TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TANK FORCES OF THE SOVIET ARMY, BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY A. ZHADOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402830001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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Trends in the Deveiop..ent of the Tank TrcDps
of the Soviet Army
Array General A. Zhadov
Historically, Soviet military theoretical thought has responded
actively and sharply to all problems of military science which have
arisen with the appearance of new means of armed combat, technical
equipment of armies, change in the organizaticnal structure of the
troops, and the methods cf employing them in battle and operations.
Recently the pages of our journals on military theory and special
? research works have carried different opinions on the outlook for the
further developm?nt of armor technology and on the organizational
forms of tank groupings (obedineniye) and large units (soyedineniye)
in the composition of the ground forces.
In this respect the article by Marshal of Armored Troops P.
Rotmistrov, "Paths for the Further Development of the Tank Troops of
the Soviet Army" (Special Collection of Articles of the Journal
"Voyennaya Mysl", First Issue, 1>61) merits attention. In this
article a series of recommendations are made concerning the outlook
fcr Soviet tank construction and the organization of the principal
large units of the ground forces which have a definite practical
interest.
At the same time it must be confessed that the formulation of
several questions and the way in which they are elaborated are not
convincing.
Marshal of Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov gives primary
attention in his article to the conditions which determine the
further development of tanks, the role of armor protection of tanks
in connection with the development of antitank weapons, the signifi-
cance of heavy tanks, and several questions dealing with the
organization of tank troops.
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t- ..~ _xa t_t.} : '? . _ . 1:. -!.: . .._~ch they
have been formulate-1 and v:-w, with--,-at clairing to
furr.'_sh a full exposition Of tr.e ;rob:_-r:s coanL -ted with the con-
temporar,, developne:it cf t.ankc anw to organization of tar troops.
At the prese _t tine t?:.c tai . c tree \ I n the development of ant-4-
teeh:lol^&~ have beer. above 8'_.l by the availabiitY of
missile-nuclear wtapc.n_ a::i t tt'? r at.:re of a f.itu,rc war as a highly
maneuverable cr(- with the brow..: ali:'_i tion of the rli-ans cf mass
destruction. Comrade Rotmistro-v speaks about this point correctly in
his article.
However, it is impossible to agree vith his statement that "the
tank troops, in close cooperation-with missile troops and aviation,
will be the deciding power in the ground forces". (p.26)
In our opinion, such a y,,int of view is mistaken.
? Ti. is well known that large .s its of coribires arms (tank and
motorized rifle divisions), other aruas of troops, and aviation will,
as a rule, successfully carry out their tasks only if the results
of missile-nuclear strikes are ably utilized. Specifically, iuriag
battles and engagements these strikes will be the main means of
destroying the enemy. There is no need to prove the truth of this
statement.
The role of tank troop: in a.ohieving the goals of a battle, an
operation, and of the var as a waDlr will be great, but, this role
should oe examined from the point of view of effectively utilizing
the results of missile-nuclear strikes, for these in the final analysis
constitute the principal force for the destruction the enemy.
At the beginning of his ,article Comrade Rotmistrov correctly
observes that the tank cocti::es three basic combat characteristics:
firepower, armor protection, and motility. However, in the subse-
quent account, instead of exanir_iag all of these questions from the
point of view of the nature of a future var, and determining the
further paths for perfecting the combat characteristics of tanks,
and above all of their armamert,the first and foremost promotes the
concept of heavy armor -lating of tanks.
is
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T ve t i ,-le and its existence
i s a comsat
is justified ,-,^f Fnt it possesses pover_`'wl am ent.
It is well known that during Wcrl War II (The Great Patriotic
a.ks was sgnificar. '
mr3 i _ ^ ari I egvy t
War) the n5-neaverabiiity of our tanks, b,~t u-til the midd'e
superior to the Jel- g T which had gti=r~-
IgA3 they y were inferior in arrezn'L'.. rnese tanks,
of 1 r ;+ rester grazirg range, caused
great
of 75-88 sm., higher r_.2zle ve~~.. a^-i
great damage to our tanks. However, wt,en our tanks and assa It guns
superiority
(SU) received guns of 85-152 mm. ,his was practically
eliminated.
