THE NATURE OF MODERN ARMED COMBAT AND THE ROLE AND PLACE IN IT OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES, BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY P. KUROCHKIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402850001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Nature of Modern Armed Combat
and the
Role and Place in It
of the
Various Branches of the Armed Forces
by
General of the Army P. Kurochkin
The concept of creating a special Collection of articles
of the Journal Military Thought (Voyennaya M,ysl), for the
purpose of presenting an opportunity to the leaders of the
Armed Forces to exchange Was freely and to discuss the most
important problems of modern (military) art is timely and,
unquestionably useful. This is confirmed, at:.leabty by the
worthry and keen analysis of questions, and the decisiveness,
with which the first authors of the Collection are coming
forward. A discussion that starts in this fashion is beaded
for sharp and fundamental disputes, promising a fruitful
denouement.
In the articles found in the first Collection, way new
positions on the nature of modern warfare are brought up,.as
veil as methods and forms of conducting armed combat, and
regard? the employment of the branches of the armed forces
in it. We shall dwell upon individual questions brought up
by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich in his article, and also do
the articles of Lieutenant-Generals I. Tolkonyuk and V. Baskakov
that touch upon the same questions in many ways .1
Is Soriet Military Art Undergoing a Crisis?
Comm to the articles of Generals Gastilovich, Tolkonyuk,
and Baskakov is their position that there is a discrepancy between.
our military art and the new conditions of nuclear warfare;
regarding this, they state that it is necessary to make a bold
reappraisal of our entire military doctrine, strategy, opera-
tional art, and tactics in particular. The authors of the
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article speak unequivocally of a crisis which they claim
Soviet military science and military art are undergoing.
"We", says General Gastilovich, "are undoubtedly trying
to squeeze missile-nuclear weapons into the framework of the
old, habitual position of our military doctrine, only moder-
nizing the latter slightly,t.and we forget that this doctrine
was formulated on the basis of the employment of means of
armed combat that are basically different from present-day
means and cannot be compared with them" (page 6). "The
matter does not go 'beyond the adaptation of the old forms and
methods to the new conditions, while it should be a matter
of completely new categories in military affairs. Apparently
the time has cow to sacrifice, boldly, many of the positions
an which the basic principles of operational art and tactics
are based" - in this way, General Tolkonyuk supports Gastilovich.
"This is a clear contradiction of the theory of operational
art and can be called a crisis without exaggeration", - thus
General Baskakov would summarize the matter.
These are not just words; the posing of the question is
sharp and, at first glance, basic. However, upon deeper exami-
nation one finds that the authors put things on the agenda that
have been raised already and even partially settled. In our
opinion, there is no basis !or speaking of a fundamental re-
asseesm&nt of Soviet military doctrine, :.or. of a"crisis in
military art. For our military doctrine has already been re-
examined with the introduction oL atomic weapons, and that
which is viewed as a "crisis" in military art is nothing more
than the natural expression of the contradictory and surging
development of military affairs.
Indeed, of which attempts to squeeze missile-nuclear
weapons into the framework of the old positions of our military
doctrine, of what "slight" modernization of this doctrine,
are they talking about, when the very opportunity for the state-
ment of Comrade Gastilovich arose only as a result of the
formulation of new doctrine, completely different from the old
one. It is paradoxical that Comrade Gastilovich bases his
judgements on the re-examination of doctrine on the poeitions
of the new doctrine formulated in addresses and speeches of
H. S. Ehrusbehev, and in the speeches and orders of the IJ6.S:t
Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovskiy,
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and other government and military leaders.
Soviet military-scientific thought did, for a certain
period of time, follow the path of partial
d
mo
the old doctrine, in order to lessen to some extent the impact
of nuclear weapons on the established forms and methods of armed
combat. But this evolved naturally from the objective conditions
prevailing at the time, determining the possibilities of
military-scientific thought. However, it should be stated that,
to a certain extent, everything that was done during this period'
helped to develop Soviet military science and military art, and
laid the groundwork for going on to the next higher step of their
development for the creation of a new military doctrine.
The establishment of a completely new doctrine based on the
employment of missile-nuclear weapons in armed combat was a
comparatively long and complicated process. The final formulation
of this doctrine could be put on the agenda only after, the creation
oftbe actual materiel prerequisites, which determined not only the
vtlopment of the axes of the use of nissile-nuclear weapons,
but also the assurance of qualitative advances in its d~ivelopsent,
in the form of achieving unlimited range and accuracy in the
destruction of targets, as well as the quantitative accumulation
of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.
