REAR AREA SUPPORT OF MISSILE TROOPS IN FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, BY COL. GEN. OF ARTILLERY G. F. ODINTSOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402780001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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REAR AREA SUPPORT OF MISSILE TROOPS
IN FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
by Colonel General of Artillery
G. Odintsov
As is known, timely and thorough rear area supply of missile
troops is the most important condition for achieving success nlan
operation. But the recently adopted system for supplying . si
and missile fuel to troops does not yet completely fit the nature
of modern operations. It requires further improvement. From this
point of view the article by Lieutenant General M. Novikov is of
great and practical interest, and the questions upon ..hick it
touched required the most serious attention.
It is difficult, ho-wc.er, to agree with the author's assertion
that under present-day conditions the principal organizer of the
supply of troops with missiles and ?.. ???
Zo-ne-half page missinj
The experience of having service of artillery armament sub-
ordinate to the deputy commander of troops , for the rear area
did not prove itself during World War II when the conditions and
volume of rear area work were considerably simpler. And it is
doubtful that such subordination will be acceptable under present-
day conditions. The resubordination (perepodchineniye) of the
*service of missile and artillery armament not only increases the
volume of work of the rear area chief, but also requires tbeerear
area staff to spend considerable time coordinating both the very
important and the routine problems with the directorate or de-
partment of missile and artillery armament, the HQo f f missilleeO
troops and artillery, and also with the departments
troop of the front (a_-may). It is difficult at this time to state
whether it is expedient to have the service of missile and artillery
* sluzhba raketno o i artilleriyskogo vooruzheniya
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armament subordinate to the chief of missile troops and artillery,
even though such subordination was completely justified in the
years of World War II. At that time all of the field and anti-
aircraft artillery was under the commander of artillery. He
organized the combat activity of all artillery, and only he was
able to direct the work of the service of artillery armament.
At the present time only units (chast) and large units
(soyedineniye) of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, as
well as units and large units of field artillery, are subordinate
to the chief of missile troops and artillery. Antiaircraft weapons
(antiaircraft artillery, troop aid army missiles of the class
"surface-air") have gone over to the control of the chief of PVO
troops of the front (army). The dual control of the combat
activity of missile troops and artillery leaves its mark on the
conditions of work of the service of missile and artillery arma-
ment. It is compelled to execute the instrictions Arai requirements
of two chiefs: the chief of missile troops and artillery and the
} , _ d G- """ .r..,..,,, cAcId +>.t the further equipping of com-
wvvt..? - - -
buA. L a r u
bined arms large units and operational groupings (obedineniye)
with tanks increased significantly the need for tank ammunition,
the expenditure of which is planned and determined to some extent
by the staff of the front (army). Consequently, the service of
missile armament also has to coordinate its activities with the
staff of the front (army). In essence, therefore, three senior
officers have an influence on the work of the service of missile
and artillery armament in the resolution of basic problems. This
is obviously an abnormal situation. In order to eliminate it, it
is advisable to transfer the subordination of the service of
missile and artillery armament directly to the commander of troops
of a front (army).
To some extent this proposal evolves from the real inter-
relationship of the chief of service with the staff and the
commander of troops of a front, since he very frequently is the
chief advisor to the command on questions of supplying troops
with nuclear weapons and missiles of all types. Also, this
proposed resubordination of service. brings it nearer to those
elements of control where the basic questions of the combat
employment of missile troops and other arms of service are
decided.
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of an
considered as resources of the commander of 'troops of a eon an
Let us exemine some of the author's personal proposals.
The complex.utilization of rail, road, and air transport in
the operational rear area undoubtedly is necessary, but the
possibilities of using them for missile troops are extremely
limited. As can be seen in Diagrbm 1, missiles, component parts,
(komplektuyushcheye imusheheatvo) and nose sections (golovnaya
chart) are delivered from the zone of interior (tyl.strany) to the
rear area missile bases of the front principally by rail and air.