In the postwar period, with respect to the perfection of tank
more attention to raising the accuracy of fire
armament, we have paid { and the feasibility of ,iPl ivering
in motion, armor-piercing capabi~t;;, However, the
fire at night even under conditions of poor visibility.
artillery systems wi-t. whithocurt tanks Rare nowTiaredWared of much War .
on
more powerful than thosE
It Is true that we have recently deve'iped artillery systems With
for rmor-pi-.rcing shells on the order of 1,000 m/sec
a velotr f~~ s and 1,600 m/sec for smoothbore guns. But
and d greater foorr rifled g~ ~ rovided for the armament of mediums
even these artillery systems, p
tanks, are only transitional.
An analysis of combat operations and some experience shows that
a modern tank should be armed with the most modern (perspektivrLoye)
missile weapons, which will enable effective dessttruction.atLadgreat
distance of any-enemy tanks, either moving contemporary conditions on the field of battle there willltalsodbee
many other 'argets, such as self-propelled artillery, p
armor, armored carriers, armored prime movers, and various targets
with light cover which must be annihilated from great distances
without expending heavy-caliber artillery shells CT missiles in the
armament, such have,
process. For the destruction of these targtanYs
e,
besides guns or missile: systems, other powerful since the machine
heavy-caliber machine guns or small-caliber guns,
guns now on tanks do not enable the destruction of varied and
numerous lightly armored and other targets at a distance of 1.5X100--HUM 50
2,000 m. and more.
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in deciding this question "there cannot be yet another
However,
extreme, which, as a matter of fact, Comrade Rotmistrov advances,
defending the necessity of retaining heavy tanks having thick armor.
Ever since tanks became a massive weapon on the field of battle,
they inevitably called for the creation of new means of combating
them. The competition of armor with projectiles has continued over
a perliod cf forty years. In this single com:.at between armc..r and
antitank fire, as of today the latter has retained the advantage.
Incidentally, this is conceded even in the works of the Academy
of Armored Troops which have appeared under the editorship of
Marshal of the Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov. Thus, in the
last
Collection of the Works of the Academy No. 177, vhich appeared year, it is candidly pointed out that the armor protection of tanks
lags behind the development of the means of its destruction, and in
connection with the appearance of antitank guided missiles, this 1"
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rotectcr. o.' tanks. Together with powerful
The artia..omil- p
armament, modern tanks should afford dependable biological pro-
tecticn of the crew from the contaminating elements of nuclear
weapons, and. mainly from penetratjr,g radiation. Solving this
problem only by increasing the thi^kness of the armor has not Frcven
feasible. The steel armor should guarantee the necessary strength
of the hull of the tank against the effects of the blast wave.
Dependable biological protection of the crew may be achieved by
using a special "lining", which will stor the stream of neutrons,
or by building special structures inside the tank into which the
crew must be put. The latter req.ire st:uctur changes in the tank,
the reduction of the crew to 2-3 men, and the automatization of all
processes of the conduct of fire, driving, and communications. The
necessary work in this direction is already being carried out.
The armor protection of tanks. In discussing the role of armor
protection of tanks, the author strongly attacks those who promote
the idea of increasing the maneuverability and transportability of
ground forces large units by decreasing the weight and overall
dimensions of tracked and other combat vehicles.
Nor do we propose increasing the maneuverability of ground
forces large units and units (chase) by sharply weakening the
armor protection of tanks and other combat vehicles.
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D?fending the concept of powerfully armored tanks, Comrade
Rotristrcv casts d3ubt upon the effectiveness of .co-ern antitank
guided missiles (upraviyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad - P RS).
Presenting the tactical-technical data of these missiles, which
our potential enemies have, he categorically asserts "that their
appearance in the family of weapons of mass destruction and tanks
does not for the present afford sufficient basis for concluding
that it is inexpedient to provide our basic types of tanks with
powerful armor protection.". (p. 30.)