The stockpiling of nuclear-missile weapons in adequate quanti-
ties affected the characteristics, methods, and forma of modern
armed combat profoundly. This was reflected in the new Soviet
military doctrine and "the novelty of modern warfare and its
dissimilarity.1rith past wars".
Led by the new military doctrine and corresponding
directives of the Party, the Government, and the higher military
command, Soviet military-scientific thought began to clarify
and define the laws and principles which have to be incorporated
into the basis of armed combat at its present stage, and to search
for new methods and forms of this combat, taking into consideration
the nature of the political goals of the opposition's coalitions
and the existing materiel base.
This process is nothing more than a re-examination of the
theoretical views that have accumulated regarding the conduct
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of a war and military actions of all tiimensions, training,
organization, and equipping of the armed forces. But this is
not a bald and pointless repudiation of all previously accumulated
experience of armed combat. In Lenin's philosophical notebooks
the dialectical nature of repudiation is brought out as follows:
"Hot a bald repudiation, not a random repudiation... is gbarae--
istic and essential in dialectics... but a repudiation, as a feature
of communication, as a feature of development, with the retention
of the positive...." (V. I. Lenin. Filosofskiye tetradi, 1947,
page 197).
To speak of a crisis of military art in these circumstances--
willingly or unwillingly, signifies the downgrading of the import-,
ance of a huge amount of work already curried out in this direction,
and closing one's eyes to the actual situation, in other words,
misunderstanding the crux of the process which is going on.
Without a doubt, the completion of a new qualitative advance,
and the elevation of Soviet military science to a new level 9f
development which answers modern requirements, involve certain
"growing pains". What is required is a reappraisal of the old
with a decisive rejection of everything that is of no value, and
the blazing of new trails. All this is connected with overcoming
? the occasionally stiff resistance of various kinds of conservatives,
who actually are inclined to substitute the renewal and moderni-
sation ,of old experiences, ab ve all the experience of World War II,
for a decisive turn to' new endeavors.
The problem before the leading representatives of Soviet
military-scientific thought is to clarify the new military
doctrine and mobilize all our forces to fulfill the programmed
directives of the Party, the Government, and the Minister of
Defense to assure a new advance in the development of military
science. This problem is within reason and, without a doubt,
gill be fulfilled in a very short time. During this struggle
unprincipled conservatism will be defeated, as will harmful
talk of many kinds about stagnation and crisis in Soviet
military science.
Againt a One-Sided Approach to the Solution of the Question
of the ature and Forms of Modern Armed Combat.
The basic thesis of the articles of Generals Gastilovich,
Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov is the affirmation of the paramount#
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role of nuclear-missile weapons in all aspects of the combat
activity of the armed forces. General Gastilovich writes:
"Under modern conditions, groupings (obedineniye) of missile
troops of the Supreme High Command (VGK) with their unlimited
range of action and the tremendous force of their firepower
have become the main and decisive branch of the armed forces...
The efforts of all other branches of the armed forces.-have
to be directed towards the most rapid and effective utilization
of strikes by the missile groupings of the VGK. Besides, the
basis for planning the actions of each branch of the forces
is also based on their use of their own missile-nuclear weapons,
and not on the number of divisions, ships, aircraft, etc."
(page 7). On page 11 he comes to the conclusion that in his
"concept, the main, leading role belongs to the operations
of the missile groupings of the VCK, but not for the purposes
that we usually visualize than now. This is not combat with
the nuclear means of the enemy, nor the weakening of his economic
potential, nor combat against the reserves, etc., but the complete
destruction of the enemy with nuclear weapons of megaton range
against a vast territory, eliminating entire countries from the
war."
1. Tolkonyuk states: "There is good reason to believe that
often the will of the enemy to resist can be suppressed only by
strikes of nuclear-missile weapons" (page 21). We find this in
General Baskakov's article: "Nuclear weapons should be considered
and employed as independent and decisive means for destroying the
enemy" (page 32). It should be noted that the statements of the
first two authors refer largely to the general strategic aspect,
and the third--to the field of operational art. But this does
not change the substance of the formulation of the question.