The principal organizer of the loading and dispatch of this freight
is the Chief Artillery Directorate and the 12th Chief Directorate
of the Ministry of Defense. The responsibilities of the front rear
area are limited to dispatching these transports, upon arrival, tu
the various front rear area missile bases or their sections
(otdeleniye). it is unlikely that missiles vill be transported
within the front area by rail under the existing system of supply
because of the extremely limited number of rear area missile
installations (uchreshdeniye) capable of handling misaile components
and because of the comparatively slow pace of reconstruction of
rail lines behind the advancing troops. Besides this, transportation
within the front area is also limited., to a certain extent, by the
lack of an adequate number of temperature-controlled (izotermicheskiy)
railroad cars, specially equipped railroad cars, and gondola cars
(poluvagon) at the front.
In the operational rear area the basic method of supplying
troops most of the missiles which have undergone preliminary
technical preparation is by special cross-country carriers
(gruntovaya teleihka) and not just automotive transport. It is
practically impossible to use them for other purposes, just as it
is not possible in practice to use truck motor pool's for transporting
missiles. That is why the author's proposal of giving the chief
of the rear area the responsibility of transporting missiles to the
troops by complex utilization of the transport in the fr=t rear
and
area is impractical; for it does not reflect true caiab ontirr
is not supported from the materiel viewpoint. The only other means
that the chief of the rear area will be able to use for transporting
missiles is helicopters. But up to the present time they ere still
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We come to the same conclusions when we analyze the conditions
for transporting special fuel and for fueling missiles. It is
known that the fueling of missiles is carried out in preliminary
preparation areas by forces of the front rear area missile bases.
At these preliminary preparation areas the fueling facilities are
used both for the transporting of missile fuel and for the fueling
of missiles. These same fueling facilities are incorporated in the
plan of service of missile and artillery armamentforTtransporting
missile fuel elements from the depots of the front.
principal of function of the service icce depots supppply of fuel must be the
Lone word misainnj development One-half page mis31ng..7
armament, and no other should be responsible for the organi-
zation of the delivery of missiles.
The correct deployment and timely movement of rear area missile
units of the front and army depend not only on the prepared network
of railroad lines and military roads, but also on the groupings of
missile troops and on their combat operations. The timely movement
of troops is determined by the front troop commander with the acttive
participation of the chief of missile troops and artillery,
as by the chief of PNO troops. It is evident that these chiefs will
not be inactive ,egard. ng the deployment and movement of the missile
bases of the front rear area. Their thoughts on this subject will
be more sound than the proposals of the chief of the rear area.
We do clot deny the need for a close working relationship among all
the above-mentioned senior officers, but we do not :e the need
to levy this resDonsib ility on the chief of the rear area. to the
last word conceiu_?,- this matter will obviously b r loneto less
commander of the tr ips of a front (army). ss need
to include the rear area apparatus in the planning of supplying the
troops with missiles, when the matters being decided relate not
only to the work of rear area misaile installations but also to the
of
feasibility of using the transport equipment of
missiles. The latter depends, basically, on the missions of the
In other words, t e feasibility of using troop
missile units.
transport for delivery of missil depends on the times of their
launching. It appears to us that it is in the interests of this
matter to have constant contact between the chief of the rear area
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and the chief of missile and artillery armament. Regarding `coordi-
nation, the directorate of missile and artillery armament is required
to coordinate with the rear area staff and with the fuel supply
service: the areas where front rear area missile bases and missile
fuel depots are to be set up; the distribution of the missile fuel
received to its destinations; and, the time required to establish
M0SG depots and the road network at the front. Under the circum-
stances the chief of the rear area, although not responsible for
supplying the troops with missiles, must give all possible assistance
to the service of missile and artillery armament.
section crew of the rear area base. The distances tha., ready
missiles must be transported during different periods of an
* OBG - possibly. Qt4eleni a spetsialnogo goryuchego - special
We fully share Lt. Gen. K. Novikov's opinion that the new system
of supplying troops with missiles has a number of serious short-
comings. In our opinion, to these shortcomings should be added:~
the narrow specialization of the rear area missile bases of the
front and their inadequate ability to withstand enemy action; the
difficulty in organizing nose section crews (otdeleniye); the cos}
paratively great distances over which ready (gotovaya) missiles
hive to be transported; and the difficulty of relocating bases.