It is well known that every weapon has its positive and negative
sides. For the present evep antitank guided missiles have their
ne ?^tive side. However, in appraising these means of combat, Comrad~
Rot'iistrov emphasizes primarily their deficiencies. But this does
not detract from the effective..Less of antitank missiles and the broad
prospects for their development. They are becoming more and more
universal and can be used not only for all types of ground _ombat
vehicles, including tanks, but even ag&inst helicopters. It is
nconc'eivable not to reckon with this possibility.
The development of the FTURS, of course, does not mean that
tanks have been repudiated. This merely presents us with the
problem of searching out new ways of defdnding tanks from antitank
weapons.
It is well known that the KV heavy tank was developed by us
before World War II for breaching fortified arear, defense zones,
and also for combat with enemy tanks. But in the course of the war
our troops usually bypassed fortified areas. Therefore, heavy tanks
were used as a means of close support of infantry in breaching strong
position defenses, and especially for combat with enemy tanks. As
a result of the large amount of metal consumption, the high cost, and
their insufficient maneuverability, a very limited number of these
...:L. t
tanks were prodaced during the war. Instead of heavy tanks for
with assault guns (shturmovoye orudiye) and tanks of the enemy, we
began to produce a large number of assault guns (SAU) on the chassis
of medium and heavy tanks.
Therefore, our self-propelled and ordinary artillery, and also
our heavy tanks, bore the main brunt of combat with enemy 'Tiger"
tanks and "Ferdinand" assault guns. By virtue of the great weight
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and slight mobility of these enemy, seh- cles on the field of battle,
and in spite of their heavy armor, the; were successfully shot up
even by our medium tanks armed with 8 mm. guns.
Under modern conditions the problem of breaching enemy defenses
will be solved mainly ty atomic weapons. And, in general, the type
of defense in place used in the last war Gill rarely occur.
It may now be asked, is there a need for heavy tanks to solve
the protler of breaching defenses? Of course not.
Knowing this, Marshal of Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov tries
to analyze heavy tanks as a means of qualitatively strengthening
medium tanks, reckoning that the latter are inferior in power and
armor protection to the medium tanks of our probable adversaries.
For this purpi.se, the American medium tank M-60, the basic tank of
the U. S. Army, is compared with our T-55 tank. But the parameters
used in this comparison do not give a correct conception of the combat
qualities of these vehicles. Nor is it easy to compare an American
tank with our T-10M, insofar as the latter is considered a means of
qualitative reinforcement of our T-55 tank.
In the case in point, comparisons are made of parameters such
as armor protection, unit of fire, engine horsepower, fuel capacity,
caliber of gun, and muzzle velocity. For example, the horsepower
of the T-55 engine is 580, while the M-6r' has a 750 hp engine. Bov-
ever, takin6 into consideration the relative weights of the two vehicles,
the unit power ratings are identical. The fuel capacity of the
American tank is twice as great as ours, but the rated cruising range
of both tanks is practically identical. As far as the armor protection
of our medium tank is ..oncerned, the armor on the turret is signifi-
cantly thicker than that of the M-60, while the armor protection of
the hulls is almost the same.
Despite the somewhat greater caliber and muzzle velocity of the
armor-piercing shell of the American tank, in comparison with the
armor-piercing shell of the gun on our medium tank it does not enjoy
any particular advantage with respect to effectiveness.
In comparing our T-10M heavy tank with the M-60, we see that the
armor protection of their hulls is the same, with the exception of the
armor on the turrets, where our tank has much thicker armor. In terms
of armament, the muzzle velocity of the armor-piercing shells of both
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tanks is ii nt ca._, and d fifer only i : their caliber. But the
presence in the unit of fire of the American tank of a subcaliter
projectile (arid possibly a shaped-charge shed too) renders it a
suffic'_.ently strong weapon for ~,ontytinw ci r heavy tank. The
cruising rare of the N.-6C is almos that cf our tank. 5ct
tanks have pcver plants of identical unit power rating. Consequently,
their nobility on the field of battle in moderately rugged terrain is
about equal.
As is evident, it is hardly proper to speak of specific advantages
of our 7-1-ON; heavy tank over the American nedLum and heavy tanks.