If we follow the concepts developed by the authors of the
articles mentioned, and doubtless agree that nuclear-missile
weapons obould have the decisive role in assuring the possibility
'dt conquering in a short time", in a way, on the whole, or to
achieve success in any operation, everything else seems relatively
simple. It is only necessary to supply the missile troops with
adequate mans, providexthe necessary nuclear missile means to the
ground forces and other branches of the armed forces, review certain
aspects of our military strategy and operational art, and thus
are created tbe^cosditions for successful resolution of the course
and outcome of all armed combat.
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Guided by this premise, General Gastilovich offers a fairly
simple plan of action (a vatiation of the concept for the European
theater). In this plan a countering nuclear-missile strike is
made against two or three NATO countries with the purpose of "total
destruction of the enemy" and the elimination of these countries
from the war. In order to utilize the results of this strike,
the ground forces are put into operation; thirty to forty various
ground forces division quickly "finish off" the remaining forces
of the enemy in the border area, and at a rapid rate they conquer
the zones that have to various degrees been destroyed and
dontaminated by radiation produced by the massive strike of the
strategic missiles, and occupy the country.
Besides, "if after the conquering of the territory of the
countries that were subjected to the first massive nuclear strike,
the enemy does not capitulate, then a similar all-destroying
blov may be repeated against the next country." The substance of
the variations of actions proposed by the author amounts on the
one hand, to the complete destruction of the anemy and with-
drawal of,a country from the war, and on the other band, to the
conduct of operations of the ground forces in order to overrun
the destroyed and contaminated zones, the suppression of any
remaining resistance, and the occupation of the country.
In our opinion, the concept presented has many contradictory
features. In the first place, the concepts "total destruction of
the enemy" and "eliminate a country from the var" mean the end of
all resistance, and capitulation of the countries. But once this
is so, what major operations by significant elements of the ground
forces can we talk about under these conditions? Why throw in
thirty to forty divisions with the purpose "mainly of conquering
rapidly the zones that, ifivarying degrees, have been destroyed
and contaminated by radiation"? One does not need much of a flair
for fantasy to imagine what these troops will encounter in a
country that has been subjected to a nuclear-missile strike
"for complete annihilation". Panic, chaos, masses of dead and
mutilated persons, and the ruins of the destroyed cities will
exert a deleterious influence on the troops. The same conditions
will oblige the troops tr undertake the incredibly complicated
tasks of establishing order, carrying out rescue - rehabilitation
(spasatelno - vosstanoviteinaya) work, organizing relocation,
rendering medical"assistnince, and providing rations for large
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masses of people. At the same time, the troops themselves will
be exposed to irradiation and contagion and many complicated
problems affecting them can arise, which will not be so simple
to solve. The questions of billeting, supply, medical and
sanitation services, and others will become extremely complicated,
and sometimes they will simply be insoluble.
Having taken the concept proposed by the authors as a basis,
we cannot avoid falling into an insoluble argument concerning the
place they assign to nuclear-missile weapons, and the role of the
ground forces and the other branches of the armed forces. This
conception leads to the repudiation of any significant place for
the, ground forces, and in fact abolishes all branches of the
armed forces except missiles; it abolishes strategy, operational
art and tactics, and joint actions by the branches of the armed
forces and the arms of troops composing them which have been
studied and established.
What are the reasons why the conception developed try Generals
Gastilovich and Tolkonyuk is groundless?
First of all, it is impossible to combine the incompatible.
One cannot speak of the possibility of "total destruction of the
enemy", of the possibility-"of crushing his capability and will to
/-resist", of the elimination of entire countries from a war by
nuclear-missile weapons alone, on the one hand, and the necessity
and possibility of conducting on the territory of these countries
large-scale and vigorous operations of the ground forces on the
other band.
Second, and most important, the solution of the problem must
be sought only through a thorough evaluation of the situation,
which is possible only by taking the political factors into
accou t along with the materiel factors. The content of the new
Soviet military doctrine orients our military thought towards
exactly this kind of approach to the solution of questions.
In fact, our new military doctrine is based on the paramount
role of nuclear-missile troops and provides for the carrying out
of decisive nuclear-missile operations. Our nuclear-missile
troops are capable of erasing from the face of the earth any
country or countries attacking us or 9tber Socialist states.
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However, this basic premise stems only from the possibility of
such a destructive war: being unleashed by a frantic clique of
imperialist lunatics who are in power. In this case, we have
to be ready to deliver the most destructive blows against the
instigators of the war.
