and with the staffs of the interior
military districts, on all matters connected with the allocation and
preparation et airfield networks for the military transport aviation and
with the necessary materiel-technical means, with the establishment of fuel
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R600302490001-8
TOP SCRET
Page 7 of 12 Pages
reserves, with cover of the departure area for the landing operation and of
aircraft of the military transport aviation on the flight up to the front
line for the landing, as well as matters concerning the setting up of
communications. Obviously, all this work will be completed in peacetime
and reflected in the appropriate plans and then periodically refined. It
seems to us that it is also desirable and completely possible to plan in
advance the procedure by which the troops to be landed would come to the
home airfields of the military transport aviation and the amount of the
landing force to come to each airfield.
In accordance with the decisions adopted and the plans worked out,
appropriate preparatory work must be conducted. Otherwise the necessary
combat readiness of the airborne troops and military transport aviation
could hardly be ensured.
In passing we should mention that the transfer of control of the
landing force to the commander of the airborne troops in this period has
yet another advantage: the staff of the front in the most crucial period
of preparation and conduct of the initial operation is released from-Iht
varied and ,labor-consuming_work connected with_th2=anlaf__the
airborne troops and military transport aviation.
How then, in this case, does the staff of the front support the
organization of combat actions of the landing force andcooperation
with the advancing troops, and who assigns the combat task to the landing
force, and when? Here there can be two solutions. First, when the task is
defined for the airborne landing force by the commander of the front. In
this case the group of officers of the front staff will have to arrive in
the departure area for the landing operation by aircraft, assign the task
to the landing force and give the initial instructions for cooperation with
the front troops./ Second and, if you will, the most typical, when the
combat task is defined for the landing force by the Supreme High Command,
while corresponding instructions are given to the commander of the airborne
division by the commander of the airborne troops./) The staff of the front
will simultaneously receive information concerning the time and area where
the airborne landing force will be dropped (landed), concerning its tasks
and instructions for support of the landing operation and the combat
actions of the airborne division. This does not exclude the possibility
that all these questions will be reflected in the plan of the initial front
operation which has already been worked out in peacetime. Otherwise the
commanderof the front will have to make some corrections in his initial
decision: to allocate aviation and missile/nuclear means for the fire
support of the landing operation and support of the combat actions of the
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
ECRET
TOP
Page 8 of 12 Pages
landing force.
The question may arise as to whether the data which the commander of
the landing force will receive from the commander of the airborne troops
are sufficient for the efficient organization of the combat actions and
cooperation with the front troops. Or in simpler terms, in bypassing the
staff of the front, can thelanding force be assigned the task in its
entirety? We think that when airborne landing forces are employed in the
initial operations this is completely possible. Indeed, the enemy grouping
we have identified basically will not change up to the beginning of war.
Therefore, the data which the General Staff has at its disposal concerning
the most important enemy targets in the landing area will be no less
complete than those available in the front. In addition we should take
into consideration that the initial nuclear ATM:rife planned by the
Supreme High Command, and that the operational airborne 1anding_fgro
be employed to accomplish tasks primarily in the deep_rear_of_the-eneMY?a.,t.
a _distance _of_ 300 to 500 kilometers or more from the front line. In these
areas strikes against the enemy will be delivered by the front means, as
well as by strategic missiles and long range aviation, so that the
commander of the landing force will be able to receive comprehensive
information from the airborne troop commander about the situation which is
taking shape in the landing area at the moment of the drop and landing of
the airborne division.
In this way the commander of the landing force will be given
information about the enemy and have indicated to him the area and
procedure for the landing, the combat task, where, when and against which
targets the nuclear strikes will be delivered or planned, the yields of
their bursts, the expected radiation situation, at what time and from what
directions it is intended that the troops will enter the operating area of
the landing force, the initial data on setting up communications with the
staff of the front, and the procedure for maintaining and supporting the
landing force. Of course, we are not excluding the possibility that the
commander of the front might introduce some refinements or changes into the
combat task and the T-Focedure for supporting the landing force, should this
be necessary. Technical communications means are used for such
refinements. Information about progress in the preparation of the landing
force, about possible changes in its composition, and of the beginning of
the landing operation can be transmitted via these means.
The commander of the military transport aviation exercises control
over the landing operation. In the course of preparation routes for the
flight of transport aircraft with the landing force over their own
TOy'?ZET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
TOlynCRET
Page 9 of 12 Pages
territory must be refined in the staff of the district (army) of the Air
Defense of the Country and in the staff of the interior military district
(districts), and for the flight over enemy territory -- in the staff of the
front. These very levels refine the procedure for covering the military
transport aviation against strikes from the air and the procedure for fire
support for the landing operation during the flight over enemy territory.
When making an airborne_landing_froM_IbtjBey rear it will be necessary in
the majority of casq?_to rPfuel_tha_transport aircraft at intermediate
aiffields both en route to the_target and on re:L-11Fri _mutes. As a rule,
1iii or ie-Aieling-will be located in the zone of the front.
Therefore, all the questions in connection with refueling aircraft and
servicing them will have to be resolved by the staff of the front, and the
allocation of the necessary means will be entrusted for the sake of
practicality to the commander of the air army. In so doing, the
preparation of airfields and delivery of materiel should be carried out in
advance, in peacetime. This pertains .particularly to the establishment_d
fuel reserves at airfielaKafTZTto_ihlis7adi of foils (th.tsgmiltio
beini that-2-50-to 360 AN-8 and AN-12 ? a e allocated for the landing
_ _
of an airborne .ivision).