The necessity for having heavy tanks is also based on the fact
that the Americans have at their disposal different systems of
artillery of 150-21+0 mm. on tra...ked chassis, which is a means of
-reinforcing their medium tanks. Combat with this artillery is
supposed to be waged by heavy tanks with the thickest armor protection,
as though our medium tanks were not capable of carrying out this combat
over great distances. Such claims have hardly any basis.
? It seems to us that in order to achieve superiority over the enemy
we do not require the production of heavy tanks, which are three times
more expensive than the medium tanks and only slightly superior, but
rather a sharp improvement of the combat qualities of our medium tanks,
primarily the power of their armament.
As we pointed out above, th!.s problem in tack construction has
basically been solved successfully already. We now have a medium
tan which is not ir,frri or tn, and `-:ensmodern y
::rpasscs, the hesv~
tank in terms of armament, armor protection, and protection against
the contaminating elements of nuclear blasts. Moreover, it has a
higher rated cruising range ^.:.d greater maneuverability. New models
of such tanks will be armed with artillery systems with a muzzle
velocity for armor-piercing projectiles of 1,015 - 1,600 m/sec, which
will be capable of piercing the front armor on the American M-60
tank at a range of more than 1,000 m, and the side armor at a distance
of 3,000 m.
These tanks are not only not inferior to, but significantly
outclass, all known models of foreign tanks with respect to the
parameters of rated cruising range, maneuverability, armor protection,
and weight.
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Therefore, then' is nc-reason to fear that the rep-idiation of heavy tan s ray e i the loss of our present qualitative superiority
over enemy tanks.
But this certainly does not rear.. that we sho-diediately remove
our modern heavy tanks from the arsenal and haveess them netted dun. ng
case war should break out, they can be used
many combat tasks.
Having called for a scientific approach to the solution of the
as we have seen, Comrade 3otmistr3v does not
question of heavy tanks,
propose anything new in the field of tank construction to correspond
with the requirements of a possible war, but merely defends the old
trend in the eF-velopmnent of tanks, leaning solely on the experience
of t.t l 1-To++ TT
w ..
Considering exclusively tha mgbile nature of a future war, the
increased role of airborne troops, and the necessity of transferring
motorized rifle divisions by air over significant distances for ful-
filling combat missions which may arise in the course of an operation, we will require, besides a basic type of medium tank, a light tank
with pcverful conventional and missile armament.
Our present light ta_-k, the Fr-76, has for the present only one
quality - It is amphibious. But this tank has such weak armament and
refore olarge dimensions that it cannot be transported by air.
tank Thereh would our
u be
efforts should be directed toward designing light
powerfully armed and whose weight and dimensions would all..a it to
be transported by air. At the same `ime, such a tank should possess
ofebattleit croEs haghlyrs afloat,
tactical mobility whicY?would
and high speed on the field
necessary both for fulfilling reconnaissance tasks and for other
types of combat support.
ruction
Under modern conditions, a high and reliable degree of destruction
of the enemy with missile-nuclear weapons willoften mpermit
. an This
to be carried out without the infantry having to
circumstance means 'hat we must have a highly maneuverable armored
carrier with a powerful antitank missile weapon and a small-caliber
e--caliber machine gun. The design of such an armored
carrier should have the necessary antiatomic resistance and should
assure biological protection of the personnel inside. Its di-
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this, traitoirstation
mensions should afford the simultaneous
advisableaatothe
man rifle squad. In connection
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present time to have rife platoon consisting of two squads so
that its organizational structure will not be disrupted in movement
by armored carriers. It should be emphasized that even in peace-
tLrre such a squad would be\more spunky and lively.
Marshal of Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov very sharply
criticizes those comrades who propose new organizational forms of
the basic large units of the ground forces. In particular, those
comrades who propose thou creation of a `reified organization of the
basic large units of the ground forces are just about viewed as
dangerous people who have encroached on such concepts as "tank
troops", "tank formations" (gruppirovka), tank armies, and tank
divisions. It seems to us that it is incorrect to speak from such
positions about people who propose new forms of organization of our
troops. Life itself raises problems of perfecting the organization
of the troops.