Herein we cannot escape the fact that the bastion of those
who inspire this policy of playing with fire is beyond the
confines of the European continent; so, in the event of the
unleashing of a war, the main efforts of our Armed Forces,
first and foremost of the chief component - the missile troops -
will be directed primarily against the decisive element
of the enemy coalition. Here too, however, the question can
only lie in the plan to defeat the enemy quickly and completely
and eliminate his capability to continue active military operations.
This is the basic and the most cvuiplicated task facing our
missile troops. It has to be solved in the shortest possible
time, with maximum use of the -ffectiveness of nuclear-missile
weapons.
The success of the outcome of this operation (operations)
of the missile troops will depend on a series of circumstances,
above all., on the selection of the proper moment to inflict a
strike on the most vitally important enemy centers, primarily
on his centers of nuclear-missile weapon production:and inter-
continental-missile launching bases. The result of the operation
must be the ruination of the military and governmental machines
of the aggressor. A blow of exactly this type can also cause
other partners of the enemy coalition to give very careful thought
to the advisability of entering the war. But an indispensable
condition of `complete victory must be the readiness of the
missile troops to carry out one or more operations against some
of the countries of Europe and other continents. We have in mind
the countries that will undertake to follow their senior partner
into the war. The intensity of the reaction must fluctuate,
depending on the nature of the actions of the armed forces of
one country or another.
In the determination of the degree of reaction it is
necessary to consider that nuclear-missile weapons must be
used in a decisive and purposeful way, but only within the limits
of expediency. The forsaking of this requirement can lead to a
situation wherein a war unleashed by aggressors will involve such
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large human and material losses on both sides that the consequences
may be catastrophic for mankind.
In one case it may be necessary to conduct operations for
the complete destruction of the means of retaliation, and in
another--to destroy the strategic nuclear weapons bases. It is
clear that in a strategic situation of this type it may be
possible to find a place for the utilization of the other branches
of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and of the forces of
other countries of the Socialist camp.
We are also inclined to think that, in some cases and in
now directions, the primary role will belong to ground forces
equipped with nuclear-missile weapons. This can occur in the
mfolding of agents vhen, after execution of the countering
e]+ssr-missile operating against the aria bulwark of the
imperialist bloc, or simultaneously wit: it, a strike is
delivered=At a gromp of objectives in the countries which
Illmd the we of their territory by their senior partner for the
of the first blow. This strike will not have the
purpose of "complete annihilation of the enemy" in the sense
that General Gastilavich uses it. The strike is calculated to
disorganise the governmental control and destroy the main strategic
end opentiooal nuclear weapons bases, as well as the main
formations of enemy troops. In order to achieve the results
desired of the operation, the ground forces will carry out joint
aperatlcbs with the air forces and the navy for the complete
destruction of the armed forces of the enemy *nd the achievement
of the ultinate goals of the war. The ground forces, with their
sabilaty and tremendous firepower, are aiming in decisive
directions - the seizure of key positions of a country,
possession of which will decide the outcome of the campaign
In a given. theater.
The directions of troop actions are stipulated in the overall
scheme of a campaign. In addition, an effort should be made to
avoid troop operations in areas where the terrain is highly con-
tOtinated by radioactivity arising as a result of our own strategic
-oaclear-dsiile strikes. The troops should use their own naclear-
missile weapon Capabilities to support their operations. The
expenditure of these means should be strictly limited and aimed
at the destruction of on" formations capable of disrupting or
slaving dam the succeseftl development of attack in decisive
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When necessary for the assurance of a correlation of forces
favorable to our troops, the forces and means of VGK missile large
units (soyedineniye) maycarry out strikes upon receipt of requests
for fire from a front and an army.
Thus, we consider that the dominant role in an operational-
tactical plan will quite often belong to the ground forces, by
dint of their being equipped with nuc~ear-missile weapons, and
above all, to the highly mobile motorized rifle and tank large
units.
In regard to the size of the Armed Forces, we consider that
a large part of the adult population, capable of active parti-
cipation, will be mobilized and used as needed to guard and
defend the entire territory of the country. Among the special
organizations, the rescue-rehabilitation detachments will play
an important role.
Obviously, self-defense and guard units and large units, as
? well as rescue -rehabilitatioL detachments, have to be created
in accordance with territorial criteria and be prepared in
advance to fulfill their tasks.