According to the data from the troop exercise "Don" the new
system provides that e?--!h front have one front technical missile
babe and one front 'technical ZUR base (Diagram 1). The front technical
missile base, which is intended for the preparation of tactical and
operational-tactical missiles, includes one transport battalion
(parkovyy divizion), one technical, and several mobile technical
repair bases. The front technical ZUR babe is intended for the
preparation of antiaircraft missiles and may be composed of one or
two transport battalions and three or four technical battalions.
From the front missile bases it is possible to detach two nose
section crews comprising a very small personnel force (from the
FRTB -- one mobile technical repair base and a transport and
technical battery; from the FTB ZUR -- a technical battalion and
several ;transport _ batteries (batareya).) Because of this, even
during a period of preparation for an operation, all missile
troops operating in a zone of 150-200 km are obliged to depend on
each nose section crew of the rear area base: during the
operation all missile troops of a front must depend on each no%e
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operation may be 150-200 Ion, or more. The transporting of ready
missiles over such great distances adversely affects their relia-
bility. While retaining the concept of centralized preparation
of missiles, it is more advantageous to have two bases with a
broad profile but capable of preparing all types of missiles (see
Diagram 2), instead of two specialized bases. In this way the
distances of transport are reduced by two times and the stability
of work at the bases is increased. By organizing the rear area
missile bases in this manner, if one directorate of the base is
put out of commission it will not affect the work of all sections.
In order to reduce the distances that ready missiles are transported
and in order to increase the maneuverability of the bases, it is
advisable that each base, instead of having specialized sub-units
(podrazdeleniye), have small complex rear area installations designed
to receive, to relocate, to carry out the preliminary preparation
o' missiles, and to bring the nose section components (golovnsya
chast) to the final stage of readiness. We propose that each rear
area missile base have at least two installations for the prepa-
ration of operational-tactical missiles and the nose sections of
tactical missiles, and also two or three installations for the
preparation of army antiaircraft mibeilea. In our opinion, the
proposed organizational structure of the rear area missile bases
removes, to a certain extent, the short:omings of existling bases
and insures a wide dispersal of missile resources at all levels of
supply. Besides this, it sharply reduces transportation distances,
increases maneuverability, simplifies the organization of
redeployment, and also increases the stability of the entire
system of supplying troops with missiles.
In our opinion, an offensive operation can be started when the
missile resources of the front reach 70 - 80 percent of its
requirements. The remaining missiles can b' on their way to the
rear area of the front. Also, it is definitely a,wre advantageous
that the troops have in their possession a considerable portion
of the missile resources. However, Lt. Gen. M. Novikov's pro-
posal that at least 50 percent of the missiles required for an
operation be delivered to the troops before initiating an operation
is apparently not altogether correct. This proposal is applicable
to a certain extent for tactical and operational-tactical missiles,
when the transport capabilities of troop units are fully conenen-
surate with the existing rates of expenditure. Antiaircraft missiles,
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especially those of the army, are expended in much larger quantities
than missiles of the surface-to-surface class. Therefore it is
doubtful that it will be possible to supply the antiaircraft missile
units with 50 percent of the missiles required for the operation in
advance of the operation, because the transport facilities of the
units are not calculated to handle so great a volume of freight.
We think that it would be best to create supplies in the units
adequate for two days' needs. Such supplies will become the norms
for the mobile reserves of the missile units. The amount
calculated for one launching installation (puskovaya ustanovka)
may be:
Tactical and operational-tactical -- three missiles;
Troop antiaircraft (voyaoovaya zenitnaya) -- six missiles;
Troop army (voyekovaya armeyskaya) -- eight missiles.