Alluding to the experience of the Second World War; Comrade
Rotmistrov declares "that not rifle divisions, reinforced by tanks,
decided the suc;QSS of an operation, as French militarythheeoorists
thought, but rather tank divisions, tank corps,
? (p. 34).
It must be stated that Soviet military theorists and practitioners
have never propounded the role of tank and combined arms large units
during the past war in such a way.
Everyone knows that during the Second World War the success of
offensive and defensive operations by precise
ar't.illery anditanksn
of rifle large units and groupings, the massive utilization and
with tank corps and armies, along with
support of artillery and aviation, and also the constant support of
operations by special branches of troops and by the rear area.
Incidentally, neither the Germans nor the Americans, and the
French even less so, ever succeeded in achieving such harmonious
and
coordination. On the whole, German reliance on tank troops 50X1-HUM
aviation proved to be unsound.
Unfortunately Comrade Rotmistrov's discussions of the exper'-
ence gained in World War II neglect this side of the question.
Ascribing an exclusive role -to the tank troops, he introduces as
an example the meeting engagement at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943.
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In his opinion, during this engagement the strikes of the German
tank forces were countered only by our tank troops, and specifically
by the Fifth Guards Tank Army under the command of Comrade Rotmistrov.
The Fifth Guards Army, as he writes, not only did not follow the
order of the commander of the Voronezh Front on the joint delivery
of a counterthrust, but did not withstand the enemy onslaught, and
left the line being held.
It is impossible to agree with such an appraisal of the events.
For the delivery of a powerful counterthrust at Prokhorovka, General
Headquarters (Stavka) had reinforced the Voronezh Front significantly
at the expense of the strategic reserves. In this counterthrust
there participated powerful forces of all branches of the troops
composing this front, and by their joint efforts (and not merely by
the Fifth Guards Tank Army) halted and then threw back to their
original position the tank corps of the enemy. We render due credit
to the performance of the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which played an
important role in delivering the counterthrust. But other armies
of the front also played an important role in the execution of this
action. To ignore this fact will lead to excessive exaggeration of
the role of the tank troops and, in particular, of the Fifth Guards
Tank Army.
It is well known that the forces on the Voronezh Front were not
able to develop a counterthrust 6n 12 July because of the extremely
complicated situation on the southern face of the Kursk Arc. Ar..d in
this respect, the task posed to the troop commanders of the front was
not fulfilled. Among those who did not fulfill their mission of
12 Ju!y was the Fifth Guards Tank Army. Therefore, a one-sided
accusation of only the Fifth Guards Army for non-fulfillment of the
order sounds clearly unconvincing and unobjective.
As far as the performance cf the left flank corps of the Fifth
Guastds Army is concerned, which Comrade Rotmistrov writes about, it
suet be stated that on 12 July large units of this corps' repelled the
blows of superior enemy forces from the line being held. Only towards
evening did the enemy succeed, by employing its superiority in tanks,
in forcing back one division of the corps a fairly short distance.
In his article Comrade Rotmistrov time and again emphasized the
necessity for a scientific approach to the utilization of the experi-
ence gained in the last war. At the same time, in disucssing the
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events at Prokhoro vka, he definit iy diK.? ses from this criterion and
attempts to compare incomparable glanitites. It is well known that
the Fifth Guards Army in the engagement at Prokhcrovka did not have
tanks and that this substantially linitea their combat capability in
a battle with a strong tank formation of the enemy. Quite different
was the situation of the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which had (together
with the attached tank corps) around 870 tams and assault grans. In
evaluating the role of tank corps and armies in operations during the
last war, it is impossible to compare mechanically their combat
capability with the combat capabilities of rifle divisions, corps, and
combined arms armies. Every comparison which lays claim to being
scientific should be based on a deep analysis of these and other large
units and groupings of troops.
It is generally necessary to state that it is impossible to take
isolated examples from the experience of combat operations of the
troops during World War II and on the basis of these to draw con-
clusions about the organization as of the present and the possibilities
of basic large units and groupings of the ground forces.