However, the size of the regular ground forces will undoubtedly
be large; in other words, without a massive army it is impossible
to have rapid and definitive victory in a future war. It is
particularly necessary to consider the colossal losses that the
ground forces will suffer, which will. require sizeable reserves
trained for operations.
In connection with the great probability that-under certain
conditions of the situation it will be necessary for the troops to
.ulfill the tasks of occupation, we consider it necessary to give
special emphasis to the importance and responsibility of this
function of the troops and to the advisability of carrying out at
least the most elementary training of the troops in this sphere.
In the past there have been serious difficulties in this regard.
Now, under the conditions of the wide use of nuclear weapons, it is
necessary to surmount the serious complexities of the situation.
The command of field troops is confronted with the necessity not
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ir47, ...=Y; r
o-. F na ser ~f '.1? o .tee in a sta'.?_ of c'. 2t:. :;fi
ccrtanir.3`:E_. a?P3c an to o. _ E., of ~e'_.Y~P 'Nli:.
ne:dicaL a'. an 1 fc ..C 1 . e ea ure. ra lea. c :e y
dra~ _ __ _oo.segaences .
t-v crs.l A~:rects of Ope-aticnai Art
A ?-o. -eSsrler t of 3 nunhher q'aestio=:0 Gi Otet ziti0_'.E _ art
by the authors of the special Collection is ia;.cete.l, timely, and
necessary. Ln the vanguard of these stands the solution of such
questions as the place, role, and conduct of nuclear-miFsile
operations in modern warfare, questions about the scale of modern
front and army operations, regarding new principles of planning
offensive operations, regarding the principle of concentrating the
main efforts to destroy the enemy's nuclear means and main troop
formations, regarding the creation of rescue-rehabilitation
troops, and the working out of operations within military
? districts. A profound elaboration of these questions, on the
basis of mass employment of nuclear weapons, will be a resounding
contribution to the development of Soviet military science.
In this connection, it must be noted that the formulation
of some of the questions, especially in the articles of Generals
Gastilovich and Baskakov, in our opinion, are faulty. This applies
particularly to the question of operational offense and operational
defense, which we shall dwell upon.
The substance of the statements of Generals Gastilovich
and BaakaScov uri this question ano'unts to the following: nuclear
weapons eliminate the boundaries between operational offense and
operational defense (page 37); in modern conditions offensive and
defensive operations will be distinguished from one another mainly
by the number of nuclear weapons allotted them (pages 12 and 15),
in these operations the methods of troop operations will be identical
(pages 15 and 37); defense, in the former meaning of the term, can
only occur on a tactical scale (pages 14 and 37); the creation of
defensive zones is impractical--any large unit executing defense
in place will be destroyed by nuclear strikes by the enemy or wil._
mereir be bypassed by him (page 15); on an operational scale,
?
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defe::ss ca _~.~t
of one or another type of combat ope a
have plenty of forces and means (including nuclear weapons), but
(raEe i;,?
a. -Er t =? We feel tnat 'ae cannot,
.:a:-: acre. 'a._... pr at
t
times s clearly rlCEi'.,i~:`ra-i~ta/Marxist _ialecticS in general, and d the
tiCr.s c` armed c~:}at in part t ...:La_ .
new co r
~_..
Oe~ rre^.ge
actual i` y , '-.a`= employment c1 :.uclea.~ wear
t'r.e nature of mode-: cfi nsive an efensive operatior:= radically.
Large-scale ^ ale G1aP_P.]Vc i:. x, ate,gressi'.'e-:eS an... decisiver.ess are now
P-sc
inherent to both an offensive and a defensive operation . ;?nie
modern conditions, an offensive operation will have more elements
of defense and the defensive operation will have more elements of
an offense. However, this has not made, and will not make,a
defensive operation an offensive operation.
It does not follow that we turn our main attention to the
similarity of offense and defense if we want to understand the
substance of this contradictory phenomenon, but to their differences,
to the study of the specific peculiarities of the opposing aspects,
to the exposition and minor
aspects this contradiction,
approach either to operational art or to tactics.
Obviously, we should not speak here of erasing the dividing
line between operational offense and operational defense, but of
the new nature of these conflicting aspects of armed combat,
caused by the mass employment of nuclear weapons, and of the
need to develop qualitatively new methods of conducting modern
offensive and defensive operations. Talk of "erasing the dividing
-line" only leads us away from the solution of urgtnt problems of
Modern offense and defense.