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Lt. Gen. M. Hovikov proposes that small mobile sub-units for
storing and transporting missiles be added to the rear of motorized
rifle and tank divisions. Butvdto burden the rear of a division if
the division will get not more than four to six tactical missiles
for the entire operatic,.,. The rate of use will be somewhat hig~uer
in an antiaircraft missile battalion, but through the joint efforts
of the missile and army transport2 battalions if will be possible
to supplement the supply successfully. The addition rf a small
missile delivery', and storage sub-unit to the division rear at once
necessitates the addition of at least one lifting crane for trans-
loading missiles, and teams to make adjustments (reglamentnaya rRbota)
on the missile and nuclear nose section. It is clear that this will
not increase the maneuverability of the division rear.
Having stated our proposals, we would like to note that the
questions mentioned in the article by Lt. Gen. M. Novikov need
further serious study, consideration, and testing in troop field
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Support of Troops of a Front with Missiles According to Data of
Exercise "Don"
Diagram
1. Iz tyla strany -- From the zone of interior
2. Parkovyy divizion -- Transport battalion
3. FRTB -- Frontovaya raketnaya tekhnicheskaya baza -- Front
missile technical base
4. Tekhnicheskiy divizion iz 4 PRTI* -- Te
chnical battalion of
4 mobile repair'-- technical ba
tteries (podvizhnaya
remontnaya tekhnicheskaya batar
eya)
5. FSRT -- Frontovoy sklad raakct:.;,g;; topl
area for missile fuel
iva -- Front storage
6. Tekhnicheskiye diviziony -- Technical b
attalions
7. FTB ZUR -- Frontovaya tekhnicheskaya ba
za Zenitnykh
upravlyayem,,rkh raket -- Front t
surface-to-air missiles
echnical base for
S. Puskovyye diviziony -- Launching battal
9. Otdeleniye FRTB -- Section of the FRTB
10. Otdeleniye FSRT - Section of the FSRT
ions
11. Otdeleniye FTB ZUR -- Section of the FTB
ZUR
12. frbr* -- frontovaya brigada -- Front bri
gade
13. Armeyskiy parkovyy divizion -- Army tran
sport battalion
14. fzenrap* -- frontovoy zenitnyy raketnyy
i artilleriyakiy polk
Front antiaircraft missile and a
rtillery regiment
15. arbr* -- armeyskaya brigade --\ Army brig
ade
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16. msd -- motostrelkovaya diviziya -- Motorized rifle division
ti
17. td -- tankovaya diviziya -- Tank division
18. Armiya -- army
Abbreviations which are marked above with an asterisk were
not expanded in the text of the article.
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Diagram 2*
Suggested Variation for Deployment and Movement of Rear Area
Missile Units of a Front and Army in an Offensive Operation
Conventional signs
1. FSR -- Frontovoy eklad raket -- Front missile warehouse
2. APD -- Armeyskiy parkovyy division -- Army transport battalion
3. Golovnoye otdeleniye APD -- Nose cone section of the APD
4. NR -- Sborochn. tsentr nazemiiykh raket -- Assembly center for
surface-to-surface missiles
5. ZR -- Sborochn. tsentr zenitnykh raket -- Assembly center for
surface-tc-sir missiles
6. let FTRB -- ?rontovaya tylovaya raketnaya baza -- Front rear
area missile base
7.
2nd FTRB
8.
PBF* -- Peremeshchennaya baza fronts
of the front
-- Transloading bas
e
9.
3/8* -- Stantsiya anabzheniya -- Railhead
10.
AK* Armeyskiy korpus -- Army corps
11.
AK rezerv -- !K-reserve
12.
Pd (rez.)* -- Pekhotnaya diviziya (rezerv) -- Infantry division,
reserve
13. brtd* -- bronetankovaya diviziya -- A1mored uivision
-13-
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14. Blizhayshaya zadacha -- Immediate mission
15. Dalneyshaya zadacha -- Followup mission
* Abbreviations which are followed by an asterisk were not
expanded in the text of the article.
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