It is quite clear that the most serious and dangerous error which
can be committed in using examples from military history for the
development of military theory is to attempt to transfer mechanically
the experience of the past to the present. In spite of his great
experience in military-theoretical research, it seems to us that
Comrade Rotmistrov has committed just such an error.
Modern trends in the development of the ground forces consist
of continuously equipping them with new technical means of combat.
In this respect the relative preponderance of tanks is growing
particularly fast. Under these conditions there can be no question
of diminishing the role of the tank troops. We can merely consider
their most purposeful organizational development.
At the present time we have two types of divisions - motorized
rifle and tank - and these afford the requisite maneuverability and
the introduction of vigorous and decisive actions into battles and
operations. Tank divisions possess great penetrating power which
increases their independence in conducting combat operations. They
are more mobile and maneuverable and have very high cross-country
ability off roads, better resistance against nuclear weapons, and
less cumbersome organization than motorized rifle divisions.
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However, the eX~'erierce of many exercises sh.1ns that the presence
of heavy tank regiments in these divisions reduces their operational
mane-averaci:ity and complicates the supply problem in the course of
battle. Therefore, army tank comaarlders have made what we telive to
be correct prop ::palm or_ repia.c. g these regiments with tank
regiments. Heavy tanks would then. be p~ d. most purposefully in
heavy tank divisions or in separate tank regiments.
v ions,
Our motorized rifle divisions have fewe!, tanks, a.tank antitank
but are superior to them in artillery, and P t1cuiarly i
weapons. Therefore a question arises regarding further perfecting
of the organizational forms of both divisions in order to achieve a
successful combination of the positive qualities in both.
Nor is it possible to agree with Comrade Rotmistrov concerning
the advisability cf creating a light motorized rifle division.
Judging by the type of missions which are assigned it, and also by
its technical equipment, such a division would not differ particularly
from the present airborne division.
And now several words about our armies. We do not know who has
raised the question of abolishing our present tank armies, as
Comrade Rotmistrov conjectures. At the same time, auanalysis
frthe
combat capabilities of modern armi~s and the experience
large command staff and army exercises show that a combined-arms army
with a composition of two tank and three or four motorized rifle
divisions with appropriate missile and special weapons (considering
that this army operates in the direction of the main efforts of a
front) is not inferior in the number of tanks to a tank army composed
stronger.
of four divisions, and in other factors will be significantly A tank army has great penetrating power and great mobility and
maneuverability, particularly in operations in areas with a limited
number of roads. But under modern conditions the development of
an attack at a high tempo creates an extremely difficult situation
with respect to the deployment and introduction into an engagemen
of a tank army. Often a tank army cannot break away from a combined
arms army, which also has tremendous mobility. Moreover, the enemy,
it out,
nus,
knowing of the presence of a tank army in a front, weaken the army
and having detected it viii attempt-to destroy or
principally by strikes of missile-nuclear weapons. This is why we
should seriously study the organization andhmeans oofocombat iempllooyy tints,
of modern armies in operations. Owing to
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402830001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402830001-9
we should study pr;foundly the organizational forms of modern armies.
It is incoMprehensible why Comrade Rotmistrov places the necessity
for the existence of the tank division, when no one doubts this, in
direct dependence on the existence of the tank army. These are two
different questions and should not be confused.
There is no doubt that in the last war tank armies and tank corps
basically played a fundamental male in the development of operations
at high tempos. Under modern conditions high tempos of development
of operations will depend mainly on the skillful utilization of nuclear
weapons and missile troops. In this respect, not only tank, but also
combii.ed-arms armies, must develop high rates of advance. In a
number of cases, the latter will have more, not less, tanks than tank
armies of four divisions.
In meeting engagements, principally nuclear weapons will play the
major role. The success of operations by tank and motorized rifle
large units will depend on the skillful utilization of these weapons.
Therefore, there is no need to speak of some special exception of
tank large units and groupings.
Life goes forward, and our armies are being equipped more and
more with the latest means of armed conflict, which requires
corresponding organizational development, and officers who work at theesoluttionwofsth sdcompliicatedd all
and serious problem.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP10-00105R000402830001-9