It is likewise impossible to agree with the authors' declara-
tion that modern offensive and defensive operations will be
distinguished from one another primarily by the number of nuclear
weapons allotted them.
The forces and means of the sides, whatever their quantity and
quality, cannot in themselves determine the specific peculiarities
tion It is one thing to
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quite another to defend oneself and, on the other hand, to start
offensive actions when these forces and means are considerably
less. An example of this is the battle at Kursk, where we had
plenty of forces and means but were on the defensive, while on
other fronts, where the forces and means were significantly less,
we were taking the offensive.
The offense, as a rule, usually has comparatively greater
forces and means than the defense. But who would say that in
modern conditions it is impossible to attack and wire with equal
or even smaller forces?! Nuclear weapons indeed create more
favorable conditions for the triumph of this concept of military
art. But if this is so, the quantity of forces and means in
general, and of nuclear weapons in particular, cannot serve as
a criterion of the type of operation, because it cannot determine
the characteristic and specific traits of one or another type of
combat operation.
In our opinion, it is not the quantity of nuclear weapons
which is the factor determining the identifying featcres of
operations, but the targets and the nature of the combat
operations, and the methods and ways in which they are carried
out, insofar as they alone allow us to see the specific
peculiarities of attack and defense, their substance. The
authors ignored these factors and took as a foundation the
incidental and transient, which led them to incorrect conclusions.
General Gastilovich, alluding to the fact that part of the
forces of an army or front may take the offensive during a
defensive operation, declares that defensive operations of a
front and an army will resemble an offensive operation in their
operational methods. General Baskakov adheres to more or less
the same opinion, asserting that "the difference between the
conduct of an offense and a defense.... remains in the tactics
alone" (page 37).
It is impossible to agree with such assertions. We always
had elements of offense in our defense, but we never considered
the operational methods of troops on offense and defense as a
sign of equality. This must not :,e done now, as this will lead
unavoidably to the glossing over of the specific traits of
offense and defense, and to a one-sided and superficial scrutiny
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of the complex phenomena of armed combat, with all the 50X1-HUM
consequences that arise therefrom.
Defense has a clearly defined goal--to disrupt or stop
(told up) the enemy offensive, inflict sizeable losses on him,
and create favorable conditions for gcing over to the offensive.
And if it does not succeed in withstanding the offensive, it does
not achieve this goal. The question arises as to why we have a
defense which is incapable of stalling an enemy offensive,
inflicting losses upon him, and effecting favorable conditions
for our troops ~-o go over to the offensive?!
Consequently, the defense has to be stable if we wish to
achieve the goals; nuclear weapons cannot alter this requirement.
It is a different matter that the stability of the defense under
modern conditions need not be bound rigidly to holding whatever
has become of the main line of resistance and the forward area.
P.zt this is a question of the development of new methods for
conducting a defensive battle and operation.
The fact that the enemy, having nuclear weapons, is able to
destroy the defense, break through the defensive line, or bypass
the troops that occupy it, does not mean that defensive lines or
areas are not needed, or that the defense cannot be stable under
modern conditions. To speak of defense without defensive lines or
areas is like talking about an offensive without an attack, without
forward progress. If we approach this from the standpoinrc of the
possibilities of nuclear weapons, it will be even easier for the
offense to destroy or bypass enemy troops if they are in assembly
areas.
Obviously, we should speak of another thing: what defense
should be like under modern. conditions, what the characteristics
of a defensive line or area should be; how, where, and in what
time periods defensive installations must be created, how to
ensure the stability of the defense, how to safeguard personnel
and combat equipment in the defense, and what methods of conducting
a defensive battle and operation should be adopted in order to
attain the goals of the defense.
In his article, "Mountain Warfare Then and Now," F. Engels,
pointing out the validity of views on the impregnability of the
so-called Swiss mountain redoubt, wrote: "Does this mean that
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the defense of a rour:ta_-.z)-- ccu,trv is c_.._ tei\ .useless? Of
course not. It neans or,-.y that the deft:.: a t not be merely
passive, but should draw on its power an'i n ibiiit;r, aril operate
offensively whenever an oppcrtLn:ty arise'' "P. Eno-Is Selected
Military Works, Voyerizdat, 1957. page G;.