The combat actions of the airborne landing force must be controlled by
the commander of the front, who maintains communications with it through
the operations group of the headquarters of the airborne troops. Under
certain conditions, when a large airborne landing force will be dropped at
a considerable depth, during the initial phase of its actions control may
be implemented by the commander of the airborne troops, however, as the
offensive operation develops it will be transferred to the staff of the
front. With the approach of the advancing troops to the area of the
landing force's actions, the commander of the army might assume control in
the zone in which the landing force was landed.
Besides transmitting combat instructions to the airborne landing force
and receiving information from it, the staff of the front must display
particular concern for the systematic transmission 677"Eonnaissance data
to the landing force and for support of its combat actions.
As is known, an airborne division does not possess sufficient fire
power. It has as yet no nuclear weapons. Therefore, support of its combat
actions is one of the decisive conditions for the successful fulfilment of
tasks in the enemy rear. In recent years in exercises a control procedure
was adopted by which the commander of the landing force himself would
assign the tasks to the commanders of the units allocated for support,
bypassing the staff of the front. In this way the greatest effect was
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00165R006302490001-8
TO CRET
Page 10 of 12 Pages
achieved, especially when delivering nuclear strikes against the enemy. In
the initial period of war when preparation of an airborne division will be
conducted in the interior of the country within very short time periods,
the commander of the division will hardly be able to simultaneously
coordinate questions of cooperation with the commanders of the supporting
units. Apparently it will be necessary to give requests for strikes
against the enemy to the staff of the front. We must also take into
consideration that even cooperation which has been coordinated with some
unit might be disrupted by enemy nuclear strikes. So it is more than
likely that the landing force will have to call for the strikes of
supporting means through the staff of the front.
The main means of neutralizing the enemy in support of the landing
force which has been landed at a considerable depth will be missiles and
aviation.
As the experience of exercises has shown, from the moment the target
is detected by the reconnaissance of the landing force until the strike is
delivered against it, not less than 4j tesopnehour pass
(reconnaissance report to the commander of the landing force, performance
of the necessary calculations in the staff, transmission of the request to
the staff of the front, making of the decision by the front commander,
preparation of missiles for launching or the assigning of the task to the
crew of the aircraft, flight of the aircraft or missile to the target).
When destroying mobile targets, and these above all will be of interest to
the airborne landing force, this is a large amount of time. By virtue of
what has been said we think that in the front there should always be one or
two missile batteries on alert and a cerITE7humber of delivery aircraft
assigned to deliver strikes in support of the landing force.
The organization of fire control of supporting artillery with the
approach of front troops was repeatedly studied in the course of the
exercises and did not present any particular complexity.
Control over the delivery of materiel to the landing force in the
course of battle can be set up in two ways. We think that it would be
desirable to have the main area for supplying the landing forces in the
interior of the country. This will provide greater safety for it and will
create more favorable conditions for the preparation of reserves for a
landing operation, primarily for a parachute drop. From here transport
aircraft can deliver materiel to the landing force upon the request of its
commander transmitted through the operations group of the headquarters of
the airborne troops at the staff of the front. On the return routes, if
50X1-HUM7---
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R006302490001-8
TOP/gCRET
Page 11 of 12 Pages
the aircraft delivered their cargo by landing, they can evacuate the sick,
wounded and other casualties from the area of combat actions of the landing
force to hospitals which have been specially deployed by the front in the
aircraft refueling area.
Aside from that, it is also necessary to have an alternate supply area
set up in the zone of the front to supply the landing force. Control of
the delivery of materiel to thelanding force from the given area will be
implemented by the chief of the front rear. This area cannot be considered
the main one. It will have been subjectedto enemy strikes to a great
degree. In addition, and this is very essential, the rear services of the
front do not have the necessary forces and means to prepare cargoes for a
parachute drop. From here cargoes can be delivered to the landing force
only by landing. It is not at all advantageous to deliver parachute drop
equipment to the front and to allocate the qualified personnel. This leads
to splitting up the forces of the rear services of the airborne troops.
In conclusion we should mention that the proposed diagram for the
control of operational landing forces, in our opinion, will be desirable
not only in the initial period of war, but also when conducting the
subsequent operations of the ground forces or the navy.
50X1 -HUM
TO SECRET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R660302490001-8
TOP 5RET
Page 12 of 12 Pages
Diagram of the Organization of Control
of an Operational Airborne Landing
13
300-500 km ? 1000 km or more
4 t> 4
Note: The Military Transport Aviation lines of
communications are not shown on the diagram.
1. Area of Combat Actions of the Airborne Landing Force
2. Airborne Division
3. Forward Command Post of Airborne Troops
4. Airborne Division
5. Western Front
6. Forward Command Post of the Military Transport Aviation
7. Operations Group of the Airborne Troops
8. Supply Area of the Airborne Landing Force
9. Chief of the Supply Area for the Airborne Landing Force
10. awcander of the Airborne Troops, annTander of the Military Transport Aviation
11. Airborne Division
12. Carmunications Center
13. Departure Area for Landing Operations
14. Air Defense District of the Air Defense Forces of the Country
15. Interior Military District
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000302490001-8