In other words, in conditions when the offense becomes
stronger than the defense, the problems of the latter must be
solved, not by abolishing the defense, bit by developing new,
more advanced methods of conducting it. 'nuclear armament gives
us every opportunity for doing this. In the hands of the defense
it increases the stability of the defense immeasurably. Of course
this will be a real defense, not one backed by some sort of thin
defensive line of troops under cover, as General Baskakov
recommends. It stands to reason that neither this line nor the
defensive zone is capable of containing an enemy that is equipped
with powerful nuclear weapons. Modern defensive battles and
engagements will take place in large areas, along the front and
in depth, and often in separate directions. For this reason,
operational defense must be deep, and capable of resisting the
powerful, dispersed strikes of the offense. This can be
achieved by creating a system of defensive areas echeloned in
depth, and .1so by dispersed disposition of the reserves along
the front and in depth.
The basis of modern defense will apparently consist of
holding defensive areas firmly in conjunction with obstacles,
operating offensively wherever the slightest opportunity presents
itself, and anticipating the enemy in the delivery of strikes.
It is not difficult to imagine the gravity of the situation of the
offense if the defense is able to stop it. Even a small number
of nuclear strikes, against fairly dense, openly deployed
combat arrays of the offense, can inflict such losses that the
offense will not be able to win even by large-scale nuclear
strikes against the defense. This is an important advantage of
modern defense, the basis of which has to be a combination of
holding firmly defensive areas which are separate, not clearly
defined, but interrelated from the standpoint of firepower by
decisive counterattacks from different directions by the reserves
and the defending troops, carried out right after the delivery of
nuclear strikes.
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Proceeding from this, we consider it possicle io indicate the
fundamental directions in which, in our opinion, problems Of
modern defense must be solved.
1. Increase the firepower of the defense, the basis of which
will be nuclear weapons and the firepower of antitank means; these
means must permit the defense to win the battle of firepower against
the offense and force the latter to give up the attack or delay it.
The solution of this problem must follow the path of extensive
shifts of trajectories of nuclear-missile weapons, as well as the
path of creating in the defense, areas of resistance by fire, based
on the utilization of systems of long-range control of antitank
and rifle fire. The creation of areas of resistance by fire has
very great significance in increasing the stability of the defense,
as these areas are capable of resisting the nuclear strikes of
the enemy much better than the conventional defensive areas can,
and they can operate practically without limitations in an area
that has been contaminated by radioactive materials.
2. Increasing the mobile capabilities of the defense and
its aggressiveness, in order to stop an enemy drive by building up
troops quickly in the threatened areas, and to destroy him by nuclear
strikes, and bold counterattacks and counterblows. The solution
of this problem must take the path of creating powerful mobile
reserves dispersed along the front and in depth, and of developing
new methods of conducting a defensive battle and operation, as well
as the path of widespread use of portable obstacles, especially
proximity-controlled minefields. A well thought-out system of
quickly Installed obstacles is capable of inducing confusion in
the offense and inhibiting its progress at a point which is
favorable for delivering nuclear strikes and executing counter-
attacks.
3. Increase the capabilities of the defense for protection
against the nuclear blows of the offense by 'means of a system of
improving and developing new, high-efficiency engineer apparatus,
of creating compact, portable designs of defensive installations
that can be assembled and dismantled, of providing apparatus with
hinges for entrenchment, of developing explosive devices for making
individual foxholes and of carrying out other measures, directed
at the fulfillment of tasks of engineer support of anti-atomic
protection (PAZ) for several hours of units and large units, as well
as the improvement of individual means of anti-chemical protection
and of the protective qualities of combat equipment, directed
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toward the assure.'?ce of the `f-'as i} 1 i c ?a .
operations in an area, contaminate ,Y of c:,...., Virg defess:ve
'b.,, radioec :ire materials .
The solution of these probleys will be a gaalitative advance
in the organization and conduct of a defensive battle and operation,
a nev stage in the creative developc:er.t of modern defense.
We have touched upon only a few questions cf strategy and
operational art, the correct interpretation of which, in our
opinion, has profoundly important meaning for the solution of all
other questions of military art. Not claiming that our judgements
are infallible, ve hope that a wide exchange of opinions in the
pages of the special Collection regarding these questions will
help to find their best solutions